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Notes on orthography 
Regarding the Greek and Akkadian orthography of names of persons, places, and 
institutions, I have found it difficult to maintain consistency. I do not follow all the 
standards of English usage for Greek names. Therefore, e.g. Aristoteles will be found 
as Aristotle, whereas Kleisthenes is written with K, not C. For Akkadian names, e.g. 
Assur is given without sh, whereas some personal names not common in general 
works on Mesopotamian history are transcribed with sh or š. Sumerian words are 
transcribed in capital letters, Akkadian and Greek words are transcribed in italics. 
 
Greek vowel quantity is only used in the transcriptions given in parentheses ( ), 
whereas Akkadian vowel quantity is indicated throughout for the sake of 
disambiguation. These choices have been made purely for the sake of readability, in 
order to assure a certain level of accuracy without an unnecessary cumbersome 
orthography. 
 
The transcriptions of Near Eastern political terms follow as close as possible the 
established usage in the editions consulted. These will be specified throughout the 
relevant chapters and are summarised in Sources (chapter 8). 
 
Regarding the capitalisation of titles of books and articles, I have capitalised the titles 
of books in the main body of the text, but not in the notes or the bibliography. Articles 
appear without capitalisation. 
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1. Popular power in ancient Near Eastern and 
archaic Greek polities – A reappraisal of Western 
and Eastern political cultures 
1.1 Introduction 
Popular participation in politics is held to be the gift of the ancient Greeks to Western 
political culture and is often contrasted with the despotic traditions of the Near East. 
Was the political culture of ancient Greek city-states, poleis, with their high degree of 
popular participation, unique in the ancient world? Can the political practices of 
archaic Greek city-states be compared to political practices from Near Eastern 
polities? In this dissertation, I will discuss popular participation in politics of Greek 
poleis in the archaic period and investigate in which respects Greek political culture 
was different from and similar to practices of government in and the political 
structures of Near Eastern polities.1 Popular participation in the organisation and 
running of polities will be studied from archaic Greek literature and ancient Near 
Eastern letters and administrative texts in order to determine to what degree a 
perceived fundamental difference between Eastern and Western political cultures is 
justified.  
                                              
1 By Near Eastern polities, I mean the towns, city-states, network states, and pastoralist communities of Mesopotamia and 
Syria. Because it would make an already expansive project too large, I will not discuss ancient Egypt in this investigation. 
For the same reason, I have chosen not to discuss evidence from the Hittite empire or the city-states Ebla or Emar, although 
these polities provide interesting examples of collective institutions in Near Eastern imperial and local politics (for the 
Hittite assembly (pankuš) and elders, cf. Klengel, “Die Rolle der “Ältesten”,” 1965, 230-237; Bin-Nun, The Tawananna, 
1975, 110-129; Beckman, “The Hittite assembly,” 1982, 435-437; Hoffman, Der Erlaß Telipinus, 1984, 77-79; Marazzi, 
“Überlegungen zur Bedeutung von pankuš,” 1984, 99; Macqueen, The Hittites, 1999 [1986], 76-77; Gurney, The Hittites, 
2002 [1990], 61-67; Hoffner, “Legal and social institutions,” 1995, 561; Hoffner, The Laws of the Hittites, 1997, 79-80; 
Bryce, The kingdom of the Hittites, 1999 [1998], 94-95; Bryce, Life and society in the Hittite world, 2004 [2002], 43-44; 
Starke, “Die Verfassung des Hethitischen Reiches,” 2002, 317. For the Ebla assembly (tātamum ) and elders, cf. Gelb, 
“Witnesses of the indemnity,” 1984, 264; Durand, “L’assemblée en Syrie à l’époque pré-amorite,” 1989, 27-29; Klengel, 
“”Älteste” in den Texten aus Ebla und Mari,” 1989, 61; Archi, “Imar au IIIème millénaire,” 1990, 29; Milano, “Ebla: a 
third millennium city-state in ancient Syria,” 1995, 1222-1223. For the Emar assembly (tātamum) and elders, cf. Leemans, 
“Aperçu sur les texts juridiques d’Emar,” 1988, 217-218; Durand, “La cite-état d’Imār à l’époque des rois de Mari,” 1990, 
48; Fleming, “A limited kingship,” 1992, 65-71; Fleming, “Emar rituals,” 1992, 61; Fleming, The installation of Baal’s 
high priestess, 1992, 86; Michel, Correspondance des marchands de Kanish, 2001, 58; Adamthwaite, Late Hittite Emar, 
2001, 188-189, van Exel, “Social change at Emar,” 2010, 69-71). 
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In this chapter, I will first state my approach to the investigation of popular power in 
ancient polities. Then, I will discuss the view that there were fundamental differences 
between Eastern and Western political cultures in detail.  Problems related to the 
study of popular power will be examined, including the definition of collective organs 
of decision-making and different ways of defining the citizen community. 
 
1.2 Popular power and the problem of Athenian democracy 
The view that there were fundamental differences between the political cultures of 
East and West is typified by the conflict between Athens and the Persian Empire in 
the 5th century BCE: Athens was ruled by the people, whereas the Persian Empire was 
ruled by an autocratic king.2 Thus, the beginning of the Western political tradition is 
democracy, whereas the Eastern political tradition is rooted in autocracy. Athens was 
not only at war with the Persians; by extension, Athens represents a beginning of a 
Western democratic political culture, as opposed to an Eastern culture of autocratic 
rule, originating in the Mesopotamian city-states.  
 
Athens is regarded among scholars as the first, even the only, real democracy in 
antiquity.3 It is difficult to escape the influence of the Athenian example of popular 
power. Therefore, in the following, I will discuss Athenian democracy and its 
usefulness as an example for comparison with other polities of the ancient world 
                                              
2 Cf. Aesch. Pers. 72-80; ibid. 241-244 
3 Cf. The debate of Raaflaub and Ober in Raaflaub & Morris (eds.), Democracy 2500?, 1998, 31-103, discussed below 
(1.2.1). 
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regarding popular power. I will make clear what I understand with popular power and 
in which respects this departs from the example of Athenian democracy. 
 
1.2.1 The Athenian example: rule by the poor 
In earlier scholarship, democracy was regarded almost as a miracle, the result of the 
work of ingenious Athenians who refused to be the slaves of others.4 A more 
prevalent view today is that Athenian democracy was no miracle, but the outcome of 
long-term developments in Greek political culture in the archaic period, based on the 
traditions of local Greek communities of the so-called Dark Age.5 Still, among 
distinguished and influential scholars today, democracy tends to be considered unique 
to Athens, more specifically after the reforms of Kleisthenes in 508/7 BCE. Josiah 
Ober argues that democracy began in 508/7 with the revolt of the Athenian demos 
against oligarchic coup-makers supported by Sparta: here, the people for the first time 
acted on its own and claimed power, and thereafter, democracy was established as 
both a political structure and culture.6 Kurt A. Raaflaub is more restrictive and 
reserves the term democracy for Athens after the reforms of Ephialtes in 462/1: until 
then, the thetes, the Athenian poor, had been excluded from office, and only with their 
full inclusion in the political system after Ephialtes could there be a true democracy.7  
 
The views that democracy was established with Kleisthenes or Ephialtes suppose that 
fundamental changes took place in Athens with the empowerment of the demos or the 
thetes, i.e. the urban poor. This assessment follows the statement of Aristotle that 
                                              
4 Cf. Meier, Die Entstehung des Politischen bei den Griechen, 1980 
5 Raaflaub, “Power in the hands of the people,” 1998, 52; Morris, Archaeology as cultural history, 2000 
6 Ober, The Athenian revolution, 1996; Ober, “Revolution matters,” 1998, 74 
7 Raaflaub, “Power in the hands of the people,” 1998, 48-50 
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democracy is the rule of the poor.8 It reflects a classical tradition of Athens as a 
particular case of mob rule. As I hope to show in the present investigation, however, 
popular power can be studied as a more general phenomenon than the Athenian 
example. The dominance of the Athenian poor is remarkable for the ancient world, 
indeed, for any polity, but that does not mean that polities that fell short of Athenian 
standards had no popular power. 
 
If by popular power we understand the rule of the people, or more precisely, the 
majority of the people, restricting discussion of popular power to the democracy of 5th 
century Athens seems to me overly cautious. For all the radicalism of the Athenian 
constitution, there were other poleis besides Athens that were considered democracies 
in antiquity. Aristotle and his pupils studied and discussed several city-states and their 
constitutions, some of which were called democratic, from the fact that power was 
held by the demos, the people or citizens: these include Thebes, Megara and Rhodes, 
where democracy was overthrown by oligarchs.9 Thukydides applies the term 
democracy to polities other than Athens, including Corcyra in his discussion of the 
civil war there.10 There are several ancient sources that mention Syracuse as a 
democracy in the 5th century, although the status of the early 5th century democracy is 
uncertain.11 Aristotle states that the people of Syracuse changed the constitution from 
a “polity” to a democracy after victory in the war with Athens [in 412].12 Also, Argos 
                                              
8 Arist. Pol. 1278b6ff; ibid. 1279b26ff 
9 Arist. Pol. 1302b21ff 
10 Thuc. 3.70-81 
11 Robinson, Democracy beyond Athens, 2011, 67-72 
12 Arist. Pol. 1304a27-28 
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was a democracy in the 5th century, perhaps already in the 6th century.13 Thukydides 
mentions the assembly at Argos as the decisive institution in the polis [around 421].14 
 
The existence of several Greek democracies has not been lost on modern scholars. 
Eric W. Robinson points out how several Greek poleis were ruled by the demos, the 
people. He argues that these poleis therefore were democracies.15 Josiah Ober rejects 
this argument, insisting that Athens was unique even in a Greek context.16 However, 
it can be asked how useful such an exclusive use of the term democracy is. In the 
following, a few ancient literary examples of popular power will be discussed that 
show that the people made important decisions in polities other than classical Athens. 
 
1.2.2 Ancient democracy: rule by the people 
Ancient writers refer to popular power without emphasising that power was in the 
hands of the poor: in Aeschylus’ Suppliants, king Pelasgos of Argos receives the 
Danaids as suppliants not to himself, but to the city, polis, and therefore, it is the 
people, laos, that has to accept the suppliants. The king cannot promise any help to 
the Danaids before he has sought the advice of all the citizens (astoīs de pāsi).17 The 
decision to let the Danaids stay as suppliants is taken after a public discussion by a 
                                              
13 Robinson, Democracy beyond Athens, 2011, 7-9 
14 Thuc. 5.27-28 
15 Robinson, The first democracies, 1997 
16 Ober, “Revolution matters,” 1998, 81 n.11 
17 Aesch. Supp. 365-369 
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show of hands.18 The Danaids praise the advice of the people (to damion) that rules 
the city (to ptolin kratynei).19  
 
It may be argued that Aeschylus wrote of a mythical Argos and is not a source to the 
structure of a real polis. However, mythical Argos is a good example of a polis where 
the people have the power. Although it is an example from fiction, it shows that to 
Aeschylus, popular power was conceivable in other forms than the Athenian 
constitution after 462/1. It shows that a restriction of the discussion of popular power 
to post-Ephialtic Athens is too narrow, even for Greece.  
 
Aeschylus may not use the actual term democracy, but he gets pretty close by saying 
that the people rule. The people, to demion, are referred to without distinction as the 
totality of citizens, not as a faction of the poor. Thus, although we cannot conclude 
from Aeschylus that mythical Argos was a democracy similar to classical Athens, it 
had a high degree of popular power: the king insists that the people have the final say. 
It is of interest that the king emphasises that the totality of citizens holds authority in 
the polis: the majority makes the final decisions and these are reached in open 
discussions in assembly, where it is important to convince the citizens, even for the 
king.  
 
There is a further example of popular power in tragedy: Euripides in his Suppliants 
presents an Athens ruled by the people and king Theseus. Theseus receives the 
suppliant king Adrastos and Argive mothers who have lost their sons in battle over 
Thebes. He needs the consent of the whole city (polei pasēi), before he can promise 
                                              
18 Aesch. Supp. 604-624 
19 Aesch. Supp. 698-703 
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any help to the Argives, but adds that he will get their consent anyway. He explains 
the Argives that he needs the citizens’ consent because he has made them master of 
the city by giving all the same rights of voting (isopsegos polis). Therefore, he must 
present the Argives’ request before the assembly of citizens (plēthos astōn).20 In an 
argument with a Theban herald, Theseus emphasises that Athens is not run by a 
tyrant, but that the people rule (dēmos annassei), and the poor are on par with the rich. 
This is taken as good news by the Theban, who thinks that the masses will be easily 
led by his own persuasive speech. Theseus protests, however, and claims that 
everyone benefits when anyone can participate with deeds or advice.21 
 
Thus, equal to the example from Aeschylus’ Argos, the people of Theseus’ Athens are 
treated as sovereign in the polis, as a unity of rich and poor, and not as the rabble 
dominating their betters. Of course, this is just one side of the story; contrariwise the 
Theban herald in the tragedy gloats at the prospect of swaying the senseless mob to 
his will. Theseus emphasises the virtues of pluralism, whereas the Theban herald 
claims that the mob is easily led and has nothing to contribute in running the polis. In 
fact, Theseus seems to contradict himself in his praise of the demos, by saying that 
although he needs their consent, they will agree with him anyway. The above 
passages from Euripides should make us beware of the ideological slant to claims of 
democracy as mob rule or rule by the poor. Whether popular power is regarded as 
mob rule is a question of perspective and should not be treated as a factual description 
of ancient democracy.  
 
There is further ancient evidence that popular power was not universally regarded as 
the dominance of the poor. Forms of public participation in politics that do not 
                                              
20 Eur. Supp. 346-358 
21 Eur. Supp. 403-455 
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emphasise the poverty of the demos can be found in Thukydides: he has Perikles say 
that the Athenian constitution is called a democracy because the many and not the few 
run the city.22 Perikles also says that in democratic Athens, nobody is preferred for 
offices because of their economic class, but anyone can participate, even if they are 
poor or of low birth.23 According to Perikles, the Athenian ideal is political 
participation by all citizens.24  
 
It can be argued that the passage from Thukydides, where Perikles emphasises that 
poor people can participate in Athenian politics, supports the view of democracy as 
rule by the poor. However, Aristotle emphasises that the poor dominate a democratic 
polis as the decisive element in the constitution.25 On the contrary, Thukydides in the 
above example has Perikles point to the inclusion of the poor in the polity, not their 
opposition to or dominance over the well-off. From Thukydides, then, democracy can 
be defined as rule by the many. The participation of all citizens is considered a virtue. 
This indicates that the contrast between Athenian democracy and other forms of 
popular power is a misconception. By extension, the supposedly fundamental contrast 
between Greek poleis and other ancient polities should be critically investigated. A 
polity does not need to be ruled by the poor in order to have a degree of popular 
power. 
 
Popular power is not and should not be called a democracy without further 
qualifications. However, it may be asked whether Ober (1996; 1998) or Raaflaub’s 
(1998) restrictive uses of the term democracy is very useful (cf. 1.2.1), if by 
                                              
22 Thuc. 2.37 
23 Thuc. 2.37 
24 Thuc. 2.40 
25 Arist. Pol. 1278b6ff; ibid. 1279b26ff 
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democracy we mean “rule of the people” and not specifically the constitution of 
Athens. The evidence from Aeschylus, Euripides and Thukydides should provoke a 
discussion of popular power that is not restricted to the specific practices of Athens 
after 462/1. Popular power can be defined as collective rule by the citizens based in 
open discussions in assemblies. However, whether all or a select group of citizens are 
included in these discussions will determine the degree of popular power in the polity. 
This will be discussed in the next section. 
 
1.2.3 A sliding scale of popular participation 
Athens can be viewed as an extreme development at one end of a sliding scale of 
popular participation in politics, from political dominance of the masses, i.e. 
democracy, to no popular participation at all, i.e. autocracy. In the present 
investigation, classical Athens will serve as a case of democracy, because it was ruled 
through collective action by the citizens, including the poor, and all state business was 
discussed in the public assembly. Athens after 462/1 specifically allowed all property 
classes to participate in politics. I will avoid the use of the term democracy unless in a 
further qualified sense for polities with popular participation, and rather use the terms 
popular power and popular participation in politics. This does not mean that I do not 
see popular power in politics and Athenian democracy as related phenomena.  
 
On a sliding scale of popular participation, the two most important indicators of 
popular power will be collective action by the citizens and open debates in public 
assemblies. The polity must have councils and assemblies that are open to the citizens 
as part of its political and administrative structure. It is of importance for the 
assessment whether a council has a probouleutic function, in preparing cases to be 
discussed in the assembly, or a council instead reaches decisions that are subsequently 
announced to the assembly. It will also be considered whether a council consisted of 
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members that represented the community or was the preserve of an exclusive élite. 
The degrees of public participation in discussing and reaching decisions are important 
criteria for where to place a polity on the sliding scale. Decision-making by majority 
vote in the assembly is indicative of popular power, provided there is general access 
to this decision-making body. Thus, the degree of inclusion in the group of active 
citizens is an important factor that determines whether the people were in power or 
not. 
 
The assembly as a place of debate and public announcements is indicative of popular 
power. An important indicator for popular power is the election of officials and 
representatives by the citizens, by majority vote.26 Further, for a polity to be truly 
democratic, all citizens, including the poor, must be included among the citizens with 
full rights of participation, and anyone must be formally eligible to office. These 
criteria were not met by any ancient polity.27 However, it should be possible to 
discern between more and less inclusive polities, and thus, to describe them as having 
a greater or lesser degree of popular power. 
 
A polity does not need to be ruled exclusively by a popular assembly in order to have 
a level of popular participation in politics. A popular assembly or similarly inclusive 
public and collective decision-making body may well be part of a monarchical 
                                              
26 This should not be confused with modern elections of representatives: the identification of interests and political parties 
as known from modern representative democracies is quite distinct from the direct and personal political participation in 
ancient city-states. Although interest groups can be identified, the existence of political parties with lists of representatives 
is not known from the ancient world. As Moses Finley points out, there is a distinct lack of an electoral regime in Athens 
and Rome (Finley, Politics in the ancient world, 1983, 70-74). I have seen no convincing evidence to the contrary. The 
representatives of political parties in modern electoral democracies are quite different from the directly elected officials and 
representatives of polities of the ancient world. 
27 The thetes were formally excluded from taking office in Athens after the reforms of Solon. They were admitted to the 
assembly and the jury courts (cf. Arist. Pol. 1274a11ff; Ath. Pol. 7.3). However, with the introduction of payment for jury 
members, poor citizens of Athens probably enjoyed a greater degree of participation in politics than in most Greek poleis. 
Whether the thetes were eventually admitted to take office in spite of Solon’s laws will not be discussed here. 
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system, as was the case with the example from mythical Argos above (1.2.2). In the 
analyses of archaic Greek and Near Eastern polities throughout this investigation, I 
will focus on the above indicators for popular power to assess the degree of popular 
participation in politics. Polities will not be treated as closed systems or formal 
constitutions; rather, I will analyse polities as networks of strategies for power, for 
rulers, élites, and the masses.28 
 
In the following, I will define four strategies for power that together create a network 
of strategies that will explain the political behaviour of agents in ancient polities. 
Strategies for power pursued by the masses will be manifested in collective action and 
the making of decisions in public assemblies. I term this a broad corporate strategy: 
the masses are inclusive and their strategy for power involves a minimum of formal 
divisions between participants. A large proportion of the citizens are part of the 
political system. A narrow corporate strategy, on the other hand, involves a restricted 
collective with formal criteria for inclusion, typically wealth. Not all citizens are 
allowed to take part in the political system, only the ones who are rich enough. It is 
important that the formal criteria for participation are at least in theory attainable for 
anyone, e.g. a poor citizen can become wealthy and thus be entitled to full 
participation in politics. 
 
In contrast, strategies for power pursued by the élite will focus on the exclusion of 
most citizens from participation in decision-making bodies and decisions will 
preferably be reached in closed councils. Exclusion is based on criteria such as birth 
from an illustrious family, making this élite closed to outsiders. This will be termed a 
broad élite strategy. On the other hand, rulers will have a rather different élite strategy 
                                              
28 The focus on strategies for power in the present investigation draws on Blanton et al., “A dual-processual theory for the 
evolution of Mesoamerican civilization,” 1996, and Fleming, Democracy’s ancient ancestors, 2004. As will be seen (1.2.3; 
1.4.1; 2.8), I attempt to expand on and differentiate more closely between their concepts of corporate and élite strategies.  
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from that of broad élites, in the sense that they will try to consolidate the citizen body 
and place an insuperable boundary between their own power and that of any other 
citizen, what I will term a narrow élite strategy for power: the élite may regard each 
other as equals and share power in a broad élite strategy for power, but a ruler must 
emphasise his elevation above even the most restricted council and be a narrow élite.  
 
In the present investigation, I will look for all four strategies and how they are 
pursued simultaneously by the different socioeconomic groups of the polity. The 
different strategies will manifest themselves in choices of modes of action made by 
agents as well as in established institutions for decision-making. The relative 
predominance of different strategies for power will determine where a given polity is 
placed on the sliding scale from democracy to autocracy. I will return to this approach 
to ancient politics in more detail below (1.4.2; 2.8). Suffice it to say here that an 
approach based on analyses of strategies for power will make it possible to compare 
polities East and West, regardless of their formal constitutions or political culture. 
This comparative approach to ancient polities will breach the traditional divide 
between a Western and an Eastern political culture. Before discussing the prospects of 
comparative analyses of ancient polities, however, I will examine further the roots of 
the idea of fundamental differences between East and West and the status of this view 
today. 
 
1.3 East and West – separate worlds 
As already stated (1.1), it is the purpose of this investigation to reappraise the view 
that there is a specifically Western tradition of politics with a high degree of popular 
power. In the following, I will investigate the reasons for this widespread opinion on 
world history.  
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The idea that there are fundamental differences between Eastern and Western political 
cultures is ancient. It was formulated by Aeschylus in his tragedy the Persians written 
around 470 BCE, where the Persians, who are slaves to their king, are contrasted to 
the Athenians who are the slaves of none.29 It is stated in the tragedy, however, that 
after the defeat of the Persians at Salamis, the people of Asia are free again.30 Thus, 
the picture is twofold: Persia is ruled oppressively by an almighty king and all his 
subjects are slaves, not free citizens. However, when the Persian imperial forces are 
defeated by the Greeks, the people of Asia are free. It does not seem to be implied that 
there are any natural reasons for the oppressed state of the subjects of the Persian 
king. As will be argued below, this view appears to have changed in the course of the 
following generations of Greek writers. 
 
A somewhat ambiguous view of Persians and politics is found in Herodotos. 
Herodotos warns his Greek readers that they will probably not believe the story he is 
about to tell, about a political debate in Persia over the future constitution of the 
realm. He insists, however, that the debate he is about to relate really took place: the 
seven Persians that led the revolt against the pretender Smerdis held council to 
discuss how the country should be run now that they had dethroned the ruler. The first 
Persian to speak, Otanes, warns against a new monarchy, and argues that power 
should be in the hands of the people. Monarchy leads to uninhibited authority and will 
corrupt the ruler, just like what had happened to the recently deposed king. Otanes 
lauds rule by the people instead, what he calls equal rule (isonomia). It is 
characterised by offices being drawn by lot, officers being held responsible, and that 
all decisions are taken after common deliberation. A second Persian, Megabyxos, 
                                              
29 Aesch. Pers. 72-80; ibid. 241-244  
30 Aesch. Pers. 584-590 
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proposes oligarchy. He warns against the dangers of mob rule, and prefers the rule of 
the best men among the Persians. The third of the rebels to propose a new constitution 
for the Persians is Dareios. He argues that monarchy is to be preferred before all other 
constitutions, because oligarchy leads to strife among the rulers, whereas democracy 
leads to corruption of the citizens and power to demagogues or tyrants. Monarchy is 
the best form of constitution, then, given that the perfect ruler is king.31 
 
The Persian constitutional debate is a far cry from the image of an autocratic political 
culture in the East. As seen in Aeschylus above, the Persian ruler was regarded as 
absolute, all his subjects being slaves. This explains why Herodotos warns his readers 
that they will not believe the discussion took place. Nevertheless, Herodotos insists 
the tale is true, and could obviously well imagine that Persians discussed the 
possibility of people’s power. On the other hand, the debate ends in praise of 
monarchy, showing the Persian preference for autocracy. The point is, however, that 
Herodotos could imagine that alternatives to kingship were discussed at all among 
Persians.  
 
In the Politics of Aristotle, a radically different view of Near Eastern politics can be 
found: Aristotle claims that there is a peculiar kind of kingship found among non-
Greeks, where the king has powers approximating that of a tyrant. According to 
Aristotle, the reason is that non-Greeks are more slavish than Greeks, and Asiatics are 
more slavish than Europeans, so that they tolerate master-like rule without 
                                              
31 Hdt. 3.80-84 
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resentment.32 Further on in the Politics, Aristotle attributes the lack of spirit among 
Asiatics to the hot climate of their home region.33  
 
It is quite telling that, although Aristotle explains the Asiatic lack of spirit to a hot 
climate, he claims that all Greeks are less slavish than non-Greeks, and thus will not 
tolerate oppressive rulers. Thus, the negative assessment of Asiatics is indicative of 
cultural chauvinism: there is a difference in political ability between Greeks and non-
Greeks, a difference that can be observed in the master-like rule of Near Eastern 
kings. What is the reason for this negative assessment of politics in polities to the East 
of Greece? It may of course be based on observation of powerful kings of the East. 
However, the generality of the statement should provoke suspicion. How did Aristotle 
come to the conclusion that Asiatics are more slavish than Europeans? 
 
The idea that Near Eastern people were only capable of obedience and unable to 
practice politics can be found in the ancient medical philosophy of a connection 
between climate and spirit. In this line of thought, the habitats of the Greeks were 
contrasted to colder or warmer climates, and only the Greek middle climate could 
produce the temperance necessary for political debate.34 It is difficult to decide why 
Greeks started to speculate that Near Easterners were slavish because of hot climate. 
In my opinion, it would be logical that the symptom, slavishness, was defined first, 
and the reason, hot climate, was induced thereafter. The view of a great difference 
between Greek and Near Eastern people’s potential for political reasoning that is 
found in Greek philosophy can be explained as a result of both real experiences of 
oppressive royal behaviour and philosophical speculation on character and climate. 
                                              
32 Arist. Pol. 1285a16-1285a29 
33 Arist. Pol. 1327b18ff 
34 Cf. Arist. Pol. 1327b18ff 
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However, the basic contention of Aristotle is that Eastern people are slavish and 
unable to rule themselves, by nature, and not by climate or historical accident. This 
view needs an historical explanation. Why is Aristotle convinced that Asiatics are 
natural slaves, whereas Herodotos tells a story about Persians discussing politics? 
 
The explanation for the cultural chauvinism of Aristotle must be sought in the 
development of relations between Persians and Greeks: in the 5th century, Greeks 
defeated a Persian invasion twice, as recorded in the Histories of Herodotos, a work 
permeated with curiosity and admiration of cultures of the Near East, Egypt in 
particular. Herodotos presents Persians as discussing alternatives to kingship, but as 
he makes clear, even when popular rule were deemed feasible, monarchy would be 
preferred among the Persians. Aristotle, in contrast, proposes that Near Eastern people 
were natural slaves and hence unable or unwilling to rule themselves. If the opinions 
of Greek intellectuals are any yardstick to attitudes in their own time, it can be argued 
that the view of Near Eastern cultures has become more negative with Aristotle than 
what can be seen in Herodotos. By the 4th century, Aristotle could claim that political 
thinking was a reserve of the Greeks; all Near Eastern people were slaves to kings. 
This is in contrast to 5th century opinion, when Aeschylus saw Persian rule as the 
reason behind Asian slavery: oppressive kings treated their subjects like slaves, but 
their enslavement did not result from the nature of the subjects themselves. With 
regard to chronology, it is no doubt of importance that during the Persian wars, the 
Greeks could witness how polities conquered by the Persians were allowed to keep 
their own constitutions as long as they obeyed the Great King, making Eastern slavery 
a consequence of Realpolitik and not of nature. The change towards an unmitigated 
unfavourable comparison between Greeks and their neighbours to the East can be 
attributed to further imperial pressure against the Greek poleis in the Persian Empire 
in the 5th and 4th centuries, resulting in Greek animosity. It can also come from 
experiences made by Greeks at the Persian court, where the royal person was 
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surrounded by much ceremony.35 The point is that the Greek opinion of Asiatic 
slavishness developed over time; for all the authority of Aristotle, it was not a simply 
observed fact about the character of Asiatic people. 
 
The negative assessment of the political potential of ancient Near Eastern polities has 
survived in modern scholarship. Herodotos’ story about the Persian discussion of 
alternatives to monarchy has been found hard to believe not only among readers in 
Herodotos’ own day, but also among the supposed modern heirs of the Hellenes in 
Western civilization. The Near East is viewed as the cradle of civilisation, implying 
that Near Eastern civilisation and its polities were more primitive than the later 
Western political culture; where the Near East had Oriental despotism, the West 
developed corporations of citizens.  
 
The ancient topos of a correlation between climate and political disposition was 
developed by G.W.F. Hegel into his concept of a separate Geist for every Volk.36  
According to this concept, geography and topography are crucial to the development 
of cultures.37 Hegel claims that “die Weltgeschichte geht von Osten nach Westen, den 
Europa ist schlecthin das Ende der Weltgeschichte, Asien der Anfang”. In Hegel’s 
interpretation, like the physical sun rises in the East, so does history begin there and 
as the sun sets in the West, so does history have its end point there: “dafür steigt aber 
hier die innere Sonne des Selbtbewußtseins auf, die eine höhere Glanz verbreitet”. 
With world history, Hegel means the history of freedom, and in this history, the 
                                              
35 The relations between Greece and Persia in antiquity were complex and have recently been the object of extensive 
research (e.g. Miller, Athens and Persia in the fifth century B.C., 1997; Cohen (ed.), Not the classical ideal, 2000). I will 
not go into further discussion of this matter, however. Suffice it to say that Persia came to exemplify Eastern despotism in 
Greece. 
36 Hegel, Philosophie der Geschichte, 1970 [1832-45], 64-65 
37 Hegel, Philosophie der Geschichte, 1970 [1832-45], 116-120 
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Orient has contributed little: “der Orient wußte und weiß nur, daß Einer frei ist, die 
griechische und römische Welt daß Einige frei seien, die germanische Welt weiß, daß 
Alle frei sind. Die erste Form, die wir daher in der Weltgeschichte sehen, ist der 
Despotismus, die zweite ist die Demokratie und Aristokratie, und die dritte ist die 
Monarchie”.38  
 
In Hegel’s scheme, the East is the land of morning and mankind’s childhood, where 
only one is free and rules all others, viz. the despotic king, whereas the West is where 
freedom for all is realised, through an inner sunrise of the awareness of the self. Of 
course, the analogy of history and the sun only works from the perspective of western 
Europe. Seen from e.g. America, the sun rises in Europe and sets over the Pacific. 
Also, Hegel’s argument that everyone is free only in a constitutional monarchy is 
plainly absurd. However, this kind of schematic thinking on the history of the world’s 
cultures as a prelude to the West has proved tenacious. It invites comparison between 
East and West, but only from a Western perspective, as a comparison between 
developed and undeveloped, or primitive and mature cultures. 
 
In fact, the danger of cultural bias also applies in the inclusion of the Near East in a 
comparative investigation of popular power in ancient polities. As Marc Van De 
Mieroop points out, “the predilection to see the Ancient Near East primarily as a 
precursor of the Judeo-Christian and Graeco-Roman legacy, tacitly presents the 
European cultural development as the superior one in the world and measures the 
relevance of other traditions only in relationship to it”.39 Comparison of the Near East 
to Greece does run the risk of being an artificial attachment of a Near Eastern prelude 
to a Greek main narrative, or a search for Near Eastern origins of later Greek 
                                              
38 Hegel, Philosophie der Geschichte, 1970 [1832-45], 134 
39 Van De Mieroop, “On writing a history of the ancient Near East,” 1997, 288 
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institutions, with the implication that Near Eastern history is interesting only so far as 
it adds to the depth of European history. This must be avoided and a comparative 
study should therefore be from criteria that can be applied to polities both East and 
West, as on the sliding scale proposed above (1.2.3). Comparing Eastern and Western 
polities otherwise runs the risk of being reduced to measuring Eastern polities to a 
Western standard. 
 
Popular power tends to be discussed from a Greek perspective. The view of 
democratic and republican political traditions as unique to the Western world is 
common in modern scholarship.40 These Western political traditions of popular power 
and democratic debate are traced back to the Greeks and Romans, understood as 
ancestors of Western culture. Scholars claim that the Greeks and Romans are special 
cases in the ancient world: according to Moses Finley, politics only exists in states 
where “binding [original emphasis] decisions are reached by discussion and argument 
and ultimately by voting”.41 Finley states that “politics in our sense rank among the 
rarer of human activities in the pre-modern world. In effect, they were a Greek 
invention, more correctly perhaps, the separate inventions of the Greeks and of the 
Etruscans and/or Romans”.42 The divide between East and West is fundamental: 
Finley makes the point that “it is impossible to translate the word “freedom”, 
eleutheria in Greek, libertas in Latin, or “free man” into any ancient Near Eastern 
language, including Hebrew, or into any Far Eastern language either, for that 
matter”.43 Finley’s views are not singular. In a recent work on world history, it is 
                                              
40 Finley, Politics in the ancient world, 1983, 53; Finley, Democracy ancient and modern, 1985, 13-14; Robinson, The first 
democracies, 1997, 24-25; Raaflaub, “Power in the hands of the people,” 1998, 31; Fantalkin, “Identity in the making,” 
2006, 204 
41 Finley, Politics in the ancient world, 1983, 52 
42 Finley, Politics in the ancient world, 1983, 53 
43 Finley, The ancient economy, 1985, 28 
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claimed that “Greek and Roman republican patterns of state and society were 
eccentric and lasted only a few centuries”.44  
 
The central place of Greek and Roman political practices and concepts in what is 
perceived as a Western political tradition has the effect that Near Eastern polities tend 
to be discussed in the context of an unfavourable comparison to a Greek and Roman 
standard. This is obvious in Finley’s claim that there are no direct equivalents for 
classical terms like eleutheria or libertas in the Near East. The comparison involves 
no definition of what these terms implied in Greek or Roman contexts; eleutheria or 
libertas are invoked in order to argue that their absence from Near Eastern languages 
makes it evident that there was no freedom for the citizens of Near Eastern polities. 
To assume a natural and self-evident meaning for the terms eleutheria or libertas and 
then look for direct equivalents to these terms in Near Eastern languages is a fruitless 
approach to comparative studies.45 
 
The claims of a specifically Western political tradition and a Greek invention of 
politics have been challenged several times, by Assyriologists and political scientists. 
One of the first and no-doubt the most influential of these heretics was the 
Assyriologist Thorkild Jacobsen, who in 1943 published the article “Primitive 
democracy in ancient Mesopotamia”.46 Jacobsen argues that the earliest 
Mesopotamian city-states were ruled by the people and that rulers were controlled by 
public assemblies. Only later, with the rise of secular kingship and warrior rulers, did 
                                              
44 McNeill & McNeill, The human web, 2003, 76 
45 There is also the actual existence of terms for freedom in Near Eastern languages: AMA.GI4 in Sumerian and andurārum 
in Akkadian are terms for freedom in the sense of  release from debt and slavery (cf. Edzard, “”Soziale Reformen” im 
Zweistromland,” 1974, 145-156) 
46 Jacobsen, “Primitive democracy in ancient Mesopotamia,” 1970 [1943], 157-170 
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autocracy become the norm.47 The idea was supported by Geoffrey Evans, who 
published an article in 1958 elaborating on some of the points made by Jacobsen.48 
Jacobsen and Evans both pointed out the similarities between Mesopotamian 
assemblies and Athenian and Roman collective governance.49 Evans concluded that 
although there were assemblies in some polities of ancient Mesopotamia, the political 
importance of these assemblies quickly receded before the advent of autocracy.50 As 
will be seen, the concept of a “primitive democracy” in Mesopotamia has been quite 
influential with scholars, especially political scientists. It has also met much resistance 
from scholars of ancient history. 
 
Political scientists have shown a great interest in tracing democracy to pre-Greek and 
Eastern traditions. Raul S. Manglapus claims in his book Will of the people (1987) 
that democracy originated in Mesopotamia. He imagines an original egalitarian 
society that continued to influence state societies and produce democratic 
institutions.51  However, it must be pointed out that his argument of an “egalitarian 
instinct of the original society” has little explanatory power in investigating popular 
participation in politics. It is too general a concept to say anything about how polities 
were organised in Mesopotamia. In Manglapus’ analysis, the supposed original 
democracy of Mesopotamia is treated like an independent entity with a life of its own, 
spreading to other parts of the world like a proselytising religion or contagious 
disease. 
 
                                              
47 Jacobsen, “Primitive democracy in ancient Mesopotamia,” 1970 [1943], 158-159 
48 Evans, “Ancient Mesopotamian assemblies,” 1958, 1-11 
49 Jacobsen, “Primitive democracy in ancient Mesopotamia,” 1970 [1943], 157-170; Evans, “Ancient Mesopotamian 
assemblies,” 1958, 1-11 
50 Evans, “Ancient Mesopotamian assemblies,” 1958, 11 
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A different approach to a non-Western history of democracy is that of Yves Schemeil, 
who claims that Egyptian and Mesopotamian polities were more democratic than the 
Greek poleis.52 He argues that Egyptian and Mesopotamian polities had multiple 
councils that were “certainly as democratic as the Greek polis” because the people 
could speak their mind there.53 In his analysis, Mesopotamia had a tradition of 
polyarchy, where corporate groups representing the city population in councils and 
assemblies were in opposition to the rulers.54  He concludes that the “Egyptians and 
Mesopotamians already knew that the essence of “democracy” was not only 
citizenship but the necessity to mobilize citizens; it was not only popular participation 
but the need to organize it”.55 Unfortunately, Schemeil cites no ancient evidence for 
these claims. His argument that the mobilisation and organisation of citizens is 
somehow the “essence of “democracy”” reveals a confusion of the very concept of 
democracy, making the analysis useless for a comparison between Eastern and 
Western political traditions: I would argue that democratic debate is the sine qua non 
for popular participation in politics, not how people are organised into corporate 
groups. Without public access to information and the free expression of opinion, 
popular power cannot be effective. Making people agree is not the same as 
empowering the people. In my view, an essential aspect of popular power is when the 
opinions of different socio-economic groups are taken into consideration, in collective 
decision-making bodies.  
 
It could be argued that popular power exists where the people are allowed 
participation in political decision-making. However, popular power is effectively 
                                                                                                                                           
51 Manglapus, Will of the people, 1987, 19-25 
52 Schemeil, “Democracy before democracy,” 2000, 99-120 
53 Schemeil, “Democracy before democracy,” 2000, 104-105 
54 Schemeil, “Democracy before democracy,” 2000, 112 
55 Schemeil, “Democracy before democracy,” 2000, 116 
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curtailed if commoners have no influence on the agenda or no opportunity to make 
informed choices about which policies to support or decline. In order to wield power, 
the people have to be active agents in structuring their social and political 
environment, including making up their own opinions and forming their own agendas. 
The vote is not enough for popular power to exist and neither is access to the 
assembly. The people have to initiate their own decisions in order for popular power 
to exist. Agency and structuration will be discussed in chapter 2 (2.5; 2.7) 
 
The idea of “primitive democracy in Mesopotamia” is still influential with political 
scientists. Recently, Benjamin Isakhan has argued strongly that there are Middle 
Eastern “roots of collective governance” that can prove useful to contemporary 
political reformers in the region.56 From as diverse sources as the Koran to Sumerian 
myths, he points out that democracy cannot be claimed as a Greek invention.57 
Unfortunately, in his analysis, there is no differentiation between the interests of 
limited groups such as “the elders” and the wider community of citizens within the 
polities discussed. The resulting “primitive democracy” is too primitive for 
comparative analyses with Greek traditions of government, a main problem of which 
is exactly the opposition between limited councils and larger assemblies, i.e. rule by 
antechamber or rule by the people.  
 
In his book The Life and Death of Democracy (2009) John Keane claims to show “for 
the first time” that democracy was not a Greek invention.58 In Keane’s analysis, “the 
lamp of assembly-based democracy was first lit in the “East”, in lands that 
                                              
56 Isakhan, “Engaging “primitive democracy”: mideast roots of collective governance,” 2007, 97-117 
57 Isakhan, “Engaging “primitive democracy”: mideast roots of collective governance,” 2007, 102 
58 Keane, The life and death of democracy, 2009, x 
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geographically correspond to contemporary Syria, Iraq and Iran”.59 He also argues 
that democracy in Greece did not originate in Athens, by pointing to early inscriptions 
mentioning the demos, or people.60 These early Greek democracies Keane sets in 
relation to democratic traditions of the Phoenicians that were somehow transferred to 
Greece through trade. The Phoenicians had in turn learned their political practices 
from the Mesopotamians. As evidence for these Eastern democratic traditions, he 
cites sources as diverse as an Egyptian story set in Phoenicia where an assembly 
reaches decisions, Mesopotamian myths where the gods reach decisions in assembly, 
and a literary text that tells of a court case in Nippur where the jury consisted of 
commoners.61  
 
A problem with Keane’s thesis is that it operates with democracy as an entity with a 
life of its own, moving from one place to the next. Democracy is not defined against 
more or less inclusive forms of collective governance, except for a claim that there 
were different types of assembly democracy.62 His analysis is also marred by pure 
speculation, as when he tries to relate the history of democracy to an etymology of 
Greek demos from Linear B da-mo and Sumerian DUMU, all possible terms for 
“people”,63 as if these terms by themselves have any weight as evidence for political 
practices. The evidence he cites for assembly-based democracy in Syro-Mesopotamia, 
such as the text The Nippur Trial for Homicide, where “an assembly of commoners” 
debates a homicide case,64 or literary compositions containing creation myths where 
                                              
59 Keane, The life and death of democracy, 2009, xi 
60 Keane, The life and death of democracy, 2009, 90-92 
61 Keane, The life and death of democracy, 2009, 103-123 
62 Cf. Keane, The life and death of democracy, 2009, 97 
63 Cf. Keane, The life and death of democracy, 2009, 113. DUMU is usually translated “child”, “son”, and thus, by 
extension, can be interpreted as “people”. The supposed parallelism of DUMU and the Greek demos is highly speculative. 
64 Keane, The life and death of democracy, 2009, 118-119 
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the gods reach decisions in assembly, 65 is problematic. The evidence itself is not 
straight forward. I will return to The Nippur Trial for Homicide in chapter 4 (4.3.5). 
However, I will point out the main problems with it here, as an illustration of the 
difficulties of reconstructing Mesopotamian political culture from isolated texts: Marc 
Van De Mieroop interprets the jury at the trial as “manual labourers” and takes this as 
evidence of the general access to jury courts in Mesopotamian cities.66 On the other 
hand, Andrea Seri claims that the jury in question probably were temple personnel 
and therefore not representative of the city inhabitants in general.67 Thus, it is 
problematic to identify the jury in Nippur as “commoners” and take this as evidence 
for democracy. Keane offers no discussion of the interpretation of the text, but takes it 
as a given that the reading that fits his argument is the correct one. In fact, identifying 
the participants in decision-making processes is one of the biggest problems 
concerning Near Eastern polities. Therefore, it may be unwise for a political scientist, 
or any other scholar for that matter, to base firm conclusions on just a few texts, 
interpreted outside the context of ancient Mesopotamian urban culture. Further, 
regarding evidence from Mesopotamian myths, it is difficult to say anything about the 
realism of e.g. a creation myth as compared to political practices in real life. Keane’s 
use of this evidence is problematic because he makes no attempt to place the 
assemblies mentioned in the evidence within a larger political structure of 
Mesopotamian polities. 
 
The idea that there were democracies before the Greeks has won little favour with 
scholars of Greek antiquity. Histories of democracy from a Near Eastern or global 
                                              
65 Keane, The life and death of democracy, 2009, 113-117 
66 Van De Mieroop, The ancient Mesopotamian city, 1997, 122-123 
67 Cf. Seri, Local power in Old Babylonian Mesopotamia, 2006, 170 
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perspective are seldom cited except as to be dismissed.68 Jacobsen’s “primitive 
democracy” in Mesopotamia is termed a “spectre” by Kurt A. Raaflaub: he instead 
suggests that evidence for popular participation in politics from Mesopotamia 
represent ““non-autocratic institutions” surviving in otherwise – and necessarily – 
autocratic societies”.69 It is indeed easy to reject the arguments for popular rule 
outside Greece presented above. First, because the evidence is gathered from a vast 
span of time and space, it hardly applies to any specific culture that may be compared 
to Greek polis culture. Second, the term democracy is applied in a rather vague sense 
by the scholars professing its relevance for polities of the Near East, with no clear 
distinction between mass decision-making and decisions reached by limited councils. 
Therefore, it is difficult to establish convincing historical parallels to Greek 
democracy. Democracy as applied in the analyses of Manglapus, Isakhan and Keane 
is used as a cover-all for any kind of non-autocratic government. There is a definite 
Manichean tinge to their histories of popular participation in politics: the forces of 
democracy fight against tyranny and oppression, like a dualism of light and darkness, 
good and evil.  
 
When interested in connections between Greek and Near Eastern political traditions, 
scholars tend to describe these in terms of diffusion, from a Mesopotamian birth-place 
in the first city-states via the Phoenicians in the Iron Age to a new home in Greece. 
There have been several attempts at setting the development of the Greek polis and its 
high degree of citizen participation in relation to contacts with the Phoenicians. The 
Phoenicians have been portrayed as a kind of middlemen bringing city culture and 
republican government to the Greeks from the Near East or otherwise providing 
                                              
68 E.g. Eric Robinson rejects Manglapus’ thesis of democracy before the Greek poleis as speculative: Robinson, The first 
democracies, 1997, 24-25 
69 Raaflaub, “Power in the hands of the people,” 1998, 31 
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proto-types for Greek constitutions.70 This approach has several pitfalls, the most 
serious being that so little is known about Phoenician city-states and their political 
culture. Also, the transmission of political institutions from Phoenicia to Greece is 
difficult to explain: why should the Greeks take foreign models for their political 
structures and if it happened, how? Ultimately, the placing of the Greek polis at the 
end of a development starting in Mesopotamia that was somehow transmitted by 
Levantine seafaring peoples is a neat story, but it is teleological and faulty. There are 
significant periods of Mesopotamian history that show no clear continuity of city-state 
culture and it cannot be claimed that the Phoenician city-state culture is the same as 
that of Mesopotamia. Continuities of urban life and culture are to be expected, but 
continuity from Mesopotamia to Greece can only be argued in quite general terms. 
Therefore, this dissertation will be limited to discussions of structural and practical 
parallels East and West, and I will not venture into questions of diffusion or 
influences between Greek and Near Eastern polities. 
 
In recent years, the prevalence of a Greek perspective in studies of ancient politics has 
been called into question. A vocal critic of the classicist tradition, Martin Bernal 
claims that “conventional wisdom has been misled by Eurocentrism and anti-
Semitism into the belief that Greek cities differed categorically from Phoenician ones 
in being “free,” whereas the latter were authoritarian if not despotic”.71 However, it is 
rather pointless to claim that the view of East and West as fundamentally different in 
terms of political organisation and ideology is a result of Western cultural chauvinism 
alone. This kind of criticism loses its edge in view of the considerable difficulties in 
saying anything certain about the Phoenician cities or Near Eastern polities in general 
regarding their political culture. 
                                              
70 Drews, “Phoenicians, Carthage and the Spartan Eunomia,” 1979, 45-58; Gschnitzer, “Die Stellung der Polis in der 
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The view that political history began with the Greek polis is challenged by Kostas 
Vlassopoulos in his book Unthinking the Greek Polis (2007). He calls for a study of 
Greek history within the Eastern Mediterranean, from a Near Eastern perspective.72 
According to Vlassopoulos, “if Oriental despotism is no more than a Eurocentric 
myth, then Greek history and the Greek polis can be viewed from a totally altered 
standpoint”.73 A problem with Vlassopoulos’ call for new perspectives is the situation 
of the sources. It is not possible to discuss Near Eastern political thinking or practice 
at the same level of detail as Greek polities. Most Mesopotamian sources come from 
the palace and temples and the activities of people outside the great institutions are 
little documented. However, Vlassopoulos’ criticism of Eurocentrism in political 
history is well put. He argues against the view that democracy was discovered by 
Greeks as if it were “a physical entity that exists objectively”.74 The view that there 
were fundamental differences between the Near East and Greece seems indeed to be 
based on such objectifications or reifications of “culture” and its products.  
 
In a review of Vlassopoulos’ book, Angela Kühr argues that “we should not construct 
a European culture or a culture of the “West” translating it to the Ancient World, but 
we should not neglect either that differences existed between the Near Eastern world 
and the world dominated by Greek-speaking people, who distinguished their way of 
living by referring to a specific form of settlement: the polis”.75 The oxymoron of her 
argument is obvious: Kühr claims that one should not “construct a European culture”, 
yet argues that there was a “Near Eastern world” with characteristics that distinguish 
                                              
72 Vlassopoulos, Unthinking the Greek polis, 2007, 101 
73 Vlassopoulos, Unthinking the Greek polis, 2007, 102 
74 Vlassopoulos, Unthinking the Greek polis, 2007, 119 
75 Kühr, “Review of K. Vlassopoulos 2007,” 2009 
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it from a “world dominated by Greek-speaking people”, as if either of these “worlds” 
existed as natural phenomena outside analytical categories. Also, it is difficult to see 
how the concept of the polis prevents a combined study of Near Eastern and Greek 
polities: the Greek use of polis included non-Greek polities, and can thus not be said 
per se to warrant any differentiation between Greeks and Near Easterners, except in 
the minds of modern scholars. 
 
There are huge differences in what is known, indeed what can be known, about Greek 
and Near Eastern political traditions respectively. Any comparison between Greek 
and Near Eastern polities is made difficult by the difference in source materials: 
whereas Greek writers discuss conflicts between tyrants, oligarchs and the masses and 
report in detail about the organisation of popular power as well as its successes and 
failures, the Near Eastern evidence that is most frequently cited in comparative 
studies consists of anecdotal or mythological literary compositions, often combined 
with information culled from documents of several different periods and polities. The 
ancient Greeks were the first to produce an analytic literature about politics. Also, 
they wrote detailed histories of the political life in city-states and the conflicts in and 
between them. This means that scholars are far better informed about Greek political 
thought as well as about different forms of political organisation in Greek polities 
than they can ever be for the Near East. Also, the lack of political analyses in Near 
Eastern sources means there is a lack of clear concepts available to scholars for 
discussing political structures of Near Eastern polities beyond the palace or temple, 
including collective decision-making in towns and cities. Any comparison between 
Greek and Near Eastern polities therefore has to deal with these fundamental 
differences. A particular danger lies in making a very broad definition of democracy 
and thereafter to place all types of collective decisions together in the same basket. A 
more careful approach is needed, that takes differences as well as similarities into 
account and places councils and assemblies in their socio-political context. 
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Since Finley’s denial of the existence of Near Eastern politics,76 scholars have 
published a wealth of comparative research on Greek and Near Eastern city-states. In 
particular the Copenhagen Polis Centre has done much to further the comparative 
research of polities East and West.77 This research discusses Near Eastern polities 
with a view to their political complexity, in particular how city-states functioned in 
isolation and as nodes in city-state cultures. However, the choice of perspective runs 
the risk of introducing the East as a prelude to the West.78 The comparative project of 
the Copenhagen Polis Centre is by its very name geared towards poleis, the city-states 
of Greece. The degree and nature of the participation of common people in the 
governance of Near Eastern polities remains controversial.79 This is in part a 
consequence of the project itself: the comparative analyses of Near Eastern polities by 
the Copenhagen Polis Centre become tied to an interest in city-states that is ultimately 
grounded in an interest in the Greek polis. This means that in comparison, no city-
state culture other than the Greek had any considerable degree of popular power.  
 
The Copenhagen Polis Centre is not alone in this restatement of a uniquely high 
degree of popular participation in Greek politics. In a recent article, archaeologist 
Alexander Fantalkin states that the Greek polis is “a community of equal, local-born 
men, which stands in opposition to everything which the East symbolizes”.80 Thus, 
the image of separate Eastern and Western political worlds lives on. Having 
established the prevalent view that popular power did not exist in Near Eastern 
politics, I turn now to a closer examination of the reasons why popular participation in 
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politics in Near Eastern polities is difficult to detect and how this problem can be 
solved. 
 
1.4 Constitutions and strategies for power 
The difficulty of determining the size and composition of decision-making groups in 
Near Eastern polities is a recurring problem in comparisons between Greek and Near 
Eastern political culture. Were decisions reached by large or small groups? More 
often than not, this is impossible to determine. This detracts considerably from the 
persuasiveness of any comparative analysis of polities East and West. A case in point 
is Thorkild Jacobsen who devised the already mentioned concept of “primitive 
democracy” for early Mesopotamian polities (1.3): in his analysis, early polities of 
Mesopotamia were ruled by collective organs of decision-making until the rise of 
despotic kings and a corresponding curtailment of popular influence in politics.81 The 
term “primitive democracy” has been criticised because it does not distinguish 
between whether decisions were taken by a large popular assembly or by a limited 
council, i.e. between what the Greeks termed democracies and oligarchies.82 This is a 
difficulty that is hard to resolve, especially because sources from Mesopotamia that 
mention collective decision-making, e.g. legal documents recording decisions made 
by assembly courts, seldom specify who were in the assembly or how decisions were 
reached. This problem cannot be avoided entirely, as it originates in the very sources 
to Near Eastern polities, from Mesopotamia as well as Syria and the Levant. 
However, there are approaches that can to a certain extent get round it. A promising 
approach in my opinion is to analyse power as enacted in the strategies of agents, 
rather than expressed in formal hierarchies, as mentioned above (1.2.3). This 
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approach will be discussed further in sections 1.4.1 and1.4.2. Some difficulties 
entailed in this approach will be discussed in the following. 
 
In a monograph titled Democracy’s Ancient Ancestors (2004), Daniel E. Fleming 
claims that there were significant parallels in structure between the towns of the Old 
Babylonian kingdom Mari and archaic Greek polities: in the Near East and Greece, 
inhabitants of towns pursued corporate strategies for power through collective 
decision-making that could challenge or obviate kings.83 According to Fleming, “the 
preexisting social landscape for Greek democracy bears unmistakable resemblances to 
widespread Mesopotamian custom, whatever the particular process that led to such a 
radical innovation. It is difficult to understand how the various political forms leading 
to Athenian democracy were not constructed from the raw materials of eastern group-
oriented decision making, however unique the application”.84  
 
A problem with Fleming’s thesis is the relation he suggests between group decision-
making and democracy: although decision-making collectives in Mesopotamian 
towns do indicate that society was not autocratic, it is of great consequence for the 
existence of popular power whether the entire town reached decisions together or a 
limited council of elders or other authority figures reached decisions. Fleming does 
not pursue this problem, however, but instead argues that words for town, council or 
assembly have a “range and fluidity” so that “fixed bodies with readily definable 
constituents will be hard to find”.85 Defined collective decision-making bodies are 
indeed hard to find, but does this warrant that all group decision-making can be 
treated as evidence for a political culture that promoted the development of 
                                              
83 Fleming, Democracy’s ancient ancestors, 2004, 171 
84 Fleming, Democracy’s ancient ancestors, 2004, 16 
85 Fleming, Democracy’s ancient ancestors, 2004, 172 
 49 
democracy? Indeed, the idea of a development from diverse forms of group decision-
making into democracy is problematic. As will be discussed in chapter 3 (3.4.2; 
3.4.3), there were specific historical circumstances that created democracy in Greece, 
or more precisely Athens, the best documented of Greek democracies. It does not 
seem likely that e.g. Athenian democracy has Mesopotamian ancestors. Democracy 
cannot be plausibly interpreted as an organic entity that developed from primitive 
beginnings into a more developed form of constitution, spreading from the cradle of 
civilisation in the East to become the beginnings of Western culture in Greece. 
 
Fleming’s idea of Mesopotamian group decision-making as “raw materials” for the 
development of democracy has been met with criticism. Andrea Seri points out that 
Fleming argues that “elders” in villages and among mobile pastoralists represent 
“survivors” from before the appearance of kings in Mesopotamian states. She argues 
that this approach to political studies is similar to Jacobsen’s “primitive democracy”.86 
Fleming argues that e.g. the elders of Urgiš are powerful because they are a traditional 
authority. In his interpretation, “[t]he tradition of a powerful collective balance to 
leadership by kings may be the inheritance of a long urban history”.87 I agree with 
Seri that this is a weak argument. It reveals the tenacity of intellectual habits of 
evolutionism and cannot be said to explain the power of “elders”. The claim that 
powerful “elders” are the result of a surviving pre-monarchical institution appears 
odd, because the simultaneous existence of kings and collective institutions of 
decision-making can be seen in much of the Mari evidence. I will discuss this 
evidence in chapter 4 (4.6-8). 
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As mentioned, the lack of differentiation between councils and assemblies in Near 
Eastern sources makes any comparison between Greek and Mesopotamian politics 
rather difficult. This is because a significant difference between polities in Greece 
was not whether there was group decision-making or not, but who were admitted to 
participate in the group making the decisions and who these people represented. With 
a large category for collective decision-making that does not differentiate between 
limited councils and open assemblies, any similarities found between Greek and 
Mesopotamian polities are bound to be quite general and superficial. What is needed 
is therefore a more detailed analytical framework for ancient polities. I have 
suggested this above (1.2.3), with a division of strategies for power into élite and 
corporate strategies, further subdivided into broad and narrow élite strategies and 
broad and narrow corporate strategies. The point is to be able to analyse political 
activities that are not necessarily expressed in the formal structure of the polity, but 
visible in the actions of situated agents. 
 
What can be found in ancient Near Eastern sources are not constitutions parallel to 
Greek poleis as such, since practically all Near Eastern polities were kingships. 
However, political practices that imply popular power can be found within a greater 
whole. In order to understand these instances of popular power, it is necessary to look 
beyond the Greek terms of democracy, oligarchy and monarchy. By looking at 
institutions and practices for collective power within the political structure of a 
kingdom, it can be described as having elements of popular rule without claiming that 
it therefore must be termed a democracy. Popular participation can thus be possible 
even if the people were not the single authority in a polity. This means looking 
beyond the paradigm of autocratic Near Eastern polities. In my view, rather than 
seeing these elements of popular rule as “non-autocratic traits” in “autocratic 
societies”,88 elements of popular rule make it necessary to analyse Near Eastern 
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polities afresh, on new terms independent of the classicist and Greco-centric terms 
oligarchy, democracy, and autocracy or despotic monarchy. 
   
In order to understand the place of popular power in ancient polities, the relationship 
between rulers, the élite, and the people and their respective strategies for power must 
be taken into consideration. This means looking beyond formal hierarchies and to 
look at political practices. It also means to transcend the confines of the classicist-
derived vocabulary for polities, where constitutions are analysed as oligarchies, 
democracies, or autocracies or despotic kingdoms. The problem of categorisation was 
one ancient philosophers also grappled with when confronted with data for polities 
that did not fit just one term. In fact, the classical approach was more subtle than the 
analyses of modern scholars that were briefly reviewed above (1.3). A classical 
solution was the idea of mixed constitutions that were put together by elements from 
several constitutions. This will be discussed in the following. 
 
1.4.1 The mixed constitution: kingship and popular power 
The classical concept of a mixed constitution is a good model to work with in order to 
see different strategies for power at work simultaneously in a polity: rather than 
regarding a polity as equal to a specific type of constitution, the idea of a mixed 
constitution makes it possible to discuss e.g. popular power in a polity ruled by a king. 
 
In his Politics, Aristotle claims that his ideal constitution, the politeia, or “polity” is a 
mix of traits from democracy and oligarchy. In his scheme, constitutional traits can be 
combined in different ways. As an example, Aristotle argues that regarding assembly-
courts, it would be an oligarchic practice to subject rich non-attendants to a fine and 
not to pay the masses for attendance, and a democratic practice not to fine non-
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attendants and to pay the masses for attendance. Oligarchic and democratic 
arrangements can be combined in a politeia.89 To Aristotle, it is typical of a well-
mixed constitution that it can be described both as a democracy and an oligarchy. He 
finds this especially well exemplified in the Spartan constitution, a constitution that he 
finds much at fault, but which serves him as an illustration of the mixing of traits 
from different types of constitutions. In the Spartan constitution, he sees an egalitarian 
education for all citizens and the popular vote over members to the council of elders 
(gerousia) as well as popular control of the ephorate as democratic traits. An 
oligarchic trait is the use of elections rather than choosing candidates by use of the 
lot.90 According to Aristotle, in Sparta the kings represent monarchy, the elders 
represent oligarchy, and a democratic influence comes from the authority of the 
ephors, who come from the people. He adds, however, that some say that the ephors 
are tyrannical, and that the democratic element should rather be sought in the 
organisation of common meals and other daily activities.91  
 
The argument of a mixed constitution as the best one possible is also found in 
Polybios. According to him, the best constitution has elements from kingship, 
aristocracy, and democracy.92 By democracy he means when the will of the majority 
decides, while the laws are respected and traditions are upheld.93 His prime example 
of a well-mixed constitution is Sparta after the reforms of Lykourgos, which he sees 
as closely parallel to the Roman constitution.94 
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Thus, Aristotle and Polybios were not foreign to the idea that a constitution can have 
democratic traits, although it is formally not a democracy: the masses can nevertheless 
have a certain influence in the constitution. This kind of mixed constitution is not a 
theoretical construct. There are indications that collective organs of decision-making 
existed in Greek poleis ruled by tyrants: according to Herodotos and Thukydides, the 
tyrant Peisistratos did not abolish the established collective institutions of power when 
he seized control of Athens, but ruled according to the laws.95 Also, Thukydides 
claims that when Perikles was general of Athens, it was known as a democracy, but 
was in reality the rule of the first man in the polis.96 This indicates that authoritarian 
one-man rule could be set through without abolishing collective organs of decision-
making. Popular participation could be a part of the political structure of tyrannies. 
The discussion of popular power therefore should not be restricted to formal 
democracies, neither for Greek nor Near Eastern polities. 
 
The existence in tragedy of kings and popular assemblies ruling together, as seen in 
Aeschylus’ Argos and Euripides’ Athens,97 are further examples of mixed 
constitutions. Of course, these examples can be interpreted as purely literary 
phenomena. It is no doubt a model that fits well with Greek drama, with a king as a 
protagonist and the people as a choir. According to Pat Easterling, “the use of a loose 
model in which king and people are the essential categories of authority gave the 
tragedians great scope”.98 Beyond dramatic concerns, however, the tragedians may 
also be said to refer to forms of political organisation that were considered plausible, 
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if not modelled on historical examples, such as monarchies with active and influential 
citizen assemblies. As seen with the evidence from Aristotle, Herodotos, and 
Thukydides, a range of combinations of ruler, council, and popular assembly were 
known to the Greeks. To include the mixed constitution in the discussion of popular 
power facilitates a comparative analysis of Near Eastern and Greek polities, because 
the dynamics of the individual polity can be studies beyond an application of the 
labels democracy, oligarchy, or autocracy. 
 
As will be seen in chapters 4, 5, and 6, there is evidence that there was power outside 
the palace and temples of Near Eastern kingdoms. This will form an important part of 
the argument in the present investigation. As will be seen, even in strictly hierarchic 
and rather autocratic ancient societies, such as Ugarit or Babylon, there can be found 
meeting-places for the negotiation of interests between the different groups in society, 
such as jury courts or public assemblies. It is important to try to assess what actual 
influence such collective bodies had. Regardless of whether they had a direct and 
binding influence on political decisions at the highest levels or not, it is an important 
point that at such junctions as jury courts, diverging strategies for power could be 
pursued. Information could be obtained and opinions voiced. In chapters 4, 5, and 6, I 
will investigate the significance of such practices and institutions, in order to discuss 
public participation in decision-making and what I have termed narrow and broad 
corporate strategies for power in Near Eastern polities. In this way, Near Eastern and 
Greek polities can be compared without being dependent on Greek terms for 
constitutions and their connotations (cf. chapter 7). I will now discuss further the 
concept of strategies for power and how these can be used to analyse ancient polities. 
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1.4.2 Polities as networks of strategies for power 
Political analysis in terms of “corporate” and “exclusionary” or “network” strategies 
for power is an approach from anthropology that is quite useful for the study of 
ancient societies.99 Richard E. Blanton et al. exemplify network strategies as where 
the élite of one group maintains its power in this group through the exclusive contact 
with the élites of other groups. The manipulation of long-distance contacts makes it 
possible to obtain limited commodities, services and knowledge, by which the élite 
gains and maintains power.100 The network strategy involves “patrimonial rhetoric”, 
the establishment of a prestigious lineage, and “prestige-goods systems”, assuring the 
prestige of exotic goods as well as the élite’s monopoly of access to them.101 
Corporate strategies on the other hand involve a cognitive code that emphasises a 
“corporate solidarity” between groups in society. Society is viewed as an integrated 
whole and its subgroups as wholly interdependent. This also applies to complex 
societies, where the cognitive code emphasises the interdependence between rulers 
and subjects.102 
 
Strategies for power can be recognised in different ways of organising group 
decision-making. In a corporate strategy, popular assemblies, or arena councils, are 
the places where discussions are taken and decisions are reached. Arena councils 
must be distinguished from élite councils; the arena council is the community-in-
council, where there is an open debate on all issues, whereas in the élite council, 
participation as well as debate is restricted and the impression of unanimity among the 
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rulers is sought.103 In societies where the élite strategy is predominant, access to 
participation in discussions and decision-making is restricted to a narrow élite, and 
decisions are taken in élite councils. In a monarchy, the king and his advisors reach 
decisions, whereas in an oligarchy, councils consisting of members of a limited élite 
wield power. None of these strategies have ever been observed in pure form, but this 
is how they are useful, because they can be used to analyse the dynamics between and 
changing positions of socio-economic groups in a polity. The approach to politics as 
networks of strategies will be placed in its methodological context in chapter 2 (2.8), 
where I will discuss its relation to other approaches to ancient polities, in particular 
neo-evolutionary approaches and theories of structuration and structure. Suffice it to 
say here that through analyses of strategies for power, instead of emphasising a 
dichotomy of rich and poor or a hierarchy of rulers and ruled, polities can be viewed 
as dynamic networks of agents pursuing different strategies for power. Also, thinking 
in terms of strategies rather than socio-economic groups arranged in a fixed hierarchy 
makes it possible to explain seemingly self-contradictory political behaviour, e.g. 
popular support of tyrants. Throughout the present investigation, I will investigate 
popular involvement in politics from the nature of interactions between socio-
economic groups in the polity, through judiciary and political institutions and in less 
formal decision-making situations.  
 
The model of Richard E. Blanton et al. is quite general and there is some scope for 
refining the terms employed. As mentioned in section1.2.3 above, I will divide 
strategies into narrow and broad corporate and élite strategies. This is in order to 
better understand the political implications of the relative prevalence of the different 
strategies. All complex societies have to have a universal cognitive code for corporate 
solidarity: a society could not exist if there was no sense among the groups in society 
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of belonging to a whole. Conversely, any complex society has network strategies 
where élites use their international contacts to maintain their position, including trade 
and foreign policy. Corporate and élite strategies have to be part of a dynamic 
network of strategies for the society to function. This is indeed anticipated by Blanton 
et al. in their emphasis on the duality of the strategies for power. However, I am 
doubtful that the terms “corporate” and “network” cover the range of strategies 
employed by agents in a complex society. I therefore suggest that the strategies for 
power are differentiated into broad and narrow corporate strategies and broad and 
narrow élite strategies. In the following, I will discuss these terms in more detail and 
provide preliminary examples of these strategies in practice from the polities that will 
be examined in the present study. These different examples of strategies for power 
will be discussed in full further on in the relevant chapters.  
 
The term broad corporate strategy for power will be used when large groups of 
inhabitants of towns or cities act collectively through public and collective organs of 
decision-making or in less organised collective action, like revolts. An example of a 
broad corporate strategy is the importance of the popular assembly and jury courts in 
the Athenian constitution from the 6th century onwards, discussed in section 3.4.2. A 
less formal example is the revolt of the Athenian demos against Isagoras and 
Kleomenes in 508/7, when the latter attempted to seize power by establishing a 
restricted council of élite citizens. This is discussed in section 3.4.3. From the Near 
East, a broad corporate strategy for power can be seen in popular revolts against the 
mayors of Levantine cities under Egyptian suzerainty in the Late Bronze Age. This is 
discussed in section 6.5. The broad corporate strategy is characterised by the people 
acting collectively and the citizens identifying themselves with the polity as a whole.  
 
There are also instances where not all the people, but a group of them, distinguished 
by wealth and status, wield power. This group may still have the totality of the polity 
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in mind, but does not count all citizens as members. Although it is a form of 
collective strategy for power, the collective in power is defined to the exclusion of the 
majority of the population, often by criteria of wealth or age and experience. 
Therefore, I will term this a narrow corporate strategy. In a narrow corporate strategy, 
the highest offices are restricted to those who belong to the narrowly defined group of 
eligible citizens. Power lies in councils where full access to participation is restricted. 
Citizens may still be a part of the political system and participate in popular 
assemblies in a narrow corporate strategy, but decisions are reached elsewhere and 
councils with limited access take care of policy-making. An example of a narrow 
corporate strategy is Sparta, where the popular assembly was open to all, but power 
lay with a limited group of Spartiates who served as ephors or sat in the numerically 
restricted council of elders together with the two kings, the gerousia. This is 
discussed in section 3.4.1. Another example of a narrow corporate strategy is the 
prerogative of the richest citizens for political office at Athens after the reforms of 
Solon, discussed in section 3.4.2. From the Near East, narrow corporate strategies can 
be seen in the Old Assyrian “merchant colony” in Anatolia, the kārum Kanesh, where 
the initiative to convene the assembly lay with the rich merchants and decisions could 
be reached by the rich merchants without involving the entire community. The entire 
community of merchants, “small and great”, could participate in assembly, but this 
was at the discretion of the “great”. This is discussed in section 5.5.1. An important 
distinction between a narrow corporation and an élite is that in a narrow corporation, 
anyone could in principle attain the fulfilment of the criteria for participation in the 
limited group in power. 
 
Common to broad and narrow corporate strategies is an emphasis on the group and on 
society as an association rather than an institution. The group can be defined more or 
less exclusively and the criteria for participation are objective, such as wealth or age. 
The narrow corporate strategy is more restrictive than the broad corporate strategy 
regarding who are allowed to participate in councils and who are eligible to the 
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highest offices, but still has the larger society in mind and emphasises the 
interdependence of rulers and ruled in the polity. The corporate strategies involve a 
degree of the citizens ruling and being ruled in turn. Criteria for membership in the 
community of citizens, whether defined as a broad or narrow corporation, will be 
discussed below (1.5), regarding equality and the citizen community. 
 
As seen with the concept of the mixed constitution (1.4.1), it is conceivable that 
citizens can pursue corporate strategies under a monarch. Historically, this is a 
phenomenon that occurs where institutions for collective decision-making are not 
suppressed and the monarch acknowledges the citizens as part of the polity, as 
subjects rather than as slaves. Thus, Peisistratos was a tyrant of Athens in the 6th 
century, but the people of Athens continued to participate in politics through the 
assemblies and offices open to them. The real opponent of Peisistratos was not the 
people, but the birth élite of aristocratic families. This is discussed in section 3.4.3. A 
different example is from Babylonia in the Neo-Assyrian period, where it can be seen 
that the people of Babylonian cities are acknowledged as an authority by the king and 
his representatives. This is discussed in section 6.7. There is not necessarily an 
opposition between corporate strategies for power and kingship. Both can be found in 
the same polity. Given the duality of corporate and network strategies at work in 
complex societies, the relative balance is what characterises the polity, not the 
isolated presence of one or the other strategy.  
 
The corporate strategies are contrasted by élite strategies that emphasise the 
fundamental differences between commoners and those in power. These strategies for 
power also emphasise the exclusivity of positions of power. I will use the term broad 
élite strategy where a limited group of people are in power to the exclusion of all 
other citizens. Different from the narrow corporate strategy, the broad élite strategy 
emphasises the exclusive nature of the ruling group, typically limited by birth, divine 
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grace, or diverse definitions of virtue or nobility. The élite group sets itself apart from 
the rest of the citizenry by traits unattainable by commoners. Examples of the broad 
élite strategy can be seen in the Homeric poems discussed in section 3.3.1, where the 
basileis wage war for the sake of personal honour. They reach decisions in a 
collective, but they do not heed the assembly of fighters, the laoi. Their position is 
granted by Zeus and no commoner can match a basileus in combat or counsel. In the 
Iliad, the broad élite strategy is evident in the Thersites-episode in particular, where 
the commoner Thersites is beaten by Odysseus for speaking insolently in the 
assembly: the basileis are granted power by Zeus, whereas the commoners are 
deemed of no worth in council or battle. Only one shall rule, whom Zeus has given 
the sceptre, whereas the rule of many is a bad thing.104 
 
A similar contempt for the people outside the aristocracy evident in the Homeric epics 
can be seen in the poems of Alkaios, discussed in section 3.4.4. He reviles Pittakos, 
tyrant of Mytilene, as a base-born opportunist who has come to power by catering to 
the commoners.105 Alkaios is sent into exile by Pittakos and longs to return with his 
aristocratic fellows in order to overthrow the tyrant.106 Similar concerns for the 
privileges of the élite can be found in the poems of Theognis, discussed in section 
3.4.5. Theognis complains that at Megara, people who used to live in the countryside, 
dressed in goatskin clothes, in his own time have become noble, while those who 
were formerly noble are considered base.107 The broad élite strategy promotes a 
community of élite members, but the élite is strictly separated from the rest of the 
citizens and there is no chance of any commoner rising to the status of the élite. The 
community of élite members have little concern for the larger community of the polity 
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and pursue their interests within an international frame of reference with élites of 
other polities. This is well attested from Greece, where the aristocrats from several 
poleis convened regularly at Olympia and other sanctuaries and thus formed a 
network independent of their home communities.108  
 
From the Near East, broad élite strategies for power are less conspicuous than in 
Greek poleis. In the correspondence from Old Babylonian Mari, the heads of nomadic 
families can be argued to form a broad élite of decision-making “elders”. However, 
their councils do not appear to have been explicitly restricted and their policies cannot 
be said to go against the integrated whole of leaders and commoners in the 
community as was the case in some Greek poleis ruled by élite collectives. The élites 
of Mari communities appear rather to be pursuing a narrow corporate strategy. This is 
discussed in section 4.8. An élite of officials existed in all Near Eastern cities, but that 
does not mean that they pursued the same kind of exclusive strategy for power that 
the Greek aristocrats did or shared the Greek aristocrats disdain for any complicity 
between rulers and people. The lack of evidence for centrifugal strategies among Near 
Eastern broad élites is presumably due to the strength of centralised leadership in the 
cities, with quite stable hierarchies of temples and palaces. The stasis so characteristic 
of Greek poleis is not attested to the same degree in Near Eastern polities. This will 
be discussed in chapter 7. 
 
The strength of central authorities brings us to the narrow élite strategy. This is the 
kind of strategy pursued by rulers, with an emphasis on the exclusive position of the 
king, as a divinely favoured person endowed with supernatural qualities through his 
ancestry or other marks of distinction. Rather than the collectivity of aristocrats in the 
broad élite strategy as can be seen in Homer, the narrow élite strategy focuses on one 
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person. His family and retinue are only of interest through their connection with the 
ruler and the ruler is viewed as close to the gods or godlike himself. His actions are 
inspired by the gods and he answers only to them. War can be waged at his whim and 
the resources of the polity are at his disposal with no questions asked. Luxury is an 
integral part of the narrow élite strategy and international contacts with other rulers 
are part of the basis for the king’s status. The opinions of the community are not 
relevant in the narrow élite strategy. The king protects the community, but as a 
shepherd herds his sheep, with no reciprocal relations between ruler and ruled. 
Examples of the narrow élite strategy can be found in the abundant inscriptions of 
Near Eastern kings and hymns in their honour, where their divine favour is 
emphasised as well as their military prowess or pious restoration of temples, always 
presented as personal feats performed single-handedly. Hammurapi presents himself 
as the shepherd of the people chosen by Enlil.109 I will not discuss the narrow 
corporate strategy of Near Eastern rulers separately in the present investigation, but 
rather focus on group strategies and their relation to the central authorities. Suffice it 
to state here that in Near Eastern history, kings can be seen to pursue narrow élite 
strategies as well as broad corporate strategies: some kings were despots who waged 
incessant wars and let their subjects die of famine and disease; other kings were 
friendly to the people and respected the privileges of the city populations. 
 
As discussed above (1.2.3), the identification of broad and narrow corporate strategies 
and broad and narrow élite strategies and their relative prevalence in polities will be 
decisive for where the polity can be placed on a sliding scale of popular power, from 
democracy at one end to autocracy on the other. In any given polity, different 
strategies for power are likely to be pursued by different groups simultaneously and it 
is the relative prevalence of one aspect over the others that determines the character of 
the political culture in question. There are also ambiguous cases where the focus of 
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the analysis determines how the evidence is interpreted, e.g. popular support for 
tyranny that indicates both autocracy and popular power.  As will be seen, this can be 
interpreted from the point of view of either the tyrant or the people, which will yield 
quite different results (cf. 3.4.3). 
 
1.5 Corporations and their members: the problem of 
equality 
The most obvious difference between strategies for power can be found in the level of 
exclusion from access to participation in politics and the criteria for it. Did all citizens 
have equal rights, and if not, in which ways were citizens differentiated?110 In Greek 
political thought, the question of differentiation between citizens hinges on two 
different concepts of equality, called arithmetic and geometric equality. This forms 
the background for modern discussions of popular rule and the lack of it. As will be 
seen, these two concepts of equality are of great significance for how popular power 
in ancient polities is regarded. Did a restricted group make out the citizen collective 
or was it more broadly defined? This is often confused and a thorough clearing up of 
inclusive and exclusive citizen groups and their political implications is therefore 
required. I will start with Aristotle and Plato’s discussions of these matters (1.5.1), 
before proceeding to a modern debate on inclusive and exclusive definitions of the 
citizen collective (1.5.2). 
 
                                              
110 I will not go into discussions of the large group of inhabitants excluded from citizenship in ancient polities, such as 
women, slaves, and foreigners. No doubt, the exclusion of large groups of permanent residents from politics is a significant 
difference between ancient and modern ideas of citizen autonomy and popular power. However, the present investigation is 
of ancient polities, their authorities, and their citizens, not of socio-political conditions in the ancient world in general. 
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1.5.1 Equal and unequal citizens: the classical view 
In the Politics, Aristotle initially defines the polis as an association (koinōnia).111 In a 
polis, the statesman (politikos) rules over free and equal persons.112 Citizens (politai) 
take part in reaching decisions and verdicts.113 The citizens are equal (isous); they rule 
and are being ruled in turn.114  
 
Aristotle’s definition of the polis and its citizens may seem clear and sharp, but it has 
problems. In a polis, some offices might be limited to rich citizens, whereas the 
popular assembly could be open to all citizens regardless of wealth. In effect, this 
means that some citizens are more citizens than others, something that does not 
square with the definition of citizens as equal, ruling and being ruled in turn. Thus, it 
becomes necessary to differentiate between citizens, and to find what group of 
citizens is sovereign in the polis. This simultaneously splits both the term citizen and 
the term polis into several different categories, with separate groups of citizens and 
distinct types of constitutions. This was of course obvious to Aristotle, as well, and he 
therefore goes to great lengths throughout the Politics in discerning types and 
subtypes of constitutions and how they develop from one type into another. 
 
Aristotle states that in democracies, the people, demos, are sovereign, whereas in 
oligarchies the sovereign group is few.115 In Aristotle’s ideal constitution, called 
politeia, or “polity”, only those who can meet a moderate property qualification can 
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be citizens. He views democracy as a deviation of polity, because it gives sovereignty 
to the demos, the poor masses. These, being poor, are bound to look only to the 
interests of their own group, ignoring those of the polis as a whole.116 The difference 
between oligarchy and democracy lies in wealth or the lack of it, because the rich are 
few and the poor are many.117  
 
Aristotle’s differentiation into poor and wealthy means that there are two distinct 
groups of citizens that have opposing interests. The citizens are not considered equal; 
they are different with regard to wealth. In the best polis, the politeia, the poor would 
presumably be excluded from citizenship altogether. However, in democracies and 
oligarchies, both poor and rich are citizens, the differentiation is between which of the 
groups is sovereign in the polis.  
 
According to Aristotle, there is a range of democracies from moderate ones where the 
poor are granted access to power equal to the rich, to extreme democracies where the 
decrees of the multitude are superior to the laws of the polis. In the first kind of 
democracy, the laws are superior, making it close to the best constitution, the “polity”, 
politeia, whereas in the latter the laws are subject to the will of the people, the demos, 
resulting in a kind of tyranny by the demos.118 Aristotle defines oligarchy as 
characterised by high property qualifications for participating in politics, so that the 
poor are excluded from having a part in the constitution.119  
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The polis can thus not be considered simply a community of citizens. In the 
Aristotelian scheme, it is differentiated into subtypes according to which citizen-
group is the sovereign, the rich or the poor. Instead of a community of equals, where 
the citizens are the polis, there is a duality of equals and non-equals, of citizens with 
full rights and citizens who are excluded in certain respects. The concept of being 
equal, isous, initially used by Aristotle to define the citizens, is subsequently used to 
define subgroups of citizens and exclude the poor from the polis of the rich. This 
double use of equality, as both describing a community and excluding from a 
community, is central to discussions of oligarchy and democracy, élite dominance and 
popular power. The two meanings of equality are particularly problematic when it 
comes to defining “egalitarian”: who are equal to whom in which respects? 
 
Equality between some people implies a distinction from others. Thus, equality may 
as much be an organising principle of an oligarchy as of a democracy. Classical 
philosophers express this distinction as “arithmetic” and “geometric” types of 
equality; in the latter, each gets his own, whereas in the former, all receive the same. 
This distinction is important to have in mind when discussing popular power in 
ancient polities. It cannot be supposed that the citizens are an undifferentiated whole 
that all share the same interests. 
 
In the Laws, Plato contends that giving all citizens equal privileges is in fact a form of 
inequality. He argues that it is just to grant more to the great and less to the lesser, 
according to each person’s nature, rather than granting everything to everyone in like 
measure.120 In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle argues that only geometric equality 
is just, as in when the whole corresponds to the whole as a part corresponds to a part 
between two figures. In this way, privileges in the constitution should be 
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proportionate to the virtue of each citizen. This is opposed to arithmetic equality, 
where all citizens have the same privileges, according to their numerical qualities 
alone and not their virtue.121 The definitions of virtue (aretē) in the arguments of 
Plato and Aristotle do not concern the present investigation and will not be discussed. 
Suffice it to say that Aristotle and Plato both perceived a problem in sharing power 
and privileges indiscriminately and equally as long as people are unequal with respect 
to certain qualities, moral or otherwise. Inequality can be defined in socio-economic 
or purely ethical terms. The dilemma remains, whether it is just that people 
considered inferior receive shares equal to people considered superior. As will be 
seen in chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6, it remains an issue in ancient polities that some citizens 
are considered superior to others. Thus, what kind of distribution is just, each his own 
or equal shares among everyone?  
 
The distinction between two kinds of equality may seem mysterious, but it is actually 
a common moral distinction that people do every day: is it just and right that everyone 
get the same (arithmetic equality) or what they deserve (geometric equality)? The 
term geometric is used in the sense of proportionate, so that qualities of a said kind 
determines the level of political rights, e.g. much wealth or great virtue gives great 
political influence including access to holding all offices, whereas little wealth or 
small virtue gives little political influence and limited access to holding offices. With 
Aristotle, one could argue that the geometric kind of equality is more just: the better 
person one is, the more influence one has in the polis. Thus, according to geometric, 
i.e. proportionate equality, only the best citizens should have full rights. The opposite 
is the case with arithmetic equality, where poor and wealthy, good and bad all have 
the same right to participate in politics. 
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The two classical concepts of equality have great implications for how scholars 
interpret popular participation in politics in the ancient world. Problems begin when 
one attempts to define popular rule in polities with graded citizenship, i.e. when not 
all citizens have the same rights. How are we to define politics in a polity where only 
a narrow group have full rights? After all, a narrowly defined collective of citizens in 
charge of a polity is still popular rule, or rule by the people. The corporate strategy, if 
held to be typical of popular participation in politics, equally applies to a restricted or 
narrow group as to a broadly defined citizen group.  
 
There is also the question of criteria for distinction: since wealth at least in theory is 
attainable by all, a geometric equality based on wealth would produce a narrow 
corporate strategy. However, a geometric equality based on virtue (aretē) would 
produce a broad or narrow élite strategy, since virtue is presumably not attainable by 
everyone. Depending on the virtue and the degree to which it can be shared among 
several people, a group will be broader or narrower, e.g. the Homeric heroes are a 
broad élite because they partake in the virtue (aretē) of the basileis, whereas king 
Hammurapi of Babylon belongs to a narrow élite because he is chosen by the gods to 
rule the Babylonians. Thus, equality is a complex concept and fundamental to 
distinguishing strategies of power. 
 
1.5.2 Equality and popular power: the modern debate 
Similar to the classical philosophers, modern political philosophy struggles with 
questions concerning equality and rule by the people. What are the criteria for 
claiming that the people are in charge of the polity? Robert A. Dahl studies popular 
participation in politics from the point of view that constitutions are dependent on 
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“beliefs” held by the members of a society.122 He argues that democracy is based on a 
“Strong Principle of Equality”, a position where the citizens accept to rule and being 
ruled in turn. He defines his “Strong Principle of Equality” as a belief among 
members of an association “that all the members of the association are adequately 
qualified to participate on an equal footing with the other in the process of governing 
the association”.123 Dahl does not claim that this is a description of democracy since 
the principle of equality is not necessarily applied very broadly in the given polity.124 
He adds two additional beliefs that are necessary in order for a society to be a 
democracy, what he calls the “Principle of Equal Consideration of Interest”, viz. that 
all citizens are taken into consideration in making decisions, and the “Presumption of 
Personal Autonomy” viz. that every citizen is the best judge of his own interests.125  
 
However, Dahl’s principles do not help distinguishing an oligarchy from a democracy 
or narrow and broad corporate strategies: the “beliefs” regarding equality among 
members of a group in Dahl’s argument could still be held by a small minority 
holding power in society. Thus, with Dahl’s principles, it becomes an empirical 
question whether enough people are included in the political process for it to be called 
a democracy, i.e. rule by the people, or an oligarchy, i.e. rule by a few. Dahl’s 
concepts are useful, however, because they highlight politics as consisting of beliefs 
about what is fair and right, and that these beliefs are subject to change. Therefore, a 
polity may well experience changes from a situation where an inclusive civic body is 
in charge to a situation where a small élite takes control, and vice versa.  
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Dahl’s focus on beliefs as an important factor in political developments has 
influenced Ian Morris’ (2000) analysis of the development of democracy in the 
archaic polis. However, Morris’ view of a belief in equality as a precondition for 
popular power is criticised by Erich Kistler (2004) for being blind to the differences 
between the masses and the élite in Greek poleis. The discussion is important, because 
it highlights problems concerning how to evaluate popular participation in politics 
and how the community of citizens was defined. How can equality define both the 
masses and the élite, and still be of use in discussing popular power?  
 
According to Ian Morris, a “Strong Principle of Equality” was important in Greek 
communities of the archaic period for “the emergence of egalitarian culture within 
broad male citizen communities”, as a group of metrioi, middling citizens. In his 
view, the ideological change towards the realisation of this principle had a democratic 
constitution as one possible outcome.126 In archaic poetry and especially in Hesiod, 
Morris sees a conflict between what he terms a middling ideology and an élite 
ideology: the outcome of this conflict was that early polis societies of Greece 
abandoned élite ideals of personal excellence, and emphasised middling values.127 In 
the classical polis, this resulted in a middling culture, a strong bond of mutual 
solidarity between moderate men, the metrioi, who conceived of themselves as being 
neither rich nor poor.128 
  
Ian Morris argues that an egalitarian culture among males in Greek communities of 
the archaic period was a necessary condition for the development of Athenian 
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democracy.129 This position has been attacked by Erich Kistler, who argues that the 
ideal of being metrios is in direct opposition to the egalitarian political culture of a 
democracy.130  
 
Morris’ analysis of a democracy based on being metrios, a middling man of no 
extravagant tastes, may seem to indicate that the more humble citizens gained an 
advantage over the élite. However, it is relevant to ask who they were, these metrioi 
who wished to show distance to the extravagant élite and why they wished to do so. 
As will be argued below, it seems more likely that the metrioi were not men of 
moderate wealth, in the sense of commoners, but actually belonged to the élite 
themselves, the aristoi. Thus, being metrios does not mean to be a commoner, it 
means to be a moderate member of the élite.   
 
Morris’ argument for the ideological development behind Greek egalitarian political 
practices has been criticised exactly for coupling the ideal of being metrios with 
Dahl’s “Strong Principle of Equality”. Erich Kistler argues that the Greek concept of 
being a middling citizen, a metrios, belong to the élite and is in direct opposition to a 
“Strong Principle of Equality” that lay behind Athenian democracy.131 This means 
that the high degree of popular participation in politics that occurred in democratic 
Athens cannot be explained by the ideal of being metrios. Kistler’s objection finds 
support in Aristotle, who defines hoi mesoi, the middling citizens, as those who are 
metrios, considered to be a group of citizens who are not rich and not poor, but in the 
middle.132 According to Aristotle, as well as the writer known as the “Old Oligarch”, 
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democracy is not rule by a citizen community of moderate and considerate equals, but 
rule by the poor over the rich.133 This means that a constitution where hoi mesoi were 
in power would not be a democracy, and thus, Athenian democracy cannot be 
explained by the principle of being metrios. Morris anticipates these arguments by 
claiming that “Aristotle reshaped popular ideas of the middle way for his own 
ends”.134 However, Morris’ assessment of metrios as belonging to the demos, or 
people, is problematic, because we know nothing about how the term metrios was 
applied outside the élite.  
 
Erich Kistler criticises Ian Morris for ignoring the oligarchic nature of Greek male 
citizen communities, i.e. poleis. He emphasises the difference between arithmetic and 
geometric equality, and warns against seeing a connection between aristocratic ideals 
of geometric equality, which were in fact oligarchic, and a democratic strong 
principle of arithmetic equality.135 According to Erich Kistler, Morris’ conflict 
between middling and élite ideology fits the situation in the archaic polis, but only in 
the sense of a conflict between moderate and overweening, or hybristic, aristocrats. 
Thus, the ideal of being metrios, or moderate, which is found in archaic poets, in 
particular Hesiod, has nothing to do with the later development of radical democracy 
at Athens.136 
 
Against Morris’ proposed egalitarian ideology among commoners, it can be argued 
that the sources to the archaic period are all from the élite, and that e.g. the poetic 
persona of Hesiod as a middling farmer is a fiction far removed from the masses of 
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any Greek polis. When Hesiod presents himself as a peasant farmer who fights 
against corrupt aristocrats,137 this is not necessarily a source to peasant attitudes, but 
may be those of an aristocrat against other, more extravagant aristocrats. This will be 
discussed further in chapter 3 (3.3.2). 
 
Jonathan Hall is sceptical of Morris’ emphasis on an ideology of equality behind 
popular power. He emphasises practical inclusion in politics as promoting popular 
power, rather than ideas of equality. In his view, Athenian democracy was the result 
of revolutionary action, not ideology.138 I agree with Hall’s assessment of the 
importance of inclusion and practical participation for popular power. Most of all, I 
think it is important to place the archaic ideology of moderation and egalitarianism 
where it belongs, with the élite, and discuss popular power as practice, rather than 
ideology. 
 
The problem of  equality and democracy is pointed out by Robin Osborne, who argues 
that Athenian democracy was not popular rule at all, emphasising that the association 
of equals making out the citizens was a group created by a range of deliberate 
measures and historical conditions, including chattel slavery.139 I agree that popular 
power and Athenian democracy are concepts that must be held separate. However, it 
should not be ignored that Athenian commoners were allowed more participation in 
politics than in most Greek poleis. The exclusion of non-citizens from political 
participation in Athens is beyond the scope of this investigation, as what interests me 
is how citizens and their subgroups participate in politics. However, it is of note that 
Athenian democracy was based on several unique conditions, including chattel 
                                              
137 Hes. Op. 37-39 
138 Hall, “Polis, community, and ethnic identity,” 2007, 45-46 
139 Osborne, Athens and Athenian democracy, 2010, 30-34 
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slavery. This should make us suspicious of ideology as a main explanation for the 
development of Athenian democracy. It should also make us wary of any simplistic 
juxtaposition of Athenian democracy and popular power in general. 
 
The Greek concept of being metrios can hardly be said to form a basis for popular 
participation in politics. It refers to moderation in the sense of being equal to others 
who are metrioi, and not to being equal in the absolute, or arithmetic, sense and 
thereby part of a broad citizen community. There is a contrast between democracy as 
defined by Aristotle, where the poor majority is sovereign in the constitution, and the 
egalitarian ideology of the élite that Morris postulates as the starting point for the 
development of democracy. It is doubtful whether the “middling culture” in Athens 
had anything to do with the poor. Morris tries to solve the problem by arguing that 
many Athenians owned land and therefore could be considered metrioi.140 This seems 
rather desperate, and contrasts strangely with the “Old Oligarch” and Aristotle, who 
portray democratic Athens as mob rule, where the poor hold the rich ransom.141 Why 
is the dichotomy of rich and poor so central in the sources, if it had no basis in reality? 
In answer to this, Morris argues that Aristotle as well as the archaic poets wrote from 
an aristocratic perspective.142 It may well be that the dichotomy of rich and poor in the 
polis is overstated by poets and philosophers. However, if the élite sources cannot be 
trusted, how many other written sources are there?  
 
It is not obvious to whom Greek poets of the archaic period are referring when they 
appeal to a “middle” part of the polis. The problem remains even if one does accept 
that it was a part of élite discourse. Was the “middle” the moderate urban élite or a 
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142 Morris, Archaeology as cultural history, 2000, 161 
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group of well-off farmers? Morris admits the problem, but tries to evade it by 
claiming that all men could be included in the “middle”, to meson.143 In his view, the 
possibility for democracy was an unintended consequence of an aristocratic 
egalitarian ideology.144 It is exactly this point that Kistler elaborates on in his criticism 
of Morris: there can be no causal link between the “middling culture” of archaic 
aristocrats and the normative “middling culture” of democratic Athens.145 However, 
Kistler does not offer any alternative explanation of the development of democracy. 
Thus, both Morris and Kistler reach aporetic conclusions: the emergence of Athenian 
democracy has no direct relation to earlier forms of political organisation in Greece, 
and thus, the emergence of a high degree of political participation in politics remains 
as unique and unexpected as ever. This reinforces the tendency to see Athens as the 
starting point of a unique Western political culture. 
 
The debate between Kistler and Morris in the end leaves Athens as the only 
democracy in the ancient world. Their discussion is instructive, however, because it 
shows the difficulties in recognising popular power in the sources. In my opinion, 
popular power as a historical phenomenon must be studied from its manifestations in 
processes where the citizen community reaches decisions and governs itself. For this 
to be called popular power, however, it must be possible to demonstrate that the 
citizen community was a large group of people and not an élite few. I turn now to 
further discussion of popular power and the problem of élite dominance of the 
decisions taken by the masses. 
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1.5.3 The hidden oligarchy 
Even in a polity where all the citizens have full rights of political participation, the 
situation can arise, through the apathy of the many or the conspiracy of the few, that a 
much smaller group, an élite, reaches all important decisions and controls the polity. 
An important general problem in the analysis of popular power is the so-called Iron 
Law of Oligarchy. The term was coined by Robert Michels for political movements of 
the early last century, and describes how a narrow ruling clique will grow out of any 
democratic group.146 Following this reasoning, élite dominance in democratic 
organisations is inevitable.  
 
For democratic Athens, some scholars contend that power was in the hands of an 
élite. They claim that only a limited élite wielded power in Athens; in the archaic 
period, the people were excluded from politics and the élite continued to dominate in 
the classical democratic polis as well.147 Thus, even in democratic Athens, real power 
was in the hands of the élite, thus excluding any possibility of popular power in 
decision-making bodies. Scholars of the opposite position argue that the masses had 
considerable influence in spite of élite pretences of political and social hegemony; an 
egalitarian political ideology resulted in a constitution where decisions by the 
collective masses actually determined the course of politics.148  
 
Robin Osborne claims that a narrow group of powerful men ran Athens by deciding 
what would be discussed in the popular assembly.149 Against this argument, Josiah 
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Ober contends that discussions in the Athenian assembly constituted a real 
democracy, where the people ran the polis.150 In his argument for élite dominance, 
Osborne emphasises that proposals for decrees came from a limited group from the 
local level of the demes, making the Athenian democracy a representational system, 
and not a direct democracy.151 Ober, however, argues that Athenian orators and 
statesmen followed rules of discourse that were laid down by the assembly, and thus 
followed the initiatives of the masses.152  
 
Osborne’s dichotomy between powerful men of influence and the passive masses 
echoes the analysis of Aristotle that the polis is fundamentally divided between rich 
and poor, discussed above (1.5.1). However, it can be argued that common interests 
did exist and cooperation did occur between the élite and the masses, as seen when 
the Athenian demos rebelled against Isagoras and the Spartan contingent at Athens in 
508/7 and the aristocrat Kleisthenes reformed the political system to become more 
democratic.153 Although Kleisthenes may be said to act as leader of the people, and 
not be one of them as such, the fact remains that rich and poor could have a common 
political agenda. Therefore, insisting on fundamental differences between the élite 
and the masses may obscure other aspects of power and power-sharing in the polis. 
 
It seems that the debate over a real or imaginary Athenian democracy is polarised 
between an elitist view where élites dominate all decision-making without 
transparency of how decisions are made, and a populist view that emphasises the role 
of the assembly as an arena for discussions and decision-making. However, the role of 
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the popular assembly as an arena should not be underestimated: popular power is not 
a question of voting on every single issue as it is a situation of public debate, where 
the collective of citizens is informed, involved and active. Osborne's emphasis on who 
proposes decrees does not sufficiently take the environment in which these decrees 
were proposed into consideration, i.e. the assembly: far from being a situation of 
actual oligarchy under the name of democracy, the Athenian system where proposals 
were open to discussion in the assembly created an environment where people had the 
power to influence their own situation and the direction of decisions. In this sense, 
Ober's emphasis on the discourse between élite orators and the masses sheds light on 
how Athenian democracy worked: the power of the assembly in Athens made 
democrats out of the élite, while involving the masses.  
 
It may be argued that both the elitist and mass-oriented approach overstate their cases, 
in their dichotomy of élite and masses and their focus on social and political 
hierarchy: the first position overestimates the degree of social control of the élite in a 
town or city environment, and the second position is overoptimistic about the ability 
to or interest of the masses in making independent decisions. The insistence on a strict 
division between rulers and ruled, or élite and masses, is typical of a broader 
paradigm in the study of ancient polities, known as the Early State model, that will be 
discussed at length in chapter 2. Suffice it to state here that an alternative approach to 
a model of strict hierarchy is that both élite and masses belong to the same society and 
meet at several junctions. Seen from this perspective, their relationship is 
characterised by dynamic interaction, not static hierarchy. This made popular 
participation in politics possible, in arenas like citizen assemblies, jury-courts and at 
other public meetings, where people could participate as agents structuring their own 
socio-political environment physically and mentally (cf. 2.5).  
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The assembly as a place for the negotiation of interests is useful for a more general 
analysis of popular power. The existence of arena councils is important for popular 
participation in politics and an oligarchic control of the agenda is not necessarily an 
obstacle to popular power in a polity. Rather, the assemblies can be regarded as places 
for the negotiation of interests between the rich and the poor. Thus, a narrow 
corporate strategy would be pursued in delegating decisions to closed councils, 
whereas a broad corporate strategy would delegate them to open assemblies or arena 
councils. In a polity where the narrow corporate strategy was dominant, as in an 
oligarchic polis, the élite in power would try to downplay competition among its 
members in order to appear united and unanimous to the rest of the polis, making 
decisions in closed councils. Typically, this did not work in Greek polities, and élite 
infighting resulted in stasis, civil war. In a polity where the broad corporate strategy 
was dominant, as in a democratic polis, the élite would have to adjust their strategy 
and compete openly in assemblies rather than trying to appear united against the 
masses. The élite would then still dominate much of the dynamics of the polity, but 
would not be able to reach decisions in ways hidden from the public. The masses 
would be present at debates and informed about how policies were formed, even 
though they might not have the resources to influence policies directly by raising 
issues or holding speeches.154 By contrast, in broad élite strategies, the birth élite or 
aristocrats, would not have bothered with the assembly at all, but ruled through an 
exclusive council that simply declared its decisions to the assembly. Likewise, a 
narrow élite strategy is characterised by royal decrees, not discussion in assemblies.   
 
Beyond strategies for power and the inclusion of the masses in the networks these 
strategies make out, there is a further point that should be considered: which people 
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dominate decision-making in the polity and thereby have the most power? In his 
analysis of early democratic poleis in Greece, Eric W. Robinson tries to depart from 
the conflict of rich and poor, and instead uses the concept of being kyrios, 
“sovereign”: ancient democracies are defined as polities where the demos is kyrios.155 
Of course, as Robinson also concedes, this leaves the problem of defining who the 
demos are. To answer this, Robinson suggests that “the meaning of demos, then, 
comprises the entire citizen body, but the nature of this body will vary according to 
the type of polis and the extremity of its demokratia”.156 The approach of looking for 
a sovereign element in the polity has the merit that when popular power is not limited 
to “the rule of the poor”, but more generally as the sovereignty of the people, a 
comparative structural analysis can be made between Athenian democracy and other 
forms of political organisation in Greece. Also, this kind of approach can be used to 
analyse non-Greek polities, in order to say something about popular participation in 
politics, without limiting the analysis to whether it falls short of Athenian standards or 
not. The idea of a sovereign element irrespective of the formal organisation of the 
polity throws light on situations where the masses take control of the polity or the 
rulers concede special rights to urban populations. Although the people cannot be said 
to rule the polity through a formal assembly, they can still be said to have a decisive 
influence in their polity, thereby having power.  
 
As will be seen in the present investigation, although sovereign popular assemblies 
are hard to find in Near Eastern sources, there are indications that citizen 
communities, in the sense of collectives of citizens with broad access to participation, 
had authority in some questions. A definition of popular power as the sovereignty of 
the citizen community is thus quite useful for a comparative analysis. Problems 
concerning the definition of citizen communities themselves remain, however, for 
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most ancient city-states. Who were the active citizens and how were they defined? As 
will be seen below (1.5.4), for Near Eastern polities the sources are ambiguous at 
best. Only in a few cases can we hope to be able to make a distinction between 
collective organs of decision-making dominated by limited élite groups and collective 
organs of decision-making where power was in the hands of the common people. 
Tentatively, the latter would be cases where the participation of the citizen 
community as a large group is specifically mentioned, in contrast to more restricted 
councils of the élite or of royal appointees.  
 
1.5.4 Defining the citizen community 
Defining the citizen community and relationships between rich and poor, élite and 
commoners, are not problems exclusive to discussions of the Greek poleis, but 
concern ancient polities in general. There are several examples from Near Eastern 
polities that illustrate the difficulties involved in defining a “people” or “group of 
citizens”. In the following, I will discuss the problem of recognising “the people” in 
ancient Near Eastern sources. Also, I will discuss problems of defining the totality of 
the citizen community, beyond the dichotomy of rich and poor, rulers and ruled. I will 
return to debates on the definition and range of meaning of specific terms in the 
relevant chapters throughout this investigation.  
 
A clear example of difficulties in defining the people can be found in the Old 
Babylonian Codex Hammurapi. There is a difference in status between an awīlum and 
a muškenum, two terms for inhabitants of the Old Babylonian kingdom. What did this 
difference imply and where did it come from? The term awīlum is sometimes 
translated “citizen”, but it is not entirely clear what this implies. The basic meaning of 
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awīlum is “human being”, more specifically “man” or “free man, gentleman”.157 In 
some paragraphs of the Codex Hammurapi it denotes a man who has a higher status 
than those not thus signified, i.e. awīlum is apparently used in the sense of a “free 
citizen”, in contrast to a man of lower status, muškenum or a slave, waradum. In the 
Codex Hammurapi, the muškenum  evidently has a lower status than that of an 
awīlum, but it is not clear why and in which respects. This particular contrast between 
awīlum and muškenum only appears in Old Babylonian.158 Generally, muškenum 
means a commoner, a person not liable to service,159 or a poor man.160 The meaning 
of awīlum and muškenum in Old Babylonian will be discussed further in chapter 4 
(4.3.1). Suffice it to state here that the awīlum appears as a person of high status in 
Old Babylonian. Problems begin when one meets the term awīlum in sources from 
other periods, where the status connotations of the term are not explicit. Does awīlum 
mean a common citizen or a member of the élite? 
 
As will be seen (4.7.3), awīlum is also used of the inhabitants of a city or town 
collectively, without status differentiations, as in the evidence from Old Babylonian 
Mari. In fact, throughout the Akkadian evidence discussed in this investigation, 
awīlum is the most common term for “man”, “citizen”, or “inhabitant”. There are no 
hints in the texts to determine whether these were citizens of elevated status in 
relation to a less distinguished mass of citizens. When there is reference to the 
inhabitants of a town, the terms “the men of the city GN” (in Sumerian “LÚmeš URU 
GN” or in Akkadian “awīlū āl GN”) and “the sons of the city GN” (in Sumerian 
“DUMUmeš URU GN” or in Akkadian “mārē āl GN”), are used apparently in the 
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same sense. It is difficult to say whether the reference includes everyone, or whether 
the term only applies to a distinguished group among the residents.  
 
In the plural, awīlūtu means “people (old and young, male and female)” in the sense 
of the “population of a city or country”. This is the case in the Amarna letters from the 
Late Bronze Age.161 The Amarna letters will be discussed in chapter 6. Suffice it to 
state here that the meaning “people” implies a general use of the term awīlum, with no 
explicit differentiation between the statuses of inhabitants.  
 
In the Old Assyrian tablets from the “merchant colony” kārum Kanesh, discussed in 
chapter 5, those attending the assembly of merchants are qualified by a distinction 
between “great and small” (seher u rabi). What distinguishes “the great” from “the 
small” is not very clear, but where they are mentioned together, it is apparently in the 
sense of “everyone” regardless of distinction. The distinction between “small and 
great” is not very widespread outside Old Assyrian texts, however.  
 
References to inhabitants of towns and cities in Near Eastern sources can be 
interpreted in a collective sense. However, it would be erroneous to suppose that 
general references to inhabitants without discrimination means that all citizens of 
Near Eastern polities were equal. It is not clear who are included in the reference to 
e.g. “the men of GN”. It may refer strictly to a limited group or perhaps the elders of 
the community. This difficulty can be seen in Mogens Trolle Larsen’s argument (cf. 
6.7), that in some Neo-Babylonian texts, it is clear that the inhabitants of Babylon or 
their elders were respected by the Assyrian kings as parts in negotiations and that the 
                                              
161 CAD A II, 1968, 57-62, in particular amīlūtu 1c, 60 
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inhabitants of Babylonian cities had certain privileges in the Neo-Assyrian Empire.162 
How can it be determined whether the citizens are meant, or just their elders? It 
appears highly likely that when the Assyrian king addresses “the city”, he implies the 
Babylonians as a collective, a corporate group. However, it is not clear whether this 
group was narrow or broad in its composition.  
 
Collective terms such as “the city”, are notoriously ambiguous. In Sumerian and 
Akkadian, URU or ālum, “town, city” can mean a city as a social organisation in the 
form of a council of elders163 a collective legal person making decisions,164 or the 
collective of inhabitants.165 The Akkadian term for assembly, puhrum, likewise has a 
wide range of meanings. It means assembly, council or group.166 More specific, it is 
used in the sense of “city assembly, popular assembly”.167 According to CAD, puhrum 
in the sense of “assembly” in Old Babylonian and older texts was “an official body, 
convened sometimes by the king, which had judicial and perhaps administrative 
functions”.168 It is not easy to make precise distinctions between this body and others 
mentioned in the Akkadian texts, as they often operate together or in similar 
situations. According to the CAD, “the functional relation of this body [the Old 
Babylonian puhrum] to the city elders (šībut ālim) or its free members (awīlu) acting 
in judicial matters remains unclear”.169  
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Whether one chooses the one or the other interpretation of these terms is of course not 
without consequences for a socio-political analysis. The interpretation of local 
communities in the Old Babylonian Mari correspondence discussed in chapter 4 is a 
case in point (cf. 4.7.3): Daniel E. Fleming argues that in these letters, words for 
town, council or assembly are used fluidly and in ways that can only be made clear by 
context, but not so that it is possible to define institutions with fixed constituents. He 
decides, however, to interpret them in an inclusive sense, as a corporate entity.170 
How such collectives are interpreted may appear to be a question of faith.  
 
A further example of the ambiguity of collective references can be found from the 
Neo-Assyrian evidence discussed in chapter 6 (cf. 6.6.2): Marc Van De Mieroop 
emphasises the importance of privileges (kidinnūtu) as an indication of the high status 
of Babylonian urban populations and the respect they commanded of their Neo-
Assyrian rulers.171 However, it is not straightforward to decide whether the urban 
population was defined as a broad or a narrow group. It can be argued that urban 
inhabitants were recognised as a whole, i.e. a citizen collective with certain privileges. 
However, this must be investigated in each particular case: in some letters it is a 
practical impossibility that the entire urban population is referred to, whereas in 
others, the evidence is more ambiguous. 
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1.6 Difficulties concerning sources to ancient politics 
Concerning political structures and practices, from the Greek side, the textual 
evidence, mostly literature, provides us with discussions of ideas and analyses of 
politics, whereas from the Near Eastern side, the textual evidence, mostly documents, 
provides us with the bare mention of decisions being reached or just the titles of 
officials and decision-making bodies. This disparity of sources makes it impossible to 
make a one-to-one comparison between popular participation in politics in Greek 
polities and popular participation in politics in Near Eastern polities. Of course, it 
could be conceivable to go beyond the Greek literary evidence and focus on 
inscriptions and other archaeological material.172 That would, however, make a 
comparison of structures even more difficult, since what is known about Greek 
political culture for the main part comes from the literary evidence. Likewise, it could 
be conceivable to focus on Near Eastern literary evidence rather than the documentary 
evidence.173 However, this approach would tell us nothing about the reality of the 
political structures discussed or how representative these structures would be.  
 
Administrative or legal documents, on the other hand, are not totally free from fiction: 
they may be formulaic and mention groups that did not really take part in making 
decisions, or at least, did not have final authority. This is evident in the poleis under 
Hellenistic and Roman rule that continued to record that decisions were reached by 
the demos kai boule, the people and council, although ruled by foreign authorities, or 
in imperial Rome, where all decisions were officially taken by the Senatus 
PopulusQue Romanus, the Senate and the people of Rome, although power was in the 
hands of the emperor. The republican background of these polities may make them 
special cases, preserving republican formulae out of pure conservatism. From the 
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central point of view of the Hellenistic or Roman authorities, the people’s real opinion 
hardly mattered. However, on a local level, the involvement of the imperial 
authorities was limited to what was of interest to them, in particular military 
allegiance and the fulfilment of fiscal duties. Therefore, the formulae were probably 
not completely empty even in Hellenistic or Roman times. Conversely, Near Eastern 
documents, in particular building-inscriptions routinely attribute building-activities to 
the king, although other people of course did the actual construction. These factors 
should be kept in mind. However, in spite of these potential problems, the most 
sensible approach in my opinion is to compare the Greek literary evidence with the 
Near Eastern documentary evidence for the investigation of similarities and 
differences in political structures. 
 
Scholars know more about the ideal of the Greek polis than life in the polis itself and 
most of their literary sources come from the restricted élite of men of letters. The 
ancient Near Eastern world, on the other hand, can in several cases be studied from 
the remains of its clay-tablet equivalent of a wastepaper basket, unedited and 
incomplete. These cuneiform documents range from complete archives of official 
letters, administrative lists, contracts, and legal documents, to scraps and discarded 
copies of texts. It is not possible to answer all questions about political culture in great 
detail. The nature of the sources simply does not allow it. The present state of 
knowledge is incomplete, but it is not likely that the study of more texts will change 
this any time soon. As seen above (1.5.4), the vocabulary for citizen corporations and 
decision-making bodies is fundamentally ambiguous. What, then, can be done if one 
wishes to compare polities of Greece and the Near East? 
 
There is a need for a conceptual framework that can be used to investigate both Greek 
and Near Eastern city-states, without having to rely exclusively on Latin or Greek 
terms such as republic, democracy, or oligarchy. It has been suggested above (1.4.2) 
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how this problem can be remedied by discussing strategies for power rather than 
constitutions. In chapter 2, the relations between this approach of strategic analysis 
and more traditional approaches to political structure will be discussed, in particular 
the Early State model. 
 
With these caveats in mind, a comparative investigation of polities can be undertaken. 
I will concentrate on the citizen community and its manifestations in the political 
process, rather than on constitutional nomenclature, and focus on popular 
participation in politics on a sliding scale rather than whether the polities fit 
definitions of democracy, oligarchy, or autocracy.  
 
1.6.1 Further considerations of difficulties in sources to archaic 
Greek poleis 
The epics of Hesiod and Homer provide the earliest discussions of political decision-
making processes between members of polis communities (cf. 3.3). The value of these 
texts as sources to early poleis is controversial, however. In particular the relations 
between the mythical past in the Odyssey and Iliad and the realities of the times of 
Homer, conventionally dated to the 8th century, have been much debated. The 
uncertainties regarding the date of Homer, the nature of politics in the Homeric world, 
and its relations to later developments make it dangerous to base a discussion of early 
poleis on the Homeric epics. Although there is useful information provided by Homer 
regarding the ideologies of archaic societies, epics must be used with caution as 
sources to social realities. On the other hand, the Iliad and Odyssey were models for 
behaviour for the élite in Greek polities and therefore are indirect sources to political 
strategies and the habitus of agents pursuing these strategies (for the concepts of 
agency and habitus, cf.2.5; 2.6).  
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Hesiod is also a difficult source to archaic Greek society; his descriptions of rural 
town life in archaic Greece contain much of interest regarding social struggles and 
political life. However, Hesiod’s peasant persona should not be taken at face value 
and his probable élite background as a leisured poet must be taken into consideration. 
 
An exceptional source to archaic poleis is the so-called Great Rhetra, the constitution 
of Sparta attributed to Lykourgos (cf. 3.4.1). Parts of the Rhetra are preserved in 
Tyrtaios. Lykourgos’ entire putative reforms are presented by Plutarch. The account 
in Plutarch is quite detailed and full of anecdotes and additional information not 
found in Tyrtaios. Its level of detail should be viewed with suspicion. The figure 
Lykourgos probably belongs to the world of myth. The Great Rhetra is an interesting 
text, however, its regulations seeming to refer to the struggle for establishing good 
political order. The Great Rhetra gives an impression of the interrelated institutions 
of an archaic polis, notably a council of elders and kings and the popular assembly, 
and attempts at balancing the influence of different socio-economic groups among the 
citizens.  
 
Archaic poetry, or rather, the remains of it, provides sources to the inside of Greek 
politics and life in the archaic poleis. In chapter 3, I will use this evidence as indirect 
sources to the activities of agents in their polities and their strategies for power. I will 
also use epic and archaic poetry as sources to political institutions and structures of 
archaic poleis. Archaic poetry will form the bulk of evidence discussed for poleis 
other than Athens. Archaic Athens is discussed extensively by Herodotos, and his 
Histories will be used as a source to the period of Peisistratid tyranny and the reforms 
of Kleisthenes.  
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Later Greek literary sources will also be used, although this admittedly is problematic, 
as events and people of the archaic period tended to be reinterpreted in subsequent 
periods. Solon the democrat is a prominent example: Solon is regarded by some 
scholars as a crucial figure in the development of democracy at Athens.174  Others 
regard him as important in the development of Athens from an aristocratic polis to a 
citizen-state, but do not see him as a democrat at all.175 Several of the archaic poets 
had achieved mythical status by classical times. I will therefore treat the later 
traditions about archaic personages with great suspicion. However, it is evident that 
the struggles of different socio-economic groups within archaic poleis can be seen in 
the works of Theognis and Solon. This makes it possible to use archaic poetry as 
sources to social and political struggles. It must be kept in mind, however, that it is far 
from certain that anything comparable to the masses is represented in the sources to 
these struggles. As seen with the concept of equality in Greek political thought 
discussed above (1.5.1; 1.5.2), social divisions in archaic Greece are defined by the 
élite. It is difficult to decide to whom the poets are referring when discussing 
conflicting parties in archaic poleis. Poets are frequently speaking of the “good” 
against the “bad”, but the implication of these terms are not self-apparent, and seem to 
differ between poets according to the political situation in their native poleis.  
 
The value of the archaic poets as sources is difficult to assess. Poets provide insights 
into the social struggles of archaic poleis. However, they are obviously partisan 
spokesmen for their own socio-economic group, the élite. Some, like Theognis or 
Alkaios, appear as aristocrats or members of the birth élite of their home poleis, 
others, like Solon, had an official position in his home polis as political reformer and 
mender of the laws.  Solon’s poems are good sources to the struggles for power and 
influence in archaic Athens and the different strategies for power that were pursued 
                                              
174 Wallace, “Solonian democracy,” 1998, 11-29  
175 Raaflaub, “Homer to Solon: the rise of the polis,” 1993, 42 
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by citizens. However, there is a high risk that scholars project political attitudes and 
practices of the classical period back into agents from the archaic period: since we 
know that the Athenian constitution was democratic in the classical period, it is easy 
to interpret all developments in Athens as leading towards democracy. I will attempt 
to use the archaic poets as evidence for the archaic period and avoid discussion of the 
later reception of their poetry and assessments of their political activities. With the 
exception of Hesiod and Homer, all the poets discussed in chapter 3 have come down 
to us in fragments only. I use the Loeb editions of the archaic poets and all references 
are to those editions unless otherwise noted.176 
 
The archaic poets provide insights into the politics of their native poleis. Alkaios 
wrote partisan poetry from the point of view of the élite (cf. 3.4.4). His attacks on the 
popular tyrant Pittakos and the people of Mytilene give valuable insights into 
strategies of power in an archaic polis. Aristocratic views of social changes and stasis 
can also be found in Theognis of Megara (cf. 3.4.5). He is particularly preoccupied 
with social status and the collapse of values in his home polis. The impression from 
these archaic poleis is that of rapid changes and a wide range of strategies pursued in 
order to secure power and influence or avoid exploitation at the hands of others. 
Stasis, civil war, seems endemic, and exile the lot of the losing group. Complicity of 
the masses with popular leaders and a plethora of groups, cliques and clubs of the 
élite appear to have resulted in multiple lines of conflict in archaic poleis. Popular 
power in Greek poleis has been set in relation to an egalitarian civic ideology in 
archaic Greek communities, a proposal that has been debated extensively.177 As 
discussed above (1.5), the image of the polis as an egalitarian citizen collective is not 
self-evident.  
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177 Morris, Archaeology as social history, 2000; Kistler, ““Kampf der Mentalitäten”: Ian Morris’ “Elitist-“ versus 
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The sources to archaic poleis are complicated by a change of perspective from the 
archaic to the classical period: whereas Solon, Alkaios, or Theognis wrote poetry 
from a partisan perspective or at least from the point of view of their own 
experiences, the prose of the classical period purports to give disinterested or 
balanced analyses of events in the past. This is further complicated by the fact that 
much of the poetry from the archaic period that is preserved and thus available as 
sources to historians today was preserved in the works of classical writers. A case in 
point is the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia that offers excerpts from Solon’s poetry to 
illustrate the development of the Athenian constitution into a democracy (cf. 3.4.2). 
The archaic sources have thus been made part of an analysis and are presented in a 
certain analytical context before modern historians make up their mind about them. 
 
The study of archaic poleis is to a high degree influenced by the uneven distribution 
of the sources, in practice limiting detailed study to Athens and to a certain degree 
Sparta. This is hardly a coincidence, since several classical philosophers and sophists 
lived and worked in democratic Athens while celebrating a constitution modeled on 
that of Sparta. This has no doubt influenced the state of preservation of the available 
sources throughout the history of scholarship, no less since posterity has shared this 
particularistic interest in all things Athenian and Spartan. However, there is enough 
information from other poleis as well, to be able to give a fairly balanced picture of 
the political structure and strategies in archaic poleis. 
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1.7 Prospects for a comparative analysis: the Near Eastern 
sources 
To justify the claim that there were structural similarities with regards to popular 
power between Greek and Near Eastern city-states, it is necessary to find situations 
where the people actually were in charge or at least had a decisive influence on 
decisions. Some suggestions were made above (1.4.2), regarding broad and narrow 
corporate strategies. The following is a brief summary of sources to Near Eastern 
polities where the existence of popular power may be established and where they will 
be discussed. The situation of the sources and the relevant editions used will be 
discussed independently for each polity or polities throughout chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
 
The discussions of the Near Eastern evidence are organised under three different 
headers: chapter 4, “Local politics in network states”, concerns evidence for local 
institutions in cities in the Old Babylonian state and local communities in the Old 
Babylonian Mari kingdom. Local institutions and their relations to central authorities 
are investigated in particular. Chapter 5, “Local power in commercial cities and 
merchant enclaves” concerns evidence from the Old Assyrian merchant ventures in 
Anatolia to the organisation of the Old Assyrian city-state and its colonies. It also 
concerns evidence for the relations between local communities and merchant 
corporations of the Late Bronze Age kingdom of Ugarit. The organisation of 
merchant communities and the role of central authorities in polities predominantly 
geared to trade are investigated. Chapter 6, “Autonomy and popular power in city-
states under foreign empire”, concerns evidence from the Amarna letters that were 
sent by petty rulers of Late Bronze Age Syrian cities to the Egyptian Pharaoh. It also 
concerns evidence for the internal organisation of Neo-Babylonian cities in the Neo-
Assyrian Empire and the position of these cities in the empire. The local decision-
making bodies and the corporate identity of cities in foreign empires are investigated. 
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Possible examples of popular power are the local institutions of polities and 
communities discussed in letters from the Old Babylonian kingdom Mari.178 These 
will be discussed in chapter 4. Further possible examples are the assemblies of Old 
Assyrian Assur and its merchant colonies, the kārum Kanesh in particular.179 These 
will be discussed in chapter 5. Popular revolt and collective decisions may be found 
from the Syrian city-states of the Late Bronze Age documented in the Amarna 
letters.180 This will be discussed in chapter 6. The Neo-Babylonian city-states under 
Assyrian dominion appear to have had a high degree of autonomy.181 This will also be 
discussed in chapter 6. To varying degrees, evidence from these polities and 
communities show how collective organs of decision-making at times had 
considerable influence on politics and that the people could gainsay their rulers.  
 
In order to discuss the dynamics between élite and collective rule or narrow and broad 
corporate strategies and narrow and broad élite strategies for power, open collective 
arena councils must be discerned from closed élite councils. As will be seen 
throughout this investigation, there were polities where a larger part of the citizen 
community participated in assemblies and where large assemblies played a more 
significant role than in other polities. Documents that mention the existence of large 
assemblies of people are particularly important for testing the thesis of popular power 
in ancient polities, as well as instances where mass action had decisive political 
effects. 
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No ancient polity outside Greece can be called a democracy by Athenian standards. 
However, were there polities beyond classical Athens with a degree of popular 
participation in politics? In the discussions of documentary evidence to Near Eastern 
polities in chapters 4, 5, and 6, the importance of popular participation in politics will 
be made apparent. By comparison with the literary evidence to Greek political culture 
investigated in chapter 3, I hope to be able to demonstrate the similarities of political 
culture between East and West and to falsify the perception that there were 
fundamental differences between East and West with regard to popular participation 
in politics. The comparative analyses are found in chapter 7. 
 
The polities that will be investigated range from cities to towns, pastoralist camps to 
city neighbourhoods. Rather than claiming that popular power somehow originated 
somewhere in the Near East and spread to the West, I will focus on the conditions for 
popular power and the similarities and differences in structure between polities. The 
strategies for power pursued by groups within these polities will be paid particular 
attention, as well as the institutions through which these strategies could be realised. 
Indicative of popular participation in politics will be general access to arenas where 
information was spread, opinions were formed, and conflicting views were voiced. 
An important aspect is also whether the people were judged by their fellows in jury 
courts. Further, indicative of popular power will be the possibility for the people to 
reach binding decisions and choosing their rulers and officials.  
 
I will attempt to unravel the conflicting strategies of limited élites and the masses, and 
how these strategies were pursued within the framework of kingdoms, cities and local 
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communities. In this way, it will be made clear that Near Eastern polities were more 
complex than the autocratic kingdoms invoked by classicist scholars. It will become 
apparent that Asiatics were not of a slave-like nature, but capable of political action 
through assemblies and councils. 
 
In the next chapter, I will argue that the idea that there were fundamental differences 
between ancient Eastern and Western political developments is not simply a case of 
ignoring evidence to popular power in the ancient Near East. Rather, the view of 
popular participation in politics as unique to the Western world is a consequence of 
the popularity among scholars of exclusively hierarchic models to Near Eastern 














2. Polities, citizens and social structures 
2.1 Introduction 
In studies of ancient politics, the image of fundamental differences in Eastern and 
Western political culture is often invoked, between autocratic traditions in the East 
and popular power in the West. In this chapter, the methodological and theoretical 
background for this perceived difference in Eastern and Western ancient politics will 
be investigated. The polities of Mesopotamia have been regarded as autocratic, even 
absolutist, with all-powerful authorities based in temples and palaces.182 Scholars 
have regarded the division between rulers and ruled as fundamental to state formation 
as well as state function, corresponding to a model for early state societies termed the 
“early state” or the “archaic state”.183 In contrast, the Greeks have been regarded as 
breakers of this tradition, in establishing poleis, city-states that were also citizen-
states, where the people participated in government of the polity.184 The view that 
there was a fundamental difference between Greek poleis and city-states elsewhere 
has been challenged by Mogens Herman Hansen and his colleagues at the 
Copenhagen Polis Centre, with their comparative studies of several city-state 
cultures. Their studies reveal the high degree of structural similarity between different 
city-states, from Bronze Age Mesopotamia to Early Medieval Ireland.185 Still, the 
Greek polis is regarded as the only city-state with genuine popular rule: Near Eastern 
city-states are regarded as monarchies ruled by powerful kings with a strong bond to 
                                              
182 Hammond, The city in the ancient world, 1972, 148-149 
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the divine world. Only occasionally did these kings rule in collusion with an oligarchy 
of élite members, referred to as elders, and never were they citizen-states.186  
 
In this chapter, it will be argued that behind this negative assessment of the possibility 
of popular participation in the politics of polities outside Greece are not so much 
fundamental differences in political structure and culture, as a tendency to look at 
Greek and Near Eastern polities in rather different ways: in studies of Greek poleis, 
there is an emphasis on institutions and their function, in particular the unique 
institutional structure of Athens, with its assembly, proboleutic council, and jury 
courts.187 In this kind of analysis, the citizens’ values and actions are motivated by the 
normative orientation given by the social system and its institutions.188 In Near 
Eastern studies, on the other hand, there is a prevalence of neo-evolutionist theory and 
early state models that emphasises a division between rulers and ruled.189 In this 
chapter, it will be argued that there are alternative approaches in sociological theory 
that make it possible to investigate popular participation in the politics of Near 
Eastern as well as Greek polities.190 I will argue that neo-evolutionist and élite-
oriented theories are part of the reason why scholars ignore evidence for popular 
power in Near Eastern politics: the early state model and its derivatives serve as 
templates for analyses that consistently regard East and West as fundamentally 
different with regard to political culture (cf. 1.3). I will discuss the early state model 
in detail first (2.2), followed by its varieties the two-sector model and the patrimonial 
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household model (2.3). Then, I will investigate the structural-functionalist approach 
to state institutions and political organisation (2.4). In the remaining sections of this 
chapter (2.5-9), I will present alternative approaches to social analysis that takes 
agents and their strategies into full consideration. I will show how this approach 
explains more material than neo-evolutionary or structural-functionalist approaches. 
 
As will be seen in the following, in the early state, and its variety the two-sector 
model, as well as the alternative model of the patrimonial household, there are 
insuperable divisions between rulers and ruled and society is ruled from the top down. 
These models have no place for interaction between rulers and ruled or the mutual 
influence between citizens and political structure, what can be termed the dualism of 
agency and structure. As will be made clear in the sections 2.5-9, approaches that 
focus on multiple strategies for power and the role of agency in the political structure 
can explain polities in the ancient world better than theories based on hierarchies and 
reconstructions based on institutions alone. 
    
2.2 Climbing to state-hood: the neo-evolutionary ladder 
model 
Neo-evolutionism in the fields of ancient history and archaeology refers to the 
writings of anthropologically oriented scholars from the 1940s onwards that were 
concerned with the development of human civilisation and the state.191  The theory 
involves a succession of stages in the development of pre-industrial societies, labelled 
                                              
191 Childe, “The urban revolution,” 1959; Adams, The evolution of urban society, 1966; Fried, The evolution of political 
society, 1967; Service, Origins of the state and civilisation, 1975; Van De Mieroop, The ancient Mesopotamian city, 1997. 
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savagery, barbarism, and civilisation vel sim.192  According to neo-evolutionist theory, 
human societies on their way to civilisation or state-hood have evolved through a 
succession of such identifiable stages. Elman Service states that “mobile hunting-
gathering bands, the more settled horticultural villages, and the dense, nearly-urban 
populations of chiefdoms and primitive empires may be viewed as evolutionary 
stages, each with appropriate kinds of cultural institutions”.193 According to Morton 
Fried, at the top of the evolutionary ladder is a stratified society with political 
institutions on state level. The stratified society is characterised by an unevenly 
distributed access to basic resources. These socio-economic differences are protected 
by state institutions and the state thus develops from these relations and the 
institutions that protect them.194 This model obviously draws on Karl Marx’ ideas 
about society as evolving through stages characterised by specific modes of 
production.195 A will be seen (2.3), Marx’ model of the Asiatic mode of production in 
particular has played a significant role in the interpretation of Near Eastern societies. 
The neo-evolutionary model has a great advantage over models based on diffusion of 
statehood from a supposed cradle of civilisation in that it can explain the development 
of the state as socio-economic changes regardless of cultural contacts. However, as 
will be argued in the following, with its rigorous division of rulers and ruled, most of 
the political dynamics between citizens and the governing institutions are left out of 
the analysis. 
 
A milestone in the application of neo-evolutionary theory is the monograph The 
Evolution of Urban Society by Robert McC. Adams (1966). Adams explained the 
separate developments of the state in early Mesopotamia and prehispanic Mexico in 
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194 Fried, The evolution of political society, 1967, 185-186 
195 Cf. Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, 1969 [1857-1858], 375-413 
 101 
purely socio-economic terms. Interestingly, he terms “urban society” in the 
singular.196  This implies that although the development in Mexico was historically 
unrelated to Mesopotamia, the two are structurally parallel. Since the publication of 
The Evolution of Urban Society, the neo-evolutionary theory and its step-ladder model 
has been the most influential approach to state formation in ancient Near Eastern 
studies.197 The neo-evolutionary theory has been applied to a great variety of 
societies, from the rise of the Zulu state in modern times to the origins of civilization 
in Mesopotamia and Mesoamerica, Egypt and China.198 It is the focus on parallelism 
of structures rather than cultural diffusion that gives neo-evolutionary theory and its 
models its universal appeal among archaeologists and historians.  
 
The neo-evolutionary approach can be exemplified by the work of Morton Fried, who 
offers an evolutionary model where society goes through successive stages of 
economic and political organisation measured in degrees of limited access to basic 
resources and formalised hierarchy. These stages are termed egalitarian, ranked and 
stratified society. At the top of the ladder is a stratified society that becomes a state.199 
Thus, ancient societies are regarded as developing state-like structures to protect 
privileges and organise the exploitation of economic and social inequality. The 
stratified society that develops into an early state has a large group of exploited that 
are held in place by the developing state structures and these structures do not work in 
their interests, but are beyond their influence. The early state is a stark contrast to the 
egalitarian bands of pre-state societies, where influence is distributed evenly among 
all members. Nothing remains of this egalitarian organisation in the early state, which 
can only be analysed as relations between rulers and ruled.   
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Even if the simplified trajectory of an evolution in disparate stages is accepted, it may 
be asked how complete the transition from one evolutionary stage to the next was. 
Were all relations transformed when moving from the level of a tribe into an early 
state? It can be argued that increased hierarchy only covers one aspect of political 
integration, that between rulers and the ruled. It does not describe all socio-political 
relations between people or how society was organised at all levels. The early state 
has little room for strategies for power other than those of the group at the top of the 
hierarchy, the élite. The only dimension of power is leadership, manifested in the 
early state and its institutions. This aspect of neo-evolutionist theory is criticised by 
Adam T. Smith, who argues that “the State must give way to studies that investigate 
the active constitution of political authority”. He points out that theories of the archaic 
state operate with a leap to statehood rather than the active constitution of 
authority.200  Smith argues that studies should focus on conditions that create 
authority, rather than the state as a unit.201 I agree that this it is necessary to study how 
authority is created through strategies, in order to understand ancient politics. 
However, Smith does not indicate how the actions of the masses can be included in a 
study of the constitution of authority, focusing instead on landscapes and their 
manipulation or utilisation by regimes as constituting factors.202 In my opinion, there 
must be an explicit investigation of the role of all citizens, not just the élite and the 
governing institutions, in order to understand ancient polities and their politics. 
Agency from levels of the social structure below the élite is outside the early state 
model. This is a problem that cannot be addressed solely by looking at landscape. The 
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spatial dimension of Mesopotamian cities and their political implications will be 
discussed further below (2.9). 
 
According to Fried, leadership is obtained through the control of the means of 
production. The uneven distribution of the means of production means that some will 
be able to exert power over others. With the institutionalisation of access to resources, 
society becomes formally hierarchic. The institutionalisation of private property, 
increased population and restricted access to land leads to exploitation of the labour 
of those who do not own land.203  
 
In this scenario of the development of hierarchies, a further problem with neo-
evolutionary theory becomes evident: it operates with a closed perspective on society, 
with no alternatives for those with restricted access to resources. If people had no 
alternative, the hierarchy would necessarily be absolute, in consequence of the uneven 
ratio of winners to losers in a zero-sum game for prosperity and the need for 
maintenance by force of the existing relations of property. This was, however, not 
always the case in developing societies in the past. As pointed out by Elizabeth C. 
Stone, differences in property relations do not necessarily lead to coercion, because 
there are alternative strategies for marginalised groups, including emigration and 
changes in subsistence strategies from agriculture to nomadic pasturage.204  It can also 
be argued that land ownership does not result in unbreakable hierarchies, because 
land can be held in common by families, so that their poorer members have at least 
some access to resources. In consideration of such alternatives, the strict hierarchy of 
an early state society is less self-evident.  
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It could be argued that the state emerged exactly as a cage to hem people in and 
provide workers on the available land that was controlled by the élite. However, 
would it not be easier to make life in the state attractive than to prevent people from 
fleeing? The latter approach to state formation can be found in Elman Service, also a 
neo-evolutionist, who introduces the concept of chiefdom as an intermediary level 
between egalitarian segmental societies and true states.205 Rather than looking at the 
early state as confirming and protecting socio-economic inequality, Service 
emphasises what he terms integrative theories: the chief is able to establish a state 
based on chiefdom because a state is more effective in promoting the interests of the 
members of society. The chief shapes the further development of society towards a 
state.206  
 
A weakness with Service’s model is that it does not explain why people would 
willingly give up their autonomy, other than that they would wish to avoid the 
negative consequences of anarchy. It can be argued that the alternative to the despotic 
rule of a chief is not chaos: institutionalised leadership in a stratified society does not 
necessarily stand in opposition to forms of popular participation in politics, 
institutionalised or not. However, popular participation has no place in Service’s 
model for society’s path from chiefdom to the true state; it describes the result of 
integration in terms of increased hierarchy.  
 
Neo-evolutionist theory operates with a step-ladder model where the theoretical end-
point of social evolution is an early state, before the development of true states. A 
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mentioned above, the universal application of neo-evolutionist theory is emphasised 
by its advocates. Henri J. M. Claessen and Peter Skalník, editors of a volume 
published in 1978 titled The Early State, claim that comparative studies “have 
demonstrated that the structure, functioning and evolution of early states of all times 
and places show marked similarities”.207  Claessen and Skalník propose a working 
definition of the early state as “the organization for the regulation of social relations 
in a society that is divided into two divergent social classes, the rulers and the 
ruled”.208  In the same volume, Ronald Cohen analyses the state as characterised by 
the division between rulers and ruled into a dualistic class system. The ruling group is 
culturally differentiated from those who are ruled.209 In his view, “the details of 
political culture focus on the value of superior-subordinate relations”.210 Thus, early 
states produce “an ideological support system” to promote a political culture which 
legitimises hierarchical control.211  
 
The state understood in neo-evolutionist terms is the manifestation of the relations 
between rulers and ruled. All social and political relations are described in terms of a 
subordinate-superior division. Peter Skalník emphasises that early states were 
characterised by the presence of a political economy, where competition for office 
was a key concern.212 However, political activity was restricted to the ruling 
hierarchy: “in the political sphere the division between the state and the community, 
the rulers and the ruled was complete”.213 Thus, only the élite take part in running the 
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polity and reaching decisions. As in the models of Fried and Service discussed above, 
popular participation in politics is impossible, or at any rate falls outside the analysis 
of power relations. 
 
In neo-evolutionary theory, the Greek poleis, where citizens ruled and were being 
ruled in turn, do not fit. Presumably, Greek political practices must be regarded as 
exceptions to the principles of political evolution of increased stratification towards 
hierarchy and despotic rule. In neo-evolutionist approaches, citizens are treated as 
passive and powerless. The state is described in terms of hierarchy solely and does not 
take into consideration other possibilities for political integration, including initiatives 
from outside the élite and the existence of vertical ties between rich and poor that 
transcend hierarchy. An explanation of the state in terms of increased hierarchy based 
on land ownership and other relations of property ignores other processes of political 
and social integration, among them the self-determined wish to live in a state society 
and the solidarity of the citizen community. The view of egalitarian relations of power 
as primitive and belonging to an early stage in the process of state formation further 
excludes alternatives to the early state model and its hierarchic organisation. 
 
The view of power and social cohesion found in the neo-evolutionary theory is also 
found in two other influential models for ancient polities, the two-sector model and 
the patrimonial household model that will be discussed briefly in the following, 
before discussing alternative approaches to the analysis of ancient polities.  
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2.3 The two-sector model and the patrimonial household 
Scholars studying ancient societies tend to emphasise a divide between the city, as the 
seat of the ruling institutions, and the town or countryside, where ordinary people 
lived and worked. As will be seen, this approach creates an insuperable divide 
between rulers and ruled. Similar to the early state model discussed above, it leaves 
no room for political agency from the bottom of the hierarchy. For Near Eastern 
polities, the resulting reconstruction is that of societies with a gulf between the world 
of the élite of palaces and temples and the everyday world of town-dwellers and 
peasants; a two-sector model. In the following, I will discuss the theoretical 
assumptions of this model and its consequences for the models historians have 
constructed.  
 
The analysis of ancient polities as dualistic structures of rulers and ruled hails from 
Marx’ concept of an Asiatic mode of production: in an Asiatic mode of production, 
all property is “Gemeindeeigentum”, common property that is controlled by a central 
despotic government.214 The government controls local communities, but has no real 
connection with them; rather, it floats over them in the sense of an “über den kleinen 
Gemeinden schwebenden despotischen Regierung”.215 The cities are not the seat of 
citizen collectives, but function as centres for the exploitation of the countryside, thus 
“die asiatische Geschichte ist eine Art indifferenter Einheit von Stadt und Land; (die 
eigentlich großen Städten sind bloß als fürstliche Lager hier zu betrachten, als 
Superfötation über die eigentlich ökonomische Konstruktion)”.216 In Marx’ analysis, 
the Asiatic mode of production is static, in particular because the inhabitants have no 
independence from the community and do not own private property. According to 
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Marx, “am längsten halt sich notwendig die asiatische Form. Es liegt dies in ihrer 
Voraussetzung; daß der Einzelne nicht der Gemeinde gegenüber selbständig wird; daß 
self-sustaining Kreis der Produktion, Einheit von Agrikultur und Handmanifaktur etc. 
Verändert der Einzelne sein Verhältnis zur Gemeinde, so verändert er damit und wirkt 
zerstörend auf die Gemeinde […]”.217 
 
Thus, in the Marxist Asiatic mode of production, the government is floating above the 
local communities. Government is based in stronghold cities that are superimposed 
upon the rest of the economy. The local communities have no influence on the central 
government and the inhabitants are not capable of taking independent action or 
initiating political action. As will be seen, these underlying assumptions of an Asiatic 
mode of production characterise several influential analyses of Near Eastern polities. 
 
The dualism of Marx’ Asiatic mode of production is clearly seen in a model offered 
by I. M. Diakonoff, in which he explicitly divides the economy of the ancient world 
into a state-sector and a communal sector.218 The state-sector comprises the temple 
and palace and is opposed to a communal sector of the countryside.219 The model is 
rather similar to the early state model, but where the early state has an integrated 
population of subjects, albeit powerless, the two-sector model operates with a rather 
independent subject population. They are independent in the sense that they are 
outside the hierarchy, but at the same time they are powerless because they have no 
way of influencing the central decision-making institutions of the polity they belong 
to. 
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A similarly fundamental difference between the political centre and the countryside is 
emphasised by Robert McC. Adams in his analysis of Mesopotamian cities. Adams 
argues that the Mesopotamian urban population consisted of a narrow circle of 
specialists and “members of a sharply demarcated urban hierarchy” that had little 
connection to the majority of the population of poor peasants. He is critical of the 
“frequent emphasis given to the autonomous, formally defined corporate character of 
the Mesopotamian city”. Instead, he argues that the Mesopotamian city was by no 
means a common frame of reference for the people of Mesopotamia. Rather, most 
people lived in insecure poverty outside cities and took no part in urban culture.220  
 
The thin urban élite of Adams’ reconstruction of Mesopotamian city-states would 
have little in common with poor people in the countryside, i.e. the majority of the 
population. Indeed, there will always be marginalised groups that are outside any 
participation in politics. This group was certainly quite large in Mesopotamia. 
However, as will be seen, that does not mean that popular power cannot be found in 
local communities of towns and cities (cf. 4.3, 4.7, 5.5, 5.10, 5.11, 6.5, 6.6).  
 
The two-sector model has been particularly influential in the analysis of so-called 
palace societies of the Late Bronze Age such as Ugarit. In the interpretations of Mario 
Liverani and Michael Heltzer, palace societies consisted of nominally unfree, but 
wealthy dependents of the king and nominally free, but poor members of farming 
communities.221 The result of this approach is that the state-sector is studied from 
documents belonging to the palace and administration, whereas the communal sector 
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that consists of the peasant communities is virtually left out of the analysis of political 
power (cf. 5.8).  
 
Against this approach, it can be argued that in spite of the virtual state monopoly on 
literacy in polities like Late Bronze Age Ugarit, there are instances when the 
communal sector is reported in documents from the central administration (cf. 5.10.1, 
5.10.2). Thus, the division was not absolute. Against this claim, it can be argued that 
any mention of village life or local power reflects the interests of the central 
administration and is not a source to the communal sector. From the point of view of 
the two-sector model, all officials, councils and assemblies mentioned in the 
administrative records were part of the state-sector, meaning that knowledge of the 
communal sector is not available to scholars. However, this claim cannot be 
maintained facing instances where the records indicate that royal officials relied on 
local community institutions for making local decisions.222 This will be investigated 
further in the analyses of Near Eastern polities in chapters 4, 5, and 6. Suffice it to say 
at this point that there is evidence that gives reasons for arguing that decisions were 
actually taken locally, not exclusively by the palace and its officials. Now, if the 
palace administration actually relied on local decisions made by community 
representatives and councils, the degree of central control cannot be said to be 
absolute. How to analyse such local activities is another matter, however, and I will 
return to this in the discussion of agency and structuration further on (2.7). 
 
The two-sector model has been criticised for placing too much emphasis on 
centralised bureaucracies in Near Eastern polities. As an alternative approach, David 
Schloen suggests a model he calls “the Patrimonial Household Model” to describe the 
entire Bronze Age Near East as consisting of patrimonial societies. He argues that the 
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king owned all land, and that there was no true bureaucracy, only households and 
administrative functions based on households.223 Thus, in Schloen’s model, there is 
no real bureaucracy or state sector in Bronze Age Near Eastern polities. All relations 
of power are based on fatherly authority. This approach to ancient societies is 
indebted to Max Weber, who defines a patrimonial society as one where the ruler 
owns all the means of power and uses them through his personal dependents. His 
subjects are servants or plebeians and have no means of competing with his power.224 
Weber’s ideas are also used by Daniel M. Master, who applies the patrimonial 
household model to ancient Israel and finds a continuity of patrimonial power in 
polities from nomadic tribes to states.225  
 
Against the patrimonial household model, it can be argued that local communities 
were not directly controlled by the ruler’s household. As will be seen, there is 
evidence from several Near Eastern polities of the existence of local communities 
with their own councils and assemblies (cf. 4.3, 4.7, 5.5, 5.10, 5.11, 6.5, 6.6). Further, 
the vertical relations between the head of a household and the household’s 
subordinate members were not the only direction of integration. Horizontal 
integration between individual heads of households also existed. In addition, there 
was horizontal integration between people outside the élite. These relations do not fit 
the model of a pyramidal household as the organising principle of Near Eastern 
polities. Therefore, a different approach is necessary, one that takes into account 
agency from below and the active structuration of societies by all its members. 
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Thus, in summary, the early state model and the two-sector model can be criticised for 
their too rigorous separation of rulers and ruled, between central institutions of power 
and local communities. However, the solution to the problem of understanding 
relations between central authorities and local communities does not lie in a 
pyramidal household model where all land was owned by the king. The household 
played an important role in organising the different functions of Near Eastern states, 
but cannot be said to be the only organising principle. Instead of describing a rigid 
structure, whether this was a pyramid or other pointed geometric shape, the analyses 
in chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 will be based on the discourses of the society under 
discussion and the dialectical relations between rulers, the ruled, and the social 
structure.  
 
As stated above (2.2), the early state model has been very influential with scholars of 
the ancient world. It has provided a theoretical basis for the assumption that politics 
cannot have existed in polities before and beyond the classical world (cf. 1.3). 
Alternatives to this approach will be discussed below (2.5-9). Before turning to 
dialectical analyses of agency, structuration, and structure, an approach that is quite 
influential in current analyses of Greek polities will be examined. This approach may 
be termed a form of structural-functionalism, an approach associated with the works 
of Talcott Parsons. Structural-functionalism goes beyond relations of production and 
makes instituted norms and generalised values the most important factors in political 
integration, exemplified by the analyses of Greek polities by Mogens Herman Hansen. 
As will be seen, structural-functionalism is a further theoretical basis for the 




2.4 The good society and the good citizen 
In structural-functionalist theory, society changes towards greater complexity as part 
of a process of generalised values that support this level of complexity. Talcott 
Parsons preferred the term “functional analysis” to “structural-functionalism”.226 
Parsons’ theories on social evolution and human action quite consistently work on the 
premise of the positive function of the normative conditions in the social structure for 
perpetuating social forms. He proposes an analogy between the institutionalisation of 
cultural values or norms as observed in social studies and the natural selection of 
mutations in biology.227 Similar to Parsons, Mogens Herman Hansen argues that the 
institutions of a given polity, including norms of behaviour, are the main factors in 
determining the attainable level of popular participation in politics. Thus, in Hansen’s 
analysis, the democratic institutions of Athens created the democratic Athenians, not 
vice versa.228 In the following, the arguments of Talcott Parsons for a functionalist 
analysis of social structure will be examined. 
 
Talcott Parsons analyses the stratification of society as contingent with the 
development of normative constraints. He argues that “through the differentiation of 
roles there is a differentiation in the specific goals which are morally approved for 
different individuals. But, so far as the society is morally and hence institutionally 
integrated, they are all governed by the same generalized pattern”.229 In this view, 
behaviour is governed by norms that contribute to maintain the structure of society 
and the norms are adhered to in order to preserve the social structure.230  
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Thus, Parsons claims that individuals in society relate to a commonly held morality 
and adhere to it in order to preserve their social status. This in turn preserves the 
structure of society. Parsons’ view of action in general is consistent with this claim: 
he argues that actions can be explained by an abstraction to more general analysis in 
order to bring forth “the functional relations involved in the facts already 
descriptively arranged”.231 In his view, actions are directed by norms and “conceptual 
schemes”, so that actors “try to conform their action patterns which are, by the actor 
and other members of the same collectivity, deemed desirable”.232 He states that 
“there is no such thing as action except as effort to confirm with norms”.233 In 
Parsons’ action theory, it is important to include what he terms an “integrated value 
system”, a system “common to large numbers”.234 
 
A weakness with Parsons’ sociological analysis is that it presupposes one universal 
system of values in the society under study, i.e. a high degree of value generalisation. 
In complex societies, however, there are several value systems at work at once, 
depending on the perspectives of the situated agents. Parsons does not take this 
sufficiently into account, but claims that “the normal individual feels satisfaction in 
effectively carrying out approved patterns and shame and disappointment in 
failure”.235 In this way, supposedly, good norms will produce a good society, 
following the supposition that any normal person will want what is best. Against this, 
it can be argued that a generalised morality does not define the range of strategies 
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available to and pursued by citizens. In any society, there are competing groups and 
individuals with a range of perspectives on their own situation and how to achieve 
their goals. The world looks different to a temple scribe than to a peasant. Parsons’ 
analysis would only apply to unitary societies or very limited parts of a given society.  
 
A central concept for Parsons’ theories of social structure and human action is 
“cybernetic models” for the analysis of actions: the different sectors of living systems 
stand in an “order of cybernetically hierarchic control relative to each other”.236  Thus, 
in Parson’s theory of social evolution, he implies that the normative constraints of 
society have cybernetic control of the actions of agents and also legitimise relations of 
power.237 However, he does not seem to consider the possibilities of dynamic 
relations between agents and structure or conflicting orders of cybernetic control. 
Instead, he argues that political evolution moves towards modern liberal 
democracy.238 This kind of teleological evolutionism does not explain events, such as 
revolts, that cannot be said to follow normative constraints. Parson’s view of society 
does not allow for conflicting interests between different socio-economic groups, a 
recurring phenomenon in most complex societies.  
 
A prominent scholar whose analyses of ancient polities can be termed functionalist is 
Mogens Herman Hansen. Hansen’s analysis of democratic Athens reflects the view 
that institutions and the values they impress on the citizens explain how polities 
evolve: in an analysis of the Athenian political development towards democracy, 
Hansen emphasises that the institutions of Athens were open and public to a very high 
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degree and that these included courts, the council and the assembly.239 According to 
Hansen, the characteristic traits of Athenian democracy are connected to the political 
institutions.240 He argues that the ancient Greeks held that the best life comes from the 
best institutions and that therefore the democratic man in Athens was created by the 
democratic institutions of this specific polis.241 
 
There is no doubt evidence that supports the view that Athens was unique in its 
institutional structure and had a unique political culture. Does that mean that Athenian 
democracy was the only form of genuine popular power in the ancient world? In 
section 1.2, it was argued that this was not the case: it cannot be ignored that Athenian 
democracy shared traits with polities that did not have the same specific institutional 
system as Athens. Athenian democracy and popular power are not the same. 
However, this is exactly the underlying assumption that leads scholars to categorically 
deny the existence of popular participation in politics in Near Eastern societies (cf. 
1.3): lacking an institutional system similar to Athens means that popular power did 
not exist. However, rather than working from a paradigm where society is viewed as a 
system of generalised norms and institutions that determine the expectations and 
behaviour of its members, it should be kept in mind that complex societies are not 
unitary: complex societies have several competing sets of norms, e.g. those of the rich 
and the poor, the old and the young. As will be seen below (2.5), institutions are not 
only shaping the members of society, members of society are agents actively choosing 
how to put institutions to use. Agents negotiate their position in society through 
institutions and sometimes outside them. Thus, society cannot be analysed from its 
institutions alone. Only by studying how people act, rather than presupposing their 
behaviour from institutional and structural analyses, the true range of political actions 
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undertaken and strategies pursued by agents can be revealed, from all levels of society 
in ancient polities. 
 
To focus on agents and their influence on the structure of the society of which they 
are members brings the present discussion into the conceptual framework of 
sociologists Anthony Giddens and Pierre Bourdieu. As will be seen, their theories on 
social structure and habitus are more fruitful than neo-evolutionist or structural-
functionalist approaches. Before discussing the alternative models provided by an 
approach from structuration and agency, I will present and discuss the sociological 
theories of Giddens and Bourdieu at some length, as well as scholars who have put 
their theories to use in analyses of ancient polities. 
 
2.5 Structure, agency and structuration 
It was argued above that the approaches both from neo-evolutionary theory and 
structural-functionalism are equally insensible to activities and attitudes of people 
outside the élite. This creates problems when using these theories as the basis for 
investigations of popular power in ancient polities. This is because societies consist of 
a multitude of agents that contribute to the structure of society and negotiate their 
lives from their individual social and economic standing, including citizens at the 
nether end of the social hierarchy. The aforementioned approaches to social analysis 
do not account for the totality of agents and their strategies in ancient societies. 
Therefore, they are of little use for analysing social changes initiated from the lower 
classes in society as well as concerted action of the citizens that transcend the 
divisions of rich and poor.  
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In the sociological terminology of Anthony Giddens, which will be discussed in the 
following, the dynamics of society is described as resulting from agents contributing 
to the structures that are shaping their own behavior. As will be seen in the following, 
agents have agency and the effect of their actions on structure is structuration. The 
possibility of a course of action is determined by the social system that in its turn is 
determined by the social structure. However, the actions of agents can reinforce as 
well as challenge the social system and have the effect of structuration, causing 
changes in the social structure. Therefore, following this analytical approach, all 
levels of society must be taken into consideration in undertaking an analysis of social 
structure and political action, not just the élite or the upper levels of the social 
hierarchy. This makes it possible to undertake a comparative analysis of polities of the 
ancient world that include those outside the élite. By transcending the assumption that 
East and West represent fundamentally different political traditions, i.e. early states 
vs. citizen-states, the actions of agents in the polities under discussion can be taken 
properly into consideration. 
   
According to Giddens, structure is marked by an absence of the subject, whereas the 
social system comprises the situated activities of human agents.242 I take this to mean 
that the social structure is beyond the direct influence of the individual. Individuals, 
human agents, act according to social structures and these actions and the conditions 
they are performed under form social systems. Giddens emphasises that “structure is 
recursively implicated” in social systems. The production and reproduction of social 
systems are the results of an ongoing process of structuration by knowledgeable 
human agents: “crucial to the idea of structuration is the theorem of the duality of 
structure […] The constitution of agents and structures are not two independently 
given sets of phenomena, a dualism, but represent a duality. According to the notion 
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of the duality of structure, the structural properties of social systems are both medium 
and outcome of the practices they recursively organize”.243  
 
Thus, the social system comprises the actions of individuals and this upholds the 
social structure, but actions can also change the structure. The social structure shapes 
the course of action taken by individuals as it is simultaneously shaped through 
changes in the social system through structuration. In this way, society can be 
understood as the product of its members, who are in their turn shaped by the society 
of which they are members. Although this argument runs the risk of infinite regress, 
the perspective opens up for analyses of society that look at how people influence the 
structure of societies of which they are part. Popular participation thus cannot be ruled 
out a priori in a polity dominated by institutions like palaces or temples. Action is not 
limited to the élite; all levels contribute to structuration. The duality of structure is 
important for a discussion of the structure of polities because it emphasises social 
structure as the result of ongoing human interaction and not as the result of a process 
of evolution and increasing élite dominance or the establishment of generalised values 
that cybernetically directs all actions. When the totality of society is taken into 
consideration, it becomes apparent which structural limitations and possibilities there 
are for popular participation in politics and which courses of action people could 
choose. Different from a static model of hierarchy like the early state, action from 
agents outside the élite can be taken into consideration. Thus, in a monarchic polity, 
people could choose actions that ran contrary to parts of the social structure, e.g. 
obedience to the king, while being informed by other aspects of the social structure, 
e.g. protecting their community as citizens.  
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Giddens emphasises that a theory of structuration must recognise “human beings as 
knowledgeable agents, reflexively monitoring the flow of interaction with one 
another”. He argues that the human agent influences the social order as well as being 
influenced by it, “[…] the normative elements of social systems are contingent claims 
which have to be sustained and “made to count” through the effective mobilization of 
sanctions in the contexts of actual encounters”.244  
 
Approaching social systems as consisting of contingent claims opens up for a much 
more inclusive analysis than what can be provided by the early state model: the early 
state model is focused on the élite as structuring and controlling the polity, whereas 
Giddens’ approach includes a totality of influences, high and low. It is a more 
nuanced and dynamic approach than the structural-functionalism of Parsons, where 
society has a generalised normative system that all members of society obey to the 
best of their abilities. Giddens’ focus on reflexivity promises more answers than the 
evolutionary perspective of the neo-evolutionary approach can provide. By 
emphasising the ongoing structuration of human societies, the view of states as the 
end-point of evolution falls away. It is a great advantage over neo-evolutionism to 
study the structure of society as the result of the actions and choices of a totality of 
agents, not just the élite. Their vertical and horizontal ties can be taken into 
consideration, beyond the hierarchy of rulers and ruled. In this analysis, the socio-
political structure of a polity results from negotiations between groups and individuals 
in society, i.e. agents, against the background of cultural traditions and economic 
realities, i.e. structures. Ancient polities did not have one single generalised normative 
system or a single unshakeable hierarchy of socio-economic positions. They should be 
studied as complex networks of agents pursuing different strategies for power. Their 
strategies should make out the focus of political analysis, not definitions of 
hierarchies or institutionalised norms. In this way, comparative analyses are made 
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possible, by looking beyond the structures, focusing instead on the interplay of 
structure, agents, and their actions. 
 
2.6 Habitus, schemes, and strategies 
It should be kept in mind that social structures tend to be quite stable: people do not 
necessarily change their views of the world very easily; much less act on these newly 
gained perspectives. The world of contingent expectations can be termed the habitus, 
in the terminology of Pierre Bourdieu. The concept of habitus, according to Bourdieu, 
means that “the structures constitutive of a particular type of environment (e.g. the 
material conditions of existence characteristic of a class condition) produce habitus, 
systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to 
function as structuring structures, that is, as principles of the generation and 
structuring of practices and representations which can be objectively “regulated” and 
“regular” without in any way being the product of obedience to rules, objectively 
adapted to their goals without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express 
mastery of the operations necessary to attain them and, being all this, collectively 
orchestrated without being the product of the orchestrating action of a conductor”.245  
 
As I understand this, it can be argued with Bourdieu that who you are determines 
what you do, in the sense that what you do is not determined by clear and articulated 
rules, but by internalised perceptions of what is right and proper. These perceptions 
are shaping possible courses of action without being actively formulated or expressed. 
They are being reinforced collectively among one’s peers, not explicitly as rules but 
as the dispositions shared by those who partake in the same habitus. It is important to 
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notice that habitus is not a generalised normative system. Different types of habitus 
exist in different socio-economic groups within the same society. 
 
The dispositions shared by the partakers of a habitus can be termed schemes, an 
important concept in the theory of habitus. Bourdieu explains human practice as an 
enactment of schemes constituting the alternatives for action within the habitus which 
the agent shares with the group he belongs to. The habitus is reproduced by each 
agent, but not automatically: “the schemes of thought and expression he has acquired 
are the basis for the intentionless invention of regulated improvisation”.246 
 
The schemes can be changed by experience, but will more often be reinforced by the 
habitus, the world of expectations the agent shares with others of his group. It can be 
argued, then, that human behaviour, although predictable, cannot be said to be 
predestined or determined. The structure of society is not decided upon by an élite, it 
is created by all the members of the given society, with their different forms of 
habitus and the different schemes that inform their actions. It is not created by free 
improvisation, but along inherited as well as acquired schemes.  
 
Bourdieu emphasises that practice is informed by schemes and that these cannot be 
regarded as theoretical rules.247 He defines scheme as a variant meaning of rule, “in 
the sense of a scheme (or principle) immanent in practice, which should be called 
implicit rather than unconscious, simply to indicate that it exists in a practical state in 
agents’ practice and not in their consciousness, or rather, their discourse”.248 The 
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schemes, although not explicit, define the strategies of agents. Bourdieu points out 
that the individual strategies make out a system of strategies “defined as the sum total 
of the strategies through which individuals or groups objectively tend to reproduce the 
relations of production associated with a determinate mode of production by striving 
to reproduce or improve their position in the social structure”.249  
 
It may be objected that in this perspective, all people are born into a certain behaviour 
that they will invariably reproduce. Thus, the structure of society could be explained 
by establishing the dominant institutions and prevailing norms of behaviour in a given 
society. However, a process of learning is set in motion by processes of interaction 
with people of other types of habitus. Thus, the theory of habitus does not imply a 
static view of social structure. It should be kept in mind that the stability of a social 
structure depends on the reproduction of schemes. Although they tend to, agents do 
not invariably reproduce the schemes of their habitus: their schemes are part of a 
structure that is determined by other agents and their schemes, as well. Thus, 
strategies of agents from the entirety of the polity under discussion must be taken into 
consideration, not just those of the élite. 
 
Although Bourdieu’s habitus may seem agent-proof, meaning that the agent has no 
way to perceive his own schemes and is thus unable to knowingly change his own 
course of action, the idea of schemes opens for a great variety of strategies pursued 
within any given polity. Important for the dynamics of societies are the interstices, 
areas of society where power structures overlap and established borders are put under 
pressure. Bourdieu’s ideas of how schemes are acquired through practice can help 
explain how new schemes are born out of new circumstances.  
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It is important to have in mind that the dominant institutions in society cannot be 
expected to determine the actions of all the members of society. Strategies for power 
that cross established hierarchies must be expected. Studies of political action in any 
given society are not exhausted by the establishment of the position of the most 
powerful institutions. The strategies of all agents must be taken into consideration as 
contributing to the networks of strategies that make out the polity. 
 
2.7 Agency and structure 
Having presented the analytical tools for investigating societies as consisting of 
agents, structuration, and structure, I will now investigate further how these concepts 
can be used in social analyses. I will first discuss some ideas on structure from 
William Sewell Jr. (2.7.1). Then, I will investigate the ideas of Elizabeth M. Brumfiel 
on social struggles (2.7.2), followed by a discussion of Michael Mann’s ideas on the 
sources of social power (2.7.3). As will be seen in the following, agency and structure 
open up for more nuanced analyses of ancient polities than neo-evolutionism and its 
early state model or structural-functionalism, theoretical approaches that underlie the 
view that Eastern and Western political traditions are fundamentally different. 
 
2.7.1 Schemas and resources 
The relations between agency and structure are difficult to unravel, and it is not 
possible to suppose one without the other. In William Sewell Jr.’s analysis, structure 
and human agency interact and produce a new structure, “the agents can (or are forced 
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to) improvise or innovate in structurally shaped ways that significantly reconfigure the 
very structures that constituted them”.250 Sewell wishes to avoid idealism, i.e. that 
ideas or mental schemas determine the material world as perceived by humans. He 
argues that “structure, then, should be defined as composed simultaneously of 
schemas, which are virtual, and of resources, which are actual. If structures are dual in 
this sense, then it must be true that schemas are the effects of resources, just as 
resources are the effects of schemas”. The term structure only applies when resources 
and schemas “mutually imply and sustain each other over time”.251 
 
Thus, it is not possible to operate with abstract mental schemas, such as an inherent 
love of freedom or a naturally slavish attitude, as driving forces behind political 
choices without taking physical resources into consideration, as well. Both schemas 
and resources determine the social structure. However, these qualifications to the 
theory of structure may be said to emphasise human agency. Structure is not solely 
determinant; its relation to human agents can be termed dialectic, in that agency and 
structure mutually determine and change each other. Therefore, the definitions of the 
dominant institutions do not constitute a satisfactory political analysis. Pointing out 
the dominance of palaces and temples or councils and assemblies is not a sufficient 
analysis of how societies of the ancient world were experienced by the people who 
lived in them.  
 
Sewell applies the concept of agency to the structure of states: “states and political 
structures are consciously established, maintained, fought over and argued about 
rather than taken for granted as if they were unchangeable features of the world 
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[…]”.252 The active negotiations involved in the formation of political structures are 
important to keep in mind, because they invite analyses of polities as dynamic and 
multifaceted structures.  
 
Sewell’s point that agency and structure need to be taken into consideration when 
discussing struggles over political structures can be further explored with the concepts 
of narrow and broad élite strategies for power, as well as narrow and broad corporate 
strategies, discussed in chapter 1 (1.2.3 and 1.4.2). Polities are places where different 
groups and individuals vie for power and influence. Therefore, the strategies pursued 
by members of society can stand in opposition to the established structure and 
represent other groups than those in power. 
 
2.7.2 Struggle and negotiation 
The focus on strategies for power in socio-political analysis means to analyse 
societies as consisting of several competing and complimenting strategies. This is 
suggested by Elizabeth M. Brumfiel. She argues that in social analysis, focus should 
be on alliance networks based on gender, class, and faction and the realignments in 
these alliance networks, and not on closed systems.253 She calls for a behaviouristic 
approach: “[…] we must recognize that culturally based behavioural “systems” are 
the composite outcomes of negotiation between positioned social agents pursuing 
their goals under both ecological and social constraints”.254  
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The focus on negotiations implies that not only the rulers are taken into consideration, 
but also the ruled and their relationships with each other. Brumfiel emphasises that 
the perspective of human agency must be expanded to include the participation of 
people outside the élite.255 She asserts that “the history of states is the history of 
strategy and counterstrategy deployed by oppositional groups, leading cumulatively to 
the emergence of social hierarchy and its dissolution”.256 She suggests that specific 
sequences of changes in social power should be studied alternately from a subject-
centred and system-centred point of view.257   
 
In the present investigation, social change over time is not as central as the 
simultaneous existence of competing and cooperating agents and their strategies for 
power. It should be pointed out that societies do not only consist of oppositional 
groups. At least, opposition is not a stable constant. Vertical ties between the élite and 
humbler members of the community must be kept in mind as much as vertical 
divisions, and the same applies to horizontal relationships between individuals as well 
as groups. 
     
2.7.3 Sources of power 
An important contribution to the study of societies beyond hierarchies and bounded 
systems is that of Michael Mann, in the first volume of his work The Sources of 
Social Power.258 Mann argues that power must be analysed as having several 
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sources.259 In Mann’s analysis, there are ideological, economic, military, and political 
sources to power, meaning that power is not unitary, but has several dimensions. The 
organisation of society is derived from a network of actors with power derived from 
ideological, economic, military, and political sources.260  
 
The four dimensions of power in Mann’s analysis can be criticised for being 
somewhat arbitrary, in the sense that some of them will overlap, in particular 
economic, political, and military sources of power. They are useful tools for analysis, 
however, because they make it possible to study several dimensions of society at 
once, rather than supposing a unitary system. Mann’s dimensions of power and their 
agents create not unitary structures, but networks. Mann conceives of societies as 
“multiple overlapping and intersecting power networks”.261 In his definition, “a 
society is a network of social interaction at the boundaries of which is a certain level 
of interaction cleavage between it and its environment”.262  
 
Mann’s ideas of society as networks of interaction open up new possibilities for 
analysing political action. The subject and the system interact, in such a way that the 
system is not absolutely bounded and the subject is not absolutely determined. Mann’s 
approach focuses on what creates power and what dissolves it, from a perspective of 
agents, their schemes and resources. This approach transcends the élite perspectives 
and institutional focus of neo-evolutionism and structural-functionalism. Political 
action can be analysed as conditioned by what is considered possible or proper, the 
expectations and ambitions that constitute the schemes that agents are informed by in 
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their choices of strategies for power. In this way, analyses of ancient polities will 
allow for different views of society co-existing within the same polity. In the 
following two sections (2.8 and 2.9), I will discuss recent work on ancient polities 
that use sociological approaches of analysing agency and structuration. 
 
2.8 New approaches to ancient societies 
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter (2.2), neo-evolutionary theory and the 
early state model have been widely applied by scholars to explain all ancient societies, 
both their development and their structure. Twenty years after Claessen and Skalníks 
publication of The Early State (1978), came a volume titled Archaic States, edited by 
Gary M. Feinman and Joyce Marcus (1998). It is interesting to note that whereas the 
1978 publication of Claessen and Skalník speaks of the “early state” in the singular, 
the 1998 publication speaks of “archaic states” in the plural. As will be seen in the 
following, the perspective has been widened to include contestation of hierarchy as 
well as alternative trajectories to the development of states. In recent decades, 
approaches have become more discursive, as power is analysed in terms of social 
relations and not mere economic facts, e.g. people’s relations to the means of 
production. These new approaches are dialectic, in that they highlight the interplay 
between social structures and human agents, and the impact of new directions in 
sociology represented by Giddens and Bourdieu is evident. 
 
Richard E. Blanton, in his contribution to Archaic States suggests a discursive 
approach to archaic states, an approach, he argues, that “points to the fact that social 
life consist of a discursive interaction of social structure, carried intergenerationally, 
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and social actors pursuing varied goals”.263 To achieve this, he divides power into the 
subcategories of material and cognitive-symbolic dimensions that, although they are 
likely to be mobilised simultaneously, help illustrate trends in the evolution of archaic 
states.264 Blanton distinguishes between exclusionary power strategies and corporate 
power strategies. The strategies for systemic exclusionary domination are 
characterised by state control of prestige goods and craft specialists in the material or 
objective dimension and correspondingly in the cognitive-symbolic dimension by a 
patrimonial view of society, divine rulership, and imperialism. The corporate power 
strategy, on the other hand, in its material dimension is redistributive, based on 
euergetism, and decentralised regarding prestige-goods systems. In its cognitive-
symbolic dimension, it is characterised by accountability of the ruler, commonwealth 
government, reflexive communication, decentralisation of sources of power, and the 
“semiautonomous functioning of lower-order subsystems”.265 
 
Following Blanton’s analysis, power is expressed both in material relations and 
symbolic representations that mutually reinforce each other. The different strategies 
for power are pursued simultaneously, meaning that at the central level, a ruler can 
emphasise his own person and centralised institutions of power, whereas at the local 
level, communities can emphasise cooperation and communal decisions. Both 
strategies can be found at work at the same time, so that integration in the polity 
operates both horizontally and vertically. In Blanton’s terms, the strategy of the ruler 
is called an élite strategy, whereas that of the community is called a corporate 
strategy.  
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As argued in chapter 1 (1.2.3; 1.4.2), in order to describe competition for power and 
the dynamics of communities, I find it necessary to divide the élite and corporate 
strategy into narrow and broad subcategories. On a general level, there is a difference 
of élite and corporate strategies in that the élite regards itself as a different kind 
altogether, whether they are a group of aristocrats or an individual king and his 
family, i.e. a broad or a narrow élite respectively. The broad or narrow corporations, 
on the other hand, hold that they have more in common than being separate. The 
criteria for equality will be stricter for a narrow than for a broad corporation, but at 
least in theory, someone from the masses can aspire to the narrow corporation given 
that he becomes able to meet the necessary requirements. The distinction between a 
broad élite and a narrow corporation must be attempted in each particular case. It is 
necessarily blurry and will be easiest to define when their self-assessment is available 
in the sources. 
 
Recently, David B. Small has attempted to apply a dual-processual model of strategies 
for power to ancient Greece.266 He demonstrates that at ancient Priene, the 
archaeological record of contexts for interaction and evidence from inscriptions can 
be analysed to give a picture of the dualistic relationship between networking and 
corporate strategies for power within the polity.267 However, his analysis of the 
evidence of Priene shows that it can be difficult to discern between networking and 
corporate strategies, because in some contexts, a corporation will be very exclusive, 
exemplified by meetings of community honorands at the Panionion sanctuary.268 
Thus, a broad élite can also be understood as a narrow corporation. The only way to 
definitely determine this is when the criteria for membership in the group are 
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available to modern scholars. This is unfortunately not often the case, and many 
arguments must remain inferential. 
 
As argued above (2.7) the analysis of society as the interplay between agents and their 
strategies for power means the abandonment of models of the early state type. This is 
a perspective that has become more explicit among scholars in recent years. Norman 
Yoffee, in the book polemically titled Myths of the Archaic State, argues that “the 
central concern in studying the evolution of the earliest states is not to identify an 
essencialised and reified political structure (“the state”), but to explain the 
mechanisms through which social units that were becoming progressively 
differentiated were reassembled”.269 In his analysis of state formation, Yoffee follows 
Michael Mann and his approach to power, discussed above (2.7.3), as derived from 
ideological, economic, military, and political sources.270 Yoffee subsumes political 
power under economic power.271 Mann and Yoffee’s approach to power as having 
several sources has the advantage of making power rest with several groups that 
together make out the totality of society.  
 
In order to explain the emergence of states, Yoffee emphasises that “three main 
dimensions of power and the different means of achieving power – the struggle for 
control of economic resources, control of knowledge, ceremonies, and symbols, and 
control of armed forces – need to be co-evolving for states to emerge, since these 
three sources of power all reinforce one another”.272 In his analysis, the formation of 
early states was characterised by heterarchy, different hierarchies coming together. He 
                                              
269 Yoffee, Myths of the archaic state, 2005, 34 
270 Cf. Mann, The sources of social power, 1986, 22-27 
271 Yoffee, Myths of the Archaic state, 2005, 34-38 
272 Yoffee, Myths of the Archaic state, 2005, 38 
 133 
points out that this process might also be reversed into dissolution of the polity.273 
Yoffee draws attention to the question how people came to live “in a variety of 
differentiated social organizations and the nature of power within these 
organizations”.274 In his analysis, contrary to the early state model, “the earliest states 
“integrated” these social organizations only loosely, and rulers and elites were 
constantly concerned to communicate a dominant way of meaning. Non-elites or 
peripheral elites accepted, negotiated their lives under, or struggled against these 
terms”.275 In Yoffee’s analysis, an example of these negotiations can be found in the 
relations between central and local authorities in Mesopotamia: law-making by 
Mesopotamian kings never supplanted assemblies; quite the contrary, the 
communities kept their decision-making organisations and developed them within 
city-state structures.276 Yoffee points out that “bureaucrats of the crown were also 
members of the community or of entrepreneurial families and organizations, and on 
the level of individuals there are many identities and social roles that cannot be neatly 
separated into either the community or the state, since people can be members of 
both”.277 Yoffee can thus be said to argue against the two-sector model and its 
separation of central institutions and local communities (cf. 2.3). The application of 
the two-sector model to Near Eastern societies is discussed further in chapter 5 (5.8). 
 
Following the arguments of Yoffee, states must be examined not only as the 
institutions and symbols for the division of rulers and ruled. Rather, processes of both 
horizontal and vertical integration must be taken into consideration. This position has 
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been argued throughout this chapter. Throughout the analyses of the present 
investigation, the local communities will be taken into consideration, not just in their 
relation to the central authorities, but also as self-regulating communities. The 
relations between local councils and officials and the local communities form an 
especially promising field of study for an investigation of popular power. This 
investigation is difficult, however, because so much of the available evidence strictly 
refers to the élite sphere of society. Against Yoffee’s point about bureaucrats of the 
crown living in local communities, it could be argued that professionalism would 
prevent any consideration of local community interests by bureaucrats, and that 
sources to their activities would only inform us about central institutions. However, as 
will be seen in the analyses throughout the present investigation, there is evidence for 
the integration of local and central levels of authority as well as for collective 
decision-making that were not controlled by the central hierarchy. 
 
2.9 Consensual cities and urban élites  
Mesopotamian cities are often regarded as dominated by the great institutions of 
temples and palaces and a narrow élite of the powerful; the rulers, the rich, religious 
specialists and the bureaucrats. In this perspective, the political outlook of the 
population would be limited to local concerns. This political culture, in the terms of 
Gabriel Abraham Almond and Sidney Verba, can be described as “parochial”: there is 
no division between political, economic or religious roles and local communities and 
ordinary people have no expectations of the political system.278 The opposite of a 
parochial political culture is termed a “participant culture”, where individuals expect 
to be able to use the political system for their own ends.279 These are useful 
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distinctions for the study of ancient polities. E.g. if the political culture of Near 
Eastern local communities was predominantly parochial, there cannot be expected to 
have been much popular participation in politics in relation to central institutions. 
However, if there was a participant culture among a large part of the people, the 
picture would be rather different. It must be kept in mind that for a political culture to 
move beyond a parochial orientation, there has to be connections between central and 
local levels. In this perspective, the concept of consensual societies becomes useful, 
an approach to ancient Near Eastern polities that has been advocated by Elizabeth C. 
Stone in particular. As will be seen in the following, consensual societies, as well as 
the related concept of heterarchy, are interesting models for discussing ancient 
societies beyond hierarchies. It has been applied to Old Babylonian cities in particular 
(cf. 4.3.4). 
 
Elizabeth C. Stone argues that Near Eastern city-states should be studied not as 
repressive hierarchies, but as consensual societies, defined as societies characterised 
by “consensual arrangements among differently defined segments of society”.280 In 
her analysis, preindustrial economies of the Near East are characterised by lack of 
people, not land. Therefore, urban leadership has to maintain the labour force. Cities 
are “places where the communication necessary to forge consensus among all groups 
in a non-autocratic society can take place”.281 In her argument, “the key to the 
consensual basis of Mesopotamian city-states lies in the structuring of the habitation 
zone, where both elites and manufacturing were firmly embedded in residential 
neighborhoods”.282 She argues that the urban plans and residential data of 
Mesopotamian cities were similar to Medieval Islamic cities and that they “suggest an 
                                              
280 Stone, “City-states and their centers,” 1997, 15 
281 Stone, “City-states and their centers,” 1997, 16 
282 Stone, “City-states and their centers,” 1997, 19-20 
 136 
urban landscape made up of numerous small, face-to-face communities”.283 Thus, 
power was not only in the large institutions of temple and palace: in addition, heads of 
households competed for power in neighbourhoods and larger urban assemblies.284  
 
Adam T. Smith points out that “spatial practices of urbanism and political practices of 
authority are not separable”.285 He emphasises the significance of a “dynamically 
changing urban landscape that is produced, in large measure, by political 
practices”.286 Smith admits that the sources to a diachronic investigation of these 
landscapes are hard to come by, but argues for a study of Mesopotamian cities 
“produced as multidimensional landscapes that assembled the power and legitimacy 
of complex, multi-sited regimes”.287 In his interpretation, Mesopotamian cities 
consisted of “interlinked sites of elite and grassroots authority”.288 He supports 
Stone’s interpretation of Mesopotamian cities as divided by canals into different 
sectors, leading to a great degree of fragmentation.289 In Smith’s interpretation, the 
Mesopotamian cities were shaped by house owners and local authorities like the 
“mayor”, who functioned as intermediary between the king and the people, 
contributing “to shape the physical environment of the city”.290 
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Smith’s thesis is highly problematic, because he does not have the sources at hand to 
investigate his claims: the overall plan and extension of residential areas of 
Mesopotamian cities are largely unknown. Further, the idea that political practices 
produced urban landscapes is problematic in view of the conservatism of Near 
Eastern rulers and their preoccupation with renovation of temples, walls, and canals 
rather than the founding of new cities. The sources to different building phases and 
their politics that Smith would need in order to argue for the political shaping of 
urban landscapes are lacking. Of course, cities are shaped by the political regimes that 
are housed in them, but this is not a very profound observation. The evidence for a 
correlation between regimes, inhabitants, and urban space is simply not there. Instead, 
Smith argues vaguely that grassroots institutions and house owners shaped the cities, 
but cites no evidence for these claims. In fact, Smith’s point that political regimes 
built city infrastructure291 seems to contradict this. Space and Mesopotamian cities 
will be discussed further in section 4.3.4. Suffice it to say here that there are great 
methodological difficulties in arguing from city-plans to political practice. 
 
The view of Mesopotamian cities as the integration of several face-to-face 
communities can perhaps overlook the ties between central institutions and the rest of 
the city, similar to the two-sector model that was discussed above (2.3). Marc Van De 
Mieroop warns against the use of a face-to-face model for Mesopotamian city 
neighbourhoods, because it implies a conceptual separation of local communities 
from the central institutions of power.292 This is no doubt a prudent warning: the 
central institutions were important not only economically, but also politically and 
religiously, and would be integral parts of the lives of all citizens of the polity, albeit 
not necessarily on a daily basis. 
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Against Stone’s thesis of consensual cities in Mesopotamia, it could be argued that 
city-plans and the distribution of artefacts say little about social organisation or 
solidarity between neighbours. Having a common place of residence does not 
necessarily imply actual social interaction between rich and poor. Thus, strict 
hierarchy may well exist between social groups, although they live in the same 
neighbourhood, as it can be observed from several pre-modern cities, including 
Pompey, where patrician urban residences lie on the same insulae as humble 
workshops. The lack of economic or status segregation of neighbourhoods cannot 
alone count as indicating consensual arrangements between rich and poor.  
 
Consensus is a difficult term. Who are agreed and to what? How is agreement 
reached? Stone’s argument that Mesopotamian polities needed to secure their labour 
force through concessions and maintained social cohesion through consensual 
arrangements is not altogether compelling. The control of labour can take many 
forms, not all of them peaceful. Societies with scarce labour can solve this problem in 
ways such as enslavement of its own population through e.g. debt slavery. Labour can 
be procured in the form of chattel slaves such as prisoners of war. The concept of 
consensual societies is useful, however, because it highlights the processes of 
negotiation between different groups in society, from the ruler to local élites to the 
masses, and does not focus exclusively on the decisions of rulers. Whether the masses 
actually had a say in politics, is a matter that has to be decided in each specific case, 
depending on whether they were included in decision-making groups or not. 
 
Eva von Dassow emphasises the role of “the public” in Mesopotamian cities and 
argues that it represents a continuum between central authorities and the community. 
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She suggests that “the community (ideally) constituted itself as a public to form the 
state and to exercise a role in its own governance”.293 In her interpretation, Jürgen 
Habermas’ concept of the public sphere can be applied to Mesopotamian cities, by 
postulating an active oral culture of discussion and decision-making not visible in the 
written sources.294 She emphasises that “the community constitutes a public that 
mediates between its own members and governmental authority”. She claims that it is 
of minor importance to her analysis who participated in this public sphere, since there 
are always people that do not participate.295 
 
The case for a public sphere in Mesopotamian cities cannot be said to be very strong. 
Von Dassow has a reductionist view of public governance where anything that is not 
the king’s orders is interpreted as the will of the community. Further, she ignores the 
problem of inclusion or exclusion from the decision-making community and insists 
that any public sphere have their non-attendants. This is not a very convincing 
argument for the existence of a public sphere that represents the will of the 
community. Von Dassow does not take into consideration the fundamental 
importance of the question of inclusion in any discussion of politics from antiquity 
until the present: who are included in the decision-making processes? To postulate a 
vaguely defined public sphere does not contribute much to further the understanding 
of popular power in Mesopotamian cities. 
  
Stone argues that heads of households competed for power in Mesopotamian cities. 
However, she does not define their relations to the rest of the citizens. Von Dassow 
argues that the public mediated between its own members and central authorities. 
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However, she does not investigate who belonged to this public. Can this be called 
consensual arrangements? The important question remains; consensus among whom? 
With regard to the existence of popular power, it is highly problematic that we do not 
know who participated in reaching consensus.  
 
Rather than arguing for consensual urban societies in Mesopotamia, the structure of 
central authorities, local institutions, and heads of households can perhaps better be 
described by the concept of heterarchy, a simultaneous existence of several hierarchic 
orders in a society.296 Heterarchy is a useful concept, because it points to the 
multiplicity of orders in a society. As seen above (2.8), it was used by Norman Yoffee 
as an alternative approach to the early state model.297 However, it is an ambiguous 
term: on the one hand, it can describe an egalitarian society where people are of equal 
standing and authority. On the other hand, it can describe a society dominated by 
several competing élites. Also, heterarchy can describe relations between the 
members of an egalitarian council at the top of an otherwise hierarchic society. Thus, 
heterarchy is not the same as a wide distribution of power, and may well indicate a 
narrow corporate strategy, where the heads of households dominate all decision-
making, or a broad élite strategy where aristocratic leaders act independently of the 
rest of the community. Therefore, it is necessary to analyse the available evidence 
with a view to both inclusion and exclusion from organs of decision-making.  
 
The concept of heterarchy can be used to describe quite different types of societies. A 
good example is an analysis of David B. Small’s of the economy of archaic Greek 
poleis, where he uses the model of heterarchy to argue that these polities had an 
underdeveloped economy where élites were outside any kind of state control and 
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therefore could build up and perpetuate a solid oligarchic powerbase and an élite 
heterarchy.298 Thus, lack of integration of élites in a central hierarchy does not 
necessarily mean popular power. 
 
The concept of an élite heterarchy of sorts can also be found in the analysis of 
Douglas North et al. of societies as consisting of institutions and organisations for the 
generation of rent. North et al. argue that the main problem in explaining how states 
work involves how powerful individuals can be credibly committed to stop fighting. 
Their answer is that “controlling violence depends on the structure and maintenance 
of relationships among powerful individuals”.299 A weakness with this explanation is 
that it does not address how powerful individuals attain power. Much as with Small’s 
thesis mentioned above, North et al. imply that compared to the élite, the rest of 
society is underdeveloped. The masses cannot or will not provide resistance to the 
rich and powerful. The élite in the model of North et al. appear to exist in a void. The 
exclusive focus on powerful individuals in an internally integrated élite ignores the 
society where these individuals live and the strategies for power that are 
simultaneously pursued by those outside the élite. Rather, society is understood as a 
social contract between the powerful in order to escape annihilation. Hobbes is 
lurking in the background.300  
 
The negotiations and struggles of the commoners should not be ignored in an analysis 
of polities. The approach of agency and structuration makes such an inclusive analysis 
possible. Social contract theories as that of North et al. have a myopic view of society 
that operates with cohesion only among the élite and their cohesion is the result of 
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their struggle to survive as an élite. The analysis does not take the rest of society into 
consideration. On the other hand, generalised consensual arrangements cannot be said 
to adequately describe the situation in ancient polities. There is plentiful evidence to 
social struggle and social divisions in Near Eastern as well as Greek polities. 
 
In the following analyses of ancient polities, perspectives from the élite as well as 
from the masses will be included, in order to examine the totality of the social 
structures. Action taken in institutions of collective-decision making and broad 
corporate strategies for power pursued by the masses will be emphasised, in order to 
examine popular power. The existence of heterarchies will be explored. The aim is to 
get at processes of structuration that are driven by agents from outside the élite. This 
will be done through analyses of procedures in collective organs of decision-making 
that were open to all citizens as well as analyses of instances of direct action from the 
masses.  
 
2.10 Conclusions  
There are several approaches to the study of ancient polities. Some of the most 
influential theoretical approaches in the last fifty years, the neo-evolutionary approach 
and structural-functionalism, quite consistently ignore the role of the masses in 
ancient politics outside the classical world. They have contributed to reinforce the 
view of a fundamental divide into Eastern and Western political traditions. The neo-
evolutionists emphasise institutions that maintain the stratification of society; the state 
is the political expression of the division between rich and poor and creates a 
hierarchy of rulers and ruled. This applies to Morton Fried (1967) and Elman Service 
(1975), as well as other scholars working from neo-evolutionist theory and its early 
state model. Neo-evolutionist theory explains the maintenance of this stratified social 
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structure as the result of coercion, but it is also in part explained by the positive 
effects of state structures and organised leadership for the society in question. At any 
rate, the picture of early states is static; the ruled are outside politics and are viewed as 
passive subjects (cf. 2.2). 
 
The early state model is functionalistic in the sense that it develops because of and is 
maintained by its stabilising effects on society. The model is also historical-
materialistic in that the early state develops as a result of inequalities in the 
distribution of means of production. Talcott Parsons (1949) has a slightly different 
functionalist approach to the state, emphasising the positive role of normative 
determination in preserving the state. This is a kind of structural-functionalism, in that 
it emphasises the effects of generalised normative constraints in the social structures 
on the citizens’ behaviour and how this behaviour in turn preserves the state. Good 
institutions produce good norms that result in good citizens. A problem with this kind 
of explanation is that the analysis is limited to the perspective of the ruling élite of the 
polity, those who are in position to enforce norms for accepted behaviour through 
sanctions, thereby maintaining the social structure. Initiatives and actions that break 
with the norms sanctioned by those in power can then only be analysed as 
incomprehension of said norms, willful disobedience, or subversive and destructive 
behaviour, rather than being the expressions of the legitimate interests of those 
outside or below the ruling élite (cf. 2.4).  
 
In contrast to neo-evolutionist theory or structural-functionalism, the dialectic 
approaches inspired by the works of Giddens (2007 [1984]) and Bourdieu (2008 
[1977]) make it possible to take the entirety of society into consideration and look at 
the role of structuration from below and initiatives from the masses as part of the 
development and functioning of polities. Dialectic and discursive analyses are more 
enlightening and useful than neo-evolutionist or structural-functionalist approaches 
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because they take more agents in society into consideration and do not regard 
societies as bounded systems. Rather, the discursive and dialectic approach opens for 
the interaction of several groups and several cultures and subcultures in a polity. The 
strategies of power pursued by agents in their societies, including the élite and the 
masses, can be studied in their relative prevalence or dominance, providing a view of 
the entire network of strategies that contribute to the structure of polities through 
structuration. Society is thus studied along several axes, vertically and horizontally. 
The state is not viewed exclusively from an élite point of view; the role of the masses 
is included in the discussion of politics (cf. 2.7.1-2; 2.8-9). With this approach, 
political culture in ancient polities beyond that of the central institutions can be 
studied. In this way, Near Eastern and Greek polities can be compared beyond their 
formal political structures.  
 
In this chapter, I have presented alternative models for explaining ancient polities 
beyond early state models or institutionally defined polities. These include consensual 
societies and heterarchies (2.9). Most important for the following investigation, 
however, will be the analysis of ancient polities from the point of view of strategies 
for power, especially broad corporate strategies of the masses and narrow corporate 
strategies of local councils of elders in order to reveal processes of social structuration 
initiated by agency from outside and below the central élites and their institutions 
(2.7-8). 
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3. The archaic poleis 
3.1 Introduction 
The archaic poleis offer a range of interesting socio-political conflicts and solutions 
that give valuable insights into the politics of Greek city-states. In this chapter, 
relations between the élite and the masses will be explored in particular. The role of 
popular power in archaic poleis will be investigated from epic and archaic poets. 
From these sources, political action will be explored in institutions for decision-
making as well as from action in less formal settings. Emphasis will be on the 
dynamics between groups of the élite, the masses, and leaders who held power alone 
in archaic poleis.  
 
I will begin my investigation of archaic poleis with a brief presentation of the 
problems concerning definitions of the polis as community and locality, followed by a 
discussion of the so-called hoplite reform and its significance for defining archaic 
polis communities (3.2).Then, I will discuss the polis in Homer and Hesiod, with an 
emphasis on institutions for decision-making and strategies for power (3.3). The 
analysis of the structure of archaic poleis and the strategies for power pursued by their 
citizens will focus on Athens, Sparta, Megara and Mytilene (3.4). From these poleis, 
archaic poets provide sources to how different socio-economic groups vied for power 
and negotiated their positions in the social fabric of their poleis in the archaic period. 
Problems concerning equality and the unity or differentiation of the civic body in 
archaic poleis will be given particular attention. 
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3.2 The polis as city-state and citizen community 
The beginning of the polis as city-state and citizen community is generally agreed to 
belong in the 8th century BCE, with the rise of complex nucleated societies with 
institutionalised decision-making bodies throughout Greece. These societies are held 
to have developed out of the homesteads and village societies in the post-Mycenaean 
period of the Iron Age known as the Dark Age.301 The archaic polis can be defined as 
a community as well as a town or city. However, scholars tend to emphasise social 
organisation rather than urban features in defining the polis. Archaeologists agree that 
the urbanisation of Greece was a slow process and not very wide-spread until the 6th 
century BCE. City-walls are attested quite late in Greece, after a long hiatus from the 
Mycenaean period to the 6th century.302 This has led to a debate whether the polis 
should be called a city-state, or if it was first and foremost a community of citizens, 
regardless of urban features of the settlement where the citizens lived. Mogens 
Herman Hansen puts a terminus ante quem about 650 BCE for the polis as a 
community of citizens and as a city. He argues that from 650 onwards, there are 
written sources to the polis in the sense of city-state, i.e. a city that is the centre of a 
state with its own constitution and citizen-body. From the middle of the 7th century, 
archaic poets refer to polis both as a political community of citizens and as an urban 
centre.303 This is a reasonable argument that makes good sense of the available 
written sources for the archaic period. Archaic poets refer to their native poleis as 
cities as well as citizen-communities.304 However, it should be pointed out that the 7th 
century is rather late compared to the cities of the Homeric epics and the earliest 
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colonies on Sicily. When did Dark Age communities become poleis? What can 
archaeology contribute to the dating of the polis? 
 
After the collapse of the Mycenaean palaces, centralised settlement is attested from 
archaeological finds at several places in Greece in the 11th century BCE. This 
evidence for early centralised communities creates problems for archaeologists 
regarding the date of the polis. Anthony Snodgrass attempts to find the point in time 
when centralised settlements of Dark Age Greece became centres of poleis, admitting 
that it is uncertain whether archaeology can determine when a settlement may be 
called a polis: the classic example is Sparta that never had a centralised urban core, 
but nevertheless was called a polis.305 However, Snodgrass argues that there are 
indications of significant changes from the Dark Age to the archaic period: some sites 
in Greece had centralised settlement and walls in the 11th century BCE, but these 
settlements were abandoned around 700 BCE. Snodgrass suggests that the reason why 
these strongholds were abandoned was a new political order towards the 7th century, 
when the city-state and its citizen army provided security, replacing the old 
fortifications.306  
 
Snodgrass’ hypothesis fits the view of Hansen that archaic poetry indicates a date 
around 650 BCE for nucleated and urbanised settlements of citizen communities in 
Greece. I agree with this date for the urbanised polis and find it convincing that 
literary evidence as well as archaeology suggests that the polis as city-state and citizen 
community can be placed in the 7th century. However, this date is not unproblematic: 
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there were poleis in Sicily that were reputably founded in the 8th century.307 It is hotly 
debated whether these poleis were planned settlements from the start, established by 
organised expeditions dispatched by their home poleis and led by an official founder, 
known as the oikist, or represent the results of settlements by improvised ventures.308 
However, the exact date of the founding of these poleis and the establishment of their 
urban features do not concern the present discussion of the politics of archaic poleis. 
Suffice it to say that in the course of the 7th century, poleis appear to have become 
city-states with urban features throughout Greece and to become recognized as such 
in the use of the word polis in the sense of citizen-state and city-state. 
 
The rather late dating at 650 BCE might seem strange compared to the conventional 
dating of epic literature, the 8th century, and the presence of fortified cities that are 
called poleis in the Iliad. Does this mean that the epics are pure fantasy, irrelevant for 
the study of archaic Greece? As will be discussed below (3.3), there are good reasons 
for including the epics in a discussion of the archaic polis. As will be seen, the most 
important communal institution of the polis, the agora, is present in the society of the 
Homeric epics. At any rate, any dating of the polis should allow for a development 
over time from isolated homesteads and small hamlets into city-states. More 
importantly for the present discussion, as will be argued, is that the social struggles 
typical of the archaic poleis can be seen in epic literature (3.3.1). I turn now to the 
typical institutions of the archaic polis and the main social divisions of archaic polis 
societies. 
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The town square, agora, is first attested archaeologically as part of the planned layout 
of a Greek settlement at the colony Megara Hyblaia in the 7th century BCE. No 
equally clear evidence for urban planning has been found for such an early period in 
mainland Greece.309 The development of a formally planned agora was an important 
part of the establishment of poleis as urbanised citizen communities. The main 
political centre of any polis was the agora. It was a demarcated public place where 
meetings were held and official business was carried out. The polis can be said to be 
centred on its agora. However, the public nature and mass appeal of such an open 
political space was countered by the private symposia, the drinking clubs of the élite. 
These meetings had connotations of debauchery, luxury and secrecy. Oswyn Murray 
points out that the symposia had a certain cosmopolitan flair, as the place to receive 
guest friends from abroad.310 The private gatherings of the élite could also be 
suspected of having a political nature as hotbeds for conspiracy. The symposion is 
therefore a contrast to the agora, and the two institutions, the one private and élite, the 
other public and egalitarian, are good illustrations of the conflicting worlds of the few 
and the masses in archaic poleis. As will be seen from the poetry of Alkaios and 
Theognis (3.4.4; 3.4.5), the symposia were an important part of aristocratic ideology. 
Thus, from the earliest attestations to their social fabric, archaic poleis were 
characterised by public assemblies as well as restricted gatherings. The élite were not 
confined to symposia, however. More importantly, several archaic poleis were ruled 
by councils where only the élite had access. The dynamics of council and assembly 
were important in the social struggles in archaic poleis. The dominance of the council 
over the assembly is also evident in epic poetry, as will be argued below (3.3.1). 
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In the archaic poleis, the masses and the élite have their separate spheres, but there are 
dynamic relations between the rich and the poor. In some poleis, the assembly 
attained a superior position. However, there is a tendency with classical scholars to 
downplay these dynamics and argue that polis societies were fundamentally 
egalitarian (cf. 1.5.2). Underpinning this view is the theory of the so-called hoplite 
reform, which I will discuss in the following.  
 
According to the theory of a hoplite reform, the polis community is first and foremost 
defined through the citizen army of hoplites. Hoplites, soldiers with heavy equipment 
including shield and spears, are traceable from finds in burials from the 8th century. 
Hoplites provided their own equipment and thus only farmers with a certain amount 
of property could qualify for participation. Hoplite equipment has been claimed as the 
best a posteriori indication for the polis.311 An army of hoplites is regarded as 
essential for the development of the polis.312 The so-called hoplite reform is 
frequently evoked to argue that Greek poleis were fundamentally egalitarian citizen-
collectives where only those who contributed to defending the polis had a part in its 
politics.313 As I will argue in the following, the emphasis on hoplites as fundamental 
to Greek city-state politics gives a false impression of the polis as an egalitarian 
citizen community of soldiers. The idea of a close correlation between military 
prowess and political participation stands in the way of a proper analysis of the 
dynamics of power in archaic poleis between rich and poor citizens, the élite and the 
masses. 
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The theory of a hoplite reform involves a change from heroic warfare of individual 
warriors, as seen in the Homeric epics, to a style of fighting where the citizens 
defended the city and their land as hoplites with mass tactics, the phalanx. In the 
phalanx, the fighters stood on line and covered each their neighbour with their 
shields. This is interpreted as the very image of the new citizen communities in 
Greece in the 7th century. To Max Weber, the polis was originally a warrior’s guild.314 
If this was correct, however, it should be possible to establish correlating dates for the 
hoplites and the poleis they defended, either archaeologically or from texts. This 
correlation is not easily established. Snodgrass points out that there is no 
archaeological confirmation of a hoplite reform from finds of equipment: rather, the 
development of the hoplite panoply was a piecemeal process.315 This may seem self-
evident, but the floating date of the hoplite reform is quite significant: if the 
introduction of hoplite equipment cannot be dated, the claim that hoplites promoted 
the establishment of poleis as citizen communities cannot be established 
archaeologically. 
 
Chronology is also problematic regarding the emergence of phalanx tactics as an 
alternative to the heroic fighting of epic poetry. Joachim Latacz has demonstrated that 
tactics quite close to that of the phalanx are found in Homer.316 If the establishment of 
the polis as a citizen community is regarded as a departure from the aristocratic world 
of the Homeric heroes, the basileis, the presence of phalanx tactics in the 8th century 
world of Homer makes it difficult to argue that the introduction of the phalanx was 
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important for the establishment of a new political order of a citizen community by the 
middle of the 7th century.  
 
Recently, scholars have expressed their doubts concerning correlations between the 
emergence of hoplites and a specific Greek form of city-state with broad citizen 
participation in politics. Peter Krentz argues that no definite military reform can be 
established archaeologically and therefore, no hoplite-driven political reforms can be 
argued for the archaic period. Rather, Krentz points out that hoplites must be regarded 
as a stable feature of Greek communities, and not the result of military reform.317 This 
view is also argued by Kurt A. Raaflaub, who assigns land-owning farmers an 
important place in the military and political structure of the archaic period, without 
assuming that the hoplites are indicative of a new egalitarian collective of citizens.318 
I agree with these assessments. The idea that the polis was an egalitarian community 
of warriors that emerged in the 7th century cannot be maintained. The correlation 
between shields, spears, tactics, and the polis as a citizen community is doubtful. This 
means that the polis should not be regarded as primarily a community of equal, self-
owning farmer hoplites. Rather, archaic poleis were city-states with a composite 
community of citizens, rich and poor, with complex dynamics of strategies for power. 
The archaic poleis were not egalitarian guilds of warriors, but they were not early 
states with insuperable divisions between the élite and the masses, either (cf. 2.2). 
This is a widely debated question, however, and I will return to it further on in this 
chapter: problems concerning supposed egalitarian relations between warriors in the 
Homeric epics and the social structure of the archaic polis will be discussed below 
(3.3.1). The role of hoplites in the reforms of Solon and Kleisthenes will be discussed 
in sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 respectively. 
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To conclude this section, it should be made clear that there is no such thing as the 
archaic Greek polis; there were great differences between them. Some general 
remarks on the archaic Greek polis can be made, however. The polis can be said to be 
attested as a political community and city-state from lyric and elegiac poetry of the 7th 
century BCE. Urban features including an agora and public sanctuaries are attested 
from the same period onwards. In archaic poleis, the citizen community had internal 
divisions between different socio-economic groups. There were collective organs of 
decision-making such as the assembly, but there were also more restricted councils, 
and the relations of power between these institutions could vary significantly between 
poleis and in each polis over time. The dynamics between the socio-economic groups 
and the broad or narrow collective decision-making bodies of archaic Greek poleis 
will be explored from the evidence provided by archaic poets in section 3.4 below. As 
will be argued, the Homeric epics were an important part of the ideology of élite 
social groups in archaic poleis. I now turn to the epic evidence, predominantly the 
Iliad and Odyssey of Homer, in order to investigate the earliest written evidence to the 
dynamics of archaic poleis. 
 
3.3 The polis in Homer and Hesiod 
It is a commonly held view among scholars that the beginnings of polis society can be 
found in the Homeric epics.319 The transition from the societies of the epic world to 
the historical Greek poleis is difficult to grasp, however, and has been interpreted in 
several ways. Moses Finley argues that the epics were written down at the end of the 
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Dark Age, in a period when “a new civilization was in embryo”.320 In his analysis, the 
Homeric world “fits neither the Bronze Age nor the city-state world which was to 
come. If it is to be placed in time […] the most likely centuries seem to be the tenth 
and ninth”.321 However, most scholars agree today that the Homeric epics were 
composed in the 8th century. In the interpretation of Ian Morris, the increase in simple 
and uniform graves in Greece around 750, accompanied by the establishment of 
common sanctuaries, and the advent of writing, all suggest a new reality in the archaic 
period, a reality that corresponds in time with Homer.322 Morris suggests that the 
Homeric epics should be analysed as ideological tools for the élite in the social 
upheavals surrounding the birth of the polis in the 8th century.323 Kurt A. Raaflaub, on 
the other hand, is convinced that Homeric society is more than a polis in embryo and 
is a predecessor of the historical polis.324 In his analysis of Homeric society, he 
emphasises that the constituent elements of the polis can all be found in Homer, 
“albeit in an undeveloped form” and that the polis has a central place in the society of 
the poems.325 A similar argument has been offered by Fritz Gschnitzer, who argues 
that because the Cyclopes are described in the Odyssey as lacking laws and councils, 
there had to be poleis in the Homeric world. He claims that “mit diesen Versen hat 
uns das Epos die Frage, ob bei den Griechen der homerischen Zeit Staat und Recht 
schon ausgebildet waren, selbst beantwortet”.326 However, laws and councils alone do 
not necessarily indicate a polis in the sense of a city-state. It should be possible to be 
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more precise regarding what exactly is historical in Homer, for this line of thought to 
be convincing. This, however, does not seem to be the case. At any rate, in order to 
discuss the use of epics as sources of élite ideology in archaic Greece, the reality and 
fantasy of the epic world will be discussed in the following. 
 
The relations between epic society and the polis are problematic. Epic society is 
impossible to place securely in any historical period and is clearly heterogenic. 
Scholars explain the fantastic or archaising elements in the epics, in particular the 
Iliad and Odyssey, as conscious efforts by the poet to provide an “epic distance” 
between his contemporary Greece and the time of the heroes.327 Raaflaub argues that 
“the social background of heroic poetry needed to be modern enough to be 
understandable, but archaic enough to be believable”.328 However, the sifting of 
fantastic from real elements in the epics is a rather arbitrary exercise. A case in point 
is the presence of kings in Homer. Were there kings in Greece in the archaic period? 
Scholars doubt this.329 Sarah Morris points out that kings who actually rule their 
communities are not attested from early Greece.330 Rather, she argues that the 
dynasties of local kings of the Dark Age into the archaic period can be explained as 
deliberate fictions made by local élites, perhaps under the influence of neighbouring 
royal traditions from Lydia, Egypt or Persia. Stories of ancient kings do not warrant 
that early Greek communities were ruled by kings.331 Attempts have been made to 
explain kings in Homeric society as leaders in a kind of proto-polis. The basileis are 
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interpreted not as rulers of kingdoms, but as local big men, community leaders known 
from anthropological literature whose power was based on the giving of gifts.332 
Walter Donlan also emphasises the non-state nature of Homeric society. He analyses 
the basileis as leaders of households that “enlarged their spheres of influence by 
recruiting non-local supporters”.333 I agree to Sarah Morris’ assessment of the 
historical position of kingship in archaic Greece and would rather see the presence of 
kings in Homer as fiction than preserved fact. The alternative explanations of 
leadership in epic society offered by Qviller and Donlan do not establish that there 
were kings or kingly figures ruling communities in Iron Age Greece. Although 
anthropological parallels to Homeric kings can be found, this does not strengthen the 
claim that there was an historical Homeric society ruled by kings. Informal or 
charismatic leadership does not warrant royalty. Rather, as will be discussed below 
(3.4), archaic Greek communities appear to have been led by groups of leaders, not 
sovereign kings. 
 
Scholars have pointed out that the values of the Homeric world are difficult to 
reconcile with a consistent system of social values that one would expect in a 
functioning society. The virtues of epic society appear split: aristocratic ideals of 
personal excellence clash with egalitarian values of community and group solidarity. 
This is well illustrated by the hero Achilles, who sulks by the ships to the downfall of 
his fellow Greeks, for the sake of personal honour. This has been observed by several 
scholars. Arthur W. H. Adkins points out that the distribution of prizes at the funeral 
games of Patroklos is a particularly clear example of the “tangle of values” in Homer: 
prizes are awarded according to virtue (aretē) as well as for prowess.334 He argues 
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that these conflicting values can be taken as indication of social changes in Greece at 
the time of the recording of the epics.335 However, the argument of changing values is 
difficult to accept, because it cannot be established what was changing into what and 
when. Margalit Finkelberg points out that the contrast between competitive and co-
operative values in Homer illustrates the difficulties of assigning the epic world to 
one specific historical period.336 This is an important observation. The explanation of 
inconsistencies in the Homeric epics as due to the transitional nature of the society of 
the epics is methodologically dubious. It works on the premise of “Homeric society” 
as a primitive or pre-political stage in Greek history. As Raymond Westbrook points, 
the transitional stage model poses the problem of exactly when to place these stages 
in the course of Greek history.337 I agree that the Homeric epics can be used as 
sources to ideologies of the archaic period, but it is dangerous to base a reconstruction 
of changes in archaic Greek societies on interpretations of the epics alone. 
 
The political structure of Homeric society appears to be halfway between myth and 
reality. The kings are divine and therefore to be obeyed without question. However, 
several of the institutions typical of the polis, including councils and assemblies, are 
found in the epics. As Malcolm Schofield points out, eloquence in council is as much 
a virtue of the heroes as prowess in battle.338 However, it is obvious that the 
assemblies and councils of the heroes are a far cry from anything that can be called 
citizen rule. Finley remarks that the emphasis on eloquence in council among the 
heroes squares badly with the actual advice they give. He argues that their role as 
advisers and speakers in the assembly corresponds to their social status and not to 
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particular skills at debate.339 This is a very useful observation, because it places the 
epic world not as an early historical level of Greek political developments towards the 
classical polis, but as the expression of the values and ideology of an élite, the 
aristocrats of archaic poleis, forming one side of a contemporary whole rather than an 
early stage of a teleological process. 
 
Although an historical Homeric society cannot be established, the time of Homer, 
conventionally dated to the 8th century, was a turning point for Greek communities. 
Archaeologists argue that the increase of finds, especially graves, from the Late 
Geometric period suggests a major population increase in Greek communities. 
Anthony Snodgrass dubbed the archaic period the “age of experiment”, because of the 
dramatic changes in the archaeological record, including the rise of centralised 
settlements.340 However, as was discussed above (3.2), the polis as a city-state and 
citizen community is not securely attested before the 7th century. This leaves a gap 
between the epics and the historical polis of about a hundred years. It is not possible 
to reconcile the different interpretations of epic society or decide which historical 
period the epics represent. As will be seen (3.3.2), this also applies to Hesiod: it is not 
likely that his epics give a first-hand account of the life of a peasant in the 8th century. 
Therefore, I suggest that rather than being regarded as a forerunner of the polis, epic 
society should be placed in the realm of archaic élite ideologies, either of the 
aristocracy, as in Homer, or of the self-owning leisured farmer, as in Hesiod. These 
ideologies pervaded the period of polis establishment and Greek expansion into the 
Mediterranean in the archaic period, from the 8th to the 5th century. 
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In the following, I will discuss the political structure and dynamics of Homeric 
society as it is described in the epics and set this in relation to élite ideology of the 
archaic period. What were the relations between the Homeric heroes and the rank and 
file of the army? 
 
3.3.1 Homeric politics: Odysseus and Thersites 
As discussed above (3.3), it is a moot point when and where to place the political and 
judiciary institutions of the Homeric epics. What the epics do tell about political 
organisation is that the institutions of the Homeric world were rather similar in outline 
to those known from archaic and classical poleis. As mentioned already, the society of 
Cyclopes is described as uncivilised, having neither laws nor assemblies.341 This must 
mean that there were societies with laws and assemblies in the time of Homer. 
Assemblies, councils, and magistrates have a place in the communities in the epics, 
and the kings are part of these institutions. Some settlements are urbanised, Troy 
being an obvious example, with institutions for collective decision-making 
conducting their sessions in urban contexts.342 The political institutions of epic appear 
as amalgams with no exact historical model. Therefore, the connection between these 
institutions and those of historic poleis will not be discussed further. Rather, in the 
following, what will be investigated are the epics as sources to political ideologies in 
the archaic period. I will first investigate the so-called Thersites episode of the Iliad 
(2.53-277) as an example of aristocratic values, before I look at the attitudes to power 
that can be found in the epics of Hesiod, a rather different world from that of Homer 
(3.3.2). 
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An important aspect of the political culture in the Homeric epics is the consistent 
dichotomy of the heroes and the host, between the basileis and the laoi. The basileus 
leads and the laoi follows, and the laoi is never acting independently of the basileus. 
Johannes Haubold points out that “the single agent has to keep the people safe”.343 
This is a good observation. The people are constantly in an inferior position. Their 
leaders, the nobility, belong to a different class of beings. There are isolated 
statements in Homer where the heroes claim that their power and prestige comes from 
the people and that they owe them to fight for their protection.344 Fritz Gschnitzer 
finds evidence that the people owned the land the basileis ruled over and had granted 
them their geras, their privileged place in society.345 However, it must be pointed out 
that any respect for or gratitude towards the masses is seldom translated into practice. 
The heroes are constantly defined as over and above any of the rank and file in deed 
or counsel. As will be discussed in the following, relations of power between the hero 
and the multitude is quite consistent with élite sentiments towards the masses in the 
archaic period. The emphasis in Homer on egalitarian relations between the basileis 
and the inferiority of the laoi points towards the differentiation of status in archaic 
poleis between the élite and the masses. The differences in status between the basileis 
and the laoi can be seen in the Second Song of the Iliad, when Agamemnon wishes to 
test the resolve of the Achaeans and Odysseus chastises the commoner Thersites 
(Il.2.53-277). This example will be examined in detail in the following. 
 
The situation leading up to the Thersites episode is a crisis in the Achaean camp. 
Agamemnon gathers the foremost heroes to a council (boulē) to tell them about a 
recent dream of his: the fall of Troy is imminent and he will be victorious that very 
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day. He has full confidence that this is a true omen, but decides to test the Achaeans, 
by encouraging them to break the siege and go home. Then, the other basileis are 
supposed to talk them out of fleeing.346 At the summons, the Achaean host rushes to 
the agora. Heralds strive to silence the noisy agora and make it listen to the 
basileis.347 The crowd finally falls silent, and Agamemnon rises to speak wielding a 
sceptre. He claims Zeus has told him they will not be able to take Troy after all.348 
Their task being futile, they might as well go home. The laoi are more than willing to 
do so. The entire assembly breaks up and the host storms down to the ships to leave 
Troy for good. According to the plan of Agamemnon and the basileis, the basileis try 
to stop them, to no avail, until Athena inspires Odysseus to take the sceptre of 
Agamemnon and go rally the troops.  When Odysseus meets any basileus or excellent 
man, he tries to stop him with words, by arguing how unworthy it is for such a man to 
be afraid, saying that “all do not know the scheme of Agamemnon; it was a scam to 
test your loyalty, and who knows how he will punish the Achaeans for their 
cowardice”.349 However, when Odysseus meets a commoner, he hits him with the 
sceptre and rebukes him, bidding him to shut up and listen to his betters, saying “the 
commoner is nobody in battle or in council; indeed not all can rule the Achaeans. 
There is no good in the rule of many (polykoiraniē). There must be one ruler, one 
king, to whom Zeus gave the sovereignty”.350 At last the laoi return noisily to the 
agora, like the waves of the sea.351 
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The dichotomy between basileis and laoi is brought to the fore in this episode, as 
Odysseus claims that the commoners are of no worth at all in council or battle, 
whereas the basileis rule by the will of Zeus. The council of the heroes has devised a 
stratagem to test the laoi, who have no knowledge of what goes on in the council. 
This suggests a broad élite strategy, where an exclusive, but internally egalitarian 
decision-making group hides its decision-making processes and keeps other groups, 
including the majority of the people, out of the process. Odysseus calls the masses to 
silence by pointing to their inferiority, not to the egalitarian relations between the 
fighters. Rational argument and kind words are reserved for those Odysseus considers 
worthy, whereas the masses are treated like animals. 
 
At the word of Odysseus, the assembly falls silent, except for one man, Thersites, who 
clamours and shouts abuse at the basileis. He is described as a notorious slanderer, 
who argues with the basileis in rude language and tries to make the Achaeans laugh 
with his irreverent talk.352 He is further described as the ugliest man of the entire host 
who went to Troy, a bandy-legged, hunchbacked pinhead whose only talent is to 
badmouth his betters.353 Thersites reviles king Agamemnon and accuses him of 
wishing to continue the war for the sake of personal gain. He further mocks the 
Achaeans, calling them weaklings and women for not abandoning the greedy 
Agamemnon, arguing that the king then would see whether the common soldiery was 
useful or not. Finally, he calls Achilles a phlegmatic coward for not killing 
Agamemnon when he took away his prize, the girl Briseïs.354 Odysseus brings an end 
to Thersites’ tirade by making it known that if he ever hears him hurling such abuse 
again he will strip him of his clothing and cane him soundly, whereupon he treats him 
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to a few blows with the sceptre. The unhappy Thersites falls silent and weeps, 
whereat the rest of the Achaeans laugh heartily, calling this the best of all the feats of 
Odysseus.355 
 
The clash between the commoner Thersites and the basileus Odysseus is a fine 
illustration of the differences in rank and status and their implication for public 
participation in the assemblies in the Homeric world. Clearly, there is a gulf between 
the leaders of the army and the rest. Marcel Detienne argues that the Homeric heroes 
were formally equal and that the middle, to meson, was an important principle in 
dividing booty and in speaking to the assembly.356 In his interpretation, the social 
group of this egalitarian warrior class became the polis and their reciprocal relations 
are found again in the agora of Greek poleis.357 As seen in the Thersites-episode, 
however, commoners were excluded from the circle of peers, although they evidently 
belonged to the group of fighting men. Some scholars argue that Thersites is an 
egregious character. Kurt A. Raaflaub claims that the Thersites-episode does not 
indicate that the basileis were superior to the laoi, but is an example of bad behaviour 
from the rank and file.358 This interpretation overlooks the ideological bias of Homer, 
however: Thersites is described as insolent and ugly exactly to highlight his inferiority 
to the basileis and to bring home the message of the divine right to rule for the 
basileis over the laoi and by extension, the archaic aristocracy, over the commoners. 
What does this tell us about the social structure of the archaic polis? It seems evident 
that only a small minority could call themselves equals, i.e. the aristocrats (cf. 1.5.2; 
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1.5.2). Thus, popular power in the polis cannot plausibly be claimed to originate in 
this closed circle of élite members. 
 
Detienne’s analysis of the beginnings of the polis does not explain the transition from 
a limited circle of heroes to a supposedly broadly defined egalitarian civic body. In 
the Thersites-episode, aristocratic arrogance is more evident than anything else and 
the community is completely dominated by the heroes. This reveals a fundamental 
difficulty in supposing egalitarian relations as the basis for polis society. However, 
the episode is not unequivocal and is open to different interpretations. It can be 
interpreted as an élite assertion of superiority and a criticism of popular involvement 
in decision-making. It can also be read as a protest against arrogant leaders. Arnaldo 
Momigliano points out that the intervention of Thersites is “clearly considered 
scandalous (yet it does happen)”.359 Kurt A. Raaflaub interprets the harangue of 
Thersites as an expression of general dissatisfaction with kings or big men.360 
Criticism of the leaders is no doubt an important aspect of what Thersites is saying, 
but the reaction to his harangue is just as interesting and appears as the main focus in 
the Iliad’s narration of the episode: nobody defends Thersites’ criticism and Odysseus 
can punish him at will. Thus, seeing Thersites as somehow a popular voice against the 
élite is to read modern notions of freedom of speech into the episode. Rather, this 
episode appears designed to highlight the contrast between the heroes and the host, 
and by extension, the archaic élite and the masses. However, the Thersites-episode 
can be read in different ways: the criticism against the basileis is quite explicit and 
can be plausibly argued to express feelings harboured by many of the rank and file of 
archaic Greek societies. 
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The evidence from the Thersites-episode is ambiguous: Thersites is described as 
hideously ugly, and is hardly an ideal to anyone, yet, he does gainsay the basileis. 
Likewise, the assertion that everyone supported Odysseus is perhaps exaggerated. 
Indeed, the bullying necessary to underpin the respect for the basileis may indicate 
that their status was not secure. The irreverent speech of Thersites can be said to 
represent a broad corporate strategy for power against the dominance of the basileis, a 
strategy for popular power, shared among the laoi: Thersites does not only say “to hell 
with the war”, he points out how the war benefits the powerful and harms the 
commoners. Conversely, the humiliating corporal punishment meted out by Odysseus 
reveals a broad élite strategy of marking off a distinction between the circle of 
basileis and good men on the one hand and the masses on the other. In the ideology 
that informs this strategy for power, the basileis are supposed to do the talking, they 
are the best in council and in battle, whereas the rest should hold their peace and do as 
they are told. The rule of many is a bad thing, whereas the rule of one king is the will 
of the gods. As will be discussed further below (3.4.4; 3.4.5), this fundamental 
difference between the élite and the masses can be found in some of the archaic poets. 
First, however, the political ideology of Hesiod will be investigated. 
 
3.3.2 Hesiod “the peasant” 
The other great epic poet of the 8th century, Hesiod, is discussed here as further 
evidence to attitudes to power and relations between social groups in archaic Greece. 
In the Theogony, Hesiod describes himself as a shepherd herding sheep on Mount 
Helicon when the Muses gave him inspiration for poetry.361 In the Works and Days, 
Hesiod gives advice to farmers amid ethical observations useful for life in what he 
calls the age of the race of iron, when all mankind must work hard for survival. It is a 
                                              
361 Hes. Theog. 22-25 
 166 
time of lies and deceit, when the strong oppresses the weak.362 Hesiod complains that 
gift-devouring basileis have cheated him of his rightful inheritance, bribed by his own 
brother, Perses. The basileis are judges, but they trample justice underfoot.363 He 
warns that Dike, personified justice, is protected by Zeus and will punish those who 
abuse their power.364 Hesiod gives advice to keep good relations with one’s 
neighbour; to invite him often and help him in whatever way one can, so that he may 
repay the favour should one need it.365 
 
Hesiod appears as a hard-working farmer, always concerned that hunger and poverty 
may strike the unprepared. His concern for justice pervades the Works and Days, and 
he presents himself as the victim of injustice. The two great adversaries in his world 
are his lazy spendthrift brother Perses and the gift-devouring judges that have no 
respect for justice. He presents himself as a shepherd and a peasant. Is Hesiod a 
source to sentiments held by people outside the élite, even peasant attitudes? The 
sentiments expressed in the Works and Days have been interpreted as evidence for an 
egalitarian ethos between members of the archaic polis (cf. 1.5.2). Ian Morris argues 
that Hesiod’s race of iron were peasants with a local interest, uninterested in foreign 
luxury, travel, or strange lands. After the race of heroes, “the burdens of Zeus 
inflicted on the race of iron isolated them from the past and from the wider world”.366 
In Morris’ interpretation, this new outlook on life can be set in relation to “city-states 
dominated by internally egalitarian male citizen elites defined by descent and gender 
but not by wealth, and controlling excluded and fragmented groups of women and 
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slaves”. He argues that “these citizens also turned their backs on the heroic past and 
the oriental world, but now from a sense of superiority. A narrower elite of wealth, 
birth, and education claimed to rise above these associations of peasants. Their ability 
to manipulate Lydian culture and act like heroes and even gods constituted, in their 
own eyes, proof of this”.367  
 
Interpreting Hesiod as a spokesman for the peasants is problematic. Part of the 
problem lies in the nature of the source material itself, the epics. It seems highly 
unlikely that a peasant of the archaic period composed the Theogony and Works and 
Days. Hesiod may have suffered injustice at the hands of judges and he may have 
placed much value on hard work and honesty, but that does not make him a peasant. 
That he composed the poems in a peasant persona is an entirely different matter, but 
to accept at face value his claim to be a shepherd on Mount Helicon seems rather 
credulous. Even if he was a person with the resources to compose two epic poems, 
and thus no peasant, he may be argued to voice the concerns of the peasants of his 
community. However, this does not make him a source to peasant attitudes, but a 
source to the attitudes of a wealthy landowner concerned for the poor. 
 
Scholars have interpreted Hesiod quite differently from Morris. Erich Kistler does not 
accept Morris’ interpretation of peasant attitudes in Hesiod. He argues that Hesiod’s 
dike is not a concern for equality between peasants, but an expression of “vertikale 
Solidarität” between some members of archaic élites and the poor.368 In his 
interpretation, the advice to work hard and spend little points to the ideal of being 
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metrios as opposed to committing hybris.369 Kistler argues that to Hesiod, Zeus is 
protector of justice: justice in the sense of “korrektiver Gerecthtigkeit,” the kind of 
justice that should prevail between rich and poor.370  
 
I agree with Kistler’s point that Hesiod cannot be interpreted as a peasant or 
spokesman of the underprivileged. His concerns can be seen as those of a member of 
the élite directed against other, less scrupulous members of the élite, rather than a call 
for justice coming from the oppressed. Hesiod’s concerns are not for the thetes, the 
landless rural poor, but for the self-owning farmer. He can be interpreted as a 
spokesman for the values of a narrow corporate strategy of egalitarian relations 
among local landowners. However, Hesiod should not be taken as evidence for a 
broad corporate strategy of mass empowerment that included the poor. His appeals to 
Dike appear as a reaction to the hybristic behaviour of other members of the 
landowning group and abuse of power to secure the upper hand against other 
landowners, including exploitation of the weak and destitute.  
 
3.3.3 Social groups in epic poems, their values and their strategies 
The values of the Homeric epics are those of the élite. The basileis are in power, 
simply because Zeus wants it so. They are better than everybody else and their power 
is not challenged. The Thersites-episode rather emphasises the élite perspective than it 
is tempering it: Thersites is no plausible challenger to the rule of Odysseus or the 
other basileis. Ideological values influenced the strategies of power available to the 
basileis as well as to the laoi. Although we hear little about the values and 
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expectations of the laoi, it is evident that they obeyed their basileis and accepted this 
as a norm, at least as far as we can trust the Iliad. But of course, the whole narrative is 
from the perspective of the élite, and therefore, it cannot be claimed that e.g. the other 
fighters’ laughing at Thersites’ chastisement is a source to the thoughts and values of 
the rank and file. The strategies for power pursued by the basileis are that of a broad 
élite: it is a limited body of internally equal basileis, with strict demarcations against 
inferiors. They make decisions without the knowledge of the laoi and even devise 
stratagems to test them in secret. In a polis, such a group would be an aristocracy, not 
an oligarchy. This is because the status of the basileis is not from their possessions of 
land or livestock, but from their honour and their divine pedigree. Their social 
position is inherited and no outsider can attain that status no matter how much land he 
owns or possessions he might amass. The basileis use their international contacts to 
establish networks of men of equal status. This is rather different from the local world 
of Hesiod. 
 
Hesiod’s values appear as those of a concerned farmer, himself well enough off, but 
aware of the dangers of hybris and the destructive powers of greed and injustice. The 
strategy for power available to the subsistence farmers of his community is solidarity 
and mutual help between landowners. This is a narrow corporate strategy: Hesiod 
does not advice to give to the needy, but to give to those who can help in their turn. 
This community of farmers would correspond to an oligarchy, in that ownership of 
land is an important criterion for being a full member. However, power in Hesiod’s 
society is not in the hands of the local farming community as a collective, but with the 
basileis. They appear as a broad élite and make decisions through deceit, influenced 
by bribes. 
 
The élite values of the Homeric aristocracy and the views of a moderately well-off 
farmer found in Hesiod can be found again in the archaic poets that I will discuss in 
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the following. They form part of the world of attitudes that contributed to shaping the 
political structures of the archaic poleis of the mid-7th century. As will be seen, the 
perspectives of the archaic poets were diverse and sometimes complex. Attitudes to 
wealth, status, and justice are important for the choices of strategies for power chosen 
by the different agents in their individual poleis. 
 
3.4 Archaic poleis as networks of strategies 
From the archaic poets that will be discussed in the following sections, the impression 
is that archaic poleis were riddled by struggles between members of the élite, whether 
individual families or geographically organised groups. Commoners were also 
involved in these struggles, most conspicuously as followers, but sometimes also with 
their own agenda. These struggles and how they are discussed by the archaic poets 
will make out the bulk of the following discussions. I will analyse four different 
poleis separately, viz. Sparta (3.4.1), Athens (3.4.2; 3.4.3), Mytilene (3.4.4) and 
Megara (3.4.5). What were the dynamics of power between élites and masses? What 
were the conditions for popular power in archaic poleis?  
 
Struggles between groups and individuals in archaic poleis frequently escalated into 
civil war, stasis, and sometimes had the result that one man seized power and become 
a tyrant. It is a fairly common phenomenon of the archaic period that the masses sided 
with tyrants. Stasis and tyranny will be discussed from the archaic poets, as well as 
from classical sources where relevant. I will concentrate the discussion on the power 
struggles of the archaic period, before 500 BCE. In these struggles, the role of the 
masses can be studied together with élite factions and individual contenders for 
tyrannical power. As will be seen, groups of the élite as well as commoners, 
aristocrats as well as peasants, pursued strategies for power in archaic poleis. The 
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archaic poleis were not simply hierarchies, but structures consisting of multiple 
alliances and enmities that made them networks for achieving objectives, including 
dominance over other, competing groups.  
 
3.4.1 Sparta: the Great Rhetra 
The constitution of archaic Sparta is known from the so-called Great Rhetra, a metric 
oracular response from Delphi that laid down the organisation of the polity. It has 
come down to us as part of Plutarch’s biography of Lykourgos.371 Since Plutarch 
wrote in the 1st century CE about events supposedly taking place in the 8th century 
BCE, the biography is a late source to the archaic period. This makes it dangerous to 
use: the Rhetra itself is probably archaic, but Plutarch’s interpretation certainly is not. 
I will include Plutarch, however, since the parts of his information relevant for the 
present discussion can be confirmed from the 7th century poet Tyrtaios. The Great 
Rhetra is a difficult source. Paul Cartledge states that the Great Rhetra is a text “over 
which more scholarly ink has been spilt than over any other Greek text of comparable 
length”.372 However, it contains many intriguing hints at the political structure and 
culture of archaic Sparta. In antiquity, Sparta’s ancient constitution was held by many 
Greeks to be the best in the world. Who had the power in Sparta and how and to 
which degree were the people active in politics? 
 
The elegiac poet Tyrtaios gives a version of the Rhetra and refers to a visit to 
Delphi.373 However, the connection between the reformer Lykourgos and the Rhetra 
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is tenuous. Tyrtaios does not mention Lykourgos. Finley argues that this indicates a 
later invention of the lawgiver Lykourgos as the man behind the Rhetra.374 I agree 
that the figure of Lykourgos must to a large extent be considered legendary. Rather, 
the reference in Tyrtaios places the political structure of the Great Rhetra in the 
middle of the 7th century.375 However, the chronology of the Great Rhetra and the 
relation of Tyrtaios (Tyrt. 4) to the text are controversial issues and will be discussed 
further below. In the following, I will present the evidence to the constitution of 
archaic Sparta from Tyrtaios and Plutarch, before discussing who participated in 
politics and how. 
 
Plutarch (Lyc. 6) quotes the Great Rhetra as giving instructions to divide the people 
into phylai and obai. The lawgiver was to establish a council of elders (gerousia) 
counting thirty members including the arkhagetai. Further, there is to be gathered in 
assembly (apellazein) at a specified place outdoors from time to time to decide upon 
measures. The people (damos) are to be sovereign (kyrios) and have the power 
(kratos). Plutarch explains that the phylai and obai are clans and tribes, that 
arkhagetai are the two kings, and that the meetings of the assembly, ekklesia, take 
place outdoors at a specific place because the Spartans had no halls or other buildings 
for this purpose. Also, he explains that the people were not allowed to introduce any 
measures, but had the choice of ratifying or repealing measures proposed by the elders 
or kings, so that the people had final word. This was soon considered unwise, 
Plutarch explains, and therefore an addition was made to the Rhetra, that sessions 
could be interrupted by the kings or elders if measures were made crooked by the 
people.  
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Tyrtaios (Tyrt. 4) says of the Spartan constitution that two kings ruled together with 
the council of elders, the gerousia, and only these had the right to make propositions. 
The popular assembly could not make any propositions of its own, but were expected 
to discuss the propositions of the kings and the gerousia in a spirit of justice and 
honesty.  
 
Based on these two sources, it can be plausibly suggested that the basic structure of 
archaic Sparta was a powerful council including the kings and a popular assembly 
with circumscribed powers. This constitution was praised for its wisdom by later 
commentators throughout antiquity, with its combination of kings, council, and 
assembly, completed by the later introduction of ephors, people’s representatives for 
controlling the kings’ actions.376 These later interpretations are problematic, however, 
because they appear to judge Sparta from the point of view of a dichotomy between 
oligarchy and democracy, categories that were defined in the classical period, thus not 
immediately applicable to archaic poleis. Instead, the present discussion will focus on 
the political and social structure of archaic Sparta and the strategies for power that 
were available to its citizens. 
 
It should be pointed out that the people are granted quite extensive powers in the 
Great Rhetra. However, in Tyrtaios 4, the assembly is not allowed to freely propose 
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measures. Plutarch presents Tyrtaios 4 as evidence that there was made an addition to 
the Rhetra.377 This addition is referred to as the Rider and it is supposed that it was 
introduced to temper the original Great Rhetra and take away some of the powers of 
the people. However, the relation between the Great Rhetra in Plutarch and fragment 
Tyrtaios 4 is highly controversial. Efforts have been made to establish a relative 
chronology between one and the other.378 I will return to the debate on the 
development of the Great Rhetra below, suffice it to state here that I doubt that the 
Rider was a revision of an original Lykourgan constitution. What is important for the 
present investigation is what the texts can tell us about the political and social 
structure of archaic Sparta. I will not go into discussions of the relative chronology of 
the Rhetra and Rider, but treat them together as evidence for the political structure of 
archaic Sparta. 
 
The Great Rhetra and the Rider were apparently supposed to establish a balance 
between different groups in archaic Sparta, between an élite of kings and elders on the 
one hand and a citizen body on the other, as well as between more and less well-off 
citizens. Paul Cartledge suggests that the Great Rhetra is the product of a crisis 
situation: “At a moment of supreme crisis at home and abroad this formula offered 
something, politically, to all the contending groups. As a result of its enactment the 
monarchy survived, though with diminished power. The Gerousia (Senate), which 
included the two kings ex officio, became the supreme political organ in effect, but its 
membership was limited numerically and (except for the kings) formally subjected to 
the constraint of public election though not to public accountability. The non-
aristocratic damos was granted political recognition, indeed formal sovereignty, but 
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its power of initiative was effectively bridled”.379 Cartledge’s argument can be said to 
recognise the importance of accommodating different interests for the cohesion of the 
polis. In my view, it is sensible to view the Spartan constitution as an attempt to 
forestall stasis by granting formal political participation to all citizens within certain 
limits. However, I would argue that it was not necessarily a specific crisis behind the 
process resulting in the Spartan political structure. The struggle to avoid stasis must 
have been a continuous concern in Greek poleis, so that there is no need to identify a 
single factor behind the division of power in archaic Sparta.  
 
It seems clear that the people were formally recognised as a part of the Spartan 
constitution. However, the extent of their authority is difficult to ascertain. The 
position of the people in Sparta has been much debated. François Ollier argues that 
the structure of power was such that the people were dominated by the gerousia, to 
the extent that “le people de Sparte n’a donc qu’un fantôme de pouvoir”.380 In his 
reconstruction, the gerousia was in charge in Sparta and was an instrument of power 
for the oligarchs. This also applied to the ephors.381 Ollier’s view is supported by 
most scholars. W. G. Forrest points out that the gerousia had enormous power in 
Sparta and that it did not answer to anyone outside itself, having control in all 
political questions.382 However, he emphasises that although the assembly could not 
change any measures when they were proposed by the gerousia, the gerousia 
nevertheless brought these measures before the assembly for the final decision.383 
Arnaldo Momigliano argues that Tyrtaios 4, the Rider, “gives the kings and the 
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gerontes power of veto, limiting preexisting rights of the assembly. The veto controls, 
but does not abolish, the powers of initiative of the assembly”.384 It can be argued that 
the scholars referenced above all comply with Plutarch’s late account that emphasises 
popular power (cf. Lyc. 5 and note 376 above). Thus, their reconstructions can be 
claimed to be based on a late source and not on evidence to archaic Sparta. Indeed, 
scholars have offered alternative readings. Against the view that the people lost power 
to the gerousia, Daniel Ogden argues that the people were granted more power with 
time and not less.385 He bases his argument, however, on a highly speculative relative 
dating of the Great Rhetra and the Rider, claiming that the archaic wording of the 
Rider makes it older than the Rhetra.386 This does not warrant the conclusion that the 
people were granted more power with time in Sparta: for later periods, it is evident 
that power in Sparta was not in the hands of all the people, but belonged to a limited 
élite of kings, elders, and ephors. Therefore, I agree with Ollier that archaic Sparta 
was under the control of the gerousia and that measures were taken to circumscribe 
the power of the assembly.  
 
Perhaps the curtailing of the assembly indicates that Sparta had a political structure 
that made broad popular participation in politics possible, but a political culture that 
was to a large extent authoritarian, dominated by a powerful gerousia? From the 
poems of Tyrtaios, unity among the citizen hoplites, the homoioi, was all-important in 
Spartan culture.387 Measures taken to avoid dissent in the assembly can be seen as 
attempts to preserve the appearance of unity in the decision-making bodies of the 
polis vis-à-vis the helots, the enslaved original inhabitants of the Peloponnese. This 
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aspect of Spartan society is quite pronounced in the classical as well as modern view 
of Sparta and will therefore be given some consideration in the following. Was Sparta 
an exceptionally cohesive polis? Did it have a stronger corporate identity among its 
citizens than other poleis? 
 
Social control through education and a collective lifestyle was held to be typical of 
Sparta in the classical period. Xenophon wrote a Constitution of the Spartans in the 
early 4th century and had extensive personal experience of life in Sparta and among 
Spartans abroad.  He observes that the education system makes sure that adolescents 
are under constant control and supervision.388 This also applies to adults, whose duty 
is to actively seek excellence in all virtues, supervised by their neighbours and fellow 
citizens.389 However, the image of an extremely cohesive society can be said to be 
part of a mirage created from the 5th century onwards by intellectuals who sought to 
highlight the shortcomings of their home poleis by contrasting them with Sparta. 
Thus, Sparta is presented as different from all other poleis, whereas in reality, it had 
much in common with them, including struggles between different socio-economic 
groups. François Ollier dubbed this phenomenon “le mirage Spartiate”. He argues that 
philosophers and politicians in 5th and 4th century Athens created Sparta as an 
oligarchic ideal in contrast to democracy, “une cité illusoire, mirage que les désirs 
s’enchantement de voir briller devant eux à l’horizon”.390  He suggests that Athenian 
philosophers viewed the Spartan oligarchy as a living past, an example of “la Gréce 
d’autrefois, avec ce people robuste et sain, fidèle à ses vieilles moeurs austères”.391 
Ollier points out that the ancient traits of Sparta’s constitution are superficial: 
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although the kings of Sparta appear as survivals of the ancient past, they cannot be 
claimed to be an important part of the government.392 He also points out that the 
Spartan citizens, homoioi or “equals”, “peers”, were similar in little more than name 
and that there were significant differences in wealth between citizens.393 The last 
point is a good observation: the élite of the gerousia was indeed distinguished not 
only by age and status, but also wealth and the kings were part of this affluent élite. 
The image of Sparta as a stable constitution established by Lykourgos, with unique 
institutions that survived from ancient days and a citizen body where everyone was 
equal must be regarded as a mirage. Thus, the classical image of Sparta as a collective 
of equals is not very instructive for an analysis of archaic Sparta. I would rather 
emphasise the combination of kings, council, officials, and the assembly as the most 
interesting feature of archaic Sparta, and the apparent attempt to preserve cohesion 
through a balance of authority and obedience, initiative and respect. 
 
The Spartan efforts to accommodate several groups in the polis were praised in 
antiquity as a well-mixed constitution (cf. 1.4.1). However, to discuss an archaic 
constitution in terms of oligarchy and democracy as Plutarch does (cf. note 376) must 
be considered anachronistic philosophical speculation. This has been recognised by 
scholars. Moses Finley interprets the Spartan constitution as a sign of “permanent 
conflict” and not a “mixed constitution”.394 Indeed, the impression of archaic Sparta 
from the Great Rhetra and the Rider is not of a constitution with a definite sovereign 
group, but one of several interests being accommodated into a unifying structure that 
allowed the citizens, the kings, and the elders to pursue their interests in the polis and 
still retain a socio-political unity. Thus, Finley’s objection is well put. The political 
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structure of Sparta is open for a network of strategies: by offering means of political 
participation to all parts of society, a balance could be achieved that could help avoid 
stasis. This does not mean that it was a harmonious or balanced mix of constitutional 
elements. 
 
The main dichotomy in Sparta was between the council and the assembly, pursuing 
narrow and broad corporate strategies for power respectively. However, what about 
the kings? Did they pursue a third strategy, a narrow élite strategy for power? The 
peculiar institution of two kings in Sparta is held to be a unique feature of the Spartan 
constitution.395 However, they do not appear as the sovereign rulers of Sparta. Rather 
than survivals from a tradition of monarchy in Greece, they appear more like 
hereditary officials with priestly functions. The inclusion of the kings in the council of 
elders makes it likely that Spartan kings were hereditary officials rather than 
monarchic rulers. As Sarah Morris points out, kingship in archaic and classical 
Greece was tied more specifically to rituals, than monarchy in the sense of royal 
rule.396 True, tyrants did attain sole power similar to that of kings in some poleis. 
However, this kind of monarchic rule does not appear to be related to the sacred 
aspects of Greek kingship with its priestly functions. At any rate, tyranny is certainly 
no parallel to the position of the Spartan kings. The Spartan kings should be treated as 
part of the political structure of officials, council and assembly, and not as sovereign 
rulers. 
 
Archaic Sparta was a polity that appears to forestall conflicts by defining and 
formalising the relations between the different groups in society. This is instructive 
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for reconstructing the political concerns in an archaic polis. The lines of conflict in 
Spartan society are clearly illustrated in the explicit opposition in the Great Rhetra 
and the Rider between gerousia and damos, ephors and kings. It is perhaps a paradox 
that formally equal citizens, the homoioi, were opposed to each other in the political 
structure. However, inequalities existed in real life, and these inequalities also 
influenced the prestige of individuals and the interests of groups of citizens. From 
Xenophon’s Constitution of the Spartans, it can be seen that the egalitarian ideology 
regarding wealth did not work in practice: e.g. the rich contributed wheat cakes to the 
syssitia.397 This shows that by the 4th century, the formal equality between citizens 
was in word only. J. M. Moore points out that the Spartan education system was based 
on competition, thus creating winners and losers, whereas the ideology was equality 
between all citizens.398 Although this is evidence from the classical period, it can be 
argued that the Spartan constitution was a range of compromises in order to protect 
the polis by having the best hoplite army possible and at the same time maintaining 
peace among the different socio-economic groups of citizens. It failed gradually in the 
classical period, with drastically decreasing numbers of full citizens, but the archaic 
constitution nevertheless aimed at inclusion and compromise, rather than exclusion of 
the people. The Spartan political structure allows for the pursuit of strategies for 
power also from below, in the popular assembly, but makes it possible for the élite to 
maintain control through the gerousia. The people, on the other hand, could, at least 
in name, control the king and elders through the ephorate. 
 
As mentioned above, some scholars interpret Tyrtaios as indicating a reaction in 
Sparta aiming at curbing the power of the damos.  The contexts of the Great Rhetra 
and Tyrtaios 4 are unclear. Reconstructions of the situation in archaic Sparta are made 
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difficult because the chronology of the sources is disputed, resulting in widely 
diverging assessments of the texts available to scholars. A case in point is Hans van 
Wees, who offers a new interpretation of Tyrtaios 4 and the Great Rhetra based in 
part on emendations of these incomplete and difficult texts. Van Wees argues that 
Tyrtaios writes about victory in war and not about citizen rights, claiming that the 
verses of Tyrtaios 4 were written in order to prevent the people from rebelling against 
the authorities. The situation at the time of Tyrtaios’ poem is “civil unrest in a time of 
war”, making it necessary to calm the people and make them fight for the common 
cause of preserving Sparta. He does not accept that Tyrtaios is quoting the Great 
Rhetra, claiming that he is citing an oracle that refers to victory in war “if the 
common people obeyed kings and Elders”.399 Van Wees suggests that the Great 
Rhetra was written after the time of Tyrtaios.400 His interpretation of Tyrtaios 4 as an 
exhortation to obey the kings and elders is not accepted by Kurt A. Raaflaub, who 
points out that the conclusions of van Wees are only possible to reach by emending 
and reinterpreting this rather short poem.401 I agree with Raaflaub’s criticism and do 
not believe that a restructuring of the fragmentary evidence to archaic Sparta is a 
fruitful approach to understanding its social realities. Exactly how Tyrtaios’ poem 
would have a soothing effect on the rebellious people is not clear and van Wees reads 
much into incomplete sentences. Further, his reconstruction of Tyrtaios’ motivations 
for composing his poem is highly speculative. Of course, it can be argued that 
Tyrtaios 4 is too incomplete to securely couple it with the Great Rhetra either, but in 
my opinion, the reconstruction that makes the most sense is to see the two texts as 
related, both aiming at the preservation of polis unity by granting a balanced amount 
of authority to the rich and the poor, the officials, elders, and the people. I cannot 
agree with van Wees that the people are chastised in Tyrtaios 4. Rather, they are 
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actually mentioned specifically as part of the constitution with a right to take part in 
reaching decisions. 
 
There have been made several suggestions that fit Tyrtaios into a scheme against 
popular power. In the interpretation of W. G. Forrest, Tyrtaios presents the damos as 
less powerful and important than the kings and the gerousia because he belonged to a 
group of reactionaries that wanted to revise the Rhetra and give the people less 
authority.402 The idea that the Great Rhetra granted power to the people and that later 
changes to the constitution diminished their influence is accepted by several scholars. 
Anthony J. Podlecki argues that “the heart of the innovation” of the Great Rhetra was 
“calls for meetings of the citizens to be held at regular intervals”.403 In this sense, the 
Great Rhetra was “a significant move in the direction of “damocracy””. The supposed 
revision in the Rider found in Tyrtaios 4, however, was “a shifting back towards a 
more centrist or even oligarchic position”.404 In Podlecki’s analysis, in the time of 
Tyrtaios, “the pendulum had swung away from “damocracy” and the aristocrats began 
to tighten their grip once again; a decision was taken to rescind some of the legislative 
powers either granted to the Apella through the original terms of the Rhetra or 
wrested by it in the course of putting the Rhetra’s terms into practice”.405 He suggests 
that “Tyrtaeus’ poetic talents were enlisted to help camouflage the seam between 
original Rhetra and added rider”.406  
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Podlecki’s suggestion that Tyrtaios’ poems camouflaged the fact that the popular 
assembly had lost the right to make independent decisions is unconvincing. It hinges 
on the assumption that the Great Rhetra and the Rider represent two phases in the 
development of the Spartan constitutions. However, the relationship between these 
two documents is controversial and cannot be securely established. Thus, the 
proposed relative sequence of these texts cannot be said to pull much weight. The 
same goes for reconstructions of developments from Lykourgos to Tyrtaios. After all, 
the 8th century date for Lykourgos, indeed his very existence, is doubtful. To postulate 
an oligarchic clique working to change the constitution from an original Lykourgan 
constitution by the help of the poetic talents of Tyrtaios is speculation. The Spartan 
damos could not have failed to notice that their decisions were subject to the 
discretion of the gerousia. Further, a poem stating that the assembly was subject to 
the gerousia and that this was the ancient and original arrangement would be refuted 
by the evidence of the Great Rhetra itself. This text was after all known as late as the 
time of Plutarch. Therefore, it seems likely that the Spartan constitution took shape 
gradually, from institutions that were common among poleis in the archaic period. It 
was not the work of a lawgiver named Lykourgos. The Spartan constitution can 
therefore be part of a general discussion of the structure of archaic Greek poleis. The 
conflict of interest in Sparta between the masses and élite was accommodated in a 
political structure with several levels of authority that functioned together, determined 
by blood, by social status, and by age. 
 
Despite several difficulties in the sources to archaic Sparta, some conclusions can be 
drawn: Spartan society was militaristic to a high degree, and much of its social 
structure was geared to maintain unity among the citizens. There is a certain balance 
between the hereditary élite of the royal families on the one hand and the most 
prominent citizens on the other, expressed by the ephors’ power over all magistrates. 
The gerousia included the kings, making it reasonable to see this as an élite council. 
Was this élite opposed to the ephors? It appears so, although the ephors were also 
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élite members. They were supposed to be the protectors of the damos, but their 
powerful position no doubt set them apart from most citizens. A further difficulty is 
the popular assembly, which was entrusted with the final word in decisions, but at the 
same time was suspected of twisting the measures brought before them. This is a 
rather strange situation: why is popular consent important for decisions to be made, if 
the people are not to be trusted? Why not ignore the popular assembly altogether? Its 
place in the political structure appears to reflect the need to strike a balance between 
the different groups of society in order to preserve the unity of the polis. The masses 
of the citizens were informed of political measures without necessarily influencing 
them, at least not spontaneously. The Spartan constitution provided for popular 
participation, but nevertheless discouraged it or circumscribed it to a high degree. The 
ideal of an egalitarian citizen body is an interesting contrast to the inequalities in 
power and influence between the majority of citizens on the one hand and the ephors, 
elders and kings on the other. This should arouse suspicion against claims of close 
relations between an egalitarian ideology and popular power. The egalitarian ideology 
of the Spartans was geared towards producing good hoplites, but the egalitarian 
relations between hoplites in the field were not matched by egalitarian relations in the 
institutions of power, as is obvious in the circumscribed powers of the assembly. 
 
The network of strategies for power in archaic Sparta can only be tentatively 
reconstructed from the Great Rhetra and Tyrtaios. However, it appears that cohesion 
was a general objective and that there were no protests against the high degree of 
authority that rested with the limited councils of the gerousia and the ephors. It may 
appear that the assembly, a large and inclusive decision-making body, promoted a 
broad corporate strategy for power.407 However, power of initiative did lie with the 
                                              
407 Conversely, it can be argued that the overall strategy of the citizens was that of a broad élite, at least from the 
perspective of the helots: Sparta had to defend itself against the helots, who massively outnumbered its citizens. Therefore, 
the citizens had to appear united against the immediate surrounding helot population. However, people who were not 
citizens will not be taken into consideration in the present investigation of political strategies. 
 185 
more limited decision-making bodies. The gerousia, although including the kings, 
composed a narrow corporation and ordinary citizens could hope to join their ranks. 
Likewise, the ephors formed a council that was formally open to participation from 
ordinary citizens. These institutions did not actively recruit new members. Members 
served for life. This makes the gerousia and ephorate more like broad élite institutions 
than narrow corporations. Ordinary citizens were obliged to voice their opinions in 
the assembly, an institution that was stripped of its power to make suggestions and 
therefore without much influence. Thus, the only broad corporation in the Spartan 
system was explicitly curtailed, and a broad corporate strategy for power unlikely to 
succeed. In practice, broad élites, the elders and the ephors, wielded power and they 
watched over the assembly as well as the kings. The kings could not pursue a narrow 
élite strategy because they were part of the gerousia and controlled by the ephors, 
rather than being sovereign rulers. 
 
3.4.2 Athens: Solon  
Solon was elected archon and reformer at Athens in 594/3 BCE and famously “shook 
off the burdens” of Attika’s farmland. His reforms included the seisakhtheia, “the 
shaking off of burdens” and the introduction of four new property-classes, tele, for 
Athenian citizens. Also, he is credited with establishing the council of four hundred, 
called the boule, and the jury courts known as the heliaia. However, many aspects of 
Solon’s reforms are disputed. Most scholars agree that Solon liberated the people by 
removing horoi, markers placed on land from which the cultivator had to pay over a 
proportion of his produce, and by banning loans with one’s body as surety.408 The 
details of these arrangements for debt and slavery are difficult to establish, however. 
Solon is also credited with dividing the citizens into new classes. Most scholars agree 
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that the division of the citizens into four classes was according to the productivity of 
their land and that political power was distributed accordingly. Solon is said to have 
strengthened the position of the commoners in three ways: loans with surety on the 
person were banned, any citizen could initiate a lawsuit on behalf of anyone, and all 
citizens could appeal to the heliaia.409 The definitions of the new property-classes and 
the role of the new council are disputed, however. In fact, most of Solon’s reforms are 
disputed to a degree or other, and I will discuss the problems of debt-slavery, 
property-classes, and the new council of Solon further below. In the following, I will 
present the Solonian reforms with an emphasis on social conflicts and their solutions. 
What did Solon do and what did it mean for popular power in Athens? First, the 
seisakhtheia will be discussed from the evidence in Solon’s poems, for the most part 
preserved in the Athenaion Politeia, to establish the nature of the conflicts at Athens 
before the reforms. Thereafter, the tele and the new council and jury-courts attributed 
to Solon will be discussed. In conclusion, I will discuss the aims and objectives of 
Solon and how these have been interpreted by scholars. What was the seisakhtheia? 
 
In a famous poem (Solon 36), Solon claims to have shaken off the burdens of the 
earth “whose boundary markers (horoi) fixed in many places I once removed; 
enslaved before, now she is free. And I brought back to Athens, to their homeland 
founded by the gods, many who had been sold, one legally (dikaiōs) another not 
(ekdikōs), and those who had fled under necessity’s constraint, no longer speaking the 
Attic tongue, as wanderers far and wide are inclined to do. And those who suffered 
shameful slavery right here, trembling before the whims of their masters, I set free. 
These things I did by exercise of my power, blending together force and justice, and I 
persevered to the end as I promised. I wrote laws for the lower and upper classes alike 
(thesmous d’ homoiōs tō kakō te k’agathō […] egrapsa), providing a straight legal 
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process for each person. If another had taken up the goad as I did, a man who gave 
bad counsel and was greedy, he would not have restrained the masses (dēmos). For if 
I had been willing to do what then was pleasing to their opponents and in turn 
whatever the others planned for them, this city would have been bereft of many men. I 
set up a defence on every side and turned about like a wolf among a pack of dogs”.410  
 
Solon’s claim to have freed the earth by removing the horoi is an important piece of 
evidence for the reconstruction of archaic Athens. Horos means boundary, 
landmark.411 According to LSJ, in Solon 36, it means “pillar set up on mortgaged 
property, to serve as a bond or register of the debt”.412  Thus, horoi in Solon 36 are 
taken to mean stones set up to indicate that loans were secured with surety in the land. 
The poem Solon 36 is taken by most scholars to mean that Solon cancelled debts by 
removing mortgage markers or boundaries.413 The Solonian horoi are problematic, 
however, since no archaic horoi have been found that really fit this description. 
According to Josiah Ober, it is probably not possible to establish what Solon’s horoi 
were or how they looked like.414 In my opinion, the horoi must be interpreted in light 
of Solon’s other measures, i.e. to provide freedom for the Athenians. Therefore, they 
were probably stones marking land encumbered by dues or debt. Solon states that he 
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ensured that those who had been sold into slavery because of debt could return to 
Athens. This he claims to have done by the power of his office, and he wrote laws 
applicable to noble and base alike, so that all would have a fair trial. He emphasises 
that he did not take sides, but defended himself against both sides, like a wolf 
surrounded by a pack of dogs. Further, Solon insists that he did not favour the people, 
referred to as demos or hoi kakoi, and did not deliver the rich into the hands of the 
poor. He does not state that he empowered the demos, but that he guaranteed them a 
fair trial on equal footing with the élite. What were the reasons for the shaking off of 
burdens? What did Solon wish to achieve? 
 
In a poem (Solon 4), Solon states that “it is the citizens themselves who by their acts 
of foolishness and subservience to money are willing to destroy a great city, and the 
mind of the people’s leaders is unjust; they are certain to suffer much pain as a result 
of their great arrogance. For they do not know how to restrain excess or to conduct in 
an orderly and peaceful manner the festivities of the banquet that are at hand…they 
grow wealthy, yielding to unjust needs…sparing neither sacred nor private property, 
they steal with rapaciousness, one from one source, one from another […] For at the 
hands of its enemies the much loved city is being swiftly worn down amid 
conspiracies dear to the unjust. These are the evils that are rife among the people, and 
many of the poor are going to a foreign land, sold and bound in shameful fetters […] 
This is what my heart brings me teach the Athenians, that Lawlessness (Dysnomiē) 
brings the city countless ills, but Lawfulness (Eunomiē) reveals all that is orderly and 
fitting, and often places fetters round the unjust”.415   
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In Solon 4, Solon warns against the rapaciousness and injustice of the powerful that 
will lead to the enslavement of the entire city and civil war. He complains that the 
poor are being sold into slavery in foreign countries, and that the problems in the city 
will hurt everyone. Solon praises eunomia, good rule, and he argues that this will put 
an end to unjust decisions and abuse. How did this situation arise? Who are the poor 
who were sold into slavery and why did this happen? A few more poems will be 
presented and discussed that may clarify these issues. 
 
In a fragment of a poem (Solon 4c), Solon appeals to moderation: “You who had 
more than your fill of many good things, calm the stern heart within your breast and 
moderate your ambition”.416 Solon states in another fragment (Solon 5) that he did not 
wish to be seen as taking sides in the conflict at Athens: “I have given the masses as 
much privilege as is sufficient, neither taking away from their honour nor adding to it. 
And as for those who had power and were envied for their wealth, I saw to it that they 
too should suffer no indignity. I stood with a mighty shield cast round both sides and 
did not allow either to have an unjust victory”.417 This theme is also taken up in a 
fragment of a poem (Solon 37), where Solon emphasises how he did not take sides 
between the masses (dēmos) and the better and stronger: “I stood in no-man’s-land 
between them like a boundary marker (horos).418  
 
The calls for moderation are important for understanding Solon’s position in Athenian 
society. He is clearly addressing wrongful behaviour by the rich. However, he 
emphasises that he does not oppose the rich in support of the poor. He describes 
                                              
416 Solon 4c, translation from Gerber, Greek elegiac poetry, 1999, 119 
417 Solon 5, translation from Gerber, Greek elegiac poetry, 1999, 121  
418 Solon 37, translation from Gerber, Greek elegiac poetry, 1999,161 
 190 
himself as being an intermediary between the demos and the powerful. Solon claims 
to have attempted to accommodate both the rich and the poor, stating that he stood 
with a mighty shield against both sides, or as a boundary marker between them. He 
does not take a partisan stance and does not favour the poor or the masses in 
particular. This is important for understanding the socio-political conflicts in archaic 
Athens. Rather than taking sides in a struggle between rich and poor, Solon appears to 
promote the unity of the polis. This unity was threatened by the rapacity of the 
wealthy and the plight of the poor, exemplified above with the selling of forfeiting 
debtors into slavery.  
 
In a poem (Solon 34), Solon recalls how some people were disappointed that he did 
not redistribute wealth and now regards him an enemy. However, he says, “They 
should not. With the help of the gods I have accomplished what I said I would, and 
other fruitless measures I did not make; it gives me no pleasure to act (?) with the 
violence of tyranny or to share the country’s rich land equally between the lower and 
upper classes (kakoisin esthlous isomoiriēn ekhein).419  
 
Again, it is clear that Solon did not side with the masses, but sought to promote unity 
in the polis, perhaps out of vertical solidarity, as a wealthy man concerned with the 
well-being of the less fortunate. Solon emphasises that he would personally never 
wish to act tyrannically or do things such as confiscating the property of the wealthy 
and re-distribute it so that the masses and the élite possessed equal parts. This is 
important for understanding the position of Solon and the aims of his reforms. Much 
is unknown about Solon and his objectives, however. There is more information in 
later sources, viz. the Athenaion Politeia and Plutarch’s Solon. However, these 
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sources contain anachronistic interpretations of Solon’s intentions as well as a 
confusing usage of obsolete and obscure terms and references that continuously 
puzzle scholars. Therefore, much of what is presented here from these later sources 
are hotly debated issues. I will discuss the main problems briefly, but I will not go 
into detail in the myriad discussions of the sources to Solon’s reforms and what may 
or may not have been his original definitions and intentions. Rather, I will focus on 
issues that can clarify the socio-political structure and conflicts in archaic Athens. 
 
According to the Athenaion Politeia and Plutarch’s Solon, the land in Attika in 
Solon’s days was in the hands of a few. There were Athenian peasants, called 
hektemoroi or thetes, who had to surrender a sixth of their produce to work the land of 
the rich. They could be sold into slavery, until Solon abolished debts and forbade the 
selling of Athenians.420 
 
Thus, according to the Athenaion Politeia and Plutarch, the people who were sent into 
slavery abroad by their creditors were peasants known as hektemoroi. This term is not 
mentioned in Solon 36, where there is only mention of Athenians sold into slavery. 
LSJ translates hektemoroi as those who paid a sixth or five-sixths of the produce as 
rent.421 It is a notoriously difficult term and scholars are not agreed about its exact 
meaning. Further, the identity of the people sold into slavery and the reasons why, are 
uncertain. Andrewes points out it is not clear in the Athenaion Politeia whether the 
borrowers who were enslaved are identical to the hektemoroi and that Plutarch 
understood them as separate. Thus, the hektemoroi were peasants who farmed for the 
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rich and the debtors were those who had borrowed with their liberty as surety.422 
Andrewes argues that yielding one sixth of the yearly produce are quite favourable 
terms for the lessee, so that the hektemoroi cannot really be regarded as very 
oppressed.423 He suggests that the Athenaion Politeia describes an arrangement where 
the hektemoros was a peasant bound to remain on land owned by the rich and to pay a 
sixth of their produce, but with a right to stay on this land as long as he paid, thus 
rights of the land accruing to both the rich and the poor. Problems with this system 
originated in the increasing rapacity of the rich landowners and a reduction of the 
hektemoroi to slaves.424 This seems to me a quite reasonable interpretation that also 
solves the problem of the identity of the debtors, since they can be added to the group 
of people that became impoverished and subject to the will of the rich landowners 
able to lend them grain or other resources. This solution is preferred by several 
scholars. Moses Finley suggests that the hektemoroi were farmers with no land of 
their own, cultivating the land of others for a share of the produce. In his view, some 
of the debt-slaves that Solon freed came from the hektemoroi, but not all.425 Finley 
argues that the debt-slaves of Solon’s poems had borrowed in produce and were tied 
by their loan immediately with their own bodies and with property as surety. Thus, the 
debt-slaves had a status as un-free, but at the same time had the opportunity of paying 
back the loan.426  
 
The interpretations of Finley and Andrewes seems to me to explain the situation of 
the hektemoroi quite well, since not all who were indebted appear to have belonged to 
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the same social group. Rather, debt-bondage appears to have been a wide-spread 
problem in archaic Athens, since many Athenians are reported to have been sold into 
slavery. However, there have been made objections to this solution, because the sixth 
part that the hektemoroi supposedly paid cannot be said to be very harsh conditions. 
T. W. Gallant argues that the hektemoroi were originally seasonal workers on the land 
of others, with their own land in addition. They became debt-slaves to landowners 
who had put previously unoccupied land under tenure. 427 In this perspective, debt-
slavery is related to economic changes, viz. increased use of marginal land and the 
need for labour. However, Andrewes’ solution is still tenable, since he does 
emphasise increased rapacity of the rich as a factor. This is also mentioned in Solon 4 
and Solon 4c. There is a problem with the explicit separation of the two groups, 
however, viz. the debtors and the hektemoroi. G. E. M. De Ste. Croix points out that 
the division of debtors and hektemoroi is artificial, since rent and debt in agricultural 
societies is often mingled.428 He argues that the hektemoroi were not a separate group 
from the debtors, but actually became indebted themselves, through their status as 
sharecroppers.429 In his interpretation, defaulting tenant-debtors became liable to 
seizure.430 This seems to me a reasonable inference, although it does ignore what the 
evidence actually says. It seems clear to me that the main problem in the time of 
Solon was that social inequalities were increasing to the point of crisis, when the rich 
were enslaving the poor.431 
                                              
427 Gallant, “Agricultural systems, land tenure, and the reforms of Solon,” 1982, 122-123 
428 De Ste. Croix, Athenian democratic origins, 2004, 111 
429 De Ste. Croix, Athenian democratic origins, 2004, 112 
430 De Ste. Croix, Athenian democratic origins, 2004, 118 
431 There have been made other suggestions to explain the situation of the hektemoroi. T. E. Rihll argues that the 
hektemoroi were not cultivating the land of others, but were cultivating public land against a rent in kind of 1/6 (Rihll, 
“Hektemoroi – partners in crime?,” 1991, 115-116). In Rihll’s opinion, Solon’s reforms were consequences of a situation 
that reduced citizens to slavery and made land lie vacant (ibid. 118). He suggests that Solon turned public land over to the 
cultivators who had previously rented it (ibid. 124). In this way, those who cultivated land on a lease would keep their 
livelihood without Solon having to redistribute the land of the rich (ibid. 125). There is a problem with this reconstruction, 
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The interpretation that has found most support among scholars is that the hektemoroi 
were peasants who became indebted to richer landowners in the 7th century. This 
process is not entirely clear. Hignett suggests that a poverty crisis had come about due 
to bad harvests and raids from aggressive neighbouring poleis, where peasants lost 
their land and became slaves to the rich.432 However, the reasons behind this crisis are 
not known. The suggestion that bad harvests were the reason for the crisis seems 
reasonable. However, hunger does not appear to lie at the root of the problem. It was 
the very structure of the polis that was at the heart of the problem, with rich 
landowners oppressing the peasants with impunity. Solon did not redistribute the land, 
but rather attacked the existing system of mortgage loans taken on one’s person.  
 
Anthony J. Podlecki points out that Solon is preoccupied with the damaging effect of 
koros, surfeit or greed.433 He argues that the phenomenon of debt-slavery arose 
because farmers who were better off could provide loans to their poorer neighbours in 
times of crisis, at usury rates.434 In this interpretation, the debt-crisis was created by 
deteriorating yields in Athens, impoverishment of the grain producers and a shift 
towards olive and vine cultivation for export.435 Indeed, the impression from Solon’s 
poems is that economic differences were increasing in archaic Athens (cf. Solon 4; 
Solon 4c). This may well be related to increased production of agricultural produce 
                                                                                                                                           
their bodies. Also, the poems of Solon blame private persons for selling Athenians abroad, not the authorities of the polis. 
Further, it is difficult to imagine authorities in the polis leasing out land. Did they keep a register of vacant plots? How was 
the sale of slaves organised? There is no evidence to such practices in archaic Athens. Therefore, Rihll’s argument that 
hektemoroi were cultivating public land against a pledge of rent does not convince.  
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for export, encouraging increased use of marginal land and leading to exploitation of 
available labour. Thus, Solon tried to establish rights for the poorest citizens by 
hemming in the opportunities of the rich for exploiting their debtors. Podlecki’s 
suggestion that cultivation was intensified in archaic Athens is not accepted by all 
scholars, however. Sara Forsdyke argues that there was only modest intensification 
and rather places the blame for the crisis on a breakdown in social reciprocity and a 
population increase that resulted in unrest. In this situation, the élite became more 
oriented towards making a profit and began to exploit the poor to a higher degree.436 
In this context, the rich took possession of more land and abused their power to 
enslave peasants. Solon removed the horoi to free both land and workers, in addition 
to abolishing debt-slavery and cancelling debt.437 I find this scenario quite convincing 
and find it more likely that more land was put to use than that crop-specialisation led 
to a crisis.438 
 
Whose side was Solon on? Whatever the reasons behind the impoverishment of the 
peasants, it is clear that Solon attacks the custom of enslaving debtors. It should be 
pointed out that Solon’s ideal of a humble life includes owning a horse and having a 
friend abroad.439 This cannot be claimed to be the expectations of the Athenian demos 
or the thetes. Thus, Solon is not one of the people. Rather, he appears to warn 
members of the élite against abuse of power and exploitation of their poorer 
neighbours. The poems of Solon do not give the impression of a leader of the people 
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aiming at a socio-economic egalitarian order. Rather, he seeks compromise between 
the rich and the poor. This leads us to the next element in Solon’s reforms, viz. the 
property-classes. These are not mentioned in the poems of Solon, but are discussed in 
the Athenaion Politeia. They form an important part of the reforms attributed to Solon 
and are important to discuss in order to understand the structure of archaic Athens. 
 
Solon is known for establishing property-classes (telē) for Athenian citizens. 
According to the Athenaion Politeia, these new tele were called the 
pentakosiomedimnoi, the hippeis, the zeugitai, and the thetes and corresponded to the 
amount of agricultural produce each could provide from their own land. The thetes 
produced nothing. Property-assessments were criteria for eligibility to offices 
(arkhai), but Solon retained the traditional Ionian organisation of the citizens in four 
tribes, or phylai. The poorest class, the thetes, only had the right to attend assemblies 
and jury courts, but thus participated in politics through their votes.440 The nine 
archons were the most powerful officials, chosen from election lists from each of the 
phylai (klerōtas ek prokritōn).441  
 
The property-classes have been extensively debated, but will only be discussed briefly 
here, with focus on the reasons for the establishment of the tele. Not all scholars 
accept that the tele were based on property. De Ste. Croix is convinced that the author 
of the Athenaion Politeia did not have reliable information about the property-classes 
and does not accept that agricultural produce was Solon’s original criterion. In his 
view, the highest property-class, the pentakosiomedimnoi, was assessed according to 
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ownership of land, not according to produce.442 Further, De Ste. Croix argues that the 
hippeis and zeugites were not assessed according to agricultural produce, but from 
their service as cavalry and hoplites respectively.443 It is difficult to accept, however, 
that the tradition of property-assessments from agricultural produce was a classical 
invention. The military background that De Ste. Croix postulates is an interpretation 
that is not supported in any surviving sources, except in the names of the property-
classes themselves, viz. horsemen and yoked-men, i.e. men organised in a phalanx. 
This cannot count as a decisive argument against the explanation provided by the 
Athenaion Politeia. De Ste. Croix claims that a man’s membership of the classes of 
hippeis and zeugites “depended solely on his ability to perform cavalry or hoplite 
service”.444 However, De Ste. Croix does not offer any explanation of how anyone 
could prove that he belonged to the cavalry or served as hoplite or how this was 
recorded. His interpretation is not convincing, as the most obvious and objective 
assessment of a man’s status would be his property, not his military status. Indeed, 
most scholars accept the definitions of the Athenaion Politeia. Andrewes points out 
that hippeis and zeugites probably were military terms in origin, but suggests that 
Solon “took up existing names and gave them a precise meaning defined by law”.445 
In my view, this is a reasonable explanation of the terms hippeis and zeugites. Their 
original or etymological meaning does not define their meaning after the reforms of 
Solon.  
 
Scholars agree that Solon’s new classes meant that more people participated in 
politics. Andrewes argues that Solon opened public office to more people, by 
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changing the criteria from birth to wealth.446 Hignett argues that the new property-
classes gave more rights to people who had hitherto been excluded from office.447 
However, according to Hignett, these new people admitted to office were not noveau 
riche landowners or merchants, but landowning aristocrats excluded from office 
because they did not belong to the ruling aristocratic group called the Eupatridai. 
Thus, the chief beneficiaries of Solon’s reforms were aristocratic families that were 
excluded from office under a dominant aristocratic clique.448 In recent years, scholars 
have interpreted the new property-classers as a response to economic changes in 
Athens. The reforms are seen as a break with the Eupatrid monopoly of offices, 
making all citizens except the thetes eligible to most offices. According to Lin 
Foxhall, Solon aimed at the inclusion of a larger proportion of rich farmers and other 
well-off people in the running of Athens.449 This is also argued by Lynette G. 
Mitchell, who interprets Solon as a protector of old status distinctions in the polis: by 
accepting anyone wealthy enough into the political system, Solon could keep the 
elevated status of the old birth élite outside of politics and potential debate.450 Thus, 
scholars view these property-classes as a response to a system that excluded a high 
proportion of the leisured citizens. The interpretations of Foxhall and Mitchell focus 
on an inclusion of people of wealth, a new élite, whereas Hignett emphasises the 
inclusion of members of the aristocracy. In my view, it is relevant to identify the 
reasons for including new groups of citizens in running the polity. To me, the 
emergence of wealthy élites through trade and more extensive farming seems highly 
likely. Also, the protest of excluded aristocrats seems plausible. In this perspective, 
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Solon’s reforms of the property-classes meant to break the dominance of the few 
families in power. In this way, Solon made a more inclusive polity possible. 
 
The Solonian property-classes have been extensively debated and there is no 
consensus among scholars. In a recent article, Kurt A. Raaflaub claims that Solon’s 
distribution of the Athenians into tele was based on military capacity and nothing 
else.451 In his view, Greek poleis were fundamentally egalitarian and not polarised by 
differences in wealth.452 However, this interpretation means to ignore the evidence 
available to us and replace it with speculation. As I have argued throughout this 
chapter, there are no indications that Greek communities were fundamentally 
egalitarian. Differences between rich and poor and the problems they created are well 
documented in the poems of Solon. However, Solon is not unequivocally a friend of 
the poor. Hans van Wees points out that, although Solon criticises the rich, he calls 
them agathoi and their victims kakoi. Van Wees interprets archaic Athens as polarised 
between the people and its leaders.453 In his interpretation, the masses correspond to 
the thetes and the three other property-classes are the élite.454 Van Wees argues that 
there was a large gap between the thetes and the rest of the citizens and suggests that 
the 10-20% of the citizens owned most of the land, whereas 80-90% lived on 
subsistence level.455 In my opinion, this interpretation makes good sense of the 
evidence from Solon’s poems. The plight of the thetes in archaic Athens and the 
fundamental differences in status between the rich and the poor are well-attested. 
However, van Wees’s numbers seem rather pessimistic: a majority of the citizens 
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must have been able to live off their land and there is to my knowledge no evidence to 
extensive land concentrations in archaic Athens. 
 
Solon cannot be argued to side with the poor. He is, however, associated in the 
Athenaion Politeia and Plutarch’s Solon with measures to include the poor in politics. 
Not only were the thetes recognized as citizens, they were also granted a measure of 
political participation. This was done through Solon’s establishment of the boule, a 
new council of four hundred, and the heliaia, the jury courts. This is controversial, 
however, because these institutions are not mentioned in Solon’s poems. They are 
discussed at length in the Athenaion Politeia and Plutarch’s Solon, where it is stated 
that Solon established a council of four hundred (boulē) consisting of a hundred 
representatives from each tribe in addition to the existing Areopagos council, as well 
as jury courts.456 According to the Athenaion Politeia, putting the people in charge of 
the dikasteria by establishing these courts as jury courts was among the most 
democratic of Solon’s measures: by controlling the votes, the people became master 
of the constitution (kyrios gignetai tēs politeias).457 
 
There is no agreement among scholars concerning Solon’s role in the establishment of 
the council of four hundred. Herodotos does refer to a council in Athens that protested 
against the oligarchic coup of Isagoras in 507/8.458 This does not necessarily mean 
that this council was the council of four hundred attributed to Solon. Hignett is 
convinced that Solon was a conservative and therefore claims that “Solon retained the 
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political organs of the aristocratic state”.459 In his interpretation, Solon did not create 
a council of four hundred to act as a proboleutic council for the assembly, because if 
he had indeed created a “council which prepared the agenda for a popular assembly” 
this would mean that he emphasised the role of the popular assembly: “the presence in 
a state of a proboleutic council implies the existence of an ekklesia with extensive and 
important powers”.460 Hignett does not believe that the ekklesia was powerful in 
archaic Athens. Instead, he claims that Solon’s council of four hundred in reality was 
an invention of the oligarchic coup makers of 411, in order to legitimate their own 
council of four hundred. In his interpretation, there was only one council at Athens 
before the reforms of Kleisthenes in 508/7, viz. the council of the Areopagos.461 
Hignett claims that the ekklesia had the same degree of influence after Solon as 
before and that the aristocrats in the Areopagos council decided the agenda of the 
assembly.462 He interprets the heliaia as “the ekklesia sitting in a judicial capacity”.463 
However, he doubts that Solon admitted the thetes to the ekklesia or the jury courts, 
because he finds this in breach of “the cautious conservative temperament of 
Solon”.464 Hignett’s line of argument is problematic, since Solon’s actions are 
interpreted from his temperament and his temperament is defined from his actions. 
Thus, his assessment of Solon’s reforms is circular. Hignett’s claim that the council of 
four hundred was an invention of the oligarchs of 411 begs the question why they 
would single out the number of 400 councilmen and claim this to be Solon’s original 
council. After all, they might as well have stuck to the Kleisthenic council of five 
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hundred and filled it with their own people. Thus, the scenario of an oligarchic 
invention of the council of four hundred is speculative and does not convince. 
Supposed that Solon indeed was a careful conservative, the establishment of a council 
of four hundred, hundred from each tribe, actually makes sense as a way to control the 
initiative of the demos in the assembly, because there was a property qualification for 
participating in this council. The Areopagos council, on the other hand, represented 
the oppression of the rich aristocratic landowners, and would not be conducive to an 
orderly assembly. Thus, given Solon’s stated aim of establishing harmonious relations 
between the rich and the poor, a new council of four hundred makes perfect sense. 
 
Despite Hignett’s convictions of Solon’s conservatism, it cannot be ruled out that 
there was a preparatory council for the assembly that existed independently of the 
Areopagos in archaic Athens. Andrewes argues that the council of four hundred was 
created by Solon exactly to ensure that all measures that came before the assembly 
were discussed beforehand, acting as a safeguard against unbridled popular 
participation.465 To me, this is a reasonable argument, as such a council would made 
sense in combination with the other measures initiated by Solon in order to include 
more citizens in politics.  
 
In modern scholarship, the view of Solon is split, and he is seen as either a forerunner 
of classical Athenian democracy or a conservative defender of the aristocratic polis.466 
In the following, scholarly interpretations of Solon’s agenda will be discussed further. 
What did Solon try to do? Who did he try to help? 
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Scholars see Solon as a key figure in the history of Greek political culture. Kurt A. 
Raaflaub calls Solon the first spokesman of the polis.467 Michael Stahl argues that 
Solon was the first politician of Athens, because he perceived the problems of the 
polis as created by the people as a community and attempted to solve them with an 
eye to the entire community.468 Philip Brooke Manville argues that Solon was “the 
man who established the Athenian polis, and thereby created the beginnings of a 
formal citizenship”.469 Manville does not interpret Solon as the spokesman of any 
particular socio-economic group, but accepts Solon’s self-representation in his poems 
as a true mediator, poised between the mighty and the demos, like a horos, a boundary 
stone. Solon’s achievement according to Manville lay in the creation of new 
distinctions; his laws “gave greater definition to the community and the place of the 
individual within it”.470 An important change brought about by Solon was the creation 
of “a legal boundary between slave and free which carried immediate implications for 
citizenship”.471 In Manville’s interpretation, the Solonian scheme of tele made all 
Athenians part of a system of formal statuses and even thetes were guaranteed full 
privileges in the assembly and jury courts.472 Thus, Solon’s work is interpreted as an 
important part of the process of transforming Athens from an aristocratic society into 
a citizen community. In my view, these interpretations explain the poems of Solon 
well, with their emphasis on compromise between socio-economic groups. Solon 
appears as the central figure for processes of political unification in archaic Athens. 
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His attempts at conciliation and equal consideration of interests of the rich and the 
poor reveal a great concern for the cohesion of Athenian society.  
 
Solon is quite consistent in his poems in denying that he favoured the demos and 
instead tried to reconcile the rich and the poor. Indeed, the demos appears to have 
benefitted from the establishment of the heliaia. The establishment of this kind of 
arena council is important for the possibility of pursuing a broad corporate strategy 
for power. In large assemblies such as the popular courts, the people could participate 
actively, receive information, and act as a community of equals. However, several 
scholars emphasise that Solon’s reforms did not benefit the poor. How was Solon’s 
relation to the poor and their role in the running of Athens? 
 
P. J. Rhodes is convinced that “substantial as his reforms were, [Solon] was no 
revolutionary, and the measures which he judged appropriate fell far short of what 
some of the poor and unprivileged had wanted”.473 Jonathan M. Hall emphasise the 
aristocratic outlook of the archaic poets, including Solon.474 Paul Cartledge suggests 
that Solon was the champion for a middle way, with an introduction of political rights 
for rich citizens who were not aristocrats.475 Cartledge emphasises, however, that 
there was no popular majority rule after the reforms of Solon and denies that the 
popular courts were introduced by Solon, claiming that they at any rate probably were 
not open to the poor.476 It may be that the poorest citizens were not active in the 
assembly or the courts. However, in my view, it is important that all citizens were 
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formally allowed to participate at the basic level of assembly attendance. The élite 
background or aristocratic outlook of Solon makes it improbable that he sought to 
place power in the hands of the masses. However, this does not mean that Solon did 
not recognise the positive effects of including the thetes among the citizens, in order 
to promote a coherent civic body of Athenians, rich and poor. 
 
Robert W. Wallace argues that Solon was a revolutionary who worked to transform 
the government in Athens to grant participation to the poorest citizens.477 However, it 
cannot be claimed that Solon’s measures aimed at making the demos sovereign in the 
polis, thus Solon did not try to establish a democracy. He cannot be said to promote 
popular power to any particular degree, either. It is important, however, that the thetes 
were included among the citizens and could participate in the collective decision-
making bodies of the polis. Their presence there must have changed the political 
climate considerably. In Solon’s poems, a duality of strategies for power can be said 
to be at work in the polis, viz. a narrow corporate strategy and a broad élite strategy. 
The new property-classes granted power to a defined corporate body of rich 
landowners, a narrow corporate strategy that excluded the poor from office. This was 
in reaction to the broad élite strategy of the birth élite of the Eupatrids that 
monopolized the archonship and the Council of the Areopagos. Solon wished to 
promote the cohesion of the civic body and attempted to forestall rupture of the social 
and political unity of the polis through legislation. However, the poor were still 
excluded from office. Thus, Solon’s reforms follow a narrow corporate strategy for 
power, not a broad corporate strategy where all citizens can partake in office.  
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Solon is not a member of the masses; he belongs to the élite. His narrow corporate 
strategy was not intended to make office available to all citizens. Interestingly, his 
position as reformer would be an excellent starting point for a totally different 
strategy for power, a narrow élite strategy to obtain personal hegemony. The 
empowerment of a reformer or champion of the masses had a double edge throughout 
Greek political history, as will be discussed below (3.4.3). It could lead to better 
conditions and more political influence for the people as well as the establishment of 
authoritarian rule, with little popular influence in politics. Those who feared 
authoritarian rule the most, however, were the élite, who would stand to lose all 
power and influence under a single ruler. These troublesome dynamics of masses, 
élites, and authoritarian leaders haunted several poleis of the archaic period. It is to 
this that we now turn, with the establishment and abolishment of tyranny at Athens 
and the establishment of democracy. 
 
3.4.3 Athens: Peisistratos and Kleisthenes 
The reforms of Solon did not prevent civic strife in Athens. After a period of stasis, 
the aristocrat Peisistratos seized power as tyrant. His enemies, rival Athenian 
aristocratic families, in time toppled the Peisistratid tyranny and reformed the political 
structure of Athens. In the following, I will analyse these events and investigate the 
strategies of power pursued by the agents involved in them. The fate of the 
Peisistratids, the aftermath of tyranny and the reforms of Kleisthenes are related by 
Herodotos, Thukydides, and in the Athenaion Politeia. The accounts vary to a certain 
extent in detail, but the main outline is clear. The point of the following summary of 
events is to set the stage for an analysis of the different strategies for power involved 




After his time as archon, Solon left Athens.478 In the ensuing time, the old aristocratic 
families fell out with each other and a period of stasis began.479 Peisistratos in 
particular came to the fore, as leader of an aristocratic faction.480 Peisistratos 
established himself as tyrant at Athens in steps. He was already a respected war-hero 
from clashes with Megara. Feigning an attack on his person by his enemies in Athens, 
he convinced the Athenians to grant him a bodyguard of club-bearers 
(korynēphoroi).481 In a poem, Solon criticised the Athenians for having allowed such 
a man a personal bodyguard without considering the danger of empowering a single 
individual to this degree.482 Solon was right. Herodotos relates that Peisistratos and 
his party seized the Acropolis for the first time in 561/0.483 He reports that Peisistratos 
was a friend of the people and moderate in his rule, but did not stay in power for long. 
Athens was divided by factional strife between those living on the coast, led by the 
Alkmaionid Megakles, the supporters of oligarchy from the inland led by Lykourgos, 
and the democratically minded faction from Diakria, led by Peisistratos. Lykourgos 
and Megakles teamed up to oust Peisistratos, who went into exile.484 Shortly after, 
Peisistratos was helped back by Megakles, with the help of a mock Athena steering 
his chariot up to the Acropolis.485 Relations with Megakles soured again, and 
Peisistratos fled the city and gathered new allies, money, and fighters while in 
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exile.486 Then, [in 546/5], he returned with support from the Thebans, Lygdamis of 
Naxos and a troop of cavalry from Eretria. They were victorious at the Battle of 
Pallene, and Peisistratos seized power in Athens again.487 This time he disarmed the 
citizens and established tyranny.488 Peisistratos is supposed to have been a mild ruler, 
and did not put the Solonian constitution out of use.489 His time in power was 
remembered as a golden age (hōs ho epi Kronou bios).490  
 
Herodotos and Thukydides report that the sons of Peisistratos were not as popular as 
their father. One son, Hipparchos was killed by Harmodios and Aristogeiton in a plot 
sparked by a lovers’ quarrel. His brother Hippias ruled as tyrant. The Alkmaionid 
family was in exile, but managed to get the Spartans involved in Athenian matters and 
by a combined effort they chased away the tyrant Hippias in 510.491  
 
Two men were the most influential in the city after the expulsion of Hippias and the 
Peisistratids; the Alkmaionid Kleisthenes and Isagoras, a man from an esteemed 
family. Kleisthenes included the demos in his group of followers and became their 
friend (ton dēmon prosetairizetai). He gained the upper hand, and initiated reforms, 
chief among them to rearrange the demes by making away with the traditional four 
tribes (phylai) and dividing the Athenians into ten new tribes, named after eponymous 
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heroes.492 The demes were divided by ten according to the tribes.493 The Athenaion 
Politeia reports that Kleisthenes established a new council of five hundred members 
instead of the old council of four hundred, now with fifty from each of the new 
tribes.494 Kleisthenes reorganised Attika by demes into thirty parts; ten in the city, ten 
on the coast and ten inland, and he called these parts thirds (trittys). He allotted three 
to each the ten tribes, so that each tribe had a share in all three regions (topoi). He 
made those who lived together in each deme into demotes, meaning that the citizens 
were called by their deme, and not by their patronymic.495 According to Herodotos, 
Isagoras tried to counter the strategy of the popular Kleisthenes by sending for king 
Kleomenes and the Spartans [who had formerly helped expel the Peisistratids].496 
Kleisthenes went into exile, before king Kleomenes and the Spartans arrived in 
Athens with a small force and expelled seven hundred Athenian families picked out 
by Isagoras. The invaders attempted to abolish the council (boulē), and hand over the 
rule to three hundred of Isagoras’ friends. The council protested, however, and 
Kleomenes, Isagoras and their supporters took refuge on the Acropolis. The rest of 
the Athenians (Athēnaiōn hoi loipoi) laid siege to them and drove them out.497 The 
Athenians sent for Kleisthenes and the other exiles, who returned.498 
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Some of the information in the stories about stasis in archaic Athens cannot be 
correct: democratic and oligarchic factions in 6th century Athens are clearly 
anachronistic. However, stasis between rival aristocratic cliques and parties was real 
enough, and is among the social ills addressed by archaic poets. In Athens, civil war 
between locally organised militias seems to have threatened to rip the polis apart. 
However, as will be seen in the following, stasis can also be considered part of the 
process towards the establishment of poleis as citizen communities in the archaic 
period. Who were fighting and what can this tell us about the political structure of 
archaic Athens? 
 
The reality of the topographically defined rivals in the classical accounts of Athenian 
stasis has been questioned. In the interpretation of Michael Stahl, the staseis, or 
parties to the civil war at Athens, were unstable power groups centred on powerful 
and charismatic aristocrats, and not stable and geographically defined groups of 
clients under local patrons.499 He argues that there was no opposition between 
aristocratic stasis and the polis. In his view, the polis developed hand in hand with the 
completion of a development of an aristocratic order of values, including competition 
for honour in every field. In this sense, Stahl argues, stasis was part of the 
development of the polis.500 Stahl emphasises that the staseis consisted of aristocrats 
and ordinary citizens and that they were subject to frequent shifts in their 
composition, often involving alliances with aristocrats of other poleis.501  
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Stahl’s view of stasis is supported by Philip Brooke Manville, who discusses 
Athenaion Politeia 13.5 on the local factions of Attika. He argues that local networks 
formed the core of staseis, in the sense that “the aristocratic leaders of the staseis 
raised supporters from the neighborhoods of Attika where they wielded influence, and 
each group included a variety of statuses in property, wealth, and livelihood among its 
membership”.502  
 
The staseis do appear as informal groups of aristocrats and their supporters. As 
evident from Herodotos and the Athenaion Politeia, aristocratic leaders shifted their 
allegiance and introduced foreign aristocrats in their local struggles. The staseis were 
not political parties, client groups, or regional groups, but alliances of powerful 
individuals and their local supporters. These staseis had to be actively mobilised in 
competitions for power and excellence among the aristocracy. In this sense, civil war 
could contribute to welding the polis together: the staseis drew local people into 
struggles for power, strengthening the alliances between aristocrats and commoners. 
However, it should be pointed out that stasis destabilised the community as a whole. 
Aristocratic competition could not in the long run provide stability of government and 
therefore promoted changes towards quite different regimes simultaneously. With the 
rise of one aristocrat stronger than the others, such as Peisistratos, the rules of the 
game changed, and the establishment of a more predictable political community 
became possible. Ironically, perhaps, popular power and tyranny appear as historically 
related phenomena. A unified citizen community, a demos, in time became a 
recognisable political force that opposed the fractioned aristocratic groups. What role 
did Peisistratos have in this process? 
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The figure of Peisistratos is seen by several scholars as a unifying figure for the 
Athenian polis community. The tyrant period was important for the development of 
the physical urban space of Greek poleis.503 Tyranny is also argued to have 
contributed to rallying the citizens against the domination of élite families in 
politics.504 Manville points out that the building of temples and establishment of 
processions under the Peisistratids had a unifying effect on the city.505 He argues that 
the people of Attika became Athenians in a proper sense under the tyrants: “The 
identity of each individual citizen began to be drawn into the centripetal whole, and 
each man’s social membership matured as a share of a public, all embracing 
corporation”.506 This assessment makes good sense of the changes taking place under 
the Peisistratids: the Athenians were drawn to the centre of Athens to a new degree. 
This was no doubt connected to the amount of resources the Peisistratids spent on the 
cult of Athena and her temple on the Acropolis. The identity of the Athenians became 
centred on an urbanised city-centre with monumental sanctuaries. 
 
It has been suggested that Peisistratos was a forerunner for democracy: in the analysis 
of John Salmon, Peisistratos recognised the potential in rallying popular support 
against other aristocrats and therefore “encouraged broadly democratic trends”.507 
However, there are indications that the interpretation of Peisistratos as the people’s 
friend is overstated. In the Athenaion Politeia, it is claimed that Peisistratos disarmed 
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the people.508 Among Peisistratos’ measures to secure popular support, it is stated that 
he established local courts in the demes, with the intention of keeping people from 
rural Attika away from the city and otherwise see to it that they did not want to nor 
had the spare time for interfering in politics.509  
 
It can be argued that the information in the Athenaion Politeia that Peisistratos 
disarmed the citizens and discouraged active citizenship does not fit the image of 
Peisistratos as a unifying political factor for the demos of Athens. Scholars have 
interpreted his actions in several ways. Sheldon S. Wolin argues that Peisistratos 
cannot be seen as a catalyst for a politically active Athenian demos. Rather, his 
actions indicate that Peisistratos was “destroying the public realm and its demotic 
politics”.510 However, this interpretation of Peisistratos as an anti-populist tyrant does 
not take the whole situation into consideration. After all, there are also claims in the 
Athenaion Politeia that Peisistratos was a benign and much-loved ruler.511 There are 
other sources that indicate that the disarmament of the people was not permanent: 
Thukydides mentions that citizens were armed in the Panathenaic processions that 
were organised by the Peisistratids.512 The disarmament of the citizens is therefore 
doubted by several scholars. P. J. Rhodes argues that although the Athenaion Politeia 
claims that the citizens were not armed during the Panathenaic procession (Ath. Pol. 
18.4), this was probably a deliberate misunderstanding: the tradition that the citizens 
were unarmed was a piece of propaganda “since it would have been less shameful that 
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the citizens failed to rally in the tyrannicides’ support if they were unarmed”.513 Thus, 
the event in 514 when Hipparchos was killed is held to be the reason behind a 
tradition of disarmed citizens. This explanation makes sense of the contradiction that 
Peisistratos was considered a good leader by the Athenians, yet is reputed to have 
disarmed them. He initially disarmed the citizens, but this was not permanent. Later 
historians claimed that the Athenians were unarmed in the processions, but this may 
be a tradition developed around the slaying of Hipparchos, son of Peisistratos and 
brother of the tyrant Hippias.  
 
However, several scholars maintain that Peisistratos disarmed the people. A. French 
argues that Athens lacked an army of hoplite citizens before Kleisthenes. He points 
out that after the initial disarmament of the people by Peisistratos, “there is no 
suggestion that the confiscated arms were ever distributed to other sections of the 
citizen population, nor of any organisation employed by the tyrants to mobilise any 
citizen militia; indeed the organisation of the latter was one of the most urgent duties 
later undertaken by Kleisthenes”. He claims that the Peisistratids depended on 
mercenaries. In his analysis, Thukydides statement (Thuc. 3.68) that the Athenians 
made an alliance with the Plataeans in 519 cannot be right, because these mercenaries 
would not be employed abroad. Rather, he claims that “the revival of the citizen 
militia by Kleisthenes was a necessary prelude to any policy involving foreign 
alliances and adventures.”514 French’s interpretation of the military situation in 
archaic Athens is problematic. There is indeed evidence that there was a citizen army 
in the period of tyranny. As Manville points out, Herodotos mentions several 
Athenian military victories under the Peisistratids (Hdt. 1.64.; ibid. 5.31.), including 
the taking of Naxos, making it improbable that there were no Athenian citizens under 
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arms during the Peisistratid tyranny.515 It is highly unlikely that extensive campaigns 
abroad, involving naval operations, would be undertaken by mercenaries. Therefore, 
Peisistratos probably did not disarm the citizens permanently. Thus, the connection 
between a hoplite army and the reforms of Kleisthenes are tenuous. This will be 
discussed further below. 
 
The claim that Peisistratos oppressed the people by discouraging them from spending 
time on court sessions and assembly meetings in the city is also doubtful. Rhodes 
points out that “neither an occupied peasantry nor public works are necessarily signs 
of oppression”. Rather, he suggests that part of the incentive for keeping people busy 
was an economic objective.516 Rhodes does not accept that peasants were discouraged 
from bringing their disputes to court. He argues that the cases that were dealt with in 
the new local courts were cases that had previously been settled locally by arbitrators 
from the local nobility. Now instead they were settled by representatives from the 
central authority.517 This assessment makes good sense of the motivation for 
establishing local courts and places this initiative in the bigger picture of the tyrant’s 
efforts to stamp out local aristocratic power bases. Therefore, Wolin’s view of 
Peisistratos as destroying the public realm does not convince.518 
 
The fate of the Solonian constitution under tyranny is a good test of Peisistratos’ 
commitment to the common good of the Athenians. As seen above, the sources report 
that the council and other institutions were left alone by the Peisistratid tyrants. This 
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is seen as an important indication of Peisistratos’ intentions of consolidating the 
Athenian polis. Manville emphasises that the Athenian council of four hundred, the 
assembly, and the jury courts were not put out of function under the Peisistratids and 
that more people became active citizens. He points out, however, that Peisistratos 
discouraged people from taking cases that could be handled by the demes into the jury 
courts at the agora.  In his interpretation, this means that a large number of people 
were participating in the political and judicial institutions of the city.519 Manville 
emphasises that there were several centralising measures taken by the Peisistratids, in 
particular sending judges from the centre to the demes out in the countryside.520 This 
amounts to a reversion of the argument of Wolin, viz. that the establishment of deme 
courts indicates that the citizens became less active in politics under the tyrants at 
Athens.521 Following Manville’s interpretation, citizen participation was instead 
increasing under the Peisistratids. Indeed, the establishment of central institutions as 
well as the regulation of local decision-making processes in the demes should be 
taken as indication that the polis was becoming more centralised and that the citizens 
were more involved, rather than the Peisistratids taking over all the decision-making 
processes in the polis. There is no evidence for active meddling in decisions by the 
tyrants. Quite the contrary, Herodotos states that the political and judicial institutions 
continued to function as established by Solon.522 Therefore, the picture of tyranny at 
Athens as a kind of absolutist monarchy cannot be maintained. Rather, Peisistratid 
tyranny was a period when much of the Athenian polis as a citizen community was 
formed. As was seen with Solon, the cohesion of the polis was an important issue at 
Athens. This could only be achieved by allaying strife and promoting central 
institutions. 
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The tyrant of Athens must be seen as part of the struggles for power between groups 
forming around aristocratic leaders and not as a foreign element opposed to the polis 
and its citizens. Kurt A. Raaflaub argues that the archaic tyrants contributed to 
“integrating their community”, thus “preparing the ground for a more egalitarian 
political system”.523 In his analysis, this happened because the tyrants’ monopoly of 
power made it impossible for others to compete for influence. According to Raaflaub, 
terms for equal rights and equal access to participation in debates, isonomia and 
isegoria, “are likely to have been coined in aristocratic circles as slogans to express 
what the elite had taken for granted previously but lost through the tyrant’s seizure of 
power and were striving to regain”.524 No doubt, the tyrant contributed to the 
centralisation of judiciary and political processes, to the detriment of the aristocracy 
and their local power bases. The tyrant is thus a figure that, together with Solon, 
marks a transition from aristocracy to a citizen-state, where the citizens identified 
themselves with the polis as a whole. In my opinion, to see Peisistratos solely as an 
enemy of the people, as Wolin does, overestimates the cohesion of the Athenians in 
the archaic period. After all, the peasants of Attika were clearly divided in the stasis 
between aristocrats. Further, it cannot be claimed that any of the other aristocratic 
leaders were any more concerned for the interests of the demos than Peisistratos. 
Rather, the rule of a tyrant made an end to aristocratic infighting and encouraged an 
integration of the social and political institutions of the polis. The tyrant contributed 
to creating an active demos with a political identity as Athenians. He did not establish 
popular power, however. It is to this process that I now turn. 
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The sons of Peisistratos did not manage to maintain tyranny. Hipparchos, the brother 
of the tyrant Hippias, was killed in 514, marking the beginning of the end. The fate of 
Hipparchos and its epitaph is interesting. The version the classical historians 
maintain, that it was a lover’s quarrel unrelated to the overthrow of the tyrants, was 
not the one that was the most widely believed among the Athenians. Thukydides 
polemicized against the apparently widely held, but erroneous belief that Hipparchos 
was tyrant of Athens and was killed by Harmodios and Aristogeiton for the sake of 
Athenian freedom.525 There was a drinking-song, a skolion, known as the Harmodios-
song, found in Athenaios and also alluded to by Aristophanes. It praises Harmodios 
and Aristogeiton as tyrant-slayers. The song is a warning to future tyrants of similar 
treatment. The singers threaten to hide daggers or swords in a bunch of myrtle.526  
 
What does the fate of the Peisistratids tell about popular power in Athens? The 
people’s role in opposing the tyrant is not clear. The lover’s quarrel between 
Hipparchos and his attackers belongs in the world of the élite. The tyrant-slayers have 
no connection to the Spartan intervention and plotting of rival factions that eventually 
toppled the tyranny in 510, ending in a popular uprising against Isagoras and 
Kleomenes. It is striking that it was the tradition of the tyrant-slayers that became the 
more popular story about the end of tyranny in Athens. Scholars have attempted to 
explain the popularity of Harmodios and Aristogeiton. Felix Jacoby argues that the 
skolion’s version became widespread in 5th century Athens as part of élite slander of 
Perikles as an aspiring tyrant.527 Victor Ehrenberg also suspects an aristocratic origin 
of the Harmodios-song.528 It does seem that the skolion version was not a product of 
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popular sentiments, but part of an élite ideology, a warning from the élite to their own 
not to become too ambitious. The élite can be seen as praising the slaying of the tyrant 
as part of a broad élite strategy, entailing that Hipparchos was slain by people of his 
own standing, from a rival élite faction, and that the people or the Spartans were not 
responsible for the end of tyranny. In this line of reasoning, the élite should stick 
together and none of its members should claim power for their own family 
exclusively. Regarding the spread to the general Athenian population of the view that 
the tyrant had been killed by two men of the élite, the discourse of politics can be 
argued to have changed from the archaic to the classical period: in the classical period 
under democracy, tyranny was perceived as the main threat to the established order, 
rather than the archaic threat of stasis. This may explain the popularity of the song 
among the commoners in the time of Thukydides. Also, slaying a tyrant is more 
dramatic than expelling him with the help of a foreign army. The older sources 
emphasise the role of Sparta and Kleisthenes, however, and it must be that tradition 
which is correct. In the aftermath of the expulsion of the Peisistratids, the demos took 
action to defend Athens from the coup-maker Isagoras. The demos had become an 
agent with its own strategy for power during tyranny, under the leadership of 
Kleisthenes. I turn now to the reforms of Kleisthenes. 
  
Kleisthenes’ reform of the demes was his most important political measure. By this 
reform he drastically realigned the relations between domicile and political loyalty. 
The change to a new system of tribes was a significant part of this process. It changed 
the political structure of Athens and Attika completely. 
 
According to Mogens Herman Hansen, the most important innovation in the reforms 
of Kleisthenes was the distribution of demes to trittyes and tribes. In Hansen’s 
analysis, the demes were the foundation of the reform. The demes were natural 
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geographical entities, in the sense of local communities, more than localities.529 
Hansen argues that by assigning the ca. 139 demes of Attika to trittyes and tribes, 
“Kleisthenes sought to break up the old social structures and create new political 
entities”.530 This was done by assigning the trittyes of inland, coast, and city, by lot to 
the tribes, one from each region. The trittyes each contained a number of demes, and 
in this way, people from the different regions of Attika were assigned to the same 
tribe. Since the tribes were the basis for the organisation of the army and the new 
council of five hundred, Hansen argues, the reforms of Kleisthenes placed these 
institutions beyond the reach of the aristocrats’ influence over their neighbours.531 
 
Hansen’s interpretation makes excellent sense of the sources and provides a political 
rationale to this extensive reorganisation. Admittedly, the Athenaion Politeia is a late 
source to archaic Athens. However, it describes a plausible process for administrative 
and political reform, as a solution to prevent the frequent return of stasis. The council 
of Kleisthenes was based on the tribes, and in order to curtail domination of the 
council by aristocratic factions, the tribes would have to be composed of citizens from 
all over Attika. In this way the factions, based on the personal adherents of 
aristocratic leaders, could be nipped in the bud. After Solon and Peisistratos, Athens 
was no longer a polity consisting of feuding aristocrats and their henchmen. With the 
reforms of Kleisthenes, Athens became a polity where the local communities were 
integrated in tribes consisting of demes from all over Attika. The road to stasis was 
closed. The reforms also changed citizen behavior, as they took turns serving in the 
council according to tribes. 
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As part of the reforms of Kleisthenes, the army was organised with a contingent from 
each tribe, making the citizens fight alongside their tribal fellows from all over Attika. 
Rather than following an aristocratic local warlord, the citizen now fought for the 
city. The reforms of Kleisthenes were effective measures against the broad élite 
strategy for power of the aristocratic factions that aimed at keeping power in the 
hands of a few aristocratic leaders. By reorganising the territory politically, it would 
become harder for local leaders to recruit followers, also militarily. Because the 
citizens now belonged to new tribes, and these tribes were put together by people 
living in trittyes from demes at the coast, inland and the city, local interests of each 
phyle would be divided on several places, and reduce the influence of local powerful 
families.  
 
Some scholars have argued that the Kleisthenic reform of the demes, trittyes, and 
tribes was not primarily a political reform, but an army reform connected to the 
development of phalanx tactics and the mobilisation of a citizen hoplite army. This is 
argued by Henri van Effenterre, who claims that Kleisthenes’ reforms were intended 
first and foremost as a military reform, to supply post-Peisistratid Athens with a 
hoplite army to defend the polis. He claims that scholars falsely attribute a rational 
political prescience to Kleisthenes, a person about whom very little is known, not 
least his motives for the reforms.532 Van Effenterre explains the political reforms of 
Kleisthenes as the result of Athens being organised as an image of the army. 533  
 
                                              
532 Effenterre, “Clisthène et les mesures de mobilisation,” 1976, 2 and n.4 
533 Effenterre, “Clisthène et les mesures de mobilisation,” 1976, 3-4 
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Van Effenterre’s argument that Kleisthenes’ reform was fundamentally of a military 
nature is supported by Peter Siewert, who argues that the organisation of the trittyes 
was for the purpose of military mobilisation.534 According to Siewert, there was no 
citizen army under the Peisistratids. There was an army of hoplites in the 7th century, 
but this was disbanded by the Peisistratids after the battle of Pallene in 546/5 and the 
troops that fought the Spartans in 511 and 510 were Thessalian mercenaries.535 
Siewert claims that the citizen army again came into existence by 506, when the 
Athenian fought the Boeotians, Khalkidians, and Aeginetans. This army was either 
organised according to the four tribes or improvised ad hoc.536 According to Siewert, 
the hoplites of the new citizen army wanted to protect the council of five hundred 
from Isagoras and Kleomenes and secured its first victory in the battle against them in 
507. The citizen army further mobilised ca. 9000 hoplites against the Peloponnesians 
in 506.537 
 
It must be pointed out that Siewert’s hypothesis has a rather narrow schedule for the 
organisation of the supposed new hoplite army. It does not seem convincing that an 
army of hoplites could be raised after a forty years hiatus and mobilised to protect the 
council of five hundred. Did Kleisthenes organise this army before he was exiled by 
Isagoras, in time for this new hoplite army to recognise that the council of five 
hundred and the reforms of Kleisthenes needed its protection? This does not seem 
likely. Siewert’s hypothesis is criticised by Rhodes, who points out that the 
organisation of the trittyes was not very effective for mobilisation purposes: some of 
the demes that neighboured each other were not in the same trittys, thus not very 
                                              
534 Siewert, Die Trittyen Attikas und die Heeresreform de Kleisthenes, 1982, 145-149 
535 Siewert, Die Trittyen Attikas und die Heeresreform de Kleisthenes, 1982, 154-155 
536 Siewert, Die Trittyen Attikas und die Heeresreform de Kleisthenes, 1982, 157 and 157n.23 
537 Siewert, Die Trittyen Attikas und die Heeresreform de Kleisthenes, 1982, 166-167 
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effective for mobilisation. Rather, the ancient testimony that the reforms were aimed 
at the breaking up of old associations should not be dismissed. Rhodes is also 
sceptical of Siewert’s timetable, where the new citizen army is in action as early as 
507 and points out that the appointment of ten generals for the ten tribes was not 
established until 501/0. Thus, the reforms of Kleisthenes were not primarily of a 
military nature.538 The interpretations of Kleisthenes’ reforms as predominantly 
military fail to convince. Against van Effenterre’s argument that the Athenian polis 
needed to defend itself after the fall of the tyrants, it should be kept in mind that there 
were few periods of Athenian history without external threats. It is therefore 
questionable to explain the reforms of Kleisthenes as a response to outside threats. It 
can be argued that the most pressing threat to Athens in the time of Kleisthenes’ 
reforms was not external invasion after the fall of the tyrants, as much as stasis and 
the reestablishment of aristocratic factions.  
 
As discussed above, there is evidence that Peisistratos had disarmed the citizens and 
relied on mercenaries.539 However, there is also evidence that the Athenians were 
indeed armed after the initial establishment of the tyranny of Peisistratos: the 
Athenians took up the fight against Isagoras, Kleomenes, and the Spartan troops in 
508/7.540 Van Effenterre argues that the Athenians were unable to prevent the 
Spartans from camping on their territory and taking control of the Acropolis.541 
However, it should be kept in mind that the Spartans did not initially come as a force 
hostile to the citizens of Athens. Mobilisation against them was first set in motion at 
signs of hostilities against the council and the occupation of the Acropolis. The main 
                                              
538 Rhodes, “Review: Siewert (P.) Die Trittyen Attikas und die Heeresreform des Kleisthenes,“ 1983, 203-204 
539 Disarmament of citizens: Ath. Pol. 15.3-5. Reliance on mercenaries: Hdt. 1. 64 
540 Hdt. 5.72 
541 Effenterre, “Clisthène et les mesures de mobilisation,” 1976, 4 
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problem with van Effenterre’s argument is that he identifies the lack of an army as the 
most pressing problem in Athens after the fall of tyranny and ignores how 
Kleisthenes’ reforms puts an end to stasis. By focusing on external threats and the 
lack of an army, he can argue that the reforms were primarily military in addition to 
being political, but this can only be a convincing argument if it can be shown that 
Athens had no army in 508/7, something that appears highly unlikely. 
 
Kleisthenes can be interpreted as facilitating, if not himself pursuing, a broad 
corporate strategy for power that ensured that decisions were taken with the 
involvement of a large part of the population. The reform of the demes had significant 
political consequences: the reorganisation of the demes and composition of the new 
council of five hundred meant that a large number of citizens would be involved in 
government each year, in establishing the agenda for the popular assembly. The 
reforms would lessen the chances of local leaders to create cliques or bands in order 
to take over the polis. Thus, the reforms can be seen as directed against the narrow 
élite strategy of a tyrant as well as against the broad élite strategy of aristocratic 
dominance. This does not mean that Kleisthenes was a democrat. Kleisthenes, by 
championing the people, got the upper hand against his personal enemy Isagoras, and 
for him that was probably satisfaction enough. 
 
Kleisthenes can be suspected of striving for personal power. It is a recurring double 
meaning to popular power in archaic sources, because it frequently comes about in 
complicity with some powerful individual. However, the events of 508/7 do not 
indicate that Kleisthenes aimed at personal power. After all, he was not even there 
when Isagoras and Kleomenes were chased off. Scholars have been puzzled and 
intrigued by the apparent independent action of the Athenians against Isagoras and 
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Kleomenes reported by Herodotos (Hdt. 5.72).542 What was the role of the people? 
What was their strategy for power? 
 
Walter Eder explains the initiative taken by the people as a popular struggle not to 
win new rights, but to keep the position and power they had gained under tyranny.543 
In his view, Peisistratos had made it possible for the people to gain political 
experience in the local courts that he had established in the demes, as well as in the 
assembly and council.544 In Eder’s interpretation, the tyrant thus contributed to the 
establishment of a “corporate feeling” among Athenians.545  
 
As discussed above, the development of a corporate identity of the demos can indeed 
be argued to be a result of tyranny: before Peisistratos, Athens was split into factions, 
but after Peisistratos, the demos acted with their own agenda. This must have led to a 
different political climate in Athens, beyond aristocratic feuding and loyal local 
followers. Instead of a fragmented polity dominated by infighting among the élite, 
tyranny established a state-like authority that created a focus for citizen identity. To 
set this in relation to the reaction against Isagoras and Kleomenes is fruitful. In this 
event, the demos acted in their own interest to protect the established political order. 
What was the nature of this protest? 
 
                                              
542 Eder, “Political self-confidence and resistance,” 1988; Ober, The Athenian revolution, 1996 
543 Eder, “Political self-confidence and resistance,” 1988, 467 
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545 Eder, “Political self-confidence and resistance,” 1988, 469-470 
 226 
Josiah Ober interprets the action of the Athenian demos in 508/7 as a full-on 
revolution. In his analysis, the demos protested against the attempt to dismantle the 
council of five hundred and to defend the measures put in place by Kleisthenes, 
enacted before he was exiled by Isagoras.546 In Ober’s interpretation, the Athenians 
were not united as a corporate body by Peisistratos as much as by being the hetairoi 
of Kleisthenes. The riot of 508/7 became their act of self-definition as a people with a 
political identity and purpose.547 
 
The concept of an Athenian revolution, intriguing though it is, is difficult to maintain: 
there is no information available as to what the people wanted to achieve and 
therefore, revolution is a misnomer. The Athenians chased away foreign attackers in 
defense of the newly established order. This cannot be called a revolution, however. 
There is no evidence that the Athenians aimed at overthrowing the existing order and 
introducing a new one. The role for Kleisthenes as revolutionary leader is also 
problematic. His reforms did break down the traditional recruiting ground for 
aristocratic factions, but that does not necessarily mean that he intended to empower 
the masses. It should be remembered that the people acted in his absence. To see the 
reforms of Kleisthenes and the people’s revolt as one revolutionary process is 
therefore problematic. The popular uprising against Isagoras and Kleomenes provides 
a fascinating glimpse of direct popular participation in the politics of Athens. It is 
difficult not to see this instance of popular uprising in relation to the establishment of 
democracy. In archaic Athens at the time of Kleisthenes’ reforms, a broad corporate 
strategy initiated by the Athenian demos can be discerned. 
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Little of the dynamics of archaic poleis allowed for the direct participation of the 
masses, other than as a passive audience. The poor were championed by a few 
aristocrats, but do not appear to have had an agenda of their own. It is not far-fetched 
to argue that a transformation in the people had to take place in order for them to take 
over the polity, as it happened in Athens. However, it should be kept in mind that 
Athenian democracy was not the end product of a one-way process. The dominance of 
the people was contested, exemplified by the oligarchic coups of 411 and 404. The 
revolt of the people is a significant manifestation of a broad corporate strategy for 
power, but no revolution. There is no reason to suppose that this protest would result 
in a stable democratic constitution. However, the reforms of Solon, the period of 
tyranny, and the reforms of Kleisthenes all appear to have contributed to increased 
popular participation in politics in Athens. 
 
The coupling of tyranny to popular power may look like an oxymoron, but actually 
makes good sense in archaic Greek politics: the élite in their broad élite strategy 
emphasise egalitarian relations, but only among themselves, whereas the masses in 
their broad élite strategy are followers of strong leaders or reformers who have 
stepped out of the egalitarian circle of aristocrats. The result could be the dominance 
of a narrow élite strategy of the one, great leader. E.g. Peisistratos appears as a 
charismatic leader, and the people grant him a privileged position that he consolidated 
as a tyranny. His strategy takes on a narrow élite character when he pretends that 
Athena has chosen him as ruler of Athens. He takes up residence on the Acropolis and 
he is favoured by the gods. Therefore, he is above the broad élite strategy of the 
competing cliques of the other Athenian aristocrats. However, the tyrant’s defeat of 
the other aristocrats could also lead to the dominance of a broad corporate strategy of 
an inclusive collective of citizens. I turn now to a rather different polis than Athens, 
viz. Mytilene on Lesbos, where the evidence from the poet Alkaios indicates struggle 
for power between a popular tyrant and disgruntled aristocrats. 
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3.4.4 Mytilene: Alkaios 
The poet Alkaios wrote in a time of troubles with civil war, stasis, between the 
inhabitants of Mytilene on Lesbos. This polis was periodically governed by tyrants. 
Alkaios is an important source to aristocratic sentiments towards tyranny and provides 
a view from the losing side in stasis. The situation in Mytilene is usually interpreted 
as one of internal strife in the élite: the powerful family of the Penthilidai had 
dominated the polis until they fell from power around 650 BCE, apparently because 
they had maltreated the people. This was followed by a troubled period, and a tyrant, 
Melankhros, was defeated by the brothers of Alkaios together with a certain 
Pittakos.548 Pittakos was elected for a ten year period so that he could put the 
constitution in order. Alkaios went into exile, and wrote of his hometown there. He is 
furious with Pittakos and attacks him in poems for being of low birth.549 In the poems 
of Alkaios, fragmentary thought they are, different strategies for power pursued by 
members of the élite can be seen, based in support of the people on the one hand or in 
the support of one’s élite peers on the other. 
 
The polis is central in Alkaios’ poems and he writes of stasis, of the symposia, and 
also of citizen solidarity. He is insistent that the community of citizens equals the 
strength of the polis: Alkaios says that warlike men are a city’s towers.550 Men who 
can defend themselves are the city, not stones or timbers or the skills of the builder.551 
Thus, it appears that the polis community is important to him. However, as will be 
seen, Alkaios is no friend of the people. The popular leader Pittakos is his stated 
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enemy. It is clear from several fragments that he had a particular dislike for Pittakos. 
Pittakos sent Alkaios into exile and requites by reviling him as Potbelly. Alkaios 
longs to return from exile with his comrades and overthrow him.552 Alkaios accuses 
Pittakos of being base-born and having married into a noble family.553 He rails at the 
Mytileans for having “established base-born Pittacus as tyrant of that gutless, ill-
starred city, all of them loud in his praise”.554  
 
Alkaios can be said to attack Pittakos for being an unworthy leader of Mytilene. He is 
described as ugly and base-born. Was this true? Alkaios’ description can be argued to 
be an attempt at assassination of character. Alkaios tries to convince his listeners that 
a leader like Pittakos, who sides with the people against the élite, will destroy the 
polis. Whether this was because Pittakos was a tyrant or because he was a former ally 
cannot be determined. It can be argued, however, that Alkaios is outraged with 
Pittakos exactly because he turned traitor on the aristocratic common cause of sharing 
control over Mytilene. It seems clear that Alkaios wanted to be active in politics at 
Mytilene than his exile and current status allows. 
 
In a poem, Alkaios writes to a friend that he misses the city with its assemblies and 
councils: “I, poor wretch, live with the lot of a rustic, longing to hear the assembly 
being summoned, Agesilaidas, and the council”.555 He is evidently unhappy in exile 
and appears to have rejoiced in attending assemblies and taking part in the politics of 
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the polis. It appears that Pittakos is keeping Alkaios from what he regards as his 
rightful place in the polis, viz. taking part in meetings of the council and assembly. 
 
Alkaios appears to be concerned for the well-being of the polis. In a fragment of a 
poem, he uses the metaphor of a ship-wreck to describe the polis troubled by stasis.556 
In other fragments, he appears more aloof of the polis community and the references 
to an élite lifestyle are quite explicit: he describes a treasure of arms and armour 
worthy of the Homeric heroes.557 Alkaios celebrates the drinking of strong wine and 
inebriation in several poems.558 He also refers to donning garlands and perfuming the 
body.559 In another fragment, he claims that his brother had been a mercenary with the 
Babylonians.560 Thus, Alkaios is a complex poet. He is concerned for the polis and 
hates tyrants, but is clearly a connoisseur of an élite lifestyle and must be termed an 
aristocrat. He belongs with the political institutions of the polis and a life in public, 
but also enjoys the pleasures of private symposia. 
 
The poems of Alkaios can be taken as evidence to how aristocratic groups strove for 
power. Alkaios attacks Pittakos for catering to the people and apparently wants to 
exclude the masses of Mytilene from taking part in ruling the polity. Pittakos is 
accused of betraying the fellow cause of the élite, by making himself sole ruler of 
Mytilene. This appears to be Alkaios’ resentment of his former friend, because he 
does not share power with his erstwhile fellows. The élite of Mytilene evidently 
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resented tyranny. Pittakos can be said to abandon the aristocratic broad élite strategy 
for power and makes himself sole ruler of Mytilene by the support of the people. 
Pittakos follows a narrow élite strategy, by making himself the only power in the 
polis, but attains power through a broad corporate strategy of rallying popular support. 
The people somehow or other chose Pittakos as their champion. Alkaios mentions the 
council and the assembly of Mytilene. It seems reasonable to infer that the people had 
access to a certain degree of participation in these institutions. Perhaps the decision to 
empower Pittakos was made in the assembly? It is evident that Pittakos sent dissident 
élites into exile and maintained the council and assembly, since Alkaios longs for 
these institutions in exile. Thus, the structure of power in Mytilene can be said to have 
been determined by a popular leader, a council, and an assembly. Members of the 
élite, who wanted to share power among themselves to the exclusion of the people, 
were sent in exile and the polis was dominated by a popular leader and the masses. 
 
In the analysis of Podlecki, Alkaios is critical of tyrants and monarchs, because he 
was an “aristocrat to whom one-man rule, whatever it was called, would have been 
anathema”.561 He points out that Alkaios took part in a failed attempt to defeat the 
tyrant Myrsilos at Mytilene.562 Podlecki argues that Pittakos left the hetaireia of 
Alkaios and attained autocratic power through a “constitutionally orderly process of 
selection by the Mytilean demos”. This was because the people were tired of 
“destructive feuds among the noble families”.563 He points out that the convivial 
poems of Alkaios shows that he was part of an aristocratic environment of symposia 
and wine, with a strong degree of solidarity between peers.564 On the other hand, he 
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argues, “it seems at least possible that Alkaios was able occasionally to rise above the 
selfish interests of his class and give expression to a belief, sincerely held, that the 
damos was ill-advised in acquiescing in Myrsilus’ and even legitimizing Pittacus’ 
autocracy”.565 
 
Podlecki’s analysis does not take into consideration why Alkaios was against Pittakos. 
He seems to attribute Alkaios’ outrage at the demos for having promoted Pittakos to a 
concern for the well-being of the demos. Against Podlecki’s assessment, one may ask 
whether Alkaios’ indignation against one-man rule is an expression of concern for the 
people of Mytilene, or anger at the lack of aristocratic influence in running the polis. 
His indignation at the loss of a fellow fighter against tyranny indicates the latter. 
Thus, his concern is not for the people, but for the lack of élite influence. In this 
perspective, the symposia of the élite can be seen as a political front against the 
masses and the tyrant. Pittakos was reputed to have passed laws against drunken 
offences.566 This can be interpreted as a measure against the aristocrats; the drunken 
violence that accompanied the symposia was typical of aristocratic hybris. Also, 
symposia were good environments for political plotting. Thus, Pittakos appears as a 
friend of the people and an enemy of the élite. Alkaios, on the other hand, is by no 
measure a friend of the people, and his ideal seems to be a limited regime of the best 
families in the polis. He does claim to be concerned for the well-being of the demos, 
but this does not indicate that he wanted to grant the people any power. The people 
are in his opinion easily deceived. On the other hand, he longs to participate in the 
assembly, where presumably the hated demos took part. It is thus not easy to place 
him definitely within a particular political camp. 
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There is a tendency in the sources from the archaic period to refer to the masses only 
in relation to some great man, either a reformer or a tyrant. According to Alkaios, the 
people of Mytilene elected Pittakos to rule them.567 Similarly, Peisistratos started his 
career as tyrant with a bodyguard he received from the people.568 This is an important 
point to have in mind when reading sources to Greek politics of the archaic period: 
from an élite perspective the masses are only visible in relation to their leaders. 
Implicitly, these leaders are in opposition to the egalitarian circle of the élite. This is 
the most likely source of Alkaios’ anger at Pittakos: he has broken with the broad élite 
strategy of the aristocratic families and claimed power for himself by catering to the 
people. 
 
The hostility of Alkaios towards the people of Mytilene and their leader Pittakos is a 
clear example of how élite members in archaic poleis view themselves as modest and 
egalitarian, whereas the masses are condemned as inferior and greedy and the tyrant a 
traitor to his aristocratic peers. This kind of dynamics was also seen with Peisistratos, 
who became a rallying figure for the masses (3.4.3). Tyranny thus appears to have led 
to greater cohesion of the demos and in the long run to have facilitated popular 
participation in politics in archaic poleis at the expense of the aristocrats. 
 
3.4.5 Megara: Theognis 
In Athens and Mytilene (3.4.3; 3.4.4), tyranny and popular power appears as related 
phenomena, as two possible outcomes of aristocratic struggles for power and 
fragmentation of the élite. In the following, a rather different type of conflict will be 
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investigated, that between the so-called good and the base, the agathoi and the kakoi, 
as seen in the poems of the 6th century poet Theognis of Megara. Several of his poems 
take the form of advice to Kyrnos, a young aristocrat. The identity of Theognis is 
disputed, but I will not enter this discussion here. Rather, Theognis will be taken as 
representative of an aristocratic outlook on stasis, an ideology that is expressed in the 
poems attributed to Theognis, regardless of their true author.569 As will be seen in the 
following, the aristocratic ideology of Theognis’ poems is instructive for an analysis 
of the political culture of archaic poleis. 
 
Theognis states that never have the agathoi destroyed a polis, but the kakoi are 
without restraint and adjudicate falsely for their own gain, preparing the way for civil 
strife and tyranny.570 He is full of derision for new people in power and states that 
“this city is still a city, but the people are different, people who formerly knew neither 
justice nor laws, but wore tattered goatskins about their sides and lived outside this 
city like deer. And now they are noble […], while those who were noble before are 
now base”. The poem continues with warnings against befriending any of these 
deceitful townsmen that know “neither the distinctive marks of the base nor those of 
the noble”.571  
 
                                              
569 This position is argued by Gregory Nagy, who proposes that “the figure of Theognis represents a cumulative synthesis of 
Megarian poetic traditions” (Nagy, “Theognis and Megara: a poet’s vision of his city,” 1985, 33). Similarly, Andrew L. 
Ford argues that the so-called seal of Theognis, mentioned in his poems, are meant to preserve and authenticate a codified 
collection of standards and values for the agathoi (Ford, “The seal of Theognis: the politics of authorship in archaic 
Greece”, 1985, 89) This is also argued by Lowell Edmunds, who regards Theognis as a traditional authority rather than an 
historical Megarian aristocrat, an aristocratic personality in the sense of a persona created by the poems and in the poems 
attributed to Theognis (Edmunds, “The seal of Theognis,” 1997, 40). These analyses of Theognis solve the problem of 
which poems were truly archaic and which were added later, by establishing Theognis as a traditional authority, an 
ideological position expressed in poetry, rather than seeking a true historical figure. In my opinion, this is a very useful 
approach for an analysis of archaic élite ideology and politics. 
570 Thgn. Book I 39-52 
571 Thgn. Book I 53-68, translation by Gerber, Greek elegiac poetry, 1999, 183 
 235 
From Theognis’ poems, it is evident that status could change rapidly in archaic poleis. 
This is probably related to changes in wealth. Life in the polis is urban and 
sophisticated, in contrast to life in the countryside. Apparently, new people had 
achieved high status in Megara, but how this happened is not clear. They are 
described as coming from the countryside, but the reason remains obscure. Theognis 
can be interpreted as evidence that stasis could take the form of fighting between 
groups of citizens of the polis, where one group of the élite was deriding another as 
inferior: from Theognis, it is clear that an important line of conflict in Megara was 
drawn between the good and the bad, the agathoi and the kakoi. This may be 
interpreted as the élite against the masses. However, in Theognis, it seems more likely 
that the opposing terms refer to rivalling groups within the élite, between those of 
noble birth and those of less illustrious families. In Theognis, much is made of the 
importance of not mingling with base people. Several of his poems are addressed to a 
certain Kyrnos, a young aristocrat. It would be rather superfluous to instruct a young 
member of the élite not to associate with the poor. To instruct him to stay away from 
those of bad family would make better sense.  
 
In Podlecki’s assessment, Theognis may have been the Solon of Megara, but without 
his “humanity and breadth of vision”. His poems “record the autobiographical cri de 
Coeur of an outmoded and displaced aristocrat”.572 Podlecki points out that Theognis’ 
ethics divides sharply between the virtue (aretē) of the few and the baseness (kakia) 
of the many. The highly valued aretē is the preserve of those who are of noble birth. 
573 In Podlecki’s analysis, Theognis is concerned about the threat of hybris from the 
base people, who are deceiving the demos and lead the polis to perdition: whereas the 
good have never destroyed a polis, the base desire tyranny. Podlecki points out that 
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the motivation of the base is not known, but that Theognis is possibly warning against 
fragmentation of the élite and that too much power should accrue to one faction.574 
 
The rivalry between established aristocratic élites and new groups with wealth who 
invaded on their privileges, seem to be the subject matter in the poetry of Theognis, 
and not a conflict between the élites and the masses. Thus, I agree with Podlecki’s 
assessment of Theognis’ position in Megara, although I do not see him as a parallel to 
Solon: there is no evidence to Theognis’ role as a reformer.  
 
The situation in Megara seems to involve conflicts between factions of the élite more 
than it concerns a conflict between the élite and the masses. The base people are 
apparently leading the demos, but they are not necessarily of the demos. What these 
base élite members wished to achieve is not mentioned by Theognis. Perhaps they 
were wealthy non-aristocrats who wanted access to office and positions of power in 
the polis and used the demos to gain leverage. If the suggestion that they were a 
faction of the élite is correct, the strategy for power suggested by Theognis entails the 
closing of ranks among the aristocrats to maintain a limited ruling upper class. This is 
a broad élite strategy for power. The demos appear as a threat to this arrangement, 
because they could lend support to the base, rogue élites with no respect for the 
aristocrats. The demos is not visible as agents with their own strategy for power, 
however, and what they wanted to achieve in supporting the base is not clear. Perhaps 
they wanted to put an end to aristocratic privilege? This must remain speculation, 
however, since Theognis really does not say. What he does provide, however, is a 
clear indication of the status-differences in the polis and how this was used actively in 
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rhetoric by aristocrats to brand opponents as not fit to wield power. Newcomers in 
power are accused of destroying the polis. 
 
3.5 Politics, the polis and the people 
The investigation of archaic poleis as networks of strategies for power reveals that 
there were great variations between the different poleis, for all their similarities of 
structure. A polis has a council and an assembly, as well as various other offices, and 
these institutions and offices are the reserve of citizens. However, the relative power 
of the institutions varied greatly between poleis. There is a danger of taking for 
granted that popular rule through mass assemblies was the usual situation in Greek 
poleis, because we know so much about Athens. Also, there is a danger of seeing the 
political dynamics in Greek poleis as one between oligarchs and democrats, because 
this is the kind of conflict that is discussed in the classical historians. It must be 
emphasised, however, that the archaic polis is an unclear concept between aristocracy 
and citizen community. No uniform constitution can be said to describe the polis.  
 
Popular power existed in archaic poleis, in the form of support of leading figures. 
Popular hegemony is harder to find. The demos did take political action and did wield 
power and influence, but it was rarely kyrios in the politeia. What is more often the 
case is that power was in the hands of a broad élite of important families. This élite 
was urban, as seen in the example of Mytilene, where Alkaios praises the community 
of his peers in perfumed symposia (3.4.4). This élite also controlled the institutions 
for decision-making. They were threatened, however, by reformers or popular leaders 
who could usurp power and establish a narrow élite rule of their own family and 
friends. It seems like the broad ruling élite was initially defined by birth, and then 
increasingly by wealth, as at Athens with the reforms of Solon and his property-
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classes. In practice, the broad élite became a narrow corporation open to outsiders 
who were wealthy enough to qualify. However, income was predominantly from 
agriculture, not trade, and Greek communities put emphasis on ownership of land in 
their definition of the citizens.  
 
From the poems of Solon, Alkaios and Theognis, civil strife between different groups 
in archaic poleis can be seen in all its rancour. These poets were members of local 
élites, and they can be seen as both representing and portraying attitudes and 
strategies for power in the polis. These sources are interesting for the dynamics of 
power they display as well as giving hints about political institutions in archaic poleis.  
 
The social conflicts that are visible through the archaic poems are not predominantly 
between the masses and the élite, but between élites, whether competing families or 
traditional and new élites. The masses, on the other hand, come into view as the 
supporters of reformers or tyrants. Tyrants and reformers were in essence the same 
kind of people, aristocrats who stepped out of the circle of their peers, and became 
champions of the people. There are details in the stories of these reformers that also 
indicate that these leaders could be elected by the people, making it likely that some 
kind of popular decision-making was in place behind the rise to power of individual 
leaders. 
 
Oligarchy was a relatively late concept in the development of Greek political 
vocabulary. A definition of oligarchy can be found in the Persian debate of Herodotos 
from the 5th century. He discusses democracy and monarchy together with oligarchy. 
Robin Osborne argues, however, that oligarchy is not actually discussed in this 
debate. Rather, the dichotomy of democracy and tyranny is emphasised. In Osborne’s 
interpretation, oligarchy first became a defined concept after the period of coups in 
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Athens from 412 to 404.575 This is a good observation and fits the situation described 
in the archaic poems, where aristocracy, tyranny, or stasis appear as the political 
alternatives, not oligarchy or democracy. Martin Ostwald defines oligarchy as when 
those wealthy enough to have the leisure for politics rule the polis or at least 
dominates it.576 According to Jochen Bleicken, oligarchy was a concept developed in 
opposition to Athenian democracy. This concept was a continuation of the archaic 
concept eunomia, which traditionally stood for the élite dominance of the polis.577 
Oligarchy can be analysed as the rule of a propertied, leisured élite. However, an 
important difference from eunomia is the noble status of the élite in archaic poleis 
that is not an issue in oligarchies. I agree, however, that oligarchy must be considered 
a classical concept. The main political divisions in archaic poleis were defined by the 
aristocrats, against hybristic élite members or the masses. 
 
The ideology of the masses is not visible in the sources at all, if they even had any. 
That does not mean that their actions cannot be analysed as a separate and 
independent strategy for power. As seen above (3.4.3), mass action against the élite 
factions was what brought popular power to the fore at Athens. Their strategy for 
power could succeed because there already were institutions for collective decision-
making available that could be used against enemies of popular power, in particular 
the jury courts. Empowering the people could only have a lasting effect when it was 
corroborated by collective institutions for power. These institutions were important 
parts of the structure of archaic poleis. In the archaic period, as seen from Sparta, 
Athens, and Mytilene, poleis became consolidated citizen communities where 
commoners were included in the political structure. By establishing strong central 
                                              
575 Osborne, “Changing the discourse,” 2003, 252-253 
576 Ostwald, Oligarchia, 2000 
577 Bleicken, “Zur Entstehung der Verfassungstypologie im 5. Jahrhundert v.Chr.,” 1979, 148-172 
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institutions, the poleis could function as political communities, containing and 
circumscribing aristocratic infighting. 
 
3.6 Conclusions 
Throughout this chapter, I have attempted to discern strategies for power from the 
epic and archaic poets. In my analyses, I have found evidence for political actions 
corresponding to four strategies for power that together form a network that creates 
the dynamics of archaic poleis. There was no one strategy dominating any polis 
throughout its history, but several at work simultaneously. The broad corporate 
strategy is the one least visible, i.e. cases where the people rule collectively through 
regular meetings of mass institutions, in assemblies and assembly courts. This was 
discernible in Athens after Kleisthenes, when all citizens had equal access to the 
council of five hundred. It was also visible, however, in the popular uprising against 
Isagoras and Kleomenes in 508/7 (cf. 3.4.3). From Sparta, the broad corporate 
strategy was possible in the popular assembly. However, the council of elders 
attempted to curtail their initiative, making a narrow corporate strategy the more 
dominant. With time, this developed into a broad élite strategy, where only the ephors 
and gerousia, including the kings, were influential in politics (cf. 3.4.1). 
 
The narrow corporate strategy could be seen in Solonian Athens, where the wealthy 
landowners were granted access to office. This replaced the dominance of the broad 
élite strategy of the aristocratic families that had monopolised the archonship (cf. 
3.4.2). It is of note that the broad élite strategy is the dominant strategy in the 




There are but few examples of a narrow élite strategy for power in archaic poleis. The 
clearest example is tyranny, in particular the tyranny of Peisistratos: he claimed to be 
the divinely favoured ruler of Athens and thus elevated above the squabbles of the 
rest of the aristocracy (cf. 3.4.3). 
 
An important feature of the developments in Greek poleis in the archaic period is the 
establishment of regular meetings of the popular assemblies and councils. This can be 
seen in Sparta and Athens (cf. 3.4.1-3). Through these regular meetings, the people 
had a realistic chance of participating in the politics of their community. Only by the 
formal establishment of the power of these collective organs of decision-making 
could popular power become a reality, independent of the councils of the élite. 
 
I turn now to the evidence for strategies of power in Near Eastern polities, with an 




















4. Local politics in network states 
4.1 Introduction  
Throughout Mesopotamian history, ambitious conquerors managed to unite city-states 
and pastoralist communities into network states.578 In these states, the political centre 
was no longer the individual urban centres of city-states, but the royal court. 
Governors were posted in cities and garrisons established in order to control the 
territory of the new state. Local political life became subsumed under a distant centre. 
However, as will be discussed in this chapter, there is evidence that local communities 
retained their local decision-making bodies. Through these bodies, the urban and 
pastoral communities inside network states could negotiate their position vis-à-vis the 
central authorities. 
 
In the following, I will first look at texts from Babylonia, and then from Mari. These 
two network states were, as will be seen, quite different. Babylonia was placed in the 
ancient urban heartland of Mesopotamia, controlling a number of formerly 
independent city-states. Mari on the other hand was the seat of kings ruling over 
predominantly tribal communities based in towns or living as nomadic pastoralists. 
The evidence from Babylonia and Mari offers examples of several local institutions of 
self-government and their relations to the central authorities. How did local 
communities negotiate their position with central authorities? How were local 
communities integrated in the political structure of ancient Near Eastern network 
states? What was the role of the people in local politics? These problems will be 
                                              
578 The term network state is used here to describe these states, rather than empire or kingdom, because the central authority 
was weak and intersected with local authorities. Thus, the kings of Mari or Babylon did not rule territories with coherent 
borders, but networks consisting of cities and areas under their overarching authority that retained their own local decision-
making bodies (cf. Barjamovic, “Chapter 4: Mesopotamian empires,”  2012, 23-24) 
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examined throughout this chapter, with an emphasis on collective decision-making 
bodies of cities, towns, and pastoralist communities of the Old Babylonian period in 
Mesopotamia. The strategies for power pursued by citizens and their relations with 
local and central authorities will be examined in particular. 
 
4.2 The Old Babylonian state and local institutions 
In the Old Babylonian period (ca. 1894-1595 BCE), Babylon was ruled by an Amorite 
dynasty of kings. At the height of its power, the Old Babylonian network state 
stretched from the Persian Gulf to Assur in the north, from Eshnunna in the east to 
Mari in Syria in the west.579 It reached its greatest extent under king Hammurapi. 
However, this great territory was coming apart already under Hammurapi’s son and 
successor Samsuiluna. Knowledge of Babylonian society and politics comes 
predominantly from letters, legal documents and inscriptions. The Old Babylonian 
strata of Babylon itself are under the modern ground-water table, but there are 
archives found at other sites in Babylonia that shed light on the period. 
 
The palace and the temples were the most important institutions in Old Babylonian 
society. The palace was the highest court of law, and because of its importance and 
wealth it employed the most highly skilled people in the kingdom. Employment in the 
palace has been called the “Babylonian dream”, because life as an official or scribe 
meant escape from agricultural labour and menial toil.580 Every city had temples and 
these were important expressions of their identity. The identification of the city-gods 
and the cities were expressed through the main temples; the homes of the deities. 
                                              
579 Goddeeris, “The Old Babylonian economy,” 2007, 203 
580 Sallaberger, “The palace and the temple in Babylonia,” 2007, 270 
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However, Mesopotamian temples were not exclusively places of prayer: temples were 
like giant households that owned fields and workshops and employed a high number 
of workers, both free men and slaves. Several people were attached to the temple 
organisation in one way or the other, not only priests and officials, but also 
manufacturers and labourers, as well as private individuals and groups with various 
rights and duties to the sacred households.581 Temple prebends, the right to parts of 
the income of temples, were attractive privileges that could also be sold and belonged 
to private people as well as groups.582  
 
The palace and temples played important roles in the Old Babylonian economy. The 
existence of private enterprise alongside these institutions has been a moot point, 
because the economy has been studied mostly from texts found in palace and temple 
archives.583 Recent research has shown that private entrepreneurs were assigned to 
take on tasks for the temple or palace in the Old Babylonian period.584 In the 
interpretation of Goddeeris, the three economic sectors of palace and temple 
households and those of private individuals became increasingly interconnected.585 
This is also argued by Marc Van De Mieroop, who finds evidence that residents in 
Old Babylonian Ur issued loans on behalf of temples as well as being involved in 
other aspects of the daily affairs of temples.586 I find these interpretations of private 
entrepreneurs in the economic activities of Old Babylonian palaces and temples 
convincing and I agree that the Old Babylonian economy was not based exclusively in 
                                              
581 Sallaberger, “The palace and the temple in Babylonia,” 2007, 268-269 
582 Oppenheim, Ancient Mesopotamia, 1977 [1964], 190 
583 Oppenheim, Ancient Mesopotamia, 1977 [1964], 84 
584 Goddeeris, “The Old Babylonian economy,” 2007, 205-206 
585 Goddeeris, “The Old Babylonian economy,” 2007, 204 
586 Van De Mieroop, “Old Babylonian Ur: portrait of an ancient Mesopotamian city,” 1992, 128 
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the activities of temples or the palace. Citizens played an important role in the 
economy of Old Babylonian institutions. Was this also the case in politics? 
 
As will be argued in this chapter, there were institutions of city neighbourhoods and 
local communities where private citizens could participate in decision-making. Thus, 
the existence of a private sector in Old Babylonian society alongside the palace and 
temples also applies to local administration and politics. Scholars are not agreed on 
the nature of relations between central authorities and the local communities. The fact 
that the majority of texts concerning local institutions come from the spheres of 
temples or the palace is a challenge to the idea that there was a private sphere in local 
politics. This will be discussed further below. First, the evidence from Old 
Babylonian cities will be discussed. 
 
4.3 Evidence for collective decision-making in Old 
Babylonian texts 
The majority of Old Babylonian texts that mention local decision-making bodies are 
cuneiform tablets with verdicts from jury courts. Also, there is the monumental 
inscription known as the Codex Hammurapi, as well as the collection of laws known 
as the Laws of Eshnunna.587  As an illustration of the difficulties involved in 
understanding Old Babylonian society, I will first briefly discuss a famous passage 
                                              
587 The nature of the Codex Hammurapi as a compilation of real laws has been questioned: Jean Bottéro argues that the 
Codex Hammurapi is not a code of law, but a “scientific work devoted to justice, it is at the same time the expression of a 
political idea in which justice had to occupy the first place” (Bottéro, “The “Code” of Hammurabi,” 1992, 169). Zainah 
Bahrani points out that “it is not each case that is at issue here, but law itself. Therefore, we can say that the subject of this 
monument is Law itself, as an abstract phenomenological concept” (Bahrani, “The Babylonian visual image,” 2007, 160). 
These are reasonable assessments in my view, as it can be argued that the very act of compiling and publishing a collection 
of laws is to establish Hammurapi as king of justice, receiving kingship from Marduk and protecting the weak from the 
strong. Regardless of whether the Codex Hammurapi was a formal code of law or not, it still remains a valuably historical 
source to Old Babylonian society, its institutions and practices. 
 247 
from the Codex Hammurapi: §5 says that if a dajānum, “judge”,588 has reached a 
decision and put it on a sealed tablet, but later changes this decision, he is to pay 
twelve times the amount involved in the case, and they shall expel him from his office 
as judge in the assembly (ina puhrim) and he is banned from sitting with the judges in 
a case.589 What does this passage tell us about the Old Babylonian legal system, the 
role of assemblies, and the participation of citizens in decision-making?  
 
As an isolated passage, Codex Hammurapi §5 really cannot tell us very much. There 
appears to have been some kind of assembly called puhrum, but the passage says little 
about what kind of assembly this was or who participated in it. This is unfortunately 
the case with several of the verdicts recorded on cuneiform tablets, as well: there are 
terms that appear to refer to councils, assemblies, and officials, but how the Old 
Babylonian legal system worked is nevertheless difficult to understand. Much 
information that is unavailable to scholars was implicit for the scribes who wrote the 
tablets on which modern reconstructions rely. As will be seen, a bewildering amount 
of terms existed for legal institutions. Terms for e.g. assembly varied from city to city 
in Babylonia and even within cities and the relations of one to the other are difficult to 
disentangle. 
 
For all these difficulties, admirable attempts have been made to reconstruct the Old 
Babylonian legal system from tablets containing verdicts, as well as from the Codex 
Hammurapi. Arnold Walther’s Das altbabylonische Gerichtswesen (1917) and 
Édouard Cuq’s Études sur le droit Babylonien (1929) are indispensable reference 
works for students of Old Babylonian society. In this chapter, much of the discussion 
                                              
588 CAD D, 1959, 28-33 
589 Cod. Ham.  §5: Meek in Pritchard (ed.), ANET, 1971 [1969], 166; Viel, Complete code of Hammurapi vol. II, 2005, 
397-399 
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of institutions and officials is based on Walther and Cuq’s definitions of Old 
Babylonian terms from legal documents and the Codex Hammurapi. The most 
important terms for the present discussion of local power are puhrum, “assembly”, 
rabiānum, “mayor”, šībūtum, “elders”, ālum, “city”, kārum, “quay”590, and dajānum, 
“judge”, often appearing as a college of several judges. It is important to note that 
different institutions and officials frequently operate together in the texts. As will be 
seen, on the basis of Old Babylonian texts, it is possible to argue several different 
interpretations of the structure of Old Babylonian society. There is much scholarly 
debate on how to assess the evidence for local powers. In the following, I will discuss 
the relevant Old Babylonian terms for officials, assemblies, and councils from 
decision-making situations in a range of Old Babylonian cities, before investigating 
the position of local bodies in the Old Babylonian legal system and the role of the 
citizens in them. 
 
All the texts referred to in the following are either Old Babylonian cuneiform tablets 
containing reports on adjudication and decision-making or passages from the Codex 
Hammurapi and Laws of Eshnunna.  I will also investigate a literary discussion of 
decision-making processes, a text known as the Nippur Trial for Homicide (4.3.5). I 
will indicate where I change from law texts and legal documents to literary sources.  
 
4.3.1 The rabiānum or “mayor” 
In Old Babylonian documents, an official called a rabiānum is frequently mentioned 
together with decision-making bodies called “the city” and “the elders”. He also 
appears on lists of witnesses in judiciary texts. The term rabiānum is often translated 
                                              
590 The term kārum is often used in Old Babylonian sources about associations of merchants taking care of their business, 
and not the physical quay itself, cf. Kraus, “”Kārum”, ein Organ städtischer Selbstverwaltung,” 1982, 32. It is the kārum in 
the sense of a group of people that concerns us here. 
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with the title “mayor” or “burgomaster” of cities and has the general meaning of “the 
chief”.591 A particular difficulty concerning the rabiānum is to define the source of 
his power; whether he was a representative of the city community or an official 
appointed by the central authorities with no prior connection to the decision-making 
bodies over which he presided. In the following, the evidence for the rabiānum as 
presiding official over collective decision-making bodies and as witness will be 
investigated, to determine whether he belongs to the municipal authorities of the local 
community or if he is an externally imposed royal official. 
 
In the Codex Hammurapi, the rabiānum is mentioned together with the ālum in two 
consecutive passages: Codex Hammurapi §23 states that in the case of robbery where 
no perpetrator has been found, the robbed “citizen” (awīlum)592 shall declare himself 
“before the god” (mahar ilim), and then the ālum u rabiānum, “city and mayor”, shall 
                                              
591 Stol, Studies in Old Babylonian history, 1976, 73 
592 The usual meaning of Akkadian awīlum is simply “man” (CAD AII, 1968, 48-57). The higher status of an awīlum to a 
muškēnum in the Codex Hammurapi made Theophile Meek translate awīlum as “seignior”, a free man of standing, 
contrasted to the muškēnum, “a commoner” (Meek, “The Code of Hammurabi,” in Pritchard (ed.), ANET, 1971 [1969], 166 
n. 39). This distinction has been much debated by scholars, however, in particular in what sense a muškēnum was inferior to 
an awīlum. Against suggestions that the muškēnum were palace dependents, F. R. Kraus forcefully defends the 
interpretation of Meek that muškēnum means “a commoner”. He points out that the muškēnum in the Codex Hammurapi is 
always discussed relative to the palace (ekallum) and persons designated awīlum, but never alone, taking this to indicate 
that the term muškēnum covers all the inhabitants that did not belong to the temple or the palace (Kraus, Vom 
mesopotamischen Menschen, 1973, 105-109). In his interpretation, an awīlum belongs to an élite with connections to the 
palace (ibid. 117). A muškēnum on the other hand has no duties to the palace or the temples (ibid. 123).  Kraus is supported 
by Reuven Yaron, who emphasises that a muškēnum had no duties to the state and therefore received no special protection 
from the central authorities. This can be seen throughout the Codex Hammurapi, where the muškēnum is systematically 
underprivileged compared to the awīlum (Yaron, The laws of Eshnunna, 1988, 137-142). On the other hand, she points out, 
the people designated awīlum are not identical to the palace, nor were they all connected to the temple. The sources of the 
distinction of this group are not well known (ibid. 151-154).The arguments of Kraus and Yaron seem to have become the 
communis opinio. In a recent handbook, Gebhard Selz argues that the awīlum was a person with considerable obligations to 
the state. In his interpretation, “the members of this class possessed full rights and the state was responsible for their 
welfare” (Selz, “Power, economy and social organization in Babylonia,” 2007, 283). In return for this, the awīlum had 
duties, such as the ilku-service, a kind of feudal obligation. This was often transferred to people of lower social status, that 
of a muškēnum, who did such tasks in return for payment. Selz emphasises that a muškēnum, often translated “commoner”, 
had no formal obligations towards the state, and therefore could expect few favours in times of crisis (ibid.). The 
interpretation of awīlum and muškēnum as groups of different status according to their relationship to the state seems to me 
reasonable and well founded in the Codex Hammurapi (but for an interpretation of awīlum as member of a ruling class 
independent of the palace, see von Dassow, “Freedom in ancient Near Eastern societies,” 2011, 211-217). This will be 
discussed further below (4.4). Suffice it to state here that the awīlum belonged to an élite and had formal connections to the 
central authorities. That does not mean that they were all palace or temple dependents, but they had a status that came from 
their obligations to the state. I will therefore translate awīlum in Old Babylonian texts with “citizen”, in the meaning of a 
person with formal rights in and obligations to the state. 
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make good the lost property.593 In the next passage, §24, it says that the ālum u 
rabiānum, “city and mayor”, shall pay one mina to “his people” (ana nišišu) in case 
the victim of the robbery was killed.594 
 
Who was the rabiānum? What was his authority? In the two above passages of the 
Codex Hammurapi, it is evident that the rabiānum served a function in the legal 
system together with the ālum, “the city”, in the sense of a local authority. As will be 
discussed further below (4.3.2-3), ālum was used of collective decision-making 
bodies. The rabiānum in §§ 23 and 24 are responsible for local matters together with 
the ālum, including reimbursement of stolen goods. Thus, they are evidently local 
authorities. The collective responsibilities of the rabiānum and ālum indicate that the 
first belong with the latter. However, there is no indication in the Codex Hammurapi 
whether the rabiānum came from the ālum or was imposed on the ālum by the king.  
 
The rabiānum is not only mentioned with the ālum. In legal documents, he also 
operated with collectives known under different names. In CT VI 47b, dated to the 
reign of Hammurapi, the rabiānum reaches a verdict together with the kārum of 
Sippar in a case concerning a slave girl belonging to a divorced woman who is 
deceased. Now that the woman is dead, her ex-husband claims the slave girl, in 
breach of earlier arrangements.595  
 
                                              
593 Cod. Ham. §23: Meek in Pritchard (ed.), ANET, 1971 [1969], 167); Viel, Complete code of Hammurapi vol. II,  2005, 
420-422 
594 Cod. Ham. §24: Meek in Pritchard (ed.), ANET, 1971 [1969], 167); Viel, Complete code of Hammurapi vol. II, 2005, 
422-423 
595 Kohler & Ungnad, Hammurabi’s Gesetz III, 1909, 192-193. 713. CT VI 47b. 
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In CT VI 47b, it is evident that the rabiānum and kārum in Sippar worked together in 
a legal capacity. The kārum is usually the harbour area as well as the merchants’ 
association.596 Interestingly, the kārum in Sippar does not appear to reach decisions in 
merchant matters specifically, but instead functions as a collective decision-making 
body for adjudication. The relation between kārum and rabiānum is not clear. He was 
probably a kind of chairman. It does not seem far-fetched to suggest that the kārum in 
Sippar is analogous to the ālum of the Codex Hammurapi.  
 
There are texts that mention the rabiānum as witness. In TD 73, dated to the reign of 
Sin-muballit, the rabiānum, “mayor”, is mentioned among the witnesses in a case 
concerning ownership of fields.597 In TD 155, the rabiānum is mentioned among the 
witnesses in a case concerning the leasing of fields.598 In VS VII 149, reporting the 
verdict in a case concerning lost property, the rabiānum is among the witnesses.599 
 
Thus, it can be seen that the rabiānum was a witness in court in cases concerning 
people of the city and their property. He not only participated as a chairman in 
meetings, but was included among witnesses, indicating his local high standing. What 
was the nature of his position? According to Edouard Cuq, the rabiānum was a 
“président d’une assemblée de justice composée des anciens ou des notables de la 
ville”.600 Thus, in his interpretation, the rabiānum was a primus inter pares of the 
most important people in the city and the city elders. The interpretation of the 
                                              
596 CAD K, 1971, 231-237 
597 Kohler & Ungnad, Hammurabi’s Gesetz V, 1911, 22. 1159. TD 73. The case was apparently solved by river ordeal, a 
special type of arbitration that involved swimming across the Euphrates 
598 Kohler & Ungnad, Hammurabi’s Gesetz V, 1911, 26. 1178. TD 155. 
599 Kohler & Ungnad, Hammurabi’s Gesetz III, 1909, 201. 736. VS VII 149 (VAT 6364) 
600 Cuq, Études sur le droit Babylonien, 1929, 356 
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rabiānum’s position as that of chairman or president seems to me a reasonable 
suggestion, as the rabiānum is the only individually mentioned person involved in the 
processes of adjudication referred to above. Cuq does not go into details about how he 
was appointed, however. Was he appointed by the king of Babylon to supervise the 
decision-making bodies or was the rabiānum a locally elected chairman? As will be 
seen, scholars do not agree concerning the source of authority of the rabiānum.  
 
Scholars agree that the rabiānum had a mediating role between local decision-making 
bodies and the royal court. They disagree over the source of his mandate, however. 
Hanoch Reviv suggests that “the rabiānum was a salaried royal appointee, who was 
responsible for the elders and the settlement”.601 Thus, in Reviv’s interpretation, the 
king placed the rabiānum over the local community and he was an official who 
answered to the king concerning local decisions and verdicts. This interpretation has 
not found much support, however. Scholars have rather attempted to find the origins 
of the rabiānum’s authority in the local community. Andrea Seri suggests that the 
rabiānum was appointed by local decision-making institutions to act as the 
representative of these local powers.602 Marten Stol points out that there is evidence 
that some towns had not one rabiānum, but several that were active at the same time. 
He interprets this as indicating that a town had several “aldermen”, of which the 
rabiānum was the “burgomaster”, and suggests that the latter office rotated among the 
elders.603 This is an interesting suggestion. However, as Dominique Charpin 
demonstrates, there is no evidence that the office rotated annually. Quite the contrary, 
where rotation is in evidence, the office was held for several years.604 The close 
connection between collective bodies and the rabiānum and the local focus of the 
                                              
601 Reviv, The elders in ancient Israel, 1989, 156 
602 Seri, Local powers, 2005, 75 
603 Stol, Studies in Old Babylonian history, 1976, 80 
604 Charpin, “Économie, société et institutions paléo-Babyloniennes,” 2007, 174 
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decisions they make implies that the authority of the rabiānum was that of a primus 
inter pares in the community, not of the citizens as such, but of the elders and 
notables. This makes the rabiānum appear more as a local representative than a royal 
appointee, meaning that Reviv’s interpretation cannot be maintained. 
 
The fact that the rabiānum reached decisions with the ālum, the kārum, as well as 
“the elders”, which will be discussed further below (4.3.3), suggests to me that the 
assessments of Cuq (1929), Stol (1976), and Seri (2005) are correct: the rabiānum 
was a local leader and not a centrally appointed officer. The role of the rabiānum, as 
seen from the cases referred to above, was to participate in reaching decisions in local 
matters concerning the disputed legal status of slaves, making compensation for 
robbery, and being witness in cases concerning disputed property. To reach fair 
verdicts that would have been accepted by the rest of the decision-makers and the 
local community would have required good knowledge of the community and a 
personal acquaintance with the other decision-makers. The rabiānum therefore 
appears as an official who originated from the same body of people that he was 
leading. This means that he was either a member of a narrow corporation similar to a 
body of elders or a broad élite of local notables. Whether “the city” and “the elders” 
were exclusive or inclusive corporations or élite groups will be discussed further 
below (4.3.3). Although he was not a royally appointed salaried official, however, the 
rabiānum must have had some sort of official standing, as well as his local authority, 
and was probably responsible to the king for the verdicts that were reached by “the 
city” or “the elders”. 
 
As has been emphasised in this section, the local leader, rabiānum, frequently appears 
together with a collective of people that reach decisions. It appears that the judicial 
system of Old Babylonian cities was based not on the verdict of one person, but on 
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collective decisions. I turn now to an investigation of the collective decision-making 
bodies mentioned in Old Babylonian texts. 
  
4.3.2 The puhrum or “assembly” 
The Old Babylonian term puhrum means gathering or assembly.605 It is found in the 
Codex Hammurapi, as well as in legal documents from a range of Old Babylonian 
cities including Dilbat, Nippur and Sippar. There were also judges present at the 
puhrum. The nature of the puhrum is disputed. Was it a general assembly, an 
institution of the royal system of justice, or an informal term used for any kind of 
meeting? 
 
In the Codex Hammurapi (§5), as mentioned above (4.3), the puhrum appears as an 
assembly for adjudication where judges reached their verdicts. The composition and 
authority of this assembly is difficult to determine. I will now discuss the puhrum and 
the judges in more detail. A judge is called a dajānum.606 In Old Babylonian law 
codes and in legal texts, the judges are often referred to in the plural.607 They appear 
to have reached verdicts in colleges. How they were recruited is not known. The CAD 
states that in the Old Babylonian period, “the courts seem to have been either 
permanent (in the larger cities) or composed of citizens and city officials, often under 
the presidency of a representative of the king […]. The president of the court (in OB 
[Old Babylonian]) had no special title, and could be called simply dajānum […]. 
Professional judges were at all times extremely rare. In OB, the court was in session 
at a special gate of the city or at the temple but in this case solely for the purpose of 
                                              
605 CAD P, 2005, 485-493 
606 CAD D, 1959, 28-33 
607 CAD D, 1959, 29 
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making use of the sanctity of the locality or of certain cultic objects so as to establish 
the truth of the depositions of the parties”.608 Édouard Cuq points out that there are 
letters indicating that the king could summon the judges to Babylon and argues that 
this is evidence that the judges were subordinate to the king.609 In my opinion, Cuq’s 
assessment of the status of the judges is correct. Of course, all subjects of Babylonia 
were subordinate to the king, but the judges appear to have been instated by the king. 
Support for the interpretation of ties between the king and the judges can be found in 
the statement in the Codex Hammurapi (§5) that they could be expelled from office. 
This indicates a formal status as judge. At least the presiding judge can be assumed to 
have been a royal official. Does this mean that the puhrum was a kind of jury court or 
popular assembly presided over by royal officials?  
 
§5 of the Codex Hammurapi shows that the judges sat in a puhrum, “assembly”. 
However, did they sit in the assembly as a separate authority, or did the judges 
assemble in the puhrum? The dajānum who reopened a sealed verdict appears to have 
been alone in his crime, and therefore, it seems reasonable to argue that the passage 
concerns one dajānum, and not a gathering of them. It is not clear, however, that he 
had reached this verdict in the assembly; rather, it appears that he was expelled from 
his office as judge in the assembly. The passage can therefore indicate that a judge 
who broke the terms of his duty was found guilty and condemned in the assembly. 
Whether the judges always presided over the assembly is not clear from this passage.  
 
A further passage from the Codex Hammurapi indicates that the puhrum was indeed a 
place where sentences were proclaimed: Codex Hammurapi §202 states that if an 
awīlum, “citizen” has struck another awīlum of higher rank on the cheek he is to be 
                                              
608 CAD D, 1959, 33 
609 Cuq, Études sur le droit Babylonien, 1929,  364 
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struck sixty times in the assembly (ina puhrim) with a bullwhip.610 In this passage, the 
puhrum evidently is a place where sentences were carried out: it was in the assembly 
that the culprit was punished. However, was the puhrum a place, a regular assembly, 
or an irregular gathering of judges, participants and onlookers? 
 
It is not possible to establish whether puhrum was a regular place of assembly or 
rather the group of people assembled. Most likely, the latter was the case. Whether it 
was a regular assembly is difficult to determine, but since the puhrum was considered 
a place of adjudication in the Codex Hammurapi, it is likely that it convened fairly 
regularly. The purpose of punishment in the puhrum, as seen in Codex Hammurapi 
§202, must have been to make the sentence public. Presumably, regular public 
meetings would be required for this purpose to be fulfilled. Thus, it can be argued that 
puhrum was a public arena.  
 
Were the sentences proclaimed in the puhrum also made by the puhrum? In my 
opinion, this is not clear in Codex Hammurapi §5 or §202. It seems likely to me that 
the puhrum condemned the dajānum who had changed his verdict in §5 as well as the 
awīlum guilty of striking his superior in §202. However, these two passages give no 
firm indications of the process. How were the accused found guilty? It is likely that it 
happened in the puhrum, since the sentences were proclaimed and carried out there, 
but it is not clear from these two passages alone. The puhrum is attested from Old 
Babylonian legal documents, however, which may help clarify its composition, 
competence and place in the Old Babylonian legal system. 
 
                                              
610 Cod. Ham. §202: Meek in Pritchard (ed.), ANET, 1971 [1969], 175; Viel, Complete code of Hammurapi vol. II,  2005, 
639-640 
 257 
In VS VII 149, dated to the reign of Hammurapi, two people present their case “in the 
assembly of the city Dilbat” (ina puhur Dilbatki), concerning lost goods that were 
later restored. The verdict is made by the city Dilbat (Dilbatki). Witnesses are 
recorded with their names and titles, among them the rabiānum or “mayor”, priests, 
and a messenger.611 
 
In CT VIII 19a, dated to the reign of Ammisaduqa, great-great grandson of 
Hammurapi, owners of a field complain in “the assembly” (puhrum) that they have 
not received payment from a person who claims to have paid for the rights to till their 
field. The alleged buyer cannot produce a receipt for the field, and his claim is 
declared void.612 The text may be from Sippar.613 
 
In these two texts, VS VII 149 and CT VIII 19a, it is clear that legal processes took 
place in the puhrum and that the puhrum also reached verdicts in cases. Evidently, 
people brought their complaints to the puhrum. Thus, the proposition that the puhrum 
was a regular gathering of decision-makers is strengthened. Who sat in the assembly? 
As will be seen, this is a vexed point, and the terminology of Old Babylonian legal 
documents is of little help.  
 
There is mention, in VS VII 149, that “the city of Dilbat” reached a verdict. Arnold 
Walther interprets VS VII 149 as evidence that the city and the puhrum were 
interchangeable terms in Old Babylonian Dilbat.614 VS VII 149 will be discussed 
                                              
611 Kohler & Ungnad, Hammurabi’s Gesetz III, 1909, 201. 736. VS VII 149 (VAT 6364) 
612 Kohler & Ungnad, Hammurabi’s Gesetz III, 1909, 205. 751. CT VIII 19a 
613 Walther, Das altbabylonische Gerichtswesen, 1968 [1917], 51 
614 Walther, Das altbabylonische Gerichtswesen, 1968 [1917], 49-50 
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further below (4.3.3). The lack of clarity concerning “city” and “assembly” is typical 
of the difficulties scholars face in attempts to reconstruct a legal system from the 
elliptical terminology of cuneiform texts. The term ālum is defined in the CAD as a 
city or a city as a social organisation, as well as a village or a fort. When the term is 
used of the city as a social organisation, it indicates its administration, the officials in 
charge or the elders, as well as the city as an acting legal person.615 Arnold Walther 
was convinced that in Old Babylonian texts, the šībūtum, “elders”, equal the puhrum, 
“assembly”, which equals the ālum, “city”.616 Walther’s suggestion implies that there 
was no distinction between “an assembly”, puhrum, and a meeting of “elders”, 
šībūtum. Was the assembly a meeting of elders? 
 
If “the elders” are identical with the puhrum, the suggestion made above that puhrum 
in Codex Hammurapi §§ 5 and 202 refer to a public arena cannot be right. However, 
Walther’s arguments are not entirely consistent: although he suggests that “assembly”, 
“city”, and “elders” were interchangeable terms for the same decision-making body, 
he also suggests that “elders” formed part of the puhrum.617 In his interpretation, “the 
elders” served as witnesses, since they knew the local inhabitants and their business 
well.618 It is not clear to me whether Walther suggests that the puhrum was an 
assembly that included a group of “elders” that served as witnesses or whether “the 
elders” alone reached decisions in the puhrum.  
 
P. Koschaker and A. Ungnad argue that Walther’s identification of “assembly”, 
“elders” and “city” is untenable, because Old Babylonian texts frequently operate 
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616 Walther, Das altbabylonische Gerichtswesen, 1968 [1917], 55 
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with a distinction between “city” (ālum) and “elders” (šībūtum): the two terms are 
often paired, but they are clearly separate. Koschaker and Ungnad suggest that ālum 
and puhrum were interchangeable terms and that the šībūtum had some relation to the 
puhrum, without being identical with it. However, they concede that the position of 
the puhrum is difficult to assess.619 The argument of Koschaker and Ungnad that “the 
elders” and “the city” are distinguished in texts and therefore must be considered to 
have been separate institutions seems reasonable to me. However, it is not easy to 
distinguish one from the other. The expression “elders and the city” also occurs in 
texts, discussed below (4.3.3). “The elders” appear to have been part of “the city” as a 
separate group or to have worked together with it as an independent authority. “The 
city” in turn appears to be used interchangeably with “the assembly”. It can thus be 
argued that the legal documents discussed above mention “an assembly” and a council 
of “elders” as two distinct institutions. However, as will be seen in the next section, 
this interpretation is not accepted by all scholars, and there are several unsolved 
problems concerning Old Babylonian local powers. 
 
4.3.3 The ālum or “city” and the šībūtum or “elders” 
The ālum, “city”, is sometimes used together with puhrum, “assembly”. As argued 
above, (4.3.2), this was the case in the city Dilbat: in VS VII 149a, a case was 
presented “in the assembly of Dilbat” (ina puhur Dilbatki). The verdict of the 
assembly is spoken not with puhrum as the subject, but the city Dilbat (Dilbatki).620 It 
could be argued that there is a change in subject in VS VII 149, from “the assembly” 
to “the city” of Dilbat, indicating that there were two separate institutions or 
chambers, one where the case was presented and another where the verdict was 
spoken. However, it does not seem very likely that a different institution from where 
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620 Kohler & Ungnad, Hammurabi’s Gesetz III, 1909, 201. 736. VS VII 149 (VAT 6364) 
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the case was presented would speak the verdict. After all, on what grounds could such 
a verdict be spoken, if the case was presented elsewhere? Therefore, it seems clear 
that the puhrum and Dilbatki are identical in VS VII 149. It can thus be considered 
most likely that “the city” was used of the same kind of gathering as “the assembly”, 
rather than being a separate institution. A seen above (4.3.2), the relation between 
“the city” and “the assembly” in the Old Babylonian period is disputed. In the 
following, evidence for decisions reached by “the city” and the ālum u šībūtū, “the 
city and the elders”, will be discussed, in order to clarify who they were. 
 
In TD 232, the “city and the elders” delegate a case concerning a disputed orchard to 
adjudication by the goddess Ninmar at the gate of Ninmar, where the accused is to 
swear an oath.621  
 
 In TD 232, it is evident that the “city and elders” were a local authority that could 
demand that the accused swear an oath at a temple. The text gives little to go on, and 
it is not possible to determine who “the city” was. However, supplied with the 
indication in VS VII 149 that “the city” was an assembly, it seems evident that “the 
elders” formed a group within “the city”. The relations between “the elders” and the 
rest of “the city” are not indicated in TD 232, however. As will be seen in the 
following, scholars are not agreed concerning the ālum as an assembly or the nature 
of its relations to “the elders”. 
  
Andrea Seri argues that ālum in Old Babylonian texts is a specific institution that 
constituted “influential city dwellers” similar to “the elders”. She interprets “the city” 
                                              
621 Kohler & Ungnad, Hammurabi’s Gesetz V, 1911, 33-34: 1194. TD 232 
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and “the elders” as two separate institutions.622 Seri interprets the puhrum as an 
independent arena for negotiations involving corporate groups such as “the elders” or 
“the city” when necessary.623 In her interpretation, the ālum is in opposition to the 
local authority of the rabiānum and “elders”. She suggests that “the “city” might have 
been instituted by the state to counterbalance the role of the elders”.624 Seri’s 
suggestion that the ālum was a separate institution is criticised by Dominique Charpin 
as an unfortunate consequence of a naïve lexicographical approach that equals terms 
used in discussing decision-making with actual institutions.625 In his view, the ālum 
was not a separate institution, but was used about “the assembly”, “the elders”, and 
rabiānum in various constellations.626 I agree with Charpin that “the city” as a 
counterpart to “the elders” cannot be maintained. It seems evident that “the city” must 
be treated as a term that covers not one specific institution, but is applied more 
generally of gatherings of decision-makers. Marten Stol suggests that rabiānum and 
šībūtum “the mayor and elders” could also be called ālum, the “city”.627 Stol’s 
assessment seems to me to make good sense of the evidence without reading too 
much bureaucratic intricacy into Old Babylonian nomenclature. The diverse terms for 
decision-making bodies do appear to refer to the same kind of institution, and not to a 
wide range of bodies or committees. 
 
There is evidence that “the city” was used as a term for an assembly in Old 
Babylonian Sippar. Rivkah Harris argues that “the citizens of Sippar form a 
corporation which is referred to as the “city” or ālum (URU.KI). Sometimes the “city” 
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functions along with the “elders” suggesting that the latter is a term perhaps restricted 
to the heads of the most influential and wealthiest families of Sippar.”628 Further, she 
suggests that “it seems that the assembly [puhrum] was infrequently convened and 
perhaps only to render a verdict in a lawsuit involving the leading citizens of 
Sippar”.629 In my opinion, Harris’ assessment of the relations between “city” and 
“elders” is reasonable. “The city” can be seen as the more inclusive body, of which a 
smaller group of “elders” are a part, but not always. However, “the elders” were not 
necessarily a kind of council that prepared cases for “the city” or put its decisions into 
practice. Harris’ arguments for regarding “the city” and “the assembly” as two 
separate institutions do not convince: if the assembly in Sippar was called ālum, it is 
no surprise that the term puhrum is not used very frequently. That does mean that the 
puhrum was infrequently convened, in sessions independent of the ālum.  
 
It seems to me that since the term ālum is used interchangeably with puhrum, it meant 
a form of assembly. However, as seen in VS VII 149a concerning Dilbat, it makes 
little sense to argue that the ālum was a separate institution from puhrum. Seri argues 
that the ālum was a state institution introduced to counter local initiatives.630 This is 
speculative and does not explain the sources satisfactorily: to suppose that “the city” 
and “the elders” reached decisions separately and were in opposition seems 
unfounded, as long as texts mention that they reached decisions together, as in TD 
232. Therefore, I think that “the city and the elders” held common sessions in the 
cases where they gave a verdict together. Why “the elders” are mentioned 
specifically, is perhaps because they also had other tasks that did not involve “the 
city”. That does not warrant that “the city” was an independent institution. Having 
established that “the city” cannot be separated neatly from “the elders”, but must be 
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considered a wide term including several decision-making individuals and collectives, 
I turn now to a discussion of “the elders” and their relation to “the city”. Who were 
“the elders”? What did they do? 
 
Eva Dombradi has studied a wide range of Old Babylonian evidence for judicial 
processes, analysed them, and compiled the combinations of different actors in these 
processes into a list. From her analysis, it becomes evident that “the elders” are 
frequently mentioned either in the paired expression ālum u šībūtum, “the city and the 
elders” or as šībūt ālim, “the city elders”. Sometimes, the name of the city is given, 
e.g. šībūt Dilbatki. The šībūtum also appear as witnesses, often together with the 
rabiānum.631 This information is very useful for an analysis of Old Babylonian local 
politics. As has already been seen, “the elders” are mentioned together with “the city”, 
as well as the rabiānum, but also on their own. The distinction between “the city” and 
“the city and elders” is unclear. Although it has been established that the ālum cannot 
be regarded as an institution independent of the puhrum or the šībūtum, was there a 
separate institution called the šībūtum, and if that is the case, what was their mandate 
and authority? There are several texts that record their decisions. However, as will be 
seen in the following discussion, their position is difficult to determine. 
 
In VS VII, 7 from Dilbat, dated to the reign of Hammurapi, the rabiānum, “mayor”, 
Imgur-sin gives a verdict together with eight šībūtum, “elders”, of the city Dilbat in a 
process concerning the reclamation of an inherited field that had been sold. The two 
litigants come to an agreement.632 
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CT VIII, 6b, from Halhalla, a district of Sippar, dated to the reign of Samsu-iluna, 
concerns a process of reclamation of a field. A priestess presents a claim against a 
man concerning the field. She goes to persons termed dajānum, “judges” of Babylon 
and “the judges” of Sippar, and they investigate the case. Then, the rabiānum and 
šībūtum, “the mayor” and “elders”, of the city give testimony that she is the rightful 
owner of the field and the field is restored to her.633 
 
In Warka 48, dated to the reign of Samsuiluna, litigants approach persons termed 
dajānum, “judges” of Larsa concerning an orchard. The rabiānum, “mayor”, and 
“judges” come together, and the case is delegated to the šībūtum, “elders”, of the city. 
The defendant swears an oath to the god Lugal-kimuna, and then keeps the orchard.634 
 
“The elders” in these legal documents are called šībūt ālim, “elders of the city”. They 
reach a verdict together with the rabiānum, “mayor”. As argued above (4.3.1), the 
rabiānum appears to act as the foreman of “the elders” and to have his authority from 
the local community and “the elders”. “The judges”, persons termed dajānum, were 
apparently royal officials, to whom the king delegated responsibility for adjudication 
(cf. 4.3.2). Thus, it can be argued that in CT VIII, 6b and Warka 48, the case is 
delegated from the royal officials, “the judges”, to local powers, “the elders of the 
city”. This implies a distinction between official and local authorities; between judges 
appointed by the king and legal bodies from the local communities. Hanoch Reviv 
suggests that some cases involved royal judges and the elders, but that their 
competence and responsibilities were separate. He analyses the case in Warka 48, 
where ownership of an orchard is contested, and argues that the verdict was reached 
in two steps: the decision was taken by “the judges”, but “the details and legal 
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arrangements were heard by the settlement forum at the site of the orchard”.635 Thus, 
he argues for a two-tier arrangement, where the verdict was reached by the official 
“judges” and the local “elders” took care of the details afterwards. Warka 48 indeed 
indicates that cases were turned over to “the elders” by “the judges”. However, and 
this is a serious caveat, our understanding of the Old Babylonian legal system is 
incomplete and the reasons for delegating cases from one institution or group to the 
other are unknown. The evidence discussed here actually indicates that there was 
close cooperation between “the judges” and “the city elders”. Thus, an opposition 
between official and local powers cannot be maintained. In the following, more legal 
documents concerning the adjudication of “the elders” will be discussed, to 
investigate their relations with the royal officials and the temple authorities. 
 
CT II 9, dated to the reign of Hammurapi, is a case of disputed inheritance between 
two brothers. Complaint is raised with “the elders” of the cities Hudadu and Šibābum. 
They inspect the evidence in the case and reach the verdict that the man against whom 
a complaint is raised is to go to the temple of Šamaš and swear an oath on the basket 
of Šamaš. All he swears to as his own property, he shall keep.636 
 
In TD 232, there is a dispute over the inheritance of an orchard. The ālum u šībūtum, 
“the city and the elders” delegate the case to the goddess Ninmar by the gate of 
Ninmar, where the accused is to swear an oath.637  
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M 80, dated to the reign of Hammurapi, concerns a disputed division of a house and 
property between two litigants. They appear before persons termed dajānum, “judges” 
and the šībūt ālim, “elders of the city”, and agree to a new division of the property. 
The rabiānum is mentioned among the witnesses.638 
 
In these three texts, cases that have previously been settled, but are now disputed are 
delegated to “the elders”, who in turn either delegate them further, or settle them 
together with the judges. It is not stated who made the original verdicts. “The elders” 
are evidently legal authorities. In CT II 9, “the elders” of two towns are involved; the 
reason for this is obscure. In CT II 9 “the elders” delegate the case to a temple. In TD 
232, the “city and the elders” do the same. What does this indicate? Does it mean that 
the temple authorities were involved in a legal capacity, or simply that the litigants 
were required to take an oath?  
 
In M 43 (Warka 30), “the judges” send the litigants to the gate of the god Nin-marki. 
There, “the judges of the gate of the god Nin-marki” make them swear that their 
allegations are true, and then they are sent back to “the judges”. Judgement in the case 
is given before witnesses in the gate of Marduk.639 As mentioned above (4.3.2), the 
gates to temples were used for adjudication because of the sanctity of the temples and 
the presumably binding power of oaths taken there. According to Walther, in Old 
Babylonian cities, gates to temples often functioned as public places. Also, some 
gates had the names of divinities, and oaths were taken there.640 From M 43 (Warka 
30), it can be seen that the temples and gates of the gods were places where oaths 
were sworn and there were apparently separate “judges” at the temples. It may be that 
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the reason for the involvement of the temples was that the cases were considered to be 
solvable by oath. However, the text M 43 (Warka 30) is an indication that the gates of 
the gods even had their own “judges” and were places of litigation in their own right, 
beyond swearing of oaths. The temples and gates of the gods were evidently 
important in the Old Babylonian legal system, as well as the royal officials, local 
bodies, and the assembly. “The elders” can then be said to cooperate with the royal 
officials as well as with the temple officials. 
 
In three of the texts under discussion here, CT II 9, TD 232, and M 80, the rabiānum 
does not act together with “the elders”. It may be significant that he is among the 
witnesses in the text M 80, however. It cannot be ruled out that he was among “the 
elders” making decisions even when he is not specifically mentioned. In M 80, “the 
elders” and “judges” reach a verdict together. Again, the complexity of the Old 
Babylonian legal system is apparent. The text M 80 is in my opinion clear evidence 
that there was no systematic opposition between official and local decision-making 
bodies. The central authorities of the Old Babylonian network state did not replace 
local decision-making bodies. Rather, they appear to cooperate in reaching verdicts. 
In which cases did this happen and why? 
 
Hanoch Reviv suggests that the situation in M 80 is that the elders are asked to verify 
past legal proceedings and testimonies in court. In his interpretation, this means that 
“the judges first had to refer to the decision made by the “city and elders””.641 In his 
view, the “state authorities” relied on “the elders’ decisions, investigations and 
testimonies” because “state legislation was generally designed to complement 
traditional rulings but not to replace them”. The areas of competence sometimes 
overlapped, and there were established joint bodies of judges, officials and the 
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elders.642 To Reviv, “the elders” and “cities” were part of the same institution, being 
“the heads of the settlement and the broad civic forum of local inhabitants”.643  
 
From the texts already discussed, it appears evident that “the elders” looked into 
disputed cases and delegated them to the temples, where they could be solved by 
swearing an oath or judged by temple officials. It is also appears evident that “the 
elders” and “the judges” worked together. Cases were delegated to “the elders” by 
“the judges” under certain circumstances. However, Reviv’s reconstruction of the 
relation between judges and elders in the Old Babylonian legal system remains 
conjecture. It is not evident that “the judges” delegated cases to “the elders” because 
of their traditional authority. The shakiness of Reviv’s division into official 
authorities and traditional, local powers becomes evident with his supposed 
overlapping areas of competence and joint bodies of officials and “elders”: it is not 
clear what these separate areas of competence constituted. There is nothing 
compelling in Reviv’s argument that “state legislation” was complemented by 
“traditional rulings” in relation to the central authorities. His argument is based on the 
supposition that “the elders” were local and traditional authorities. However, as seen 
from a number of texts already discussed, “the elders” were an integrated part of the 
Old Babylonian legal system and no relic of the past. “The judges” and “the elders” 
were contemporary institutions that worked together, not as the result of a new, 
official state system imposed on traditional tribal societies, but as complementary 
parts of a working whole. What was the role of the people in this system?  
 
The public nature of adjudication in Old Babylonian cities is remarkable. “The 
assembly” appears to have comprised varying constellations of decision-making 
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groups and individuals who reached decisions that were later recorded on cuneiform 
tablets. These tablets were again brought for new rounds in court if the process was 
not concluded satisfactorily. Although there is little conclusive evidence, the people 
could probably overhear the discussions of “the city and the elders”, as some cases at 
least were sent for adjudication at the temple gates. Also, it seems like the assemblies 
in Old Babylonian cities were public gatherings (4.3.2). Possible clues to public 
participation at these sessions will be discussed below (4.3.5). “The elders”, probably 
the heads of households, had a direct influence and could participate in discussions 
and reach decisions, pursuing a narrow corporate strategy for power. A certain level 
of local autonomy may be said to have existed, with regards to adjudication. In the 
following, I will complete the survey of local decision-making in the Old Babylonian 
network state with a look at the evidence for neighbourhood adjudication in cities, in 
the institutions called bābtum, “wards” or “gates”. 
 
4.3.4 The bābtum or “ward” 
In Old Babylonian laws and legal documents, there is mention of the bābtum, a group 
of people that appears to have been responsible for local adjudication. The term 
bābtum is translated “ward”, “city quarter”, “district”, and “municipal authority”.644 
For the sake of simplicity, I will use the translation “ward” in the following. Although 
it is a well-attested term, the exact meaning of bābtum is disputed. I will first present 
the evidence, before discussing its interpretation, with an emphasis on local authority 
and local knowledge of those convening in “the ward”. 
 
In the Old Babylonian law collections Codex Hammurapi and Laws of Eshnunna, 
there are passages that define the responsibilities of the bābtum, “ward”. The Codex 
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Hammurapi mentions bābtum in three passages; §§126, 142, and 251. In §126, it says 
that if an awīlum, “citizen”, has declared his property lost when it was not, and thus 
has fooled bābtašu, “his ward”, they are to declare the facts in the case before the 
god, and he is to pay “the ward” double the amount he declared lost.645 §142 concerns 
a woman who wants a divorce. Her conduct is to be scrutinised ina bābtiša, “in her 
ward”, and if she herself has not committed any wrongful acts, but has been slighted 
by her husband, she is to take her dowry and go to her father’s house.646 §251 
concerns an awīlum, “citizen” who is the owner of an ox that gores people. If 
bābtašu, “his ward” has warned him about this, but he has done nothing to prevent 
injury, and the ox kills a mār awīlim, “son of a citizen”, he is to pay half a mina of 
silver.647  
 
The Old Babylonian Laws of Eshnunna mention bābtum in four passages; §§54, 55, 
56, and 58.648 The passages §§54, 55, and 56 closely parallel Codex Hammurapi 
§251.649 The passage §58 concerns a wall threatening to collapse that the bābtum, 
“ward”, has informed the owner about. If he does not do anything about this, and the 
wall collapses and kills an awīlum, “citizen”, the case is brought under jurisdiction of 
the king as a capital offence.650 
 
                                              
645 Cod. Ham. §126: Meek in Pritchard (ed.), ANET, 1971 [1969], 171; Viel, Complete code of Hammurapi vol. II, 2005, 
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646 Cod. Ham. §142: Meek in Pritchard (ed.), ANET, 1971 [1969], 172; Viel, Complete code of Hammurapi vol. II, 2005, 
548-550 
647 Cod. Ham. §251: Meek in Pritchard (ed.), ANET, 1971 [1969], 176; Viel, Complete code of Hammurapi vol. II, 2005, 
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publication of the Codex Hammurapi by “only a few decades” (Bottéro, “The “Code” of Hammurabi,” 1992, 159). 
649 Goetze, The Laws of Esnunna, 1951-52, 132-133 
650 Goetze, The Laws of Esnunna, 1951-52, 133-134 
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It may be argued that since the bābtum is regulated by the official laws, this institution 
was part of the central authorities. However, from the laws cited, the local nature of 
the bābtum is obvious: “the ward” is expected to keep track of dangerous domestic 
animals and derelict buildings and warn their owners, lest damage occurs. They are 
also expected to have intimate knowledge of the private conduct of married couples. 
They deal with attempts at fraud and can impose fines. However, the death penalty 
appears to be the reserve of the king. Who were members of “the ward”? What was 
their status in relation to the central authorities? The bābtum or “ward” is not only 
mentioned in Old Babylonian laws, it is also mentioned in Old Babylonian legal 
documents. There is a document, VS VII 16, which may shed light on these questions, 
as will be seen in the following. 
 
VS VII 16 is dated to the reign of Samsu-iluna, the son of Hammurapi, and concerns 
inheritance and disputed ownership of land. The accuser accuses the defendant’s late 
mother of having built a house partly onto the accuser’s property. Since the 
defendant’s mother had bought the plot of land on which to build her house from the 
accuser, the accuser wants to re-measure the whole property on which the house now 
stands. The defendant gathered “citizens” (awīlīmeš), “the sons of the ward that he 
knew” (mārīmeš bābtim mūdīšunu). The property was measured and “the sons of the 
ward” decided on a sum of silver to be paid in recompense for the infringement on the 
accuser’s property. The case was closed and witnessed by nine witnesses.651 
 
In this text, bābtum appears in the form mārīmeš bābtim, “the sons of the ward”. They 
appear to be a group of people engaged in local adjudication or arbitration. It seems 
that they are associates or at least well acquainted to the litigants. Thus, the text 
strengthens the impression of bābtum as a local body. Its collective nature is evident, 
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as “the sons of the ward” is plural. Further, they appear to have fulfilled an important 
function in the legal system by making decisions that required local knowledge as 
well as, presumably, trust from the local community. 
 
In earlier scholarship, bābtum was seen as a component of the puhrum, interpreted as 
a judicial assembly. According to Édouard Cuq, “les assemblées de justice (puhrum) 
que préside le maire de la ville, ou parfois le gouverneur, se composent des anciens 
(šibutum), ou des notables (awilum), ou des marchands (tamqarum) avec leur chef 
(akil tamqari), ou encore des hommes de la porte (mari bābtim). Ces groupes se 
réunissent suivant les cas séparément ou collectivement”.652 Thus, the bābtum is 
regarded by Cuq as one of several bodies meeting in the puhrum, in its various 
constellations of decision-makers. 
 
It seems reasonable to argue that the bābtum was a kind of local authority in Old 
Babylonian cities, responsible for cases concerning property, derelict buildings, 
livestock, and family matters. Its connection with the puhrum is not clear, however. It 
does not appear to be part of the system of “mayor”, “elders”, and “city” or 
“assembly”: in the documents discussed above, these people regularly made decisions 
in cooperation with representatives of the central authorities, but bābtum is not 
mentioned in this way. Rather, “the ward” appears to function on its own, its 
decisions recorded on cuneiform tablets and reported to the central authorities. Of 
course it could be entirely accidental that the bābtum appears on its own in the 
relatively few texts that mention it. However, the local concerns and duties of the 
bābtum in the evidence cited above indicate that it was somehow external to the 
system of decision-making discussed so far.  Therefore, I would suggest that the 
bābtum was a separate institution from any of the forms of arrangements for 
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adjudication discussed above. This is because the bābtum appears to be strictly local, 
composed of local citizens with knowledge about the local community. The 
inhabitants had a personal connection to the bābtum of their neighbourhood, as seen 
by the use of the personal possessive suffix -šu/-ša used with bābtum. 
 
The peculiarly local character of the bābtum has long since been recognised. Albrecht 
Goetze argues that the Laws of Eshnunna §§54, 55, 56, and 58 provide clear evidence 
that “bābtum is a group of people and means “Quartier, Bezirk” and the people in 
charge of it”.653 As has been seen, this claim is fully justified by the sources: in the 
Laws of Eshnunna, the bābtum takes responsibility for the wellbeing of the local 
community. Their concerns are local, as would be expected from a municipal 
authority. The Laws of Eshnunna (§§54 and 56) state that owners of vicious animals 
must pay compensation if they ignore the advice of the bābtum. This indicates that 
local safety matters were the responsibility of the bābtum, and that they might be held 
responsible for loss of life if they did not report dangerous domestic animals, or faulty 
architecture, as in §58. The local aspect is also emphasised in the Codex Hammurapi, 
where knowledge about the conduct of local people is expected from the bābtum, as 
in §142. Goetze’s conclusion that bābtum was a “Quatier, Bezirk” including the 
people responsible has been contested by some scholars, however. Their arguments 
will be examined in the following. 
 
I. J. Gelb does not accept the view that bābtum was a form of local judiciary 
assembly. Rather, he emphasises that bābtum under certain circumstances is used in 
the sense of “encampment”: in an Old Babylonian name list, he finds several Amorite 
names, and the Amorites are assigned to five different bābtum, apparently named 
after individuals, in the city where they lived. Gelb therefore argues that “since the 
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five bābtum are named after individuals, the word bābtum cannot denote as large a 
section as a “quarter of a city” […], but small encampments, each probably restricted 
to individuals belonging to a certain grouping”.654 Gelb’s argument has found some 
support: Marten Stol agrees with Gelb that bābtum could be a “ward” within a city, 
but also a “section” of a tribal grouping.655  
 
In my opinion, arguments for “encampments” do not explain bābtum as it appears in 
Old Babylonian laws or documents, where it is used of local judicial bodies 
concerned with city matters such as public safety from rampant animals or faulty 
architecture. Gelb’s interpretation implies that tribal groups retained an organisation 
from a tribal past inside the city-scape. However, there is nothing distinctly tribal 
about the bābtum in the Codex Hammurapi or Laws of Eshnunna discussed above; 
rather, focus is on local knowledge, as in a neighbourhood, and not on belonging to 
the same tribal group, as would be expected if bābtum was modelled on a tribal social 
organisation. Further, to explain the meaning of the term bābtum in the Codex 
Hammurapi and other Old Babylonian texts from a list that merely mentions the term 
is not a very fruitful approach. After all, the list of Amorite names does not indicate 
what bābtum means in the context. To translate bābtum as “encampment” does not 
offer much to go on in terms of interpreting its social implications. The interpretation 
of bābtum as a tribal encampment is of course not impossible, but it is a major 
weakness with Gelb’s argument that he takes a list of names as weighty evidence for 
social organisation. There is nothing in the list to suggest that the bābtum of the 
Amorites has anything in common with the bābtum of the Old Babylonian laws 
discussed above. Further, the argument that tribal units were transformed into urban 
social divisions is not compelling. Rather, bābtum appears connected to 
neighbourhoods, residential areas where people knew each other and their business 
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well. The warnings against letting a wall crumble in the Laws of Eshnunna §58 are 
evidence that the bābtum belongs in an urban context. The interpretation of bābtum as 
a social unit is fruitful, however, and it appears to have been as much a social as a 
physical designation, i.e. the people of a certain quarter belonged to the area of 
jurisdiction of the quarter’s legal institution. 
 
The definition of bābtum as a social group is argued by Norman Yoffee, who 
interprets the bābtum as a larger association of several related families. He suggests 
that “such “extended families” were characteristic elements in Mesopotamian cities 
and may be the key to interpreting the nature of the bābtum. With their own 
responsibilities and jurisdictions recognized by the royal administration, these 
associations (and their larger groupings) may have been the basis of kinship in Old 
Babylonian urban society, especially concerned with the allocation of special roles 
and property.”656  
 
The idea of bābtum as a kind of extended family is intriguing. However, the evidence 
from Old Babylonian laws suggests to me a more physical than social definition of 
bābtum. The concern with domestic animals and buildings makes sense in a 
neighbourhood context, whereas the bābtum cannot be expected to have kept track of 
the oxen of family members residing beyond the neighbourhood or quarter. Therefore, 
I suggest that the term bābtum were not used of extended families, but neighbourhood 
associations. This interpretation finds support with several scholars, as will be seen in 
the following. 
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The local authority of the bābtum is argued by G. R. Driver and John C. Miles, who 
suggest that “it looks then as if the mārū bābtum were neighbours who acted as jurors 
ina bābtim but were sometimes summoned to give evidence on local matters in other 
courts; but in either case they were persons who gave testimony of their own 
knowledge and not as the jury of to-day on the evidence produced before them”.657 
According to Driver and Miles, the members of the bābtum, the mārū, seem “to have 
exercised some kind of jurisdiction over their locality, and they are found occasionally 
sitting as a court”.658  
 
The local and urban character of the bābtum is emphasised by Marten Stol. He 
interprets the bābtum as judicial bodies of city quarters and suggests that they had a 
foreman who was responsible for the organisation of corvée-work, obligatory service 
by the citizens. In his analysis, people had a connection to the assembly and 
neighbourhood and the city quarter gathered in assembly to make decisions, 
particularly concerning family matters.659 
 
As seen above, the local knowledge of the bābtum is indeed well attested from the 
Codex Hammurapi and the Laws of Eshnunna. The case of divorce is particularly 
clear, but also the responsibility of the bābtum for domestic animals is obviously 
local. How was an Old Babylonian city neighbourhood organised? How did it 
function as a social unit? 
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Elizabeth Stone maintains that the bābtum was a kind of neighbourhood authority and 
argues that the neighbourhoods of Mesopotamian cities were similar to those of 
medieval Islamic cities: in Islamic medieval cities “each neighborhood contained 
individuals belonging to all classes” and “urban institutions and ties of clientage 
became the dominant unifying features”.660 In her interpretation, the bābtum “served 
as the locus of the administration of justice in cases where an individual, in spite of 
being warned, continued a practice which constituted a hazard to his neighbors, where 
someone bore false witness against a member of his ward, and where a woman 
wished to divorce her husband”.661 Stone argues that the bābtum reveals much of the 
social organisation of Mesopotamian cities. In her interpretation “the main residential 
units in Mesopotamian cities were small face-to-face communities or neighborhoods, 
probably with populations of around 500 to 1000 persons”.662 
 
Marc Van De Mieroop is critical of Stone’s interpretation that neighbourhoods of Old 
Babylonian cities were face-to-face communities or village societies. He argues from 
Old Babylonian Ur that at least some neighbourhoods were organised as artisanal 
districts in the sense that “inhabitants of different areas had different economic 
interests”.663 In his interpretation of the architecture and texts from Ur, he does not 
find the kind of neighbourhoods that Stone suggested for Nippur, but rather that the 
domestic sites tended to be inhabited by people with the same professional 
interests.664 
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Stone’s suggestion of a parallelism between Mesopotamian and Medieval Islamic 
cities is intriguing. However, it must be kept in mind that the evidence for urban 
residential areas of Mesopotamian cities is very scanty, including the Old Babylonian 
period (cf. 2.9). Also, as Van De Mieroop points out, the areas Stone surveyed from 
Nippur are quite limited, one being 20 by 40 meters, the other being 40 by 40 meters 
large and these two areas lying 30 meters apart.665 This is a justified criticism in my 
opinion, because general conclusions for Old Babylonian cities should not be drawn 
from such a tiny sample. A further problem is one of interpretation: the evidence 
presented by Stone to establish the social organisation of neighbourhoods, i.e. the 
distribution of house sizes, valuable materials, and scribal tools can tell much about 
what kind of people lived in a given area, but not necessarily much about social 
relations. Rich and poor may have lived side by side, as Stone suggests, but that does 
not mean that rich and poor people had much to do with each other. The bābtum was 
possibly similar to Medieval Islamic residential areas, but the evidence is not 
compelling. The idea of a face-to-face community between rich and poor seems to me 
particularly daring, as this cannot be read from the archaeological finds alone. To me, 
the argument of the bābtum as a neighbourhood institution common to the residents 
of a certain area seems reasonable, however. It may be that the bābtum had a 
mediating function between the various socio-economic groups of the neighbourhood. 
 
The bābtum appears to represent a kind of village authority in an urban context.  
Although the neighbourhoods may not have been village communities in every 
respect, the bābtum appears to have been a restricted council, consisting of people 
with knowledge of local inhabitants and their families, with a local mandate. Their 
position was probably based on their standing in the local community as people with 
good knowledge of local affairs. Their authority was applied in local matters that 
demanded detailed personal knowledge of the neighbourhood and its residents. It is to 
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be expected that people known for their good judgement would be preferred. What 
formal criteria lay behind their appointment are unknown.  
 
I have now discussed evidence for Old Babylonian institutions for decision-making 
from laws and legal documents. None of the texts, however, have given a clear 
picture of procedures for decision-making or of the recruitment of participants in the 
decision-making process. Therefore, I turn now to a literary text that throws light on 
who took part in a legal assembly and how decisions were reached, viz. the Nippur 
Trial for Homicide. 
 
4.3.5 The Nippur Trial for Homicide  
There are few sources to how trials were conducted in ancient Mesopotamia. A 
notable exception is the so-called Nippur Trial for Homicide, a Sumerian text from 
Nippur dated to the early second millennium BCE. It concerns a case where three men 
stand accused of murder, and the victim’s wife is accused of covering up the crime. 
Therefore, the case is taken before the king Ur-Ninurta in Isin. The king orders that 
the case will be decided before the assembly of Nippur (PU-ÚH-RU-UM NIBRUKI-
KA).666 A group of nine people, including a bird-catcher, a potter, a gardener, and six 
others identified by their patronymics, address the assembly and accuse the three 
culprits and the wife of the diseased, and a discussion follows. The assembly then 
passes the verdict and the accused are condemned to death.667  
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The text offers information about the organisation of a judicial assembly in an Old 
Babylonian Mesopotamian city. Although it cannot be said with certainty that the text 
is a description of an actual trial, the information in the text does not diverge from 
what can be learned about judicial assemblies from the Old Babylonian legal texts 
already discussed: the king could delegate cases to the puhrum and the sessions of the 
puhrum could involve smaller groups of decision-makers coming together to reach a 
verdict. Thus, the text strengthens the impression that the judicial assemblies were 
part of the central structure of power in Old Babylonian cities. Also, it confirms that 
the sessions of the assemblies were complex and could involve several groups of 
decision-makers. The text also provides new information not available in the texts 
discussed so far, viz. indications of the social status of participants in a decision-
making body convened for a trial: there appears to be commoners among the nine 
accusers. The text also gives hints about the procedure for decision-making in the 
puhrum: the accusers are a group of nine people and they present the case to the 
assembly. This is followed by discussion, and the assembly reaches the verdict. It is of 
note that the group of nine accusers are not identical to the assembly. The 
implications of the information in this text are disputed, however. Who are the nine 
accusers and what is their social standing? 
 
The Nippur Trial for Homicide has been interpreted as evidence for the participation 
of commoners in the assembly: Marc Van De Mieroop argues that on the basis of “the 
professions of some of the men who spoke out in the assembly: a bird-catcher, a 
potter, two gardeners, and a soldier”, it is clear that “manual labourers” had the right 
and leisure to participate in the puhrum.668 Marten Stol suggests that since a bird-
catcher, two gardeners, a soldier etc. participated in the assembly, anyone might have 
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been able to take part. In his opinion, it is conceivable that all citizens took part in the 
assembly.669 
 
Thus, Van De Mieroop and Stol take the occupations of the nine accusers as evidence 
that they were commoners. The fact that they address the assembly is taken to indicate 
that commoners attended the assembly and reached verdicts. However, the 
interpretation of “bird-catcher” or “gardener” as the occupations of the accusers may 
be a false lead. It cannot be ruled out that their “occupations” were some kind of 
titles, i.e. that the nine accusers are in fact officials of some sort. That the case 
concerns murder and the culprits are condemned to death are indications that the 
murder trial is not a regular assembly-session: all the cases discussed from Old 
Babylonian texts above involved disputes over matters like inheritance or land-
ownership that appear to have been solved by arbitration. Some texts deal with 
offences, but they were normally punished with fines. The impression is rather that 
cases involving the death penalty were delegated to officials or the king and not 
decided by the puhrum. Thus, it can be argued that the Nippur assembly does not 
appear to be similar to the assemblies discussed from Old Babylonian legal 
documents above. The Trial for Homicide cannot be regarded as unequivocal 
evidence for how the puhrum was organised. To me, the evidence for broad citizen 
participation in the puhrum appears quite insecure.  
 
Contrary to the interpretations of Van De Mieroop and Stol, Andrea Seri suggests that 
the nine accusers in the Nippur trial are temple staff. Therefore, according to Seri, the 
assembly in the Trial for Homicide does not give any information on how local 
assemblies worked.670 I agree with Seri that the nine accusers are probably not 
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commoners, as some of them appear with titles. Does that mean that the assembly was 
reserved for the élite? The evidence is ambiguous. Even if the nine accusers were 
temple staff or affiliates, this does not mean that they were members of the élite. 
Several people were attached to the temples, not only the élite (cf. 4.2). Stol’s 
suggestion that all citizens could participate in the assembly may be correct. However, 
“citizen” in Old Babylonian, as discussed above (4.3.1), is a difficult term and it is not 
clear whether “the citizens” are an élite or can be called the people, in the sense of the 
masses. This will be discussed further below (4.4). 
 
There is no clear evidence of a powerful popular assembly in Old Babylonian cities. 
On the other hand, it seems clear to me that the local decision-making groups, 
including “the mayor and elders”, had some kind of mandate from the citizens, since 
they met in public and anyone could bring a case to them. The assessment of popular 
power in the puhrum depends on how scholars reconstruct the relationship between 
the local “mayor”, local decision-making groups, and “the citizens”, as well as how 
“citizen” is defined, i.e. as a member of the élite or as a commoner. 
 
Although the Nippur trial cannot count as evidence that commoners spoke in the 
puhrum, in my opinion, it still can be used as a source to how a meeting in the puhrum 
was organised. The procedure in the text indicates that an assembly was led by a 
smaller body of people. In my opinion, the narrative in the text suggests that a puhrum 
was a public judicial assembly where commoners participated, but probably only as 
onlookers. Discussion is said to have taken place in the assembly, but there is no 
definite evidence that commoners spoke there. Important functions were filled by 
more restricted groups. This can explain why Old Babylonian legal texts frequently 
refer to what appears as several bodies reaching decisions, in particular the references 
to “the city and elders”. The Trial for Homicide cannot be regarded as decisive 
evidence, but it gives an indication to how we can make sense of the complexity of 
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terms for decision-making in Old Babylonian texts: the puhrum was a form of popular 
assembly where decision-making groups could present difficult cases and make 
decisions known to the public. 
 
4.4 The Old Babylonian legal system and strategies for 
power 
The actual political significance of the puhrum and the other organs for collective-
decision making mentioned in the Old Babylonian texts has been debated extensively. 
There is no evidence that the Old Babylonian puhrum was a popular assembly in 
charge of the polity. In all the texts discussed above, the puhrum and other assemblies 
are judiciary, and not political assemblies. Local adjudication appears central to the 
Old Babylonian legal system. J. N. Postgate points out that although Hammurapi had 
ultimate judicial authority within his realm and had to consider appeals made to him, 
appeals were frequently delegated back to the existing authorities in the cities of the 
realm.671 I agree with this assessment of Hammurapi’s role in the judiciary system. It 
is important to keep in mind that although the Old Babylonian kingdom was ruled by 
a king, the local authorities played a crucial role. Who took part in the local judiciary 
assemblies? 
 
An influential model for the puhrum is that it was an oligarchic decision-making 
body, reserved for a narrow élite of citizens. It is a long held view that participation in 
political and judicial assemblies was restricted to “local notables” or an “urban 
élite”.672 However, the citizens are an elusive group in the evidence. As seen above 
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(4.3.1), scholars agree that the social divisions in Old Babylonian society was 
between those with obligations to the palace and temples, called awīlum, and the 
commoners outside the great institutions, called muškēnum. An awīlum is a citizen. 
However, no agreement has been reached on the size of this group. F. R. Kraus 
suggests that awīlum has a double meaning, denoting both an élite and the population 
in general.673 This is exactly the problem: when does awīlum refer to an élite and 
when is it used in a general sense?  
 
Kraus maintains that the persons referred to as awīlum in the Codex Hammurapi must 
be considered an élite with connections to the palace.674 This is a reasonable claim, 
since these people clearly have a privileged position in the Codex Hammurapi. 
Reuven Yaron agrees that persons referred to as awīlum had privileges from their 
connections with the palace and the temples, but emphasises that this does not mean 
that an awīlum can be defined as belonging exclusively to a palace or temple élite.675 
Eva von Dassow suggests that awīlum was a status attained from ownership of land, 
in combination with duties to the palace.676 However, in her interpretation, a citizen 
was anyone who was not a wardum, “slave”.677 She argues that the difference 
between an awīlum and other citizens is that the awīlum has political authority: “the 
awīlû […] were the ruling class, peers of kings and sometimes kings themselves. 
Hammurapi’s laws attempted to formalize this status by creating an awīlum class set 
apart from the general body of citizen-subjects, the muškēnum”.678 In von Dassow’s 
                                              
673 Kraus, Von mesopotamischen Menschen, 1973, 97-98 
674 Kraus, Von mesopotamischen Menschen, 1973, 117 
675 Yaron, The laws of Eshnunna, 1988, 151-154 
676 Von Dassow, “Freedom in ancient Near Eastern societies,” 2011, 211 
677 Von Dassow, “Freedom in ancient Near Eastern societies,” 2011, 213 
678 Von Dassow, “Freedom in ancient Near Eastern societies,” 2011, 215 
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interpretation, all citizens could participate in processes of collective decision-
making.679 
 
In my view, von Dassow’s claim that there was a formal élite among the citizens, with 
a particular political influence not shared by all citizens, cannot be squared with the 
claim that all citizens could take part in collective decision-making. This self-
contradiction is difficult to escape. A solution can be found on a structural level: 
because the status of awīlum is attained by being a contributor to the community 
through duties and obligations, it is a status of being a citizen of the city-community, 
not as an official or temple dependent. With full citizen rights, an awīlum had 
authority to participate in making decisions in the assemblies. This means that Old 
Babylonian cities had a degree of popular power, but only in the sense of a quite 
limited body of people. The rest of the citizens that did not enjoy the privileges of an 
awīlum presumably could participate as onlookers, but did not possess political 
authority.  
 
It does indeed appear that several of the decision-making bodies discussed above 
(4.3.1-5) were groups with restricted participation: “the elders” and witnesses to 
decisions are few in number. They appear to be people of standing in the city. Lists of 
witnesses from verdicts reached include important people like the rabiānum and other 
people with titles. The mandate of the rabiānum and “elders” seem, however, to have 
been rooted in the community and not delegated from the royal court. This can be 
seen in the distinction between “the judges”, who appear to have been royal officials, 
and the local rabiānum and šībūtum, who appear to have been local representatives. 
Therefore, it is not self-evident that the local assemblies were restricted to an élite. All 
citizens may have been eligible. Even if the citizens were a minority group of the 
                                              
679 Von Dassow, “Freedom in ancient Near Eastern societies,” 2011, 217-218 
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urban population, the legal autonomy of the citizens is remarkable and makes it 
reasonable to claim that the people of Old Babylonian cities had a degree of political 
power. 
 
The identity of the participants in decision-making bodies is uncertain. The one text 
considered by some scholars to provide an answer to this, the Trial for Homicide 
discussed above (4.3.5), is ambiguous. It is likely that the šībūtum, “elders” were 
distinguished members of the community. Likewise, the bābtum appears as a body of 
people of high standing in the local community. The exact composition of the puhrum 
and other legal bodies is difficult to determine, however. The competences of these 
bodies are also elusive.  
 
In the Old Babylonian texts discussed above, the decision-making bodies are part of 
the legal system and reach verdicts between citizens. It is not clear that their decisions 
were final. Their relation to the official judges is difficult to grasp. The decision-
making bodies do not appear to have direct political influence. The fact that citizens 
judged each other, however, in my opinion indicates power outside the great 
institutions of palaces and temples, in a  private sphere among citizens of Old 
Babylonian cities. In my opinion, open discussion in the assembly indicates that 
decisions were taken in the kind of meeting known as an arena council (cf. 1.4.2). 
This kind of meeting is characterised by negotiations between citizens rather than 
dictate from royal officials or community representatives. Although there is not much 
written evidence for the workings of “the assembly”, its mention in laws, legal 
documents, and literary texts indicate that it was an important part of Old Babylonian 
urban society. It seems plausible to me that the urban population participated as 
onlookers at these sessions. 
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The complexity of decision-making bodies in the Old Babylonian texts is bewildering. 
How are we to interpret the complexity of terms for decision-making bodies? Andrea 
Seri argues that a starting point for a study of Old Babylonian local powers “is to 
acknowledge the existence of multiple assemblies instead of a single institution in 
every city”.680 I agree that this is a fruitful approach. However, a lexicographical 
method of equating the terms for meetings of decision-making bodies with defined 
corporations leads to false conclusions, as seen with Seri’s analysis of ālum, “the 
city”, above (4.3.3). The problem remains how to identify the different assemblies and 
to understand how these assemblies worked in combination. As Eva Dombradi (1996) 
demonstrates in her systematic analysis of Old Babylonian processual documents, 
there were different terms for assemblies in use in different cities, without any 
obvious difference in organisation. Thus, in Nippur, the puhrum was an important 
organ for judicial decisions, whereas in Dilbat, the ālum seems to have filled the same 
function.681 This is very useful information and underscores our woefully inadequate 
knowledge of the details for Old Babylonian institutions. As Van De Mieroop points 
out concerning bābtum in the Codex Hammurapi, “as with the popular representation 
of the entire town, we are also here uninformed about the membership, the 
competence, and the procedures of the gatherings of the inhabitants of a city-
quarter”.682 There are unfortunately no institutions of Old Babylonian society that can 
be said to be adequately known and this should make us careful in drawing 
conclusions, in particular in comparative analyses (cf. 7.4). 
 
Striking about the Old Babylonian cities in my opinion is the close interaction 
between the king, officials, temples, and assemblies in the legal system. This 
constitutes a system that appears quite consistent throughout the Old Babylonian 
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network state and indicates that local powers were part of the structure of decision-
making bodies of the state. In my opinion, it is of importance that officials referred to 
the organs of decision-making of the urban community and cooperated with them. 
This shows that the citizens participated in decision-making in the legal system and 
were part of the state. The citizens of Old Babylonian cities could make their own 
decisions and were judged by their fellows. This shows that urban self-government in 
legal affairs was established in Old Babylonian cities and that the local city 
institutions were part of the Old Babylonian network state. The Old Babylonian cities 
had local judicial institutions with citizen participation. Participation by the citizens 
could take the form of representation, when people of standing in the community 
made decisions. It could also take the form of public sessions, where the citizens 
could observe the making of decisions. The participation of citizens in institutions of 
local decision-making shows that there was a degree of local popular power. This is 
perhaps not surprising, since a network state cannot control every instance of local 
life and indeed profits from cooperation with local institutions. However, there 
appears to have been a high degree of local collective decisions in the Old Babylonian 
network state. This indicates popular power, rather unexpected in a kingdom with a 
ruler chosen by the gods. 
 
The impression of the political culture of the Old Babylonian network state is not that 
of a despotic kingdom, but of a central authority that delegated many decisions to 
local levels in individual cities. The king maintained control through his officials that 
cooperated with local institutions. The local institutions also reached decisions on 
their own. The local levels of decision-making seem to me to be characterised by 
restricted bodies of local notables or respected representatives who followed a narrow 
corporate strategy for power. They were distinguished by age and experience, no 
doubt, but do not appear to be members of a hereditary élite or other aristocratic 
stratum. Titles used of individuals point to their position in the hierarchy of palaces or 
temples rather than a hereditary status in the community.  
 289 
 
The local notables and elders were organised in collective organs of decision-making 
and made decisions in public. Their decisions were written down and could be 
consulted at a later stage, even contested in other organs of decision-making. The 
legal system was complex and some bodies of decision-making appear to have had 
two chambers; one limited body that presented the case and a more inclusive body 
that discussed the case and made the final verdict, as indicated by the Nippur Trial for 
Homicide (4.3.5). The evidence is, however, ambiguous. A powerful popular 
assembly is not attested for Old Babylonian cities. Rather, citizens could participate in 
smaller corporations, if they had the trust of their fellows and could spare the time. 
This is a narrow corporate strategy for power, where the group in charge is limited, 
but in principle open to all qualified citizens. 
 
I turn now to a rather different network state of the Old Babylonian period, viz. the 
kingdom of Mari. As will be seen, the evidence for local politics in communities of 
the Mari kingdom indicate slightly different ways of organising power than in the 
ancient cities of Mesopotamia. 
 
4.5 Central authorities and local politics in the kingdom of 
Mari 
In the following, the composition and competence of local political institutions in the 
Old Babylonian kingdom of Mari will be investigated, from correspondence with the 
central authorities and from letters between officials of the kingdom. Relations 
between central authorities and local communities will also be discussed. The 
kingdom of Mari offers an interesting contrast to the political situation in urbanised 
Babylonia, because it had a considerable pastoralist tribal element in its political and 
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social structure that is well documented in written sources. In the Old Babylonian 
period, a significant part of the Mariote king’s subjects lived not in cities, but in the 
steppe. The region of Mari, which included parts of Syria and north-western 
Mesopotamia, also had ancient cities, however. Several city-states thrived in the 
fertile river valleys of the Habur and Balih, in the Middle Euphrates region, and 
downstream towards Mesopotamia. The contrast and cooperation between sedentary 
and nomadic groups is a remarkable feature of the Mari kingdom. As will be seen, 
Mari offers valuable glimpses into the political structure of a network state with a 
significant non-sedentary population, between urban and pastoralist traditions. The 
first half of the 2nd millennium BCE in Syria, i.e. the Old Babylonian period, is 
sometimes referred to as the Amorite period, because groups of people with names in 
the Amorite language had risen to prominence in several important urban centres by 
this time. The Amorites were pastoralists immigrating from the west. In the 2nd 
millennium, they were integrated into the camps, towns, and cities that made out the 
political map of Syria and north-western Mesopotamia, the area that will be discussed 
in the following. 
 
The main sources of knowledge about Syria and north-western Mesopotamia in the 
Old Babylonian period are cuneiform tablets found at Mari, the so-called royal 
archives.683 Mari is an ancient site, but the earlier periods of habitation will not 
concern us here. The majority of the letters found in the royal archives are from the 
rule of Yasmah-Addu and Zimri-Lim. King Yasmah-Addu was really the 
representative of his father Šamši-Adad, who ruled over an extensive territory in 
northern Mesopotamia. King Šamši-Adad was based in the city Ekallatum and had 
                                              
683 The letters of the royal archives of Mari document political life and diplomacy in Syria and Mesopotamia in the early 2nd 
millennium BCE. Among king Zimri-Lim’s correspondents was king Hammurapi of Babylon. The more than three 
thousand letters from Mari are being published continuously; the series Archives Royales de Mari (ARM) has at the time of 
writing (2012) reached its 31st volume. Thematically arranged translations in French with commentaries are published by 
Jean-Marie Durand as Documents épistolaires du palais de Mari (vol. I-III, 1997-2000). The evidence from Mari will be 
presented as my paraphrases of the texts published in the relevant volumes of ARM and Durand 1997-2000. 
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conquered much territory from the Tigris to the Euphrates. He had defeated the local 
dynasty of king Yahdun-Lim and his sons in the early 2nd millennium BCE. Upon 
Šamši-Adad’s death, however, Zimri-Lim, a kinsman of Yahdun-Lim, regained the 
family throne. Zimri-Lim ruled Mari until the city was destroyed by king Hammurapi 
of Babylon in the mid-18th century BCE.684 In the present investigation, letters from 
the rule of Yasmah-Addu as well as Zimri-Lim will be discussed. 
 
Recently, Daniel E. Fleming has examined the tribal organisation of the Mari 
kingdom under king Zimri-Lim and relations between tribal communities and the 
king.685 His investigation of the tribal organisation of parts of Mari’s population gives 
valuable and provocative insights into the complexity of Near Eastern political 
traditions. In the following investigation, the importance of a pastoralist element in 
the politics of Mari will be taken into consideration together with the organisation of 
towns and cities. As will be seen, the tribal inhabitants were organised according to 
rather different principles than the city-state traditions of Mesopotamia: the pastoralist 
and semi-sedentary tribes were confederacies based on common ancestry and had 
several tiers of authority, including leaders of individual clans with their common 
ancestors and local heads of households with much power. Thus, it is quite different 
from the centralised urban organisation of power, based in the institutions of palace 
and temples, and urban corporations of citizens, as seen in the preceding sections on 
Old Babylonian Babylon (4.3ff). In Babylonia, city-states were the basis of the 
network state. In the Mari kingdom, the situation was a bit different: the Mari 
kingdom had towns and cities, but pastoral elements, as will be seen (4.7.1), were 
integrated in the political structure to a high degree and influenced the overall 
organisation of power. 
                                              
684 Cf. Kuhrt, The ancient  Near East, 1997 [1995], 98-101 
685 Fleming, Democracy’s ancient ancestors, 2004 
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Mari was a magnificent city, and its palace was known far and wide for its beauty: 
king Hammurapi of Babylon wrote to king Zimri-Lim reporting that the king of 
Ugarit had expressed wishes to see the palace.686 Archaeologists have uncovered that 
the palace had over three hundred rooms.687 A significant part of the royal archives of 
Mari consists of correspondence between the palace and local authorities of towns 
and camps. In the following, I will investigate evidence from the Mari 
correspondence for local decision-making, the relations between local powers and the 
centre of the network state, the palace at Mari. I will look for indications of how local 
power was organised, in particular relations between the people, the local élite, and 
the central authorities, in order to assess the political culture of Old Babylonian Mari. 
 
4.6 The kings of Mari and their subjects 
Before turning to the evidence for local powers in the kingdom of Mari, the political 
situation in the kingdom of Mari in the Old Babylonian period and its political 
structure will be discussed briefly. As already mentioned (4.5), there are two royal 
dynasties attested from the royal archives of Mari in the Old Babylonian period. One 
is the “Lim”-dynasty of Yahdun-Lim and his son, the second is the family of Šamši-
Adad. The “Lim”-dynasty was defeated by the conqueror Šamši-Adad, who became 
the Assyrian king Šamši-Adad I.688 Šamši-Adad moved his capital from Ekallatum to 
Šubat-Enlil, set up his eldest son Išme-Dagan as king in Ekallatum, and established 
                                              
686 Dossin in Schaeffer, Ugaritica I, 1939, 16 n. 2; Margueron, “Mari: A portrait in art of a Mesopotamian city-state,” 1995, 
885 
687 Whiting, “Amorite tribes and nations,” 1995, 1236 
688 In Old Assyrian chronological terms, the reign of Šamši-Adad corresponds to Kanesh level Ib, cf. 5.2 and 5.5.6. 
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his younger son Yasmah-Addu as king in Mari. At the death of Šamši-Adad, the 
“Lim”-dynasty regained their hold on Mari and Zimri-Lim became the new king.  
 
The royal family lived in a sumptuous palace far removed from the tents and dust of 
the steppe. Mari was an important city due to its strategic position on the Euphrates, 
as an important stop on the trade route from Syria to Babylonia. This position could 
also be dangerous. As Jean-Robert Kupper points out, the kingdom of Mari was 
situated between the great powers of the kingdom of Yamhad to the north with its 
capital Aleppo and the kingdom of Babylon to the south, and this could have 
unpleasant consequences in times of conflict.689 But its position in between powerful 
kingdoms was apparently quite profitable, as well. This is most conspicuous from the 
sheer size of the palace at Mari. Kupper emphasises that trade and exchange over land 
and along river routes promoted contact between the kingdoms of Mesopotamia, 
bringing cultural influences in its wake.690 Indeed, the region of Syria can be said to 
be a part of Mesopotamia in cultural terms. The Mari archives are written in 
Akkadian cuneiform, in the Old Babylonian language. The Mari kings were part of 
the political scene of Babylonia and Assyria. 
 
Mari was the capital of the kingdom of Mari and the seat of the king’s palace. 
However, archaeologists have not found many urban features beyond the palace itself. 
Daniel E. Fleming points out that there has as yet not been excavated any substantial 
residential quarters. He therefore argues that Old Babylonian Mari was no ordinary 
city in the Mesopotamian sense, with palace, temples, and residential districts, but 
rather that it was a political centre with few urban features.691 Fleming suggests that 
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the term “city-state” should be avoided when discussing Mari, “as carrying too many 
associations with very different political systems”.692 In my opinion, this is an 
important caveat that must be taken into consideration, in particular because so many 
of the groups of people discussed in the texts from Mari evidently did not live in the 
city. As will be seen (4.7.1), however, their leaders were ratified by the king there. 
Thus, the king’s palace at Mari can be seen as a centre for the negotiation of the 
interests of the different groups that made up the kingdom. The king was in a sense 
the rallying figure for several local communities. In this sense, Mari was not a city-
state, but a network state centred on the person of the king. I will follow this 
definition of the Mari kingdom in the following investigation of its political culture. 
 
Scholars have established that the population of the Mari kingdom consisted of 
several tribal confederacies that included pastoralists and townspeople. The two most 
important were the binū Sim’al, “sons of the left”, and the binū Yamina, the “sons of 
the right”.693 Both confederacies consisted of integrated town-dwellers as well as 
pastoralists, but in the time of king Zimri-Lim, control of the capital Mari was in the 
hands of the Sim’alites. According to Fleming, the texts in the Mari archives rarely 
mention the Sim’alites, because “the insider’s view is Sim’alite”.694 This seems a 
correct assessment, as the texts often mention confrontations or negotiations with the 
sons of Yamina, who are mentioned with their tribal designation throughout the Mari 
correspondence, whereas the Sim’alites are not.  
 
In the texts from Mari, there is mention of groups called the Hana. Their relation to 
the Sim’alites and Yaminites is difficult to grasp. Robert M. Whiting interprets Hana 
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as “the main tribal population at Mari” and that the Sim’alites and Yaminites are “two 
major branches of the Hana”.695 Jean-Marie Durand and Daniel E. Fleming on the 
other hand interpret Hana as the designation of the tribal element of both the 
Sim’alites and Yaminites.696 Durand proposes an etymology for Hana from a verb for 
“pitching a tent” and argues that some of the Hana are actually Yaminities that have 
no towns.697 These questions will not be discussed further in detail. Suffice it to say 
that the Hana do appear in the Mari letters as pastoralist groups belonging to the tribal 
confederacies of Sim’alites and Yaminites. I therefore accept the interpretation of 
Hana as “tent-dwellers”, and will refer to them as such or as “the tent-dwelling 
Hana”. For the present investigation, suffice it to say that there were two main 
confederacies of Amorites in the kingdom of Mari, known as the binū Sim’al, “the 
sons of the left”, and the binū Yamina, “the sons of the right”, or Sim’alites and 
Yaminites. These confederacies included pastoralists as well as townspeople. 
 
The relations between pastoralists and townspeople have often been regarded as 
hostile. However, scholars now emphasise the cooperation between these groups, 
even symbiosis, and the common origins or common identity of townspeople and 
pastoralists that live in the same region. Anne Porter argues that scholars misconstrue 
pastoralists of the ancient world as opposed to settled life. She points to the Mari 
correspondence as evidence that they inhabited both worlds.698 Indeed, in the letters 
and documents from the royal archives of Mari, the lives of the settled population and 
those who roamed the steppe can be seen to frequently convene. However, they 
appear to have been organised in quite different ways. There is a range of terms from 
the Mari texts that have been interpreted as specific to one or the other tribal 
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confederacy and their sedentary or pastoralist members. According to Whiting, among 
the pastoralists, the term for tribe was ummatum. A lower level of their tribal 
organisation was gayum, or “clan”.699 Thus, the tribal organisation of pastoralists and 
the sedentary population of the Mari kingdom was complex. Daniel E. Fleming argues 
that the two main tribal confederations, the Sim’alites and the Yaminites were 
organised quite differently from each other. In his interpretation, the Yaminites were 
organised in a number of li’mum that were city-based political units, whereas the 
Sim’alites were organised in a number of gayum that were ruled by the king of the 
confederacy.700 According to Fleming, “the Yaminite and the Sim’alite tribal peoples 
were characterized by different social structure and political traditions. Where the 
Sim’alites are defined in pastoralist terms with gayum divisions that follow mobile 
Hana herdsmen, the Yaminites are divided into five tribes that can be called the 
li’mums of their kings”. Further, Fleming points out that “the Binu Yamina seem to 
have allowed the town a greater defining role in their social categories”, in the sense 
that a li’mum or tribe had a ruler with a fortified settlement as his seat of power, and 
also that Yaminite towns are often referred to with individual leaders that are called 
sugāgum, or chieftain.701 These distinctions will be followed in the further discussion 
of Mari politics. The appointment and authority of the sugāgum will be discussed in 
particular (4.7.1). 
 
Thus, following Fleming’s analysis, the Sim’alites were politically centred on one 
king, the leader of the confederacy. In certain periods, when the Sim’alites were in 
power, their king lived in Mari. The Sim’alites were organised into gayum-divisions, 
i.e. clans, and many of them were pastoralists. The Yaminites, on the other hand, were 
organised in five li’mum, i.e. tribes, with individual kings who had their own fortified 
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towns. How were local authorities established in the Mari network state? What were 
the relations between local authorities, the local communities, and the central 
authorities? 
 
4.7 Local authorities and the king 
In the following, I will first discuss evidence for the local leaders of towns, cities and 
pastoralist groups from texts in the royal archives of Mari (4.7.1). Second, I will 
investigate politics in communities of towns and cities mentioned in the texts (4.7.2). 
Last, I will discuss evidence for “elders” and other local institutions for collective 
decision-making (4.7.3).  
 
4.7.1 The sugāgum or “chieftain”, “local leader” 
The sugāgum or “chieftain” is usually interpreted as a local leader responsible for 
managing the village or town and representing it with the king. According to the 
CAD, the sugāgum was an official in charge of tribal affairs.702 It is not clear what 
relations the sugāgum had to the tribal communities he was in charge over, however. 
Was he a local community leader or a royal appointee? This is an important question 
in the study of Mari politics. Therefore, the office of sugāgum will be discussed at 
length in this section. I will translate the term sugāgum as “chieftain”, in a broad 
sense of local leader with no further implications regarding the nature of his authority 
or position.  
 
                                              
702 CAD S, 1984, 343-344 
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The sugāgum was evidently a central figure in the organisation of several of the 
communities discussed in the texts of the Mari archives and their relations with the 
central authorities. Therefore, scholars have paid the sugāgum much attention. 
According to Robert M. Whiting, each village had a sugāgum, and larger towns might 
even have several. The pastoralists also had a sugāgum, who was their contact with 
the royal authorities.703 Philippe Talon emphasises the role of the sugāgum as a local 
leader, whose responsibilities included the collection of taxes. The sugāgum paid a 
sum to the palace once a year.704 As will be seen, these assessments are well-founded 
in the texts from the royal archives of Mari and will be followed in the present 
discussion. It can safely be claimed that the sugāgum was central for the functioning 
of the Mari state. As middle-man between the king and his subjects, he also fulfilled 
vital state functions. The collection of taxes by the sugāgum is an important point, 
because it reveals much about the structure of the Mari kingdom: the king relied on 
local authorities in order to collect taxes. It also reveals a dual position for the 
sugāgum, in that he was a local leader of the community, while at the same time being 
the subject of the central authority of the king, collecting his taxes. In the following, 
evidence from a number of letters from the royal archives of Mari will be presented 
and discussed. What was the position of the sugāgum in his community? 
 
In ARM I 6, king Šamši-Adad of Šubat-Enlil writes to his son Yasmah-Addu, king of 
Mari. Yasmah-Addu has formerly written concerning a census of the tribal 
confederation of the Yaminites, and king Šamši-Adad warns that forcing a census 
upon the Yaminites may cause another group of tribal pastoralists, their brothers the 
Rabbaites of the kingdom of Yamhad on the other side of the river to become angry 
and detain the Yaminites. King Šamši-Adad writes that king Yasmah-Addu should 
not go through with the census, but leave it to their sugāgum, “chieftain”, and make 
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him gather all the Yaminites. Also, king Šamši-Adad mentions that king Yasmah-
Addu in a previous letter has discussed the Hana, “tent-dwelling pastoralists of the 
steppe”, whether he should redistribute fields on the banks of the Euphrates and give 
to them. King Šamši-Adad says about this matter that he has consulted experts: the 
fields are not fit for division, and there will be many complaints if they are divided. 
Therefore, division and redistribution of the fields should not be undertaken. King 
Šamši-Adad advises to distribute the fields so that each keeps his part as before, so 
that there is no confusion of the fields. When anybody dies or flees, his field is to be 
given to anyone who has none. The Hana, “tent-dwellers”, are to be submitted to a 
census. Those of the Hana who have fields, shall keep them.705  
 
The situation of taking the census of the Yaminites in ARM I 6 can be seen as an 
example of the sugāgum, “chieftain” in his dual capacity as leader of the tribal group 
of the Yaminites and middle-man between the tribe and the king. He appears to fill a 
valuable position in the king of Mari’s administration of his kingdom: the king 
apparently does not want to interfere directly with these tribal groups for fear of 
trouble and therefore leaves it to the discretion of their own local leaders to perform 
the census. This can indicate that the king was only indirectly in charge over groups 
of his subjects and preferred to go through their local leaders because these men had 
the trust of their communities. However, it can also be taken as evidence that the 
sugāgum was a loyal servant of the king and that the king preferred to act through his 
trusted man rather than confront the tribesmen directly. Thus, the text indicates that 
the sugāgum could play an independent political role, but it is open for interpretation 
whether this was because of his local standing in his community as entrusted leader or 
because of his position as a loyal servant of the king. I suggest, however, that it is the 
sugāgum as community leader that makes him the preferable agent when dealing with 
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the tribal groups: if he was simply the king’s representative, it would make little 
difference whether the sugāgum interfered in order not to anger the tribes.  
 
Jean-Robert Kupper takes the king’s misgivings in ARM I 6 about the census of the 
Yaminites and the redistribution of fields as evidence that the kings of Mari were 
wary of public opinion, because Šamši-Adad was afraid that the tribes would become 
angry.706 He argues that in the Mari correspondence, “the mouth of the city” (pī ālim) 
and “the mouth of the land” (pī mātim) are referred to as something the king should 
fear.707 No doubt, ARM I 6 is evidence that the king was concerned about his subjects’ 
reactions to his decisions. However, the king of Mari cannot be claimed to be special 
in this respect. What concerns he might express in letters to his son, would probably 
not be his official stance vis-à-vis his subjects, and there seems to me no reason to 
make much out of this passage concerning the king and public opinion. The text is 
interesting, however, in that it demonstrates how the king used local entrusted leaders 
to execute potentially unpleasant tasks, such as taking the census. To me, this again 
shows the dual nature of the sugāgum, as local leader and servant of the king of Mari. 
How was the sugāgum recruited and appointed? 
 
In ARM V 24, Tarīm-Šakim, one of king Yasmah-Addu of Mari’s two viziers, writes 
to his king. He reports that the former “man” of Tizrah (awīl Tizrahki) is dead and that 
he has been approached by “some men, the sons of Tizrah” (awīlūmeš mārumeš 
Tizrahki). These men have said that they want Kāli-Ilma to lead them (ana šāpirutini). 
The vizier Tarīm-Šakim writes that Kāli-Ilma has already given one mina of silver for 
                                              
706 Kupper, “L’opinion publique a Mari,” 1964, 82 
707 Kupper, “L’opinion publique a Mari,” 1964, 81-82 
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the palace as surety, and that he is sending him to the king so that he may appoint him 
sugāgum of Tizrah.708  
 
Thus, ARM V 24 provides evidence for the appointment of a sugāgum for the town 
Tizrah. The sugāgum is also called awīlum or “man” of the town. It appears that local 
men at the death of their sugāgum suggested or presented a candidate to the vizier. 
The vizier then reported their choice to the king in Mari. The candidate paid silver to 
the palace and he was sent to the king by the vizier in order to become the new 
sugāgum.  What does this tell us about the appointment of the sugāgum? It is not clear 
from ARM V 24 who selected the candidate. He was preferred by “the sons of Tizrah” 
(awīlūmeš mārumeš Tizrahki), but it is not specified how this was decided. The identity 
of this group will be discussed below (4.7.3), suffice it to suggest here that they were 
a local group of trusted men. It is difficult to determine the standing of the sugāgum 
in relation to the town for which he was responsible. There are several possibilities. 
Was he selected by “the sons of Tizrah”? The text does not say directly, but this 
seems plausible, since “the sons of Tizrah” report to the vizier. Another possibility is 
that he was selected by the town community and that the choice of the community 
was reported to the vizier by “the sons of Tizrah”. This is not indicated by the text at 
all, however, and must be implied by conjecture. A third possibility is that he was 
selected and appointed by the king. This is not what ARM V 24 says, however; the 
text says that the candidate that was reported to the vizier will go to the king and be 
appointed by him. Since the candidate has already deposited the silver for the post at 
the palace, it does not appear likely that he will not be appointed once he is selected 
locally as candidate. There is no suggestion that the king had a choice between several 
candidates. The letter is interesting because it provides glimpses of two sides to the 
                                              
708 Dossin, Correspondance du Iasmah-Addu, 1952, 43: ARM V 24; Durand, Documents épistolaires vol. I, 2002 [1997], 
208-209 
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process of appointing the sugāgum, from the point of view of the vizier as well as 
from the town Tizrah.  
 
Scholars are not agreed concerning the respective roles of the palace and the local 
community in appointing a sugāgum. Daniel E. Fleming interprets awīlūmeš mārumeš 
Tizrahki (LÚmešDUMUmeš GN) in ARM V 24 as “a select group responsible for the 
nomination of a chief to the royal administration. The travel suggests some limited 
number of representatives much smaller than may be envisioned for an 
“assembly””.709 Thus, Fleming interprets the nomination of the sugāgum as a decision 
taken by a local élite, presumably in some sort of council. It could be argued that 
although a small group of men came from Tizrah to inform the king’s vizier about the 
preferred candidate for the office of sugāgum, this does not necessarily mean that he 
was selected by this same group. However, I agree with Fleming that there is nothing 
in ARM V 24 to suggest that the candidate was selected by the people of his town in a 
popular assembly. Thus, the men who present the new sugāgum to the vizier can be 
assumed to be involved in the selection of the candidate. They were presumably the 
peers of the sugāgum. Since he was wealthy enough to deposit one mina of silver at 
the palace, it appears likely that “the sons of Tizrah” was a local élite of wealthy men. 
The relation between the decisions of this local élite and the final appointment by the 
king are not clear, however. Again, as in ARM I 6 discussed above, the evidence is 
ambiguous as to whether the sugāgum was a community representative or a royal 
official. 
 
The details surrounding the appointment to the office of sugāgum are difficult to 
establish, because the texts are quite sparing with details. Therefore, scholars have 
offered quite different interpretations. Andrea Seri suggests that “the sugāgum is a 
                                              
709 Fleming, Democracy’s ancient ancestors, 2004, 185-186 
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royal appointee who represents the community”.710 She argues that the sugāgum was 
responsible for the military levy and diplomatic missions, but never represented the 
“interests of community members”.711 Dominique Charpin does not accept this 
interpretation: he suggests that the sugāgum was a local leader emerging from the 
local elders or notables, similar to a rabiānum (discussed above, 4.3.1).712 He argues 
that the king can only accept or decline a local community’s choice of sugāgum and 
points out that in the few cases where the king attempts to place an unwanted leader 
over local communities, trouble ensues.713 I agree with Seri that the sugāgum appears 
to belong to both worlds; he is a local representative as well as a royal official. I 
disagree that he was not a local leader, however, and I find Charpin’s argument 
convincing, that the sugāgum is similar to a rabiānum. I do not see how the sugāgum 
does not represent the interests of his community members. Although there is no 
reason to view the sugāgum as a kind of people’s spokesman with the palace, this 
does not mean that his local mandate is not without importance. In ARM V 24, it 
seems most likely to me that “the sons of Tizrah” were community members: they 
appear to be convinced that their interests were represented by their candidate as the 
new sugāgum. The appointment of the sugāgum, although by a wealthy élite, appears 
in my opinion as a form of representation of the local community. Admittedly, it is 
difficult to determine who exactly the sugāgum represented and it is perhaps naïve to 
suppose that a group of elders or similar would represent the interests of all 
community members. In ARM V 24, it seems to me that the sugāgum was part of a 
group of wealthy men, and it is safe to assume that they were all interested in having a 
sugāgum from among themselves.  
 
                                              
710 Seri, Local powers, 2005, 115 
711 Seri, Local powers, 2005, 116 
712 Charpin, “Économie, société et institutions paléo-Babyloniennes,” 2007, 170-171 
713 Charpin, “Économie, société et institutions paléo-Babyloniennes,” 2007, 171-172 
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The background of the candidate for the position as sugāgum and how he was 
appointed are not directly stated in the text ARM V 24. In the interpretation of Daniel 
E. Fleming, the king appointed the sugāgum, but “the nominees may have emerged 
from the crucible of local politics”.714 This seems a reasonable suggestion. However, 
the ingredients of this “crucible” are not well understood. Both Fleming and Seri 
argue that the sugāgum came from the local community, but they assess the 
importance of this differently. Seri emphasises his loyalty to the palace and distance 
from community interests, whereas Fleming argues for the local commitment of the 
nominee. In my opinion, the sugāgum emerged from a local élite and continued to be 
part of the local community and serve their interests. In ARM I 6 the sugāgum is a 
local leader as well as being responsible to the king for taxes and the census. Thus, 
there does not appear to be any antagonism between the local communities and their 
sugāgum. In ARM V 24, the sugāgum was ratified by the king of Mari, after being 
appointed as a representative of the local community. ARM V 24 can be taken as 
evidence for palace control over the sugāgum as well as for a local mandate. In my 
opinion, the letter ARM V 24 is evidence that both local mandate and official 
appointment were necessary in order to become a sugāgum. Since the vizier and king 
are not introduced to more than one candidate, it appears to me that the most 
important decision was the initial local selection. The local importance of the 
sugāgum can be seen in ARM I 6 discussed above: king Šamši-Adad advises his son 
Yasmah-Addu, the king of Mari, to handle delicate business with tribal groups 
through their sugāgum. In my view, this only makes sense if the chieftain was a man 
of standing in his own community who was trusted by his fellows. If he was not, it 
would be no point in bringing in the sugāgum in order to avoid local irritation at the 
census, except to have the sugāgum as scapegoat. However, this makes no sense, 
since the king aimed at avoiding trouble with “the tent-dwelling” Hana in general. I 
now turn to a rather different problem concerning the appointment of sugāgum: why 
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did the candidate sugāgum in ARM V 24 pay one mina of silver to the palace in order 
to attain his office?  
 
According to Jean-Marie Durand, to be sugāgum was a coveted position, and entailed 
possibilities for personal enrichment.715 This is a reasonable explanation for the 
eagerness of Kāli-Ilma to become sugāgum in ARM V 24. Among the responsibilities 
of the sugāgum was the collection of the taxes from his area and this probably had its 
perks. However, why did the palace demand silver? It was possibly a form of advance 
on taxes the sugāgum would later collect, but the text does not say.  
 
The payment of silver to the palace indicates that the palace and the sugāgum were 
closely connected: not only was the sugāgum appointed by the king, he also 
contributed to the king’s finances. The payment of a mina of silver also suggests that 
the candidate for the position as sugāgum was wealthy and belonged to the élite of his 
hometown. I turn now to an investigation of texts where several sugāgū or 
“chieftains” are gathered, in order to further clarify the nature of their local authority 
and their relations to the central authorities. 
 
4.7.2 The sugāgū in assembly 
In the following, I will examine further evidence for relations between central 
authorities and the sugāgū, “chieftains”, including texts that discuss meetings of 
several sugāgū and tribal groups. Some of these sugāgū are leaders of pastoralists; 
others are leaders of sedentary groups.  
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In ARM II 53, Yasmah-Addu,716 the leader of the Yaminite tribe of the Yarihū, writes 
to king Zimri-Lim of Mari that he cannot leave with [the tribal leader] Lahun-
Dagan717 as planned: “men” (awīlumeš) of the Yarihū, “chieftains” (sugāgū) of the 
Hana, “tent-dwellers”, have arrived and held him back. Yasmah-Addu also reports 
that the sugāgū of the Yaminites assembled in the town Zalpah, and went to the town 
Ahunā. There they parlayed with the Yaminite [leader] Sūra-Hammū,718 and king 
Yarim-Lim of the kingdom of Yamhad to the north of Mari. The sugāgū of the Hana 
stood up and requested that Sūra-Hammū and king Yarim-Lim go to king Zimri-Lim 
of Mari and reclaim their villages. They threatened to kill or dethrone [the tribal 
leader] Lahun-Dagan if he would not go with them. Yasmah-Addu [leader of the 
Yarihū] warns that king Yarim-Lim, Sūra-Hammū and the sugāgū are on their way, 
and that his lord king Zimri-Lim should give them whatever they want.719 
 
ARM II 53 is evidence of the important role the tribes could play in politics between 
the kingdoms of Syria. The loyalty of these tribes appears shifty and unpredictable. 
The writer of the letter, Yasmah-Addu, warns king Zimri-Lim that the tribal leaders 
are underway and advices him to give in to their demands and give their villages back 
to them. The reference is obscure, but it appears that the king of Mari was in control 
of villages that the tribe of Yarihū wanted and that they formed an alliance with the 
king of Yamhad. However, most interesting in this text for the present discussion are 
                                              
716 I follow Durand’s interpretation that this Yasmah-Addu was a leader of the Yaminite tribe Yarihū (Durand, Documents 
épistolaires vol. II, 1998, 449). It cannot be the king of the same name, because by the time of the reign of king Zimri-Lim, 
Yasmah-Addu the king had been deposed; the Yasmah-Addu in this text is therefore a namesake. His title is not given in 
the text, but he is apparently a sugāgum, “tribal leader”: his and the titles of the other “tribal leaders” in the text are inferred 
from the general discussion of the activities of sugāgū in this letter. 
717 His title not given in the text, but was most likely sugāgum. 
718 His title not given in the text, but was most likely sugāgum. 
719 Jean, Lettres diverses, 1950, 110-111: ARM II 53; Durand, Documents épistolaires vol. II, 1998, 448-449 
 307 
not the relations between kings and tribal leaders, but those between tribal leaders and 
the tribesmen: it is clear from ARM II 53 that the tribal leaders were under pressure 
from their subjects and could be deposed or killed if they did not please them. This is 
further evidence that the sugāgum was not a leader imposed on the community by the 
king. A sugāgum evidently maintained his position through his standing in his local 
tribal community. It also appears that the Hana, “tent-dwellers”, had several leaders. 
How this was organised is not clear, however.  
 
The Yaminites in ARM II 53 live in cities as well as in the steppe: there are references 
to “tent-dwellers” as well as villagers. The tribal leaders congregate in towns. It is not 
easy to identity the different groups and divisions, however. Fleming interprets the 
situation in ARM II 53 as a gathering of all the Yaminite leaders, a smaller group of 
which were the leaders of the tent-dwelling Hana. In his interpretation, the leaders of 
the Hana plead before the assembly of all Yaminite leaders for negotiations with king 
Zimri-Lim of Mari in order that they may reclaim their home towns.720 In my opinion, 
this is a good assessment of the situation. It seems clear to me that a gathering of 
leaders is taking place and that only a smaller group of these leaders are demanding 
the villages back on behalf of the community. It is of note that the tribal groups and 
their sugāgū leaders show no specific loyalty to king Zimri-Lim of Mari and rather 
rely on the king of the neighbouring kingdom Yamhad. In my opinion, this is 
evidence that the sugāgū were local leaders with more loyalty to their own tribal 
group than to their king.  
 
There is further evidence to the complex relations between the king of Mari and his 
pastoralist subjects. ARM XXVIII 25 [A.328] is a report to king Zimri-Lim of Mari 
from king Yahdun-Lim of the city Karkemiš. King Yahdun-Lim reports that while the 
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Yaminite leader Sūra-Hammū was with king Zimri-Lim, he himself was in Ahunā. 
There he received news that the Yaminite Hana, “tent-dwellers”, had assembled. King 
Yahdun-Lim went to “the assembly of Hana” (puhur Hanameš) with the tribal leader 
Lahun-Dagan and in the assembly they agreed to make peace between Sim’alites and 
Yaminites. They sent the [sugāgū]721 of the Yaminites to Zimri-Lim to make a lasting 
peace.722 
 
In ARM XXVIII 25 [A.328] the kings in their cities can be seen to cooperate closely 
with the tribal leaders and their communities of the steppe. The king of Karkemiš 
took part in the puhur Hanameš, “assembly of the Hana”, together with the tribal 
leader Lahun-Dagan. It is not clear who participated in the assembly, but it appears as 
a decisive authority for establishing the policy of the tribal groups. Thus, the text 
throws light on the organisation of the Hana: they gather in an assembly and make 
decisions on war and peace. The king of Mari, it should be noted, becomes involved 
at a later stage and does not seem to take part in the initial decision-making process. 
In the further negotiations for peace, however, the tribal representatives and the king 
discuss together.  
 
The Hana of ARM XXVIII 25 [A.328] gather in an assembly (puhur Hanameš). It 
appears that a group of sugāgū were sent as representatives of this assembly to king 
Zimri-Lim for peace talks. It is of note that peace between the Yaminites and 
Sim’alites is negotiated in “the assembly of Hana”, with the participation of king 
Yahdun-Lim of Karkemiš and the tribal leader Lahun-Dagan. This shows that “the 
assembly of Hana” had a capacity and authority to make political decisions. Besides 
                                              
721 Restored by Durand, in Kupper, Lettres royales du temps de Zimri-Lim, 1998, 34 n. b. I accept Durand’s restoration of 
sugāgū in the text, as these are the most likely to have gone to the king for negotiations. 
722 Kupper, Lettres royales du temps de Zimri-Lim, 1998, 33-34: ARM XXVIII 25 
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Yahdun-Lim and Lahun-Dagan, it is not stated who took part in the assembly of the 
Hana. Because these two men were leaders of high status, it seems to me plausible 
that the rest of the participants in the assembly were sugāgū, “chieftains”. Whether 
the sugāgū sent to king Zimri-Lim was a smaller group of this assembly is not stated 
in the text.  
 
There are few sources to how such decision-making gatherings were organised or 
who were allowed to speak there. However, A. 2677 mentions a form of gathering 
called rihsum. A.2677 is a letter sent from the diviner Asqudum, a sugāgum loyal to 
Zimri-Lim.723 Asqudum writes to the king and reports that the sugāgū of the Hana, 
having been ordered by the king to cleanse themselves of an impiety, needed purifiers 
to come to their aid. He reports that “when the Hana were gathered for a parley”, 
(inuma HANAmeš irahisu), “a commoner”, muškenum, addressed them and advised 
them concerning the grave impiety that had been committed.724 There is a lacuna 
where the commoner’s speech is reported. 
 
The gathering of Hana in A. 2677 is not called a puhrum. Rather, they are gathered in 
a rihsum. The meeting takes place in Ida-Maras. Durand suggests that rihsum was a 
form of popular assembly among the Hana.725 He argues that although the meeting 
appears to be an assembly of the leaders of the Hana, it is a democratic feature that a 
muškenum speaks in the rihsum.726 It is indeed fascinating that a muškenum speaks in 
an assembly of sugāgū. Unfortunately, it is not known what the commoner said to the 
leaders. Also, it is not possible to determine whether it was part of normal procedure 
                                              
723 Durand, Archives épistolaires de Mari I/1, 1988, 71-76 
724 Durand, Archives épistolaires de Mari I/1, 1988, 188: ARM XXVI 44 [A.2677] 
725 Durand, Archives épistolaires de Mari I/1, 1988, 181 
726 Durand, Archives épistolaires de Mari I/1, 1988, 185-187 
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for commoners to speak in the assembly. However, the fact that a commoner 
addressed the assembly of leaders indicates that the people participated in these 
assemblies. Perhaps they were present as onlookers. I do not agree that this isolated 
episode can be used to argue that the Hana had a democratic institution for decision-
making. However, it is evidence that commoners were present at assemblies and 
could speak there.727 
 
The assemblies of sugāgū, “chieftains”, discussed above show that local collective 
decision-making played an important role in the local communities of the Mari 
kingdom. The decisions of these assemblies were reported to the king and sugāgū 
went to the king to negotiate peace. This shows that the local and central levels of 
decision-making were integrated. However, it also reveals that the king did not 
control the sugāgū and local communities directly: the local communities made their 
decisions before they sent their representatives to the king. It is not clear who took 
part in the assemblies of the sugāgū, but if the analysis of sugāgum as a local 
community leader is correct, their meetings were gatherings of the heads of local 
communities. It is not stated that the general population took part in these decision-
making processes. However, there is one instance where a commoner rose and spoke 
in the gathering of the sugāgū. The interests of the commoners are likely to have been 
looked to by their community leaders. The importance of these assemblies in the Mari 
state is evidence for local autonomy and collective decision-making by the local 
leaders of towns and camps, gathering in what appears to be regional assemblies. So 
                                              
727 There is attested a further term for gathering of people for making decisions in the Mari letters, viz. tahtamum or 
tātamum, found in a number of letters published by Jean-Marie Durand, from the cities Emar and Tuttul (Durand, 
“L’assemblée en Syrie à l’époque pré-amorite,” 1989, 27-44). Jean-Marie Durand argues that the concept of puhrum and 
tātamum are complementary, but not equivalent. In his interpretation, the tātamum in the Mari sources is a collective of 
people who gather to discuss juridical, economic and political affairs of the local communities. Its decisions involve the 
entire people, and it may be described as either a council of elders or an assembly of the people. Durand also points out that 
the tātamum is autonomous regarding the representative of the Mari king, the hazzānum; he cannot influence their 
discussion or decisions (Durand, “L’assemblée en Syrie à l’époque pré-amorite,” 1989, 37). Unfortunately, there is no 
information in the letters about who gathered in the tahtamum. Therefore, I will not discuss this kind of meeting further 
here, as it is not possible to determine whether a limited group of people were gathered or a more inclusive group; suffice it 
to say that collective decision-making bodies were known under several names and appear to have been quite common 
among the local communities of the Mari kingdom.  
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far, community leaders have been discussed. I turn now to the local communities 
themselves and their internal organisation. 
 
4.7.3 The LÚmeš GN or “men of GN” 
In several letters from the royal archives of Mari, there are agents referred to as LÚmeš 
GN, “the men of GN”. This appears as a collective reference to the inhabitants of the 
city or town. It is also used as a reference to the town itself. In the Mari 
correspondence there are references to “the men of GN” making decisions and 
negotiating with external authorities. What does this imply? Who were “the men of 
GN”? 
 
In ARM XXVI 62 [A.4874], a diviner named Asqudum reports to king Zimri-Lim of 
Mari about the threat of famine due to lack of land under cultivation. The diviner 
reports that he has asked “the men of the city Terqa” (lú.meš Terqaki) to expand the 
palace fields.728  
 
In ARM XXVI 144 [A.4334], an unknown correspondent writes to Zimri-Lim about 
portents of rebellion (bārtum) in the city Terqa. Because of the signs, he had “the sons 
of the city Rāpiqum” (lú dumu.meš Rāpiqimki) confined inside the city Terqa, and the next 
day, new portents led him to expel them. They were resettled in villages (ina 
kaprātim). The sender of the letter says that he has arranged with “the men of Larsa” 
                                              
728 Durand, Archives épistolaires de Mari I/1, 1988, 205-206: ARM XXVI 62 [A.4874] 
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(lú.meš Larsaki) who will join with the Sima’lites (lú dumu.meš Sima’al) and defend the city 
(ālum).729  
 
From these texts, it appears that the term LÚmeš GN, “the men of GN” or DUMUmeš 
GN, “the sons of GN” refers to the town as well as the inhabitants. There are also 
examples of the adjectival forms of town names used interchangeably with “the men 
of GN”. In the letters cited, the LÚmeš GN, “men of GN”, appear to take decisions for 
the community: in ARM XXVI 62 [A.4874], “the men of Terqa” are approached by a 
diviner and given instructions concerning the expansion of the palace fields. It is not 
clear what these palace fields were, but the situation is probably connected to 
compulsory work or corvée-duty. It is interesting that the diviner talks to “the men of 
Terqa”, rather than a “chieftain”. ARM XXVI 62 [A.4874] indicates an identification 
of the town with its inhabitants. If the town and its inhabitants were coterminous, how 
did this affect local leadership and authority? In ARM XXVI 144 [A.4334], “the men 
of Larsa” reach decisions of war and peace. The letter thus indicates that going to war 
was the collective decision of the entire town. However, the identity of “the men of 
Terqa” or “the men of Larsa” is not clear. It is not evident that “the men of GN” were 
some form of popular assembly. Why, then, are there references to decisions made by 
“the men of GN”? How and by whom were these decisions reached? 
 
Daniel E. Fleming argues that LÚmeš GN is used to indicate the town’s activity, 
whereas DUMUmeš GN, “the sons of GN” is used about residence.730 In his 
interpretation, the inhabitants of towns were perceived as a collective. He emphasises 
that no institutionalised assembly is implied by LÚmeš GN; rather it is “only a simple 
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collective reference to the people of the town or land”.731 Fleming argues for an 
analysis of the Mari kingdom in terms of a duality of corporate and élite strategies for 
power; a corporate strategy is based on collective decisions by the whole community, 
whereas an élite strategy is characterised by decisions taken in closed councils by a 
select few.732 He finds evidence for corporate strategies in the mentioned collective 
references to pastoralist communities and towns. In Daniel E. Fleming’s analysis, the 
term LÚmeš GN, “men of GN”, “does not indicate an assembly, never mind a gathering 
of some awīlum class of free or elite men. When it does refer to a town as a whole and 
is not simply identifying some limited group of its citizens, the formula provides the 
most amorphous definition of the people, simply in action as a town. This is the 
corporate ideology in raw form, requiring no meditating institution, however 
informal”.733  
 
In Fleming’s argument, it is indicative of a corporate strategy for power that no 
mediating institution is involved in the decision-making of the town. Because there is 
no such mediating institution, such as a governor, local ruler, or chieftain, Fleming 
believes the people “as a town” took action. However, he is careful to point out that 
“the men of GN” are not an assembly. How the people took action as a town, Fleming 
does not say. Of course, it can be argued that local decision-making bodies are not 
mentioned in the royal correspondence, but somehow work in the background and 
determine the courses of action taken by “the men of GN”. This is not very 
compelling, however. The vagueness of the concept of “the corporate ideology in raw 
form” is a weakness with Fleming’s interpretation. He is careful to point out what the 
term “men of GN” is not, but he offers no further explanation of their identity or 
mode of action as a local collective. 
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Andrea Seri does not agree with Fleming’s interpretation of “the men of GN” as a 
local collective identity. She argues that the term “the men of GN” in Old Babylonian 
documents “does not refer to a corporate body; rather, in letters from Mari, the term 
was used as a polite and generic expression, meaning simply “the gentlemen”.734 It is 
difficult to agree with Seri’s argument that LÚmeš GN or awīlū in the Mari 
correspondence are simply polite expressions. As seen with ARM XXVI 144 [A.4334] 
and ARM XXVI 62 [A.4874] above, LÚmeš GN, “the men of GN” are taking action as 
a group, they are not simply addressed as “gentlemen”: in ARM XXVI 144 [A.4334], 
“the men of Larsa” (lú.meš Larsaki) undertake deliberations and negotiations. They are 
acting as a collective decision-making body. How did these negotiations take place? 
What was the authority of “the men of GN”? 
 
In ARM XXVI 62 [A.4874] and ARM XXVI 144 [A.4334], the LÚmeš GN, “the men 
of GN”, are addressed as a collective and act as a party in negotiations. The king of 
Mari and his officials refer not to community leaders, the sugāgū, but to the collective 
of the town. Does this indicate that the negotiations were undertaken with an 
assembly of townspeople? This is difficult to establish. The decision of “the men of 
Larsa” to go to war in ARM XXVI 144 [A.4334] may have been a spontaneous 
reaction to the request from the city Terqa. However, “the men of GN” is addressed as 
a collective and acts as a collective; they are also formally recognised as a party in 
negotiations. Therefore, it seems to me that “the men of GN” are more than an 
“amorphous definition of the people” as in Fleming’s analysis or a generic term for 
“gentlemen”, as in Seri’s argument.735 The identity of the city in ARM XXVI 144 
                                                                                                                                           
733 Fleming, Democracy’s ancient ancestors, 2004, 182 
734 Seri, Local powers, 2005, 170 
735 Fleming, Democracy’s ancient ancestors, 2004, 182; Seri, Local powers, 2005, 170 
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[A.4334] is the collective of “men of Larsa”. They make the decision to go to war. 
This indicates a corporate identity, although it is difficult to define. Who were “the 
men of GN” and how did they make decisions? A few more texts may clarify the 
matter. 
 
ARM XXVI 409 [A.4001+M.14046] is from the official Yasīm-El to king Zimri-Lim 
of Mari. Yasīm-El is king Zimri-Lim’s envoy to the kingdom of Andarig. In his letter 
there is a report of a dispute over the town of Šuhpad.736 Hāya-Sūmū, king of Ilān-
şurā,737 claims that although “the men of Šuhpad” (lú.meš Šuhpadayuki) have called for 
help from the Mari official Yasīm-El, king Atamrum of Andarig has occupied the 
town of Šuhpad and installed a šaknum, “governor”, there. The Mari official Yasīm-
El has gone to the town of Šuhpad to arbitrate and preserve the peace, and he reports 
to king Zimri-Lim that king Hāya-Sūmū is exaggerating the situation and that king 
Atamrum is on Zimri-Lim’s side. “The men of Šuhpad” (lú.meš Šuhpadayuki) swear 
fealty to Atamrum, and he swears an oath not to trick, kill or deport them. “The men 
of Šuhpad” swear to Atamrum to stay loyal and not kill the šaknum, “governor”. They 
declare him master of the soil (bēl epiri). King Hāya-Sūmū goes to king Zimri-Lim to 
win the town back. The Mari official Yasīm-El negotiates with Atamrum, who 
demands that Zimri-Lim, whom he calls his senior brother, should be the judge of 
whom the town belongs to.738 
 
ARM XXVI 435 [A.4884] is a report from the official Yasīm-El to king Zimri-Lim, 
and concerns a dispute over the town of Amaz between Šukru-Tešub, the king (LÚ, or 
                                              
736 This town lay on the border between the kingdom Ilān-şurā and the kingdom Andarig 
737 Neither Hāya-Sūmū nor Atamrum are mentioned with titles of royalty in this letter, but their high rank is indicated by 
the context. Cf. Charpin et al., Archives épistolaires de Mari I/2, 1988, 279 n. a, b 
738 Charpin et al., Archives épistolaires de Mari I/2, 1988, 277-280: ARM XXVI 409 [A.4001+M.14046] 
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“man”) of Eluhut, and Šubram, the king (LÚ, or “man”) of Susā and “district 
governor” (LÚ šāpitum) of the city Šubat-Enlil. King Šukru-Tešub is furious because 
the king of Susā has claimed the town, and argues that “the men of Amaz” (lú.meš 
Amazayuki) have not appealed to king Šubram for an intervention.739 
 
ARM XXVI 409 [A.4001+M.14046] and ARM XXVI 435 [A.4884] provide evidence 
for “the men of GN” as more than a collective reference to the town’s inhabitants: 
“the men of Šuhpad” attempt to decide their own fate and negotiate terms with a 
regional overlord, king Atamrum. Further, “the men of Šuhpad” swear an oath to the 
king. In this sense, they are party to a treaty. In my opinion, this means that “the men 
of Šuhpad” refers to some kind of representatives of the community. However, the 
letter gives no indication to how such a treaty was made. This is a problem with 
several texts discussed so far: decisions are attributed to the “men of GN” but how 
they were made are not mentioned. Similarly, in ARM XXVI 435 [A.4884] “the men 
of Amaz” appear competent to appeal for assistance from neighbouring rulers. In the 
letter, king Šukru-Tešub is referred to as appealing to the wishes of “the men of 
Amaz” in order to back up his claim to the town. King Zimri-Lim, on the other hand, 
is not directly involved, it seems, but has the overarching authority in the region and 
acts as the balancing figure in the struggles between other kings for control of towns 
and cities. Who exactly king Šukru-Tešub appealed to, is difficult to establish, 
however. The same applies to how the appeal was made. 
 
In my opinion, ARM XXVI 409 [A.4001+M.14046] and ARM XXVI 435 [A.4884] 
are evidence that the people of individual towns, as a collective, could negotiate with 
outside authorities. How this was done, is not clear. The reference in ARM XXVI 409 
[A.4001+M.14046] to “the men of Šuhpad” (lú.meš Šuhpadayuki) may seem to indicate 
                                              
739 Charpin et al., Archives épistolaires de Mari I/2, 1988, 339-341: ARM XXVI 435 [A.4884] 
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that the entire town took part in reaching decisions. How the entire town reached a 
conclusion concerning their relations with powerful men in their region is not stated, 
however. It does not seem very likely that they all participated. The appeal of “the 
men of GN” was evidently a source of legitimation for intervention by outside forces 
like king Atamrum. This implies a local collective political identity for the town and 
the recognition of this identity by rulers in the region. How “the men of GN” were 
organised is not clear, however, and scholars are not agreed on how to solve this 
problem. 
 
The active role of “the men of GN” in the Mari correspondence is taken by some 
scholars as evidence for some form of popular power in the local communities of the 
Mari kingdom. André Finet emphasises the role of local powers in the Mari kingdom 
and claims that the citizens of certain cities and areas could accept, refuse of choose 
their sovereign.740 Indeed, as seen above, it appears that some towns and cities were 
actively negotiating relations with outside rulers. Also, it has been seen that local 
communities could present a sugāgum or “chieftain” to the king for ratification: this 
indicates that these leaders were pointed out locally (4.7.1). However, there are no 
clear indications to how such negotiations were made or who participated in making 
decisions. It is not possible to determine whether decisions were made by popular 
assemblies and Finet’s suggestion that the citizens of Mari communities were 
autonomous collectives cannot be said to be strengthened by the evidence discussed 
so far. The details surrounding the making of decisions are lacking, making it difficult 
to determine the degree of popular power 
 
The concept of popular power in the local communities of the Mari kingdom is 
controversial. Jean-Robert Kupper emphasises that there was no people’s power in 
                                              
740 Finet, “Y eut-il une democratie Mesopotamienne?”, 1982, 148-149 
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any community of the Mari kingdom. In his interpretation, local authority figures 
were all royally appointed governors and other officials.741 As has been shown in the 
discussion of the office of sugāgum (4.7.1), however, the local authority figures owed 
their power not exclusively to the king’s ratification, but to their standing in the local 
community. It does not appear that they could ignore the opinion of their own 
community. Rather, “the men of GN”, understood as the totality of the people of the 
town could make their opinion heard and kings would listen to them. However, there 
is no evidence to popular assemblies in these cities. Rather, there are indications that 
“elders” were a group of people with authority in tribes, towns, and cities, with 
influence over the appointment of the sugāgum. In the following, more evidence for 
“the elders” will be examined. Was this group behind decisions made in the local 
communities of the Mari kingdom? Were “the elders” the real “men of GN”? 
 
4.7.4 The šībūtmeš or “elders” 
The lúšībūtmeš or “elders” are frequently mentioned in the Mari correspondence, 
sometimes more specifically referred to as “the elders” of a tribe, a place, a city, or of 
“the land”. They clearly were some kind of local authority. Who were they? What 
were their areas of competence and authority? In the following, evidence for “elders” 
of pastoralist communities will be discussed, and then evidence for “elders” of towns 
and cities. As will be seen, “elders” of pastoralist tribes play an important role in 
negotiations between the king and local communities. The source of their authority is 
not clear, however. What were their relations with the central authorities? What was 
their standing in the local community? 
 
                                              
741 Kupper, “Les pouvoirs locaux dans le royaume de Mari,” 1982, 53 
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In ARM II 16, king Išme-Dagan of Ekallatum writes to his brother king Yasmah-Addu 
of Mari, reporting that he is making peace agreements throughout the land. He refers 
to “the elders” (awīl šībūtmeš) of Zalluhān who have approached him, and he has made 
them swear an oath to conclude the peace. 742 The text is fragmentary. 
 
In ARM III 65, the official Iaqqim-Addu writes to Kibri-Dagan, the governor of the 
city Terqa. He reports that Iridānum and ten “elders” of the Hana, “tent-dwellers”, are 
on their way to the king in Mari, and asks Kibri-dagan to notify the king.743 
 
In ARM IV 29, king Išme-Dagan of Ekallatum writes to his brother king Yasmah-
Addu of Mari concerning joyous news: military reinforcements have come to Šubat-
Enlil, the capital of their father, king Šamši-Adad. He has received report that “the 
elders of the land” (awīl šībūtmeš mātim) came at night and met with a certain Hāliya in 
Šubat-Enlil. They wanted to know what was going on, and whether they were to listen 
to the leader of the troops. Išme-Dagan is pleased because “the elders of the land” 
want to make peace with him.744 The text is fragmentary. 
 
In ARM IV 68, king Išme-Dagan of Ekallatum writes to his brother king Yasmah-
Addu of Mari concerning a revolt by the mātum, “land” Hiwilat and Talmuš. The king 
was approached by “the main personages” and “the elders of the land” (lú-meš we-
                                              
742 Jean, Lettres diverses, 1950, 42-43: ARM II 16; Durand, Documents épistolaires vol. II, 1998, 92-93 
743 Kupper, Correspondance de Kibri-Dagan, 1950, 86-87: ARM III 65; Durand, Documents épistolaires vol. I, 2002 
[1997], 590 
744 Dossin, Correspondance de Šamši-Addu et de ses fils, 1951, 50-53: ARM IV 29; Durand, Documents épistolaires vol. II, 
1998, 103-105 
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d[u*-tu]m* ù lú-meš šu-gi* ša mātim),745 but he refused their gifts. He is in good 
spirits, and bids Yasmah-Addu not to worry.746 The text is partly restored. 
 
These texts give the impression of “the elders” as being quite involved in several 
aspects of politics in the Mari kingdom. They negotiate peace. Also, they approach 
the king for talks, in order to bring information. Who were they? It could be argued 
that they are officials and that they perform tasks typical of officials, like going on 
missions for the king. However, the texts cited above all concern contacts between the 
royal sphere and the pastoralist communities of the steppe. Therefore, “the elders” 
appear to be representatives of the most powerful families of their tribes rather than 
royal officials. “Elders” among the tent-dwelling Hana are evident from ARM III 65. 
They are mentioned briefly, and it is not possible to say anything about their function 
or authority. In ARM IV 29, it appears that the pastoralist “elders” had authority 
separate from the king: they approach the man in charge at Šubat-Enlil to get 
instructions, but the king Išme-Dagan is pleased that “the elders of the land” are 
friendly towards him. In my opinion, this indicates that “the elders of the land” were 
not the king’s officials at all. It is not clear from the text whether they were sedentary 
or pastoralist “elders”. In ARM IV 68, “the elders of the land” attempt to make direct 
overtures to the king, albeit unsuccessfully. “The elders” act as authorities in their 
own right that could make peace agreements and go on diplomatic missions. “The 
elders” of the pastoralist groups do not appear to be royal appointees in the texts 
discussed above. Rather, they are involved in negotiations on behalf of their own 
communities, as representatives or envoys. Was this also the case with “elders” of 
towns and cities? This will be investigated in the following.  
 
                                              
745 lú-meš šu-gi is the Sumerian rendering of the Akkadian awīl šībūtmeš 
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ARM III 73 is a letter from Kibri-dagan, governor of the city Terqa, to king Zimri-Lim 
of Mari. Kibri-dagan has gone to the town Samānum after receiving report of a 
certain affair. He reproaches “the elders of the town” (šībūt ālim) and the hazannu, 
“chief of the district” about a reported affair. He says that such a person as the one 
involved in the reported affair should be sentenced to death by fire, both him and his 
family.747 The exact nature of the affair is not mentioned. 
  
ARM III 17 is a letter from Kibri-Dagan, governor of Terqa. He reports that “the 
elders of the city” (awīlumeš šībūt ālimki) pray to the god Dagan continually for the 
well-being of the king and his armies.748 
 
In ARM XIII 148, Yawi-El, the king of Talhayūm, writes to king Zimri-Lim of Mari 
and informs him that he has sent “the elders of the city” to the king with complete 
instructions (lúŠU.GImeš DUMUmeš ālimki taklutim ana gamratim)749 in order that the 
king may speak with them at leisure. He assures the king that they will provide all the 
information he will need.750 
 
                                                                                                                                           
746 Dossin, Correspondance de Šamši-Addu et de ses fils, 1951, 94-97: ARM IV 68; Durand, Documents épistolaires vol. II, 
1998, 118-119 
747 Kupper, Correspondance de Kibri-Dagan, 1950, 94-97: ARM III 73; Durand, Documents épistolaires vol. III, 2000, 
242-243 
748 Kupper, Correspondance de Kibri-Dagan, 1950, 32-35: ARM III 17; Durand, Documents épistolaires vol. III, 2000, 
121-122 
749  lúŠU.GImeš is a Sumerian rendering of the Akkadian term awīlumeš šībūt 
750 Dossin et al., Textes divers, 1964, 155: ARM XIII 148; Durand, Documents épistolaires vol. I, 2002 [1997], 461 
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A.2417 is a letter that also concerns events in Talhayūm. “The elders” (lú-šu-gi-
meš)751 report the death of the king of Talhayūm to king Zimri-Lim of Mari. Enemies 
have breached the city-wall during the night and killed him. “The elders” write to 
Zimri-Lim and ask for troops to protect them from further attacks. They also inform 
Zimri-Lim that they send a certain Asi-Nehim so that Zimri-Lim may make him their 
new king.752 
 
In these texts, there appears to be several different referents to the term “elders” of 
towns and cities: “the elders” in ARM III 17 are praying for the well-being of the 
king. By doing this, they can be said to act as community representatives. “The 
elders” in ARM XIII 148 are dispatched with instructions in order to talk to the king 
and give him information and thus appear to be a body of advisers to the king. It 
should be noted that they are not explicitly called a body of advisors, however. In my 
opinion, they do not appear to be formal officials; rather, they seem more like 
community representatives sent to the king so that he could talk with them as soon as 
he found the time. In ARM III 73, on the other hand, “the elders” are held responsible 
for local troubles together with the hazannu. According to the CAD, the title hazannu 
is rare in Old Babylonian documents, and was possibly used in the same sense as 
rabiānum, a “mayor” or “headman” of the town or city.753 Dominique Charpin 
suggests that hazannu in Old Babylonian is used of the local representative of a 
foreign king.754 At any rate, he appears in this text as an official with local 
responsibilities. In A. 2417, “the elders” request that the king of Mari appoint a new 
king over them. Thus, “the elders” had a certain local responsibility and wrote directly 
to the king with their requests. This indicates that “the elders” formed some kind of 
                                              
751 lú-šu-gi-meš is a Sumerian rendering of the Akkadian term awīlumeš šībūt 
752 Durand, “Les anciens de Talhayūm,” 1988, 98-101 
753 CAD H, 1956, 163-165 
754 Charpin, “Économie, société et insitutions paléo-Babyloniennes,” 2007, 175 
 323 
council in charge of the city together with local leaders. From the texts discussed so 
far, the position of “the elders” is difficult to determine. They are clearly local 
authorities of some sort, but their powers are ill defined in the texts. 
 
Daniel E. Fleming argues that the Terqa elders in ARM III 17 who pray for the well-
being of the king “clearly have some sort of local status not deriving from the royal 
court or administration”.755 I agree that there is nothing in the text to indicate that 
these “elders” were royal appointees. However, it could be argued that there is 
nothing in the text indicating that they were not, either. Praying for the well-being of 
the king may have been a communal responsibility. But that “the elders” performed 
tasks for the community does not rule out that they were part of the royal 
administration. The king could very well have been involved with “the elders”. This 
seems to be the case with “the elders of Talhayūm” in ARM XIII 148, who were 
dispatched to the king with instructions. However, they may be community 
representatives that are sent on a mission for a local king without necessarily being 
appointed by the king of Mari. There are not any texts to my knowledge that mention 
the royal appointment of “elders”.  
 
The king of Mari had his own advisory board, called pirištum, meaning “secret”.756 
However, this council cannot count as a parallel to the local “elders”, since it was 
based in the palace and not in the local communities. There is evidence that other 
kings were advised by “elders”, however. In A.1241, Habdu-Malik reports to Zimri-
Lim that he has written to Hammurabi of Kurdā concerning his absence from the 
taking of an oath, asking whether he has decided not to take the oath or “the elders of 
                                              
755 Fleming, Democracy’s ancient ancestors, 2004, 197 
756 Charpin, Edzard & Stol, Mesopotamien – Die altbabylonische Zeit, 2004, 260 
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the land” (lúŠU.GImeš) has put pressure on him not to go.757 Charpin argues that this 
letter is evidence that the people could put pressure on their sovereign through “the 
elders” in certain kingdoms, pointing to the city Kurdā, where the king follows the 
advice of “the elders” regarding diplomatic decisions.758 It might be argued that “the 
elders” in A.1241 were royal advisors and not the people’s representatives. However, 
“the elders of the land” appear to have had a more independent role than acting as the 
king’s advisors, since there is a parallel question of whether the king has reached a 
decision not to take the oath or “the elders” have put pressure on him not to go. In my 
opinion, communication between “elders” and the king cannot be counted as evidence 
that “the elders” were royal officials. Rather, their power appears to have been based 
in their status in their local communities. What was the authority of the local elders? 
 
In A.2417, “the elders” of Talhayūm dispatch a new candidate for leadership of their 
town to king Zimri-Lim to be made king. According to Jean-Marie Durand, “the 
elders” of the city of Talhayūm “représentent ceux qui exercent le pouvoir à un 
moment de vacance de la royauté”.759 In his analysis, “the elders” are stepping in for 
the king. However, it seems to me that “the elders” are doing more than that; they 
have selected the new king and sent him to be ratified. This important role played by 
“the elders” needs an explanation. In my opinion, “the elders” were a local decision-
making body of men of high status in their community that could rule in the absence 
of a local leader and appoint his successor, similar to the appointment of the sugāgum 
discussed above (4.7.1).  
 
                                              
757 Durand, Archives épistolaires de Mari I/2, 1988, 225-226: ARM XXVI 393 [A.1241] 
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759 Durand, “Les anciens de Talhayūm,” 1988, 112 
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Against an interpretation of “elders” as local authorities, Andrea Seri argues that 
“elders” who exercise power during a dynastic crisis represent special cases. She 
claims that the interregnum of “elders” does not say anything about the authority or 
composition of local powers. In her interpretation “rather than a municipal authority, 
the elders from Mari sources were royal officials engaged in military and diplomatic 
issues”.760 Contrary to Seri, Dominique Charpin argues that the frequent contacts 
between “elders” and the king of Mari are not because they were royal officials, but 
because the Mari kingdom was going through a troublesome period with local 
unrest.761 I agree with Charpin that “the elders” do not appear to be royal officials, but 
rather act as representatives of the local communities. How were “the elders” 
organised? 
 
Daniel E. Fleming suggests that the elders of Talhayūm are not a political body, but 
men who “take on themselves the responsibility to speak for the town”.762 This is, 
however, quite vague, and implies that the decision behind A.2417, a letter sent to 
Zimri-Lim, was taken by the town as a corporate entity with no mediating bodies 
between the town and the king. Fleming emphasises that “we must avoid importing 
any of the features of elite councils into our interpretation of Mari period polity unless 
compelled to admit them by overwhelming evidence”.763 In his interpretation of 
A.2417, it can be seen how this position leads him to draw strange conclusions, in the 
sense that he denies that there were any decision-making bodies in the local 
communities, while insisting that decisions were taken directly by the communities. I 
am unable to understand how a corporate strategy for power could be pursued except 
through some form of collective decision-making body.  
                                              
760 Seri, Local powers, 2005, 116 
761 Charpin, “Économie, société et insitutions paléo-Babyloniennes,” 2007, 176-177 
762 Fleming, Democracy’s ancient ancestors, 2004, 196 
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“The elders” of Talhayūm in A.2417 dispatch their new leader to king Zimri-Lim, and 
ask him to install their new leader, as well as to send troops to protect the city. They 
function as an authority in the absence of a local leader. Were they an ad hoc group 
that somehow took responsibility, or were they an institution of some permanence? 
This cannot be determined from the available texts. These is evidence from elsewhere 
in the Mari kingdom, however, viz. the twin towns Isqā-and-Qā , that may illuminate 
the role of “the elders” in the political structure of cities and towns, as will be seen in 
the following. 
 
ARM II 75 is a report from the twin towns Isqā-and-Qā. The writer of the report has 
heard that “the men of Isqā-and-Qā” (lú.mešIs-qa-a ù Qa-e-em) have been called up to 
go with provisions for ten days and help a certain Hammurapi.764 The reporter has 
therefore written to “the local leader” Yamrus-El and to “the elders of Isqā-and-Qā” 
(lùŠU.GI mešIs-qa-aki ù Qa-e-em). Like a single man, he writes, two hundred men, “the 
heads” (qaqqadū) of Isqā-and-Qā assembled. He addressed them “in their assembly” 
(ina puhrišunu), wanting to know what they were up to, and to which side they were 
turning: were they not “the servants” (wardumeš) of king Zimri-Lim of Mari? Why, 
then, he asks, did they go to the aid of this Hammurapi?765 The rest of the tablet is 
lost. 
 
ARM II 95 is a letter from the diviner Ašqudum and a certain Halihadum to king 
Zimri-Lim of Mari. They report that “the local leader” Niqmā-El and “the elders of 
                                                                                                                                           
763 Fleming, Democracy’s ancient ancestors, 2004, 176 
764 Of the city Kurdā, not Babylon, cf. Durand, Documents épistolaires vol. II, 1998, 172 
765 Jean, Lettres diverses, 1950, 140-143: ARM II 75; Durand, Documents épistolaires vol. II, 1998, 171-173 
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Qā” (awīl šībūtmešQa-a) came to them. They write that they have sent them to the king, 
in order that he may look into their business and then send them back.766 
 
Qā was a rather small and peripheral town. The statuses of the local leading figures 
Yamrus-El and Niqmā-El are unclear, but they may have been petty kings. They were 
apparently not the only authorities in the town. The assembly of two hundred “heads” 
(qaqqadū) is intriguing.767 Was this group and the lùŠU.GI meš, “elders”, local 
collective authorities? The authorities of the local leaders Yamrus-El and Niqmā-El 
are difficult to determine. Horst Klengel interprets the position of Yamrus-El and 
Niqmā-El as “Schēch bzw. Ortsvorsteher”.768 Jean-Marie Durand interprets them as 
kings.769 The suggestion of Klengel that they were sheiks implies that their title was 
sugāgum. Since Yamrus-El and Niqmā-El appear together with “the elders”, it seems 
likely that they were local leaders. Durand’s suggestion that they were kings is equally 
acceptable, however: a petty king could be conceived to be addressed together with 
“the elders”. Daniel E. Fleming points out that these leaders have no formal 
designation when they are mentioned in connection with “elders”.770 It seems 
nevertheless a fair assessment that they were kings. Their lack of titles in the texts is 
probably not significant. What is more intriguing, though, is the evidence for a body 
of two hundred “heads” of Isqā-and-Qā. It has been much discussed by scholars and 
even used as evidence for popular power in these towns: André Finet suggests that the 
city of Qā had a division of power between a local ruler loyal to the king of Mari, the 
elders and the vox populi of the townspeople.771 Who were “the heads?” The 
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interpretation of the term is disputed, making it dangerous to draw firm conclusions 
about the existence of a vox populi in Mari towns from this text alone. 
 
In the first publication of the letter as ARM II 75, qaqqadū or the “heads” was 
interpreted as élite troops.772 Andrea Seri supports the view that they were troops.773 
The military interpretation is not accepted by Daniel E. Fleming, who argues that they 
were heads of households.774 In his interpretation, ARM II 75 “provides a fairy 
elaborate picture of group decision making”.775 He suggests that “behind the lú.meš GN 
formula may lie a variety of decision making bodies, in that case even two, with an 
individual and elders followed by a gathering of “heads””.776 Dominique Charpin also 
suggests that “the heads” are an élite group, separate from “the elders”.777 
 
Fleming and Charpin in my opinion may be over-interpreting ARM II 75: the gathered 
“heads” are not making decisions; they are addressed by an official and asked about 
their loyalty. “The elders” of Qā, however, do appear to have authority in the town. 
They appear to work together with the local leader of the town. Thus, to me it seems 
evident that local collective bodies were involved in local decision-making, not as 
royal appointees, but as local representatives of the families of the community. 
Whether “the heads” formed a separate body of decision-makers cannot be 
determined, since the term qaqqadū is not attested in a context that describes their 
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actual role in the local community. There is another letter that mentions “heads” 
making decisions in a town, however. Perhaps this can clarify the meaning of “heads” 
in local communities of the Mari kingdom? 
 
ARM XXVI 365 [A.4849+M.9640] is a letter from Yārim-Addu to king Zimri-Lim. 
He reports of goings on in Kasalluk. A man from Mutiabal had been taken prisoner by 
Elamites, and regained his freedom on the promise to incite rebellion against 
Babylonia. He first went to Babylon and spoke with the king there, hiding his 
intentions. Then he went to Kasalluk. “The men of Kasalluk” (lú.meš Kasalluki) heard 
his plan and they agreed to write to the sukkal, or “ruler”, of Elam.778 Hammurapi of 
Babylon, however, soon received news of what was transpiring and sent people to 
Kasalluk to investigate. The rumours were confirmed, and Hammurapi summoned 
“the heads of the men of Kasalluk” (lú.meš qaqqadāt Kasallukki) and offered them to 
send their grain and straw, sons, and daughters to Babylon for safety, while the rest of 
the people stayed in their houses in Kasalluk and the sheep grazed in their countryside 
(mātum). They agreed and went home. Hammurapi sent 6000 troops and ships to take 
away their people (nišū). However, when news arrived from Elam, they all turned 
against Hammurapi and killed those true to him. Hammurapi dispatched a punitive 
mission. It was barred on the way by troops from Mutiabal, but they were victorious 
in the end.779 
 
                                              
778 For sukkal as a royal title, cf. Potts, The archaeology of Elam, 1999, 162-163 
779 Charpin, Archives épistolaies de Mari I/2, 1988, 166-168: ARM XXVI 365 [A.4849+M.9640]  
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There is another letter relating to this episode, ARM XXVI 365-bis [M.13716], which 
states that troops have deported the population of Mutiabal, destroyed their houses 
and burned them.780 
 
According to Daniel E. Fleming, Mutiabal is the tribal population of the town 
Kasalluk. He interprets “the heads of Kasalluk” as synonymous with “the 
Kasallukites” or citizens of Kasalluk. He reconstructs the “social framework into 
which such “men” would have to fit”: Kasalluk was a settled town with a collective 
land around it where the sheep graze. “The heads” have houses where they produce 
grain and they have people dependent on them.781 Fleming regards this as evidence 
that “the heads” were “indeed heads of households”.782 
 
In my opinion, the interpretation of qaqqadū as a local group of leaders, rather than as 
élite troops, is strengthened by the information in ARM XXVI 365 [A.4849+M.9640]. 
It seems evident that “the heads” were a group with authority and power that was 
regarded by foreign rulers as capable of making decisions for the community. They 
apparently made decision together with the rest of “the men of Kassaluk”, making it 
probable that this smaller group of decision-makers had the trust of the rest of the 
people of the town and acted as their representatives. Thus, it can be concluded that 
collectives of “elders” or “heads” were important decision-making groups. They do 
not appear to have been identical to “the men of GN”, but to have formed separate 
groups in their communities. 
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4.8 Strategies for power in local communities of the Mari 
state 
In the letters from Mari, there are negotiations between community representatives 
and the king. Towns and cities appear to enjoy a degree of local autonomy. This also 
applies to pastoralist groups. There are no clear indications that local assemblies were 
institutionalised, or played a formal role in politics. There is evidence for puhrum in 
the sense of “assembly”, but this kind of gathering does not seem to have been a 
formal corporation with defined powers. Perhaps other terms for “assembly”, 
tahtamum or rihsum indicate more permanent institutions, but this is doubtful (cf. 
4.7.2).783 The terminology in the letters discussed above is opaque. Behind the terms 
lúšībūtmeš, “elders”, and LÚmeš GN, “men of GN”, local levels of decision-making are 
discerned that were not directly controlled by the king or his officials. “The elders” 
pursued a narrow corporate strategy for power. They were powerful men in their 
home communities that cooperated with the king and his officials. However, they 
were loyal to their own communities and had their power-base in their local status 
among their peers, and not from their appointment by the king.  
 
Communities negotiated their position with external authorities from a local level as 
collectives, sometimes explicitly through the elders of the community. The king of 
Mari appear as a rallying figure for several local communities, pastoral as well as 
settled, in a confederation of groups and towns centred on the palace in Mari. The 
king’s role as mediator between the communities of his kingdom is seen in his careful 
handling of business between the sedentary and pastoralist groups in the kingdom. 
The pastoralists were as much a part of the Mari state as the towns and cities. The 
local communities were integrated into the kingdom, but also made many local 
decisions and were not regularly controlled by royal officials. 
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The people are not visible as active participants in decision-making, although the 
collective of citizens are referred to as having decided on a number of issues. In my 
opinion, it is likely that “the elders” reached decisions in the community, since they 
are mentioned as an active and powerful group, responsible for the appointment of 
new leaders and being sent on missions for the king. However, these decisions were 
probably taken in public, as seen in the frequent mention of assemblies, also out in the 
steppe. Thus, people were informed and could presumably voice their opinion at “the 
assembly”. Their representatives, “the elders”, together with their local “chieftain” 
probably had the final word, however. Intriguing about the Mari kingdom, is that the 
local communities are seen to not only reach legal decisions, but also to actually make 
political decisions on war and peace and act as autonomous collectives of citizens, 
under the leadership of heads of households or other locally entrusted people. 
 
4.9 Conclusions 
In the evidence to local decision-making in Old Babylonian network states 
investigated in this chapter, it can be seen that much information is missing. It is not 
possible to determine in detail who participated in decision-making bodies or how 
local authorities were established. In particular, the relations between the local 
communities and the palace are difficult to determine. Therefore, firm conclusions 
cannot be drawn. However, it can be argued that local communities within network 
states tend to be characterised by a narrow corporate strategy for power pursued by 
community representatives, often referred to as “elders”. These community 
representatives exercised their power through councils that reached legal decisions as 
well as political decisions. Admittedly, there is more concrete evidence for political 
action by such corporations in Mari than in Babylon, but nevertheless, local councils 
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appear to have played an important role in the running of communities in both of 
these network states. 
 
In Babylon, the cities of the kingdom appear to have had a certain degree of 
autonomy, in particular regarding their legal systems. Local bodies made several of 
the legal decisions in the kingdom. However, it can also be seen that the local bodies 
were closely connected to the royal judges, so that the local system was integrated in 
the structure of the kingdom. It is indicative of corporate strategies for power that the 
citizens of the cities of the Babylonian network state were judged by their own and 
that decisions were made in public. It is also important that a significant part of legal 
decisions were made in collective bodies, with an open debate on the outcome of the 
case (cf. 4.3.3; 4.3.5). However, it is difficult to determine whether these collective 
bodies were large and inclusive or more restricted in their composition. 
 
From the Mari evidence, it appears that local communities were autonomous to a high 
degree. The communities, or more precisely “the elders”, could choose local leaders 
and the king accepted their candidates as local authorities. The local bodies 
cooperated with royal officials like the viziers of the king, but the king sometimes 
preferred to acts through local leaders, “the chieftains”, in order to maintain peace 
with the local communities (cf. 4.7.1). The local bodies of decision-making were thus 
to a certain extent integrated in the political structure of the kingdom, but also had a 
degree of autonomy and a local identity.  
 
Babylon and Mari were network states ruled by kings in the Old Babylonian period. 
However, in the Mari kingdom, the local communities were dominated by the 
decisions of “the elders”, who chose the local leaders. “The elders” could also at 
times rule the local communities on their own. These “elders” were probably heads of 
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households, and as such, the people can be said to be represented in the local 
decision-making bodies through these heads of households (cf. 4.7.4). In Babylon, 
local authorities were influential and appear to have been preferred to royal 
intervention (cf. 4.3.3-5). Thus, on a local community level, the people of Mariote and 
Babylonian towns, cities, and pastoralist camps had a potential influence, although 
this side to local politics is little documented. However, the heads of households can 
also be argued to represent a brake on popular participation in decision-making, since 
they were a group of distinguished individuals who made decisions for the 
community. In the clan-based societies of the Mari kingdom, paternal authority was 
probably strong, and the power of “the elders” must not be confused with popular 
power. However, the local communities of the Mari kingdom were not ruled by 
foreign officials imposed on them by the king. Rather, the kings were willing to use 
local decision-making bodies in order to rule their kingdoms and left many decisions 












5. Local powers in commercial cities and merchant 
enclaves 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I will investigate the organisation of the Assyrian merchant 
communities in Anatolia and the structure of the city-state Assur in the Old Assyrian 
period. I will also investigate the political structure of Ugarit in the Late Bronze age 
and relations between merchants and foreign kings, as well as between central 
authorities of the kingdom of Ugarit and local communities. These two polities are 
quite different, but they also share some features that make it useful to discuss them 
together. Scholars agree that Old Assyrian society had a high degree of sharing of 
power among the élite, an élite predominantly occupied with trade.784 In the kingdom 
of Ugarit, scholars have found that although the polity was centred on the palace, 
there were local communities with a certain degree of autonomy.785 Thus, there were 
groups with the power to make decisions outside the palace, in Assur and its colonies 
as well as in Ugarit. The importance of trade in both of these kingdoms invites a 
discussion of the political position of merchants and how they were organised. 
Although Assur’s trade was landbased and Ugarit’s trade was seaborne, they appear 
to have had powerful merchants as a common feature. In addition, for Ugarit, the 
relations between central authorities and the local farming communities of the 
kingdom will be investigated, to discuss how the kingdom was ruled and how local 
communities related to the central powers.  
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The political structure and culture of Assur and Ugarit will be analysed from letters, 
trade documents, and treaties to explore strategies for power pursued by the citizens 
and rulers. I will investigate evidence for local powers outside the palace and temples. 
To what degree was there a sharing of power in commercial cities between central 
authorities, merchants, and local communities? Who had a share in power? 
 
I will first discuss the evidence from Assur, and return to Ugarit in section 5.11. Old 
Assyrian trade was in the hands of experts. A merchant, DAM.GAR or tamkārum, 
either owned his own merchandise or transported it.786 The Old Assyrian merchants 
were organised in family firms and did not depend on the palace or other institutions 
for their funding. Several Near Eastern cities had a specially designated area, called 
the kārum, or quay, where the merchants worked. The term kārum was also used for 
the merchants’ quarter in landlocked cities, and was used in general to designate the 
merchants’ organisation as well as where they lived and worked.787 The Old Assyrian 
traders had their own organisations abroad, settled in permanent quarters or colonies, 
and these were also called, kārum. How were these communities organised? How 
were the relations between royal authorities at home and the merchant communities 
abroad? 
 
5.2 Assur and the kārum Kanesh 
In the first centuries of the 2nd millennium BCE, what is termed the Old Assyrian 
period, Assur was a city in the south of Assyria.788 It was situated on the Tigris, at the 
                                              
786 CAD T, 2006, 125-127 
787 CAD K, 1971, 231-237 
788 Veenhof & Eidem, The Old Assyrian period, 2008, 19-21 
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gateway southwards to Babylonia with connections to Anatolia to the west and Iran to 
the east.789 Inhabitants of Assur were involved in trade in materials and products from 
places far afield, notably lapis lazuli from Central Asia, tin probably also from Central 
Asia, and textiles from southern Mesopotamia that were traded for silver in 
Anatolia.790 Traders lived abroad in settlements inside indigenous cities and towns, 
but maintained contacts with Assur and were organised in family firms. Cuneiform 
texts found at the Assyrian merchant colony or kārum at Kanesh, modern Kültepe, in 
Anatolia show that there were several merchant families or houses in Assur.  
 
All the documented Old Assyrian merchant colonies were in Anatolia, in Cappadocia 
in modern Central Turkey, or underway between Assur and the Anatolian settlements. 
The merchant colonies were organised as a network of settlements established in 
close connection to, and integrated into, local cities and towns.791 The relations 
between the Assyrians and the local rulers of the communities where the merchant 
settlements were situated were regulated by treaties laying down taxes and other 
obligations for the merchants and guarantees for protection by the local authorities.792 
Texts from the Anatolian settlements include decisions made by the authorities of the 
merchant communities as well as in Assur and treaties with local authorities. These 
are important sources to the organisation of Old Assyrian society. 
 
The Old Assyrian main colony was at Kanesh, the hub in a network of ca. 30 
settlements. Almost all knowledge about Old Assyrian history is due to the finds of 
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cuneiform texts from the lower town of the ancient city Kanesh, modern Kültepe, in 
the vicinity of the town Kayseri in Turkey. Tablets from the archives of the Assyrian 
merchants were known to locals since ca. 1890, and the site was identified in 1925. 
Excavations by Turkish archaeologists started in 1948.793 The archaeological levels 
relevant for the present chapter are Kültepe level II and Ib, predominantly level II. 
Kültepe level II is ca. 1959 to 1835 BCE, and level Ib is 1800-1700.794 A fire at the 
end of level II preserved a high number of tablets in good condition.795 The amount of 
tablets dated to level II is huge. Klaas R. Veenhof estimates the number of tablets 
excavated at twenty thousand cuneiform tablets, from at least seventy different 
archives. The tablets record the activities of merchants for at least 85 years (ca. 1920-
1835 BCE), and reveals a large-scale, well organised caravan trade in tin and woollen 
textiles against silver and copper from Anatolia.796 There are also important texts 
from level Ib, viz. the recently discovered treaty texts that shed light on relations 
between local authorities, Assur, the merchants, and their colonies.797 These will be 
discussed further below (5.5.6). 
 
The Old Assyrian trade with Anatolia was organised in family firms, with the heads 
of the firms residing in Assur, while other family members took up more or less 
permanent residence in the colonies. Mogens Trolle Larsen has demonstrated that 
these family firms were fundamental in the structure of the Old Assyrian city-state 
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and its colonies, an interpretation that is accepted by most scholars today.798 How 
were the Old Assyrian city-state and it colonies organised? 
 
At the time of the first publication of the tablets from Kültepe, Die altassyrischen 
Rechtsurkunden vom Kültepe by Georg Eisser and Julius Lewy in 1930, scholars were 
convinced that Assur was the capital of a vast and powerful empire including parts of 
Anatolia.799 This view was accepted for a long time.800 However, when scholars 
realised the fundamental importance of trade for the Assyrian presence in Anatolia 
and the lack of a military presence, the idea of an Old Assyrian Empire was laid to 
rest.801  
 
In 1976, Mogens Trolle Larsen published a highly influential analysis of the evidence 
from Kanesh, The Old Assyrian city-state and its colonies that emphasises the 
commercial nature of much of Old Assyrian society, comparable to Medieval Genova 
or Venice.802 In Larsen’s interpretation, Assur in the Old Assyrian period was an 
oligarchic city-state, or merchant oligarchy, and the colonies were dominated by the 
heads of the important merchant houses.803 Larsen suggests that Assur was a self-
governed city, dominated by the institutions of kingship, “city-assembly” and year-
eponymy.804 In the Old Assyrian period, the city covered about 35 hectares with an 
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estimated population of 7-10.000 inhabitants at Assur and 2-4000 individuals were 
involved in the trade covered by the excavated archives.805 Was Assur an oligarchy? 
What were the conditions for popular participation in politics of the Old Assyrian 
city-state and its colonies? 
 
The bulk of discovered texts come from the merchant colonies, and nearly none come 
from the city Assur itself for the Old Assyrian period. This implies that much of the 
structure of Assur is based on indirect information, in particular reports sent to the 
colonies of decisions made in Assur. Much of the material from Kültepe is still 
unpublished and the bit kārim or “colony office” has not been excavated. However, 
this situation does not pose insurmountable problems, as long as the incompleteness 
of the available evidence is kept in mind. The political structure of Assur and its 
colonies in the Old Assyrian period has been reconstructed by Mogens Trolle Larsen 
and the economic institutions of the city-state has been further analysed by J.G. 
Dercksen.806 I will take their reconstructions as a point of departure in the following 
investigation. An extensive edition of the correspondence of the merchants of Kanesh 
in translation with commentaries has been published by Cécile Michel, facilitating 
comparative studies of the Kanesh material.807 The present discussion will focus on a 
selection of tablets already included in the current scholarly discussions of the 
political structure of Old Assyrian society. 
 
In the Old Assyrian texts, there are several terms that are difficult to translate. The 
term tamkārum in Old Assyrian covers “the owner of merchandise or the agent 
                                              
805 Larsen, “The Old Assyrian city-state,” 2000, 79 
806 Larsen, The Old Assyrian city-state, 1976; Dercksen, Old Assyrian institutions, 2004 
807 Michel, Correspondance des marchands de Kanish, 2001 
 341 
transporting it” as well as “creditor” in a business arrangement.808 I will use the 
translation “merchant” or “trader” throughout this chapter, for the sake of readability. 
The term kārum pl. kārū means “quay” or “port”, but in the Old Assyrian texts, it is 
used in the meaning “merchant colony” or “merchant settlement”.809 Kārum will be 
translated as “colony” and “merchant community” throughout this chapter. Other 
relevant Old Assyrian terms will be explained throughout. 
 
5.3 Assur, the king, and the eponym    
In the following, I will briefly present the main institutions of Assur and its colonies 
according to the analyses of Mogens Trolle Larsen and J. G. Dercksen of the texts 
from Kültepe,810 before investigating relations between the central and local 
authorities and the merchant communities.  
 
Assur was the main deity of the Assyrians, and that was also the name of their city. 
The king was high priest of the city god Assur. In theory, the god was ruler of the 
city, and the king was his steward. The king was known under several titles, among 
them rubā’um, “prince”.811 Larsen and Dercksen argue that the king was executive 
official of the ālum, “the city” or “city-assembly”, and used the title waklum when he 
wrote letters in this capacity.812 Waklum is a term meaning “overseer”, in the sense of 
person in charge of a group of soldiers, workers, or craftsmen. In Assyria, it is also 
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used as a royal title.813  The identification of the king with the waklum will be 
discussed below (5.5.4). The second most important official at Assur was the limmu. 
The year was named after him, preserved in lists of eponyms.814 The limmu is 
therefore referred to as the eponym by scholars. It is presumed that the eponym was 
chosen by lot, but how this process took place is unknown.815 As far as it is possible 
to tell from the Kültepe eponym list (KEL), the eponym was one of the merchants.816 
Mogens Trolle Larsen suggests that the eponym was elected from among the heads of 
the merchant houses.817 This suggestion is supported by Dercksen, who adds that 
since the king or other members of the royal family were among the eponyms, it is 
likely that the important families of Assur controlled this office.818 The limmu had an 
important position in Old Assyrian society. In Kt 92/k 491, the eponym is explicitly 
mentioned as sealing the verdict of “the city-assembly”.819 Thus, the eponym had a 
place in the most important decision-making institution of Assur. As can be seen from 
the letters of several officials, the king and his family were also merchants engaged in 
trade between Assur and its colonies.820 The king, the eponym, and “the city-
assembly” were apparently all merchants and power was shared among them. How 
this sharing of power was organised will be discussed further below (5.5). 
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The Assyrians in the Anatolian colonies lived far away from Assur and their king, but 
messengers travelled to and fro with verdicts of the authorities at home. Several of 
these verdicts are preserved on tablets, and they mention the šiprū ša ālim, “the 
envoys of the city”, that were sent from Assur to the kārū, or colonies. These tablets 
are important sources to the structure of decision-making institutions in Assur and the 
Anatolian colonies. At Assur, important decisions were taken by the ālum, “the city”. 
This is interpreted as “the city-assembly”, an institution vested with authority to pass 
judgement.821 However, as Dercksen points out, “the terminology is obscured by the 
use of the word Alum “City” to refer to the Assembly”.822 As will be seen below 
(5.5.4), it can be established with great probability that the ālum in Assur was an 
assembly, but whether it was a plenary assembly or a more restricted council is 
difficult to determine. The king and eponym participated in making decisions, as well 
as a group called “the elders”, as will be seen below (5.5.5), but the evidence for 
broader participation in “the city-assembly” is ambiguous and controversial.  
 
Decisions were taken in Assur concerning the kārum Kanesh and letters were sent 
reporting these decisions, indicating that Assur was closely involved in the business 
of the colonies. The kārum Kanesh was an Assyrian settlement in a native Anatolian 
context, and therefore the city-state Assur probably served as model for its 
organisation. Assur, however, had a king whereas the kārum Kanesh did not. The 
authority resting with “the city-assembly” at Assur suggests that the king shared 
power with representatives of the merchant families engaged in trade with Anatolia. 
Local powers in the colonies and in the city appear to have played an important part in 
the Old Assyrian state. What were the relations between Assur and its colonies? To 
what degree did the merchants abroad form autonomous communities? 
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5.4 Assur and its colonies 
There were two terms for Old Assyrian settlements in Anatolia. The term kārum or 
“colony” is used of communities of merchants living in enclaves in Anatolian towns 
and cities. There is also the term wabartum, thought to refer to “trading posts”, 
smaller settlements of Assyrians abroad.823 The Assyrian authorities sent envoys with 
tablets to the colonies, the šiprū ša ālim, “envoys of the city”. “City” always refers to 
the city Assur, either the place or “the city-assembly”. The envoys can therefore be 
regarded as messengers of “the city-assembly of Assur”. This “city-assembly”, the 
ālum, is constantly referred to in letters found at the site of the kārum Kanesh. What 
were the relations between “the city-assembly” and the merchants abroad? 
 
VS 26, 9 (VAT 9290) contains a report from a lawsuit in Assur against several 
merchants who had been dealing in certain textiles. The senders of the letter warn the 
recipient Pūšu-kēn not to become involved in the trade in these specified types of 
cloth. They also report that his house and children are well, and finish the letter with a 
warning: the orders of “the city Assur” are firm.824  
 
TC 1, 24, details among other things the arrangements made in Assur to despatch 
attorneys to the kārum Kanesh to attend to a law-suit. It also contains an order from 
“the city-assembly” to dispatch a certain Annali, who is to return to Assur to answer 
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charges. In closing, the letter relates details of investments done in Assur for trade, 
with reference to tablets stating the sums involved.825 
 
From these letters, it can be seen that “the city-assembly of Assur” were involved in 
the activities of Assyrian traders abroad. The inhabitants of the colonies continued to 
be part of the city-state of Assur. The authorities of Assur were obviously concerned 
about and committed to the Assyrian activities in Anatolia. “The city-assembly” 
interfered with fines against those who transgressed embargos of specified materials 
including different kinds of textiles. This can be seen in VS 26, 9 (VAT 9290), where 
there is a warning against becoming involved with trade in certain textiles. The text 
on this tablet demonstrates that the kārum Kanesh and all Assyrians in Anatolia were 
under Assyrian jurisdiction, making them part of the same political and juridical 
structure, although physically separated by close to a thousand kilometres. The tablets 
with these texts come from the site of the kārum Kanesh. How were the relations 
between Assur and the other colonies in Anatolia? 
 
BIN 6, 120 is a letter sent from the envoys of the city Assur and the kārum Kanesh 
together to all the other kārū, with instructions to give two named messengers 
protection and help to get from one kārum to the next.826  
 
KTP 14 is a letter sent from the kārum Wašušana to the envoys of the city Assur and 
the kārum Kanesh. The merchants at the kārum Wašušana report that a new prince has 
succeeded to the throne of Wašanīua and wishes to take the oath. They state, however, 
                                              
825 Larsen, The Old Assyrian city-state, 1976, 180, 184-185; Michel, Correspondance des marchands de Kanish, 2001, 
327-328 
826 Larsen, The Old Assyrian city-state, 1976, 248 n. 2; Michel, Correspondance des marchands de Kanish, 2001, 78 
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that the kārum Kanesh is their master, and urge them to send two men of the land and 
make the prince take the oath.827 
 
Chantre 11 is a letter from the kārum Zalpa addressed to the envoys of the city Assur 
and the kārum Kanesh. It reports that “a tablet of the city” had reached Zalpa.828 
  
The role of the kārum Kanesh in disseminating information from Assur to the other 
colonies is evident in the texts presented above. The texts suggest a hierarchy of 
settlements. In the tablet BIN 6, 120, authority is first with “the city-assembly of 
Assur”, next with “the envoys of the city Assur”, then with the kārum Kanesh and last 
with the merchants of the other kārū in Anatolia. This interpretation is corroborated 
by the letter KTP 14, where the kārum Wašušana calls the kārum Kanesh their master. 
The letter Chantre 11 seems to contradict the proposed hierarchy, since the kārum 
Zalpa received letters from Assur. Mogens Trolle Larsen argues that the letter 
Chantre 11 is evidence that letters might be sent directly between Assur and the other 
kārū, but points out that the kārum Kanesh was informed of such correspondence.829 
Indeed, Chantre 11 was found at Kültepe, indicating that the letter to kārum Zalpa 
was made known to the kārum Kanesh, apparently by sending them a copy. This again 
indicates that the kārum Kanesh was at the top of the hierarchy of Assyrian 
settlements, since they were informed about letters to the other kārū. It is at any rate 
clear that kārum Kanesh was the most important Assyrian settlement in Anatolia, 
because it is mentioned on par with “the envoys of the city Assur” in KTP 14.  
 
                                              
827 Larsen, The Old Assyrian city-state, 1976, 249-250; Michel, Correspondance des marchands de Kanish, 2001, 98 
828 Larsen, The Old Assyrian city-state, 1976, 248-249; Michel, Correspondance des marchands de Kanish, 2001, 106; 
Veenhof, Aspects of Old Assyrian trade, 1972, 292-293 
 347 
There was a hierarchy among the settlements abroad, but Assur was at the top of them 
all. The Assyrian settlements in Anatolia cannot be termed autonomous settlements, 
because they paid taxes to Assur, and the merchants abroad were held responsible for 
their actions in courts at home.830 An obvious argument for the authority of Assur 
over the settlements in Anatolia is the high frequency of references to “tablets of the 
city”: a dīn ālim, “verdict of the city” recorded on a tuppum ša ālim, “tablet of the 
city”, was apparently a valuable asset, as it is referred to by merchants in several 
letters as authoritative documentation of past verdicts and decisions.831 The 
importance of “the tablets of the city” indicates the central position of “the city-
assembly of Assur” in Old Assyrian society.   
 
Although frequently in contact with the authorities in Assur, in everyday life, the 
Assyrian settlements in Anatolia appear to have ruled themselves through their own 
institutions of collective decision-making. These institutions will be discussed below 
(5.5). The environment of the Assyrians abroad in Anatolia was urban. The Old 
Assyrian colonies were established as quarters or enclaves within Anatolian cities and 
towns. Klaas R. Veenhof argues that the Anatolian host communities were quite 
sophisticated city-states, capable of absorbing vast amounts of valuable merchandise 
brought by the Assyrians. He points out that the Assyrians were partly integrated in 
the social structure of the host communities, even taking Anatolian wives.832 In my 
view, this is a reasonable assessment of the social conditions of the Assyrians abroad. 
                                                                                                                                           
829 Larsen, The Old Assyrian city-state, 1976, 248-249, n.3 
830 Neşr. Boğ. 2 in Larsen, The Old Assyrian city-state, 1976, 267-268; Michel, Correspondance des marchands de Kanish, 
2001, 112-113; Kt 92/k, 221 in Michel, Correspondance des marchands de Kanish, 2001, 82-83  
831 CCT 3, 22b+22a in Larsen, The Old Assyrian city-state, 1976, 96; Michel, Correspondance des marchands de Kanish, 
2001, 349; TC 3, 99 in Larsen, The Old Assyrian city-state, 1976, 168; Michel, Correspondance des marchands de Kanish, 
2001, 354-355; TC 1, 46 in Michel, Correspondance des marchands de Kanish, 2001, 449; TC 2, 21 in Larsen, The Old 
Assyrian city-state, 1976, 181-182; Michel, Correspondance des marchands de Kanish, 2001, 452-453; CCT 4, 40b in 
Michel, Correspondance des marchands de Kanish, 2001, 502-503 
832 Veenhof, “The Old Assyrian merchants,” 1987, 147 
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The Assyrians evidently found liveable conditions in Anatolian towns and cities. They 
had contractual arrangements with the local rulers and had their own decision-making 
bodies. It is to these local powers I now turn, to investigate the political culture of the 
Old Assyrian city-state and its colonies. How were local decisions made and who 
participated in making them? 
 
5.5 Collective organs of decision-making in Old Assyrian 
documents 
Several texts from the tablets found at the site of the kārum Kanesh contain references 
to decisions taken by the ālum, “city”, the kārum, “colony” and the šībūtum, “elders”. 
These appear in the texts to be collective decision-making bodies, but due to the 
incompleteness of the evidence, their composition is difficult to ascertain. This also 
applies to their competence and powers. Some texts make references to decisions 
made in Assur, others to decisions made by the kārum Kanesh or other Assyrian 
settlements in Anatolia. What were the composition, power, and position of these 
collective organs of decision-making in the political structure of Assur and her 
colonies?  
 
Evidence for decision-making is most plentiful from the kārum Kanesh, mainly from 
legal texts and letters referring to trade, transactions and adjudication. Political 
decisions, i.e. decisions that concerned the whole community and groups or 
individuals that belonged to it, are also attested. Decisions appear to have been taken 
in plenary assembly as well as in smaller assemblies, but as will be seen, knowledge 
of these institutions is tantalisingly incomplete. Given the situation of the sources, 
interpretations of the political institutions in Assur are mainly based on knowledge of 
institutions at the kārum Kanesh. It is therefore expedient to start with an 
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investigation of the evidence for decision-making at the kārum Kanesh before 
discussing the structure of Assur.  
 
5.5.1 The statute texts and the kārum Kanesh “assembly of small 
and great” 
There are three very fragmentary texts, KTP 19, TC 1, 112, and TC 1, 123, which 
constitute what scholars have called the statutes of the kārum Kanesh .833 Since their 
first publication in the 1930’s, these texts have been regarded as the laws of the 
kārum Kanesh. They have little formally in common with other Mesopotamian law 
codes, however: the texts do not state what is allowed and what is forbidden or 
indicate the consequences of breaking the laws, but appear to lay down rules for 
procedure in reaching decisions. Therefore, I agree that the term “statutes” is more 
fitting than laws, and I will use it throughout the following discussion. The complex 
procedures for reaching decisions that emerge from the statutes are poorly 
understood, and it may be argued that the statute texts are too fragmentary to be used 
as a basis for reconstruction of the political or juridical structure of the kārum Kanesh. 
On the other hand, these statutes are practically the only comprehensive sources to 
decision-making in Old Assyrian communities. Therefore, the statutes will be used 
here as sources to the structure of Old Assyrian decision-making institutions, with the 
caveat that they are incomplete and that their interpretation is disputed. Who 
participated in decision-making at the kārum Kanesh? How were decisions made? 
 
In KTP 19 it is stated that if it is a matter for the assembly of saher rabi, “small and 
great”, the tupsarrum, “secretary” shall convene them in their “assembly”, puhrum. 
“The assembly of small and great” may only be convened when the majority of “the 
                                              
833 The texts referred to below are the collated texts in Larsen, The Old Assyrian city-state, 1976, 284-287 
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great” decides to do so. “The secretary” is not to convene the assembly at the request 
of just a single person. “The small” are not to take any initiative to convene the 
assembly. They are not to walk around in “the gate” of the kārum (KÁ kārim). After a 
break, the text continues, with rules for reaching a verdict concerning silver and gold, 
mentioning the merchants “in the assembly” (ina puhrim).834  
 
In TC 1, 112 there are rules for “the secretary” concerning how to divide a group of 
people at sessions of the assembly. The first group is divided into three groups for 
reaching a verdict. If they fail to solve the problem, the case is relegated to “the 
assembly of small and great”. This assembly is divided by “the secretary” into seven 
groups, and they will solve the case by majority vote.835 
 
TC 1, 123 is a very short fragment, but it mentions “standing up”, “joining together”, 
“at one place”. It also mentions “the secretary” and the bīt kārum, “office of the 
colony”.836 
 
The texts of the statutes are fragmentary and difficult to interpret. Scholars have used 
the texts to reconstruct an institutional framework for the kārum Kanesh: the bīt kārim 
or “office of the colony” and its “gate” is mentioned in the texts, understood as a 
complex where judicial proceedings took place.837 There, meetings were held by “the 
                                              
834 Driver & Miles, The Assyrian laws, 1935, 378-379; Eisser & Lewy, Die altassyrischen Rechtsurkunden, 1930, 336-340; 
Larsen, The Old Assyrian city-state, 1976, 284-285 
835 Driver & Miles, The Assyrian laws, 1935, 376-377; Eisser & Lewy, Die altassyrischen Rechtsurkunden,1930,  334-336; 
Larsen, The Old Assyrian city-state, 1976, 285 
836 Driver & Miles, The Assyrian laws, 1935, 378-379; Eisser & Lewy, Die altassyrischen Rechtsurkunden, 1930, 334; 
Larsen, The Old Assyrian city-state, 1976, 286 
837 Dercksen, Old Assyrian institutions,  2004, 101-102 
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great”. Dercksen suggests that they were the wealthiest merchants, who paid the 
dātum-contribution, a special tax paid to the colony authorities. They were exempt 
from a tax called šaddu’atum that the other merchants had to pay.838 The statute texts 
also mention meetings held by “the small and great”. In my opinion, it seems fair to 
suppose that “the assembly of small and great” was the whole community of 
merchants in the kārum Kanesh, i.e. a plenary assembly: KTP 19 states when to 
“assemble the small and great in their assembly” (saher rabi pahārum ina puhrišunu). 
The inclusion of all merchants, “small and great” indicates a plenary assembly. What 
does this imply? Was the colony ruled by all the merchants in common? 
 
The plenary assembly does not appear to have been in charge of the kārum Kanesh: 
TC 1, 112 gives rules on how to proceed to reach a verdict and describes what appears 
as two separate categories of merchants in the assembly, “the small” and “the great”. 
It might be argued that “small and great” is a case of merism, i.e. two parts denoting a 
whole. However, this makes no sense in the cases where certain actions are specified 
as undertaken by “the great”. Also, KTP 19 curtails the initiative of “the small”. 
Therefore, “the great” must have been more important than “the small”. These “great” 
merchants were probably the heads of wealthy merchant families. The formal division 
into two types of participants in the assembly might reflect a division of power into a 
more limited council of “the great” on the one hand, and a more inclusive assembly of 
“the great and small” on the other. However, it is probable that “the great” were the 
most powerful merchants, recognisable as those who paid the dātum-contribution, 
whereas “the small” were all the other merchants of the colony. Thus, “the great” 
appear not as a proboleutic council for the assembly, as much as an élite group. 
Whether “the great” was a closed élite in Old Assyrian society will be discussed 
further in section 5.6.  
                                              
838 Dercksen, Old Assyrian institutions, 2004, 112-113 
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It can be concluded that only one group is formally recognised in the statutes with 
rights to initiate sessions, viz. “the great”. “The small” did not have any separate 
authority except together with “the great” in the plenary assembly of “small and 
great”. In KTP 19, it appears that “the great” are in charge of “the office of the 
colony”, the bīt kārim, and that “the small” are not to linger by its gate. It is stated that 
“the small” are not to take initiative to gather the assembly. Thus, it can be argued 
from the statute texts that important business was reserved for “the great” and that 
those who did not share this status were barred from interfering. On the other hand, 
the plenary assembly was expected to reach decisions when cases were referred to it, 
and in this assembly, all the merchants of the colony apparently participated. The 
plenary assembly does not seem to have had the authority to take initiative on its own. 
On the other hand, the statutes state that decisions would be delegated to it when the 
majority of “the great” decided to do so (KTP 19) or when more restricted decision-
making bodies had failed (TC 1, 112). It should be pointed out, however, that the 
plenary assembly appears to have been divided into seven groups before a decision 
was reached. Thus, the decision-making processes of the colony appear to have been 
quite complex.  
 
That “the small and great” was an important institution can be seen in WAG 48-1465, 
a letter sent from Buzutāya in Assur to his brothers at the kārum Kanesh. He says that 
he has obtained “a tablet from the city” and wants it to be established in “the assembly 
of small and great” of the kārum Kanesh that it was this institution, and not himself, 
that had sentenced a certain person to prison. He asks that both the kārum Kanesh and 
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kārum Burušhattum write a letter stating that said person had been imprisoned for the 
illegal sale of meteoric iron by “the assembly of small and great”.839 
 
WAG 48-1465 was sent to private persons, but with a specific request that it be made 
known in “the assembly of small and great” that Buzutāya was not personally 
responsible for sending a person to prison. In my view, this indicates that “the 
assembly of small and great” was a plenary assembly one function of which was to 
constitute a public environment for making information known to the whole 
community. In WAG 48-1465, “the small and great” appears as the assembled 
community that can witness an official document, “a tablet of the city”, stating 
decisions reached by “the city-assembly” in Assur. 
 
There are also tablets that refer to the workings of “the small and great”. Kt 92/k 354 
contains a verdict of the kārum Kanesh “small and great”. The assembly has 
examined two witnesses concerning the testimony of a third person.840 Kt 92/k 555b 
contains a verdict of the kārum Kanesh “small and great”, concerning a dispute over 
debt. After securing the testimony of witnesses and the tablet stating the debts, the 
kārum will decide how the case shall be solved.841  
 
From Kt 92/k 354, it can be seen that the plenary assembly of the kārum Kanesh 
actually reached verdicts. Thus, “the great” did not make all the decisions in the 
community on their own. Kt 92/k 555b is evidence of the importance of the plenary 
                                              
839 Larsen, The Old Assyrian city-state, 11976, 90; Michel, Correspondance des marchands de Kanish, 2001, 300-301. 
There were embargoes on some materials, including the rare and valuable meteoric iron. 
840 Cayir, “Six documents containing decisions by the city assembly and the kārum Kanesh,” 2008, 117-118 
841 Cayir, “Six documents containing decisions by the city assembly and the kārum Kanesh,” 2008, 118-119 
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assembly in solving disputes in the merchant community. Indeed, the solving of 
disputes between merchants through arbitration appears to be an important function of 
the assembly. Rather than involving the king in Assur or “the city-assembly”, the 
merchants in Anatolia had the means to solve their own disputes locally. 
  
The plenary assembly does not seem to have been the highest authority in the kārum 
Kanesh. Rather, it is part of a political structure where initiative lay with a minority of 
wealthy merchants, “the great”. The evidence is ambiguous, however, and some texts 
indicate that the plenary assembly reached important decisions in the community. But 
it appears likely, in view of the emphasis on the authority of “the great” in the 
statutes, that this group was the most influential in the kārum Kanesh. Does this 
reflect the general structure of power in Old Assyrian society?  
 
5.5.2 “The small and great” outside the kārum Kanesh 
“The assembly of small and great” is mentioned in several letters that concern other 
Old Assyrian merchant colonies in Anatolia than the kārum Kanesh. , and also 
attested from other Assyrian merchant settlements in Anatolia. Interestingly, the 
letters do not mention “the great” as a separate authority, only “the small and great” 
together.  
 
TPAK 1, 44a is a letter sent from the kārum Kanesh, “the assembly of small and 
great” to the kārum Durhumit, “the assembly of small and great”. It concerns a 
request by the sons of three merchants that the documents of their fathers which are in 
the kārum Durhumit shall be opened and read, and then resealed by the kārum with its 
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seal and sent to the kārum Kanesh.842 The envelope of this letter is also preserved, 
TPAK 1, 44b; it is sealed by the kārum Kanesh, “the assembly of small and great”, 
and sent to the kārum Durhumit, “the assembly of small and great”.843 
 
KTK 1 is a letter sent by the kārum Kanesh to the kārum Burušhattum, “the assembly 
of small and great”, and concerns silver that has been deposited with a certain 
merchant. The rest of the letter concerns debt and charges against the family of the 
debtor.844 
 
KTK 3 is a letter sent to “the envoys of the city” and the kārum Kanesh, and was sent 
from “the assembly of small and great” of the kārum Wašušana, with a warning 
against letting the messenger of a local Anatolian prince interfere and make 
trouble.845 
 
Two of the letters presented above, TPAK 1, 44a and KTK 1 concern matters that are 
supposed to be discussed in public and made known to a number of persons. TPAK 1, 
44a is sent from the kārum Kanesh and addressed to the respective “assembly of small 
and great” of each kārum. This indicates that the plenary assembly was the proper 
public place for information to be made known to everyone as well as indicating that 
these plenary assemblies reached decisions concerning the merchants in the colony. 
KTK 1 mentions the kārum Kanesh as the sender and “the small and great” of kārum 
Burušhattum as recipient. Regarding this letter, it appears more likely that the office 
                                              
842 Michel, Correspondance des marchands de Kanish, 2001, 88-89 
843 Michel, Correspondance des marchands de Kanish, 2001, 89 
844 Larsen, The Old Assyrian city-state, 1976, 259; Michel, Correspondance des marchands de Kanish, 2001, 87-88  
845 Larsen, The Old Assyrian city-state, 1976, 251-252; Michel, Correspondance des marchands de Kanish, 2001, 98-99 
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of the colony at Kanesh, the bīt kārim, had written to the colony at Burušhattum, 
rather than the plenary assembly. The bīt kārim was probably controlled by “the 
great”, since “the small” were not supposed to linger at its gate (cf. 5.5.1, KTP 19). 
“The small and great” of the kārum Burušhattum are expected to deal with 
instructions concerning impending lawsuits or charges. KTK 3 was sent to “the 
envoys of the city” and the kārum Kanesh from “the assembly of small and great” of 
the kārum Wašušana, indicating that this assembly could speak for the community.  
 
In the letters presented above, there is no mention of separate action undertaken by 
“the great” or indication of a prerogative of “the great” for convening the assembly in 
the colonies outside kārum Kanesh. It appears that in Assyrian colonies outside 
Kanesh, decisions were reached by the plenary assemblies and that the plenary 
assemblies were the main authorities in these colonies. In the kārum Kanesh, on the 
other hand, the kārum is mostly mentioned as making decisions and sending out 
instructions, making it likely that the office of the colony was in charge. As seen 
above (5.5.1), the office of the colony appeared from the statutes to be have been 
controlled by “the great” merchants. It must be kept in mind that the kārum Kanesh 
was at the top of the hierarchy of Assyrian settlements in Anatolia, thus “the great” 
were not only dominating the kārum Kanesh, but also the rest of the settlements. 
Thus, although it does appear that “the small and great” was the highest authority in 
the settlements outside Kanesh, “the great” at the kārum Kanesh formed the highest 
authority in the Old Assyrian system of colonies in Anatolia. The reference to “a 
tablet of the city” in WAG 48-1465 above further demonstrates that Assur had the 
ultimate authority in cases concerning the merchants in Anatolia, thus detracting from 
local autonomy. This will be discussed further below (5.6). I turn now to further 




5.5.3 The šībūtum at kārum Kanesh and smaller committees 
“The great” and “the small and great” are not the only local authorities among the 
Assyrian merchants abroad that are mentioned in the texts from Kültepe. There are 
some texts that refer to šībūtum, “elders” of the kārum Kanesh. Who are they and 
what is their competence and powers? 
 
KTK 20 is a letter that mentions another letter sent from the kārum Kanesh to an 
Anatolian city or town. The writer of the letter reports that he had gone to a local 
official to say that “the elders” (šībūtum) had written to him.846  
 
KTP 4 is a letter sent to the kārum Kanesh from an individual whose name is lost. The 
text concerns negotiations with the king of the Anatolian city Kanesh. The writer of 
the letter has said to the king that “the elders give advice to the king and the envoys” 
(šībūtum ana rubā’im u šiprī imalikū), and asks why they interfere. He also reports to 
the kārum Kanesh that messages for the king of Kanesh arrive together with the 
present letter. 847 The tablet is broken. 
 
From these letters, it is not easy to gauge the competence or powers of the šībūtum or 
“elders” of the kārum Kanesh. Mogens Trolle Larsen suggests that there was both a 
council of elders and a primary assembly of all free men at the kārum Kanesh, “the 
assembly of small and great”.848 According to Larsen “it seems that the elders in 
                                              
846 Larsen, The Old Assyrian city-state, 1976, 165 n. 14 
847 Larsen, The Old Assyrian city-state, 1976, 262-263 n.39; Michel, Correspondance des marchands de Kanish, 2001, 95 
848 Larsen, The Old Assyrian city-state, 1976, 166 
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kārum Kanesh […] acted in some way as an executive body for the community”.849 It 
should be kept in mind that “elders” is not a term connected to age, but to authority 
and social standing. Thus, “the elders” can possibly have been synonymous with “the 
great” of the kārum Kanesh. This is difficult to determine, however. “The elders” in 
Old Assyrian society will be discussed further below (5.5.5). 
 
As was seen from the statute texts (5.5.1), the political structure of the Assyrians 
abroad was complex. It does not appear to have been a simple bipartite structure with 
a council of elders and a plenary assembly. This is also seen in other texts from the 
kārum Kanesh. In addition to the decision-making bodies I presume to be hiding 
behind the terms “the great”, “the elders”, and “the small and great”, there are several 
other terms from the correspondence between Assur, the kārum Kanesh and the other 
Assyrian settlements in Anatolia that seem to cover local decision-makers. It is not 
clear whether all terms apply to a formal body or institution. Of the smaller bodies 
mentioned in the texts is the so-called “group of ten”, ešartum. Cécile Michel 
suggests that this was a kind of committee of ten people and that every kārum 
throughout Anatolia had one.850 In Assur and the kārum Kanesh, there were also 
committees that are referred to as a “group of five” hamištum; according to Mogens 
Trolle Larsen, these were independent and permanent bodies, and may have 
functioned as courts.851 These assessments seem reasonable to me, as the number of 
people involved indicates a limited body of people, perhaps committees or courts. 
Mention of their activities in the letters of the merchants is evidence that they were 
involved with the business of the merchants and the city authorities. 
 
                                              
849 Larsen, The Old Assyrian city-state, 1976, 165 
850 Michel, Correspondance des marchands de Kanish, 2001, 114 
851 Larsen, The Old Assyrian city-state, 1976, 166 
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It is evident that the structure of the Old Assyrian colonies was rather complex. “The 
great” initiated proceedings and acted as an executive body in the plenary assembly. 
This may also have been the case with “the elders” Also, there were committees of a 
limited number of people that appear to have made decisions in certain cases. 
Through “the assembly of small and great” the merchant community had a degree of 
autonomy and collective authority. What this can tell us about the political culture of 
the Old Assyrian city-state will be discussed further below (5.6). I will now leave the 
institutions of the colonies and turn to “the city-assembly” and “the elders” of Assur. 
 
5.5.4 ālum – “the city-assembly of Assur” 
The statute texts and letters discussed above (5.5.1-3) hint at a complex system of 
committees and assemblies for making decisions concerning trade and for arbitration 
in the colonies. Unfortunately, for the working of the ālum, “the city-assembly of 
Assur”, the evidence is less plentiful.852 Its decisions are known, referred to in letters 
or mentioned as “tablets of the city”, but the processes by which they were reached 
are obscure. There are very few sources from Assur itself in the Old Assyrian period. 
Instead, information about “the city-assembly of Assur” must be gleaned from private 
letters on tablets found at Kültepe. In the following, the composition and political role 
of the ālum, “the city-assembly of Assur” will be investigated. 
 
In several of the tablets found at the site of the kārum Kanesh, there are references to 
decisions reached by the ālum, “city”. It is not known how frequently the ālum 
convened. There are hints at where it convened, but it is difficult to establish the size 
of the assembly or who participated in its sessions. J.G. Dercksen suggests that the 
                                              
852 There is a parallel use of ālum in the sense of “assembly” in the Old Babylonian period, cf. 4.3.3. In my opinion, in view 
of the importance of decisions made by the ālum in the texts found at the kārum Kanesh, the interpretation of ālum as “the 
city-assembly of Assur” seems a reasonable assessment. 
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“Assembly of the city” consisted of “a selected group of citizens”.853 On what criteria 
these were selected is not clear, however. As will be seen in the following, it is likely 
that they belonged to the élite, since the king appears to have been a regular 
participant at the meetings of the ālum. What were the relations between the king of 
Assur and the ālum? 
 
The relations between “the city-assembly” and the king are obscured by a confusing 
terminology for the king as well as for the assembly. I will discuss the king and his 
titles first. As will be seen below, several tablets mention decision reached by ālum u 
rubā’um, “the city and the king”. Also, several letters sent from Assur to kārum 
Kanesh, reporting decisions by the ālum, are sent by the waklum. Was this the same 
person as the king? As mentioned above (5.3), waklum means “overseer”: it is the 
Akkadian rendering of the Sumerian term, or more precisely, title UGULA, 
“overseer”. Dercksen points out that waklum was an old title used in the Ur III period 
(2012-2004 BCE).854 He argues that it is used of only one person in the texts from 
Kültepe and that this person was the king.855 Mogens Trolle Larsen is also convinced 
that the person behind the title waklum was the king.856 He argues that “the waklum 
was the man through which the orders of the city-assembly were communicated, and 
it seems very probable that he functioned as the chairman of the assembly”.857 
Dercksen agrees with this interpretation and adds that the eponym (limmu) also had a 
seat in the assembly.858 These seem to me reasonable interpretations; I find it 
plausible that it is indeed the king who is mentioned as making decisions together 
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with “the city” (with the title rubā’um) as well as sending letters to the colonies (with 
the title waklum). Also, because the eponym (limmu) was such a prominent official in 
Assur that the year was named after him, I find it convincing that he participated in 
the ālum. It therefore seems to me a reasonable inference that they both had seats in 
“the city-assembly”.  
 
The waklum was probably the king acting as chairman of “the city-assembly”. 
Admittedly, in several of the letters from the kārum Kanesh, the decisions reached by 
the ālum are called dīn ālim, “a decision of the city”, with no mention of the king or 
the eponym. Thus, the presence of the king and eponym has to be inferred. However, 
the waklum is mentioned as sending some of the letters containing “verdicts of the 
city” to the colonies. The letters that refer to decisions reached by “the city-assembly 
and the king” (ālum u rubā’um) surely indicate that the king in Assur took part in the 
decisions of “the city-assembly”. In all probability, then, the waklum, or “overseer” 
and the king are identical.  
 
I will now investigate evidence for the ālum’s activities. Kt 79/k, 101 is a letter 
containing an annulment of former instructions by the ālum concerning the buying 
and selling of gold. The waklum rectifies a letter sent previously in accordance with a 
law written on a stele in Assur that allows Assyrians to sell gold to each other, but 
makes it forbidden upon pain of death to sell it to Akkadians, Amorites, or 
Subarites.859  
 
Kt a/k, 394 is a letter sent by the waklum and contains a verdict of the ālum with 
reference to the law inscribed on a stele in Assur. The partners involved in a failed 
                                              
859 Michel, Correspondance des marchands de Kanish, 2001, 64-65 
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investment are summoned back to Assur to settle their accounts; the invested silver is 
to be collected in Anatolia and delivered untouched at Assur.860  
 
Kt n/k, 1570 is a letter from the waklum and refers to a verdict by the ālum made in 
the hamrum, “the sacred precinct” 861 of the god Assur. The verdict is that the caravan 
of Kurub-Ištar shall recuperate the losses of a group of people, in accordance with the 
stele.862 Kt b/k, 180, likewise refers to a verdict by the ālum in the hamrum; that a son 
has sent an attorney to kārum Kanesh to obtain the blood price for his dead father.863 
ICK 1, 182, also refers to the ālum meeting in the hamrum, where they reached the 
verdict that a person will dispatch an attorney to kārum Kanesh to conduct 
business.864  
 
Kt c/k, 1010 is a letter sent by the waklum that refers to a place of meeting for the 
ālum, in front of the gišKAK.EN.GAL, a “dagger”, in the holy place of the god Assur. 
The case concerns lost property. A certain Aššur-tāb is to swear an oath before the 
dagger of the god Assur that he has lost 36 pieces of cloth with no fraud on his part. 
The case will then be settled by the ālum between the others involved in this failed 
trading venture.865  
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From these letters, it appears evident that the ālum and waklum were involved in the 
business of the merchants to a high degree: “the city-assembly and the king” can be 
seen to interfere in lawsuits and business transactions, and the ālum evidently had 
authority over the colonies in Anatolia and the merchants there. Larsen suggests that 
ICK 1, 182 might be a case where the assembly in Assur has empowered somebody to 
search the house of a deceased merchant in the kārum Kanesh.866 The decision 
referred to in the letter indeed appears to involve the empowering of a person in order 
for him to interfere in the kārum Kanesh. It is of note that this was decided upon 
centrally, in Assur.  ICK 1, 182 demonstrates that the authorities in Assur had a 
degree of control over the kārum Kanesh. Also, the text indicates that families 
involved in trade had some members resident in Anatolia, and others resident in 
Assur. Apparently, the merchants or their family firms had goods and silver stored at 
home in Assur, which perhaps explains their compliance with the authorities at home. 
The trade with Anatolia was obviously of utmost importance for the Assyrians: not 
only the merchants, but the whole city including its ruler appears to be engaged in 
matters concerning trade with Anatolia. 
 
Some of the verdicts of “the city-assembly” mention the eponym (limmu): Kt 92/k 491 
contains a verdict by “the city-assembly” given “before the two šugariānums867 in the 
sacred precinct” of Assur, concerning rent from a house. A document with “a verdict 
of the city”, sealed by the eponym (limmu), concerning a sum paid for a house and a 
tablet with other acquired items is to be sealed by “the king” (rubā’um), and they will 
go into “the city hall” or “house of the city” (ana É ālimki). After a year, one part 
involved in the case is to appear before “the city” and the case will be solved. If they 
                                              
866 Larsen, The Old Assyrian city-state, 1976, 178  
867 According to Black, George & Postgate, A concise dictionary of Akkadian Š, 2000, 380, this is a term for a metal tool, 
used as symbol in Old Assyrian judicial proceedings. 
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do not appear, the other part involved will appear before “the city” and “the city” will 
give instructions on how to solve the case.868 
 
Kt 92/k 491 shows that the eponym and the king took part in the proceedings of “the 
city-assembly”. The verdict of “the city-assembly” was sealed by the eponym and the 
king and was kept in “the house of the city”. It is interesting to note that “the city-
assembly” was responsible for laying down procedures for arbitration between 
members of the community. 
 
The term for verdicts of the ālum that were sent to kārum Kanesh is always dīn ālim, 
“a decision of the city”. This indicates that the decisions referred to by the waklum or 
“overseer” are those taken by the ālum, as a “city-assembly”, and not by the king 
alone. What does this say about the political structure of Assur? Mogens Trolle 
Larsen points out that “the authority to pass judgement was vested in the city-
assembly”.869 This conclusion is indeed borne out by the copious evidence for 
adjudication by the ālum and the importance of the “tablets of the city” in matters in 
kārum Kanesh. “The city-assembly” was evidently important for the running of the 
Old Assyrian city-state and its colonies. However, did the assembly have political 
power?  
 
In the interpretation of Cécile Michel, “the city-assembly” retained the fundamental 
power in the community, whereas the king’s role was to execute its decisions. 
According to Michel, “the city-assembly” decided on foreign policy, relations with 
the colonies and with foreign powers. It controlled trade and acted as a court of law 
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for the merchants abroad.870  Further, Michel claims that “the city-assembly” 
deliberated on matters economic and juridical, and reached decisions of a political 
nature, exemplified by a decision concerning the building of city-walls.871 The 
decision concerning the city-walls is mentioned in the letter TC 1, 1, to be discussed 
below (5.5.5). The interpretations of Cécile Michel are supported by Dercksen, who 
argues that the ālum “had a political dimension: it controlled the protectionist trade 
policy and probably also formulated it”.872 Thus, scholars agree that “the city-
assembly” was an important political institution in the Old Assyrian state. 
 
The ālum indeed appears to have had great authority: important decisions and 
instructions from Assur are made known to the merchant colonies abroad, in the form 
of a dīn ālim, “a verdict of the city”. The ālum appears to have functioned as a “city-
assembly” with regards to adjudication. It acts as the collective voice of the city, with 
much authority. As will be discussed below (5.5.6), there are a few treaty-texts from 
kārum Kanesh period Ib that indicate that the collective authority of the king, the 
eponym and selected merchants was a powerful political force. It could be argued that 
the evidence for political powers in the texts discussed above is less conspicuous than 
the evidence for the ālum’s interests in business and adjudication. However, the 
interest of the ālum in foreign politics will be made clear below, from the treaty-texts 
(5.5.6) as well as in internal politics, as seen from the letter TC 1, 1 (5.5.5).  
 
It is of note that there are references in some letters to decisions recorded on stelae in 
Assur. These decisions are mentioned separately from the decisions reached by the 
ālum. Were these decisions made by “the city-assembly” on an earlier occasion or 
                                              
870 Michel, Correspondance des marchands de Kanish, 2001, 58 
871 Michel, Correspondance des marchands de Kanish, 2001, 76 
872 Dercksen, Old Assyrian institutions,  2004, 77 
 366 
were they the decisions of the king? Klaas R. Veenhof suggests that laws were 
created from verdicts of “the city-assembly” that were later written on a stele.873 In 
my view, it does seem likely that “the city-assembly” had made these decisions, as no 
other authority is mentioned making decisions concerning business and trade 
restrictions. No stele with such inscribed laws has been found at Assur, but the 
references indicate that it once existed. In my view, the indication that decisions of 
“the city” were written down for future reference is further evidence to the power of 
“the city-assembly”. It does not appear that the laws on the stele were made by the 
king. As seen above (5.4), references to embargos or trade restrictions, like VS 26, 9 
(VAT 9290) show that the ālum was the authority behind trade restrictions, not the 
king alone. 
 
The hamrum, or “sacred precinct”, of Assur is mentioned in connection with oaths 
and meetings of “the city-assembly”. Where was this? Jesper Eidem suggests that this 
was a separate place in or by the temple of Assur where oaths were taken.874 This 
seems to be a reasonable suggestion. Also mentioned is the taking of oaths before the 
dagger of the god Assur in letters concerning adjudication, as seen above. The 
hamrum probably refers to a part of the sanctuary of Assur. Therefore, it makes sense 
to have oaths taken there. Whether oaths were taken at the gate of the sanctuary or 
inside is not clear. However, “the sacred precinct” of Assur may indicate not only a 
holy place, but also a public place. Where meetings of “the city-assembly” were held 
in Assur is not usually stated in the texts. Larsen suggests that ordinary court meetings 
in Assur were held at the Stepgate. 875  The Stepgate (mušlālu) is mentioned in a text 
called the Erišum-text (=Kt. a/k 353+Kt. a/k 315).876 According to Larsen, this text 
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combines a building-inscription for parts of the Assur-temple and a stele-inscription 
set up at the Stepgate. 877 In the text, there are descriptions of the building of different 
parts of the temple of Assur, including expensive embellishments. 878 There are also 
elaborate curses condemning him who tells a lie in the Stepgate or gives false 
testimony.879 According to Landsberger and Balkan, the publishers of the text, the 
Stepgate was part of the Assur-temple, probably a monumental gate to the temple that 
functioned as entrance and forecourt.880 This seems to me a reasonable suggestion, 
since the Stepgate is mentioned in the text as part of the temple building.881 The fact 
that sessions of “the city-assembly” and court-sessions are said to have been held at 
“the sacred precinct” of Assur at least occasionally, as well as at the Stepgate, may 
indicate that their meetings were public. Of course, it could be argued that the 
sessions at “the sacred precinct” of Assur were held inside the temple, but in my 
opinion, the taking of oaths indicates that the sessions were public, in order for 
everyone to witness the oaths being taken. The taking of oaths was an important part 
of judiciary proceedings, in order to ensure fair dealings in court. This can also be 
seen in the Erišum-text, where elaborate curses are supposed to prevent the telling of 
lies in the court that met at the Stepgate. If the suggestion that the Stepgate was the 
entrance to the temple of Assur is correct, the public nature of court-sessions in Assur 
seems securely attested. 
 
Who participated in the assembly, other than the king, the eponym, and the wealthiest 
merchants? Before trying to answer this question (5.6), the evidence for “elders” at 
Assur (5.5.5) and the treaty texts from period Ib (5.5.6) will be discussed. As will be 
                                              
877 Larsen, The Old Assyrian city-state, 1976, 150 
878 Landsberger & Balkan, “Die Inschrift des assyrischen Königs Īrisum,”1950, 224-227 
879 Landsberger & Balkan, “Die Inschrift des assyrischen Königs Īrisum,”1950, 227-229 
880 Landsberger & Balkan, “Die Inschrift des assyrischen Königs Īrisum,”1950,  232-234 
881 Cf. Kt. a/k 353+Kt. a/k 315, 5-9 
 368 
seen, much of the debate on the composition of “the city-assembly” concerns the 
identification of “the elders” and the parties to the treaties between the Assyrians and 
cities in their area of interest. 
 
5.5.5 The šībūtum at Assur 
The šībūtum, “elders”, at Assur are attested in a few letters sent to the kārum Kanesh 
from Assur. Their identity is difficult to establish. Similar to the šībūtum of the kārum 
Kanesh discussed above (5.5.3), they appear to be an important body of people. Were 
the šībūtum of Assur identical to the ālum, “the city-assembly”?  
 
TC 1, 1 is a letter that was sent from Assur to kārum Kanesh by the nībum, a kind of 
Assyrian official,882 who reports that there is a demand for 10 minas of silver from the 
kārum Kanesh for the building of city-walls at Assur. The request for silver was 
decided by the ālum. The nībum reports that the šībūtum had planned to send a 
messenger (šiprum) to Anatolia in order to demand the silver, but this messenger had 
not been sent. Further, he reports that he had stopped the dispatch of the messenger of 
“the elders”, in order not to incur even more costs for the kārum. He urges the kārum 
Kanesh to send the silver for the city-walls straight away, so that the šībūtum will not 
complain. The kārum Kanesh is to inform the other kārū, in accordance with “the 
tablet of the city” (tuppum ša ālim). The kārū must hear “the tablet of the king” 
(tuppum ša rubā’im) and pay. If no silver is sent for the city-walls, the expenses will 
be covered from the funds the kārum Kanesh have at Assur.883  
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TC 1 18 is a letter from Aššur-idī in Assur to Aššur-nadā. Aššur-idī says he has asked 
the šībūtum, or “elders”, but they will not let him have any donkey. He urges Aššur-
nadā to depart quickly upon receiving the letter and go to the kārum, arrange his 
business and send him silver from there.884 
 
The relations between the ālum and the šībūtum in TC 1, 1 are difficult to establish. 
The letter was sent to the kārum Kanesh by the nībum, apparently a kind of official or 
body of officials at Assur. The exact meaning of the term nībum is not established, 
but scholars have suggested “spokesman”.885 J. G. Dercksen does not accept the 
interpretation of the nībum as the colony’s representative or spokesman in Assur. He 
suggests that “nibum may rather have been the designation for the office or group of 
officials within the City Hall specifically concerned with financial matters”.886 The 
exact responsibilities of this official or body of officials do not affect the present 
discussion, however. The function of the nībum in TC 1, 1 is to inform the kārum 
Kanesh of costs incurred and to urge them to pay quickly in order to avoid even more 
costs. In my opinion, it is therefore likely that the nībum was a point of contact 
between Assur and the merchants in Anatolia. In TC 1, 1, the nībum appears to show 
concern for the interests of the merchants of the kārum Kanesh in Assur. Whether this 
means that the nībum was their representative in Assur, remains open to 
interpretation. 
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TC 1, 1 and TC 1 18 are intriguing sources to the political structure of Assur, although 
the picture they provide is not very clear. In TC 1, 1, the šībūtum, or “elders” are 
mentioned in close connection with the ālum, “the city-assembly of Assur”. In TC 1 
18, the šībūtum are mentioned alone. What was the position of “the elders” in Assur? 
In TC 1, 1, they appear as a kind of executive committee carrying out a decision of the 
ālum. In TC 1 18, “the elders” are approached by a merchant about practical matters, 
presumably in order to go to Anatolia. “The elders” will not help him and the 
merchant therefore cannot leave Assur. It is apparent from the letter TC 1 18 that the 
decisions of “the elders” were influential. Their formal position in the political 
structure is not easy to determine, however. Were “the elders” in charge of the ālum? 
Could “the elders” detain merchants in Assur? 
 
In TC 1, 1, the demand from “the city-assembly”, for silver is followed up by “the 
elders”, who appear to be responsible for collecting the silver for building the city-
walls. In this sense, “the elders” form a kind of executive committee for “the city-
assembly”. The demand for silver to pay for the city-walls is called alternately “the 
tablet of the city” or “the tablet of the king”. As mentioned above (5.5.4), in letters 
sent from Assur, the phrase tuppum ša ālim u rubā’im, “a tablet of the city-assembly 
and the king” occurs. Therefore, it is perhaps not surprising that TC 1, 1 has two 
senders. It can be argued that the king is acting as a kind of chairman of the assembly 
in this text. This would solve the apparent confusion of who made the decisions and 
sent the letter. In my interpretation, “the city-assembly” including the king made the 
decision and “the elders” carried it out, indicating that “the elders” were recognised as 
a separate authority from “the city-assembly”. It seems plausible that this kind of 
executive committee could restrict the movements of merchants, as seen in TC 1 18. 
This is not surprising, however, in view of the close integration of the colonies and 
the central authorities in Assur, as discussed above (5.4). 
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Scholars agree that “the elders” were somehow connected to “the city-assembly of 
Assur”. Their exact relation to “the city-assembly” is not clear, however. Cécile 
Michel interprets “the elders” as core members of “the city-assembly”. In her 
interpretation, they were a part of “the city-assembly”, but this assembly also counted 
other members who did not belong to the group of “elders”.887 J. G. Dercksen 
similarly interprets “the elders” as “an influential group within the City Assembly”.888 
Mogens Trolle Larsen is convinced that “the elders” were an executive committee of 
“the city-assembly” in the sense that “the elders formed a specially privileged body of 
men who were entitled to act on behalf of the assembly and carry on separate 
negotiations”.889  
 
“The elders” do appear to have the authority to take decisions independently of the 
ālum, as seen in TC 1 18, when they refused to help Aššur-Idī to reach Anatolia. Also, 
in TC 1, 1, they can be seen to have an independent capacity as executive committee 
to send a messenger to Anatolia to collect the silver for the city-walls. What does it 
mean, however, that “the elders” were core members or an influential group in “the 
city-assembly”?  
 
It is easy to imagine “the elders” as some kind of council that worked together with 
“the city-assembly”. However, it is difficult to determine this, since the formal 
composition of the ālum is not known. It is possible that “the elders” reached 
decisions together with the king and the eponym, forming the entire ālum. However, 
there is a group of slightly later sources, the treaty-texts dated to kārum Kanesh level 
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Ib, that might provide a more secure answer to the problem of the composition of “the 
city-assembly”. These will be discussed in the following. 
 
5.5.6 “The sons of Assur” in treaty-texts 
From a few texts dated to Kültepe level Ib (ca. 1800-1700 BCE), there is evidence 
that treaties were made between Assur and Anatolian kingdoms, including Kanesh 
and Hahhum, as well as the Syrian kingdom Apum. The Kültepe level Ib period 
corresponds to the rule of king Šamši-Adad I of Assyria, a conqueror king who 
established an empire in northern Mesopotamia and parts of Syria (cf. 4.6). Assur 
continued to be an important trading city in this period.890 The first treaty to be 
discussed, L87-442 + 447 + 1331, was made between the Assyrians and the Syrian 
kingdom Apum.891 The second, Kt. 00/k 10, was made between the Assyrians and the 
Anatolian kingdom Hahhum.892 The third treaty to be discussed, Kt. 00/k 6, was made 
between the Assyrians and the Anatolian kingdom Kanesh.893 Who were the parties to 
these treaties? How were the treaties negotiated from the Assyrian side? 
 
In L87-442 + 447 + 1331, Till-Abnû, the king of Apum, makes a treaty with “the city 
Assur” (ana ālimki dAššur), concerning “a son of Assur” (DUMU dAššur) “going up or 
going down”, and anyone belonging to the kārum in Apum.894 The king is sworn to be 
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truthful to the merchants, “the city of Assur” and the kārum.895 The oath concerns 
“the city of Assur” any “son of Assur” (DUMU Aššur), “going up or going down”, 
and the kārum.896 
 
The tablet is too broken to determine what exactly the terms of the treaty were or what 
the treaty covered. The text is edited by Jesper Eidem, who points out that in the 
treaty between the king of Apum and Assur, the king swears “to the Assyrians, i.e. 
representatives of the “city of (divine) Assur, the son(s) of (divine) Assur in transit 
(lit. “going up or going down”) and the kārum in your city””.897 In Eidem’s 
interpretation, the treaty was presented “by the Assyrian representatives” in speech to 
the king of Apum. The king is addressed in the 2nd person singular.898  Eidem analyses 
the treaty as a unilateral agreement: the Assyrians wrote down the terms, while the 
king of Apum was in control and did not need to specify his taxes or duties in the 
treaty, because he could seize whatever he wanted by force, should he so wish. Eidem 
suggests that “it was the traders who needed guaranties that the obligations were kept 
within certain acceptable bounds in addition to guaranties of free passage, protection, 
etc.”.899  
 
I agree with Eidem’s assessment that the treaty is made between the Assyrian 
merchants as a group and the king of Apum. It is of interest that “the sons of Assur” is 
used as a specification of the term “city”. Thus, it can be argued that the 
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representatives of the merchants were part of “the city”. In my opinion, this indicates 
that “the city” was a collective of the Assyrian merchants, and not restricted to “the 
elders”, the king and the eponym. It appears from this treaty that the representatives of 
the collective of merchants made the treaty with the king of Apum. The king of Assur 
is not even mentioned, although he may be included in the term “the city”.  
 
Kt. 00/k 10 contains a treaty between Assur and Hahhum regulating relations between 
“the sons of Assur” (DUMU Aššur), “the sons of the colony at Hahhum” (DUMU 
kārim Hahhim) and “sons of Hahhum” (DUMU Hahhim). It is stated “the sons of 
Hahhum” shall not reach verdicts concerning “a son of Assur” or “a son of the colony 
at Hahhum” based on the testimony of anyone from Hahhum.900 Further, in case an 
Assyrian is murdered, they are to hand over the killer to the Assyrians.901 It is 
specified that the treaty concerns relations between “the sons of Hahhum” and any 
man from the kārum Hahhum or “son of Assur” “going up or going down”.902 
 
The parties to this treaty are not possible to identify further, because the tablet is 
broken where this information presumably would be given. However, it is interesting 
that the responsible party from the Hahhum side is addressed in the second person 
plural “you”. In L87-442 + 447 + 1331, the address is second person singular “you”, 
i.e. the ruler of Apum. What this implies for the organisation of Hahhum is difficult to 
conclude from one text alone. Veenhof argues that the treaty was made between 
Assur and Hahhum, formulated as a treaty between the Assyrians and a few 
“magnates” as treaty partners. He suggests that these magnates may be a local 
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oligarchy at Hahhum or an intermediate arrangement in the absence of a local king.903 
These suggestions seem reasonable to me. It is difficult to determine whether the 
collective of “sons of Hahhum” was a permanent oligarchy or an intermediate 
arrangement. The number of people involved is not mentioned. Thus, the oligarchic 
nature of the (intermediate) collective rule in Hahhum is conjecture. It seems likely 
that a relatively small number of people were involved in the conclusion of the treaty, 
however, since it would be impractical for a large assembly to make a treaty. This is 
also the case for the Assyrian side, since they probably had to travel to Hahhum to 
conclude the treaty. 
 
In the treaty from Apum, there is a distinction between Assyrians “going up or going 
down” and “the sons of the kārum”. Similarly, in the treaty from Hahhum, there is a 
distinction between Assyrians and “the sons of the kārum”. According to Veenhof, 
the treaties are formulated in this way, in order that there is a clear distinction 
between permanently resident merchants living in a kārum and caravan traders or 
other merchants coming to Apum or Hahhum. He suggests that this was because these 
cities were important road-stations on the way to Anatolia and Assur wanted to 
protect both types of merchants.904 This seems to me a reasonable explanation, and 
makes sense of the phrase “going up or going down”, used of merchants. These can 
be considered to be merchants in transit.  
 
Kt. 00/k 6 is a treaty concerning relations between “the sons of Assur” (DUMU 
dAššur) and “the sons of Kanesh” (DUMU Kaniš).905 It states that if the blood of “a 
                                              
903 Veenhof & Eidem, The Old Assyrian period, 2008, 194-195 
904 Veenhof & Eidem, The Old Assyrian period, 2008, 201-202 
905 Kt. 00/k 6, 1-2 (text in transliteration and translation in Donbaz, “An Old Assyrian treaty from Kültepe,” 2005, 63-65). 
These two lines of the text are restored, as the text is broken. Günbatti does not accept the restoration, and would rather 
have names of gods in these two first lines (Günbatti, “Two treaty texts found at Kültepe,” 2004, 251). Throughout the rest 
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son of Assur” is shed in Kanesh, they will surrender the perpetrator to the 
Assyrians.906 It is also stated that if “a son of Assur” incurs debt with “a son of 
Kanesh” and the debtor runs away, no other “son of Assur” can be seized in his stead. 
Also, when the corvée is levied, no “son of Assur” can be drafted.907 The treaty is 
concluded with an oath taken by “the sons of Assur” and “the chief executive of 
Kanesh” (GAL Kaniše’im).908  
 
Veyzel Donbaz suggests that the treaty Kt. 00/k 6 between Assur and Kanesh “seems 
to record bilateral conditions agreed to by both parties: the Assyrians and the local 
Anatolians. This contrasts with what we know from the other two Old Assyrian 
treaties, which present only the unilateral conditions relating to the Assyrians”.909 
Indeed, as was seen in Eidem’s analysis of the treaty in L87-442 + 447 + 1331 
between Apum and the Assyrians, the Assyrians appear as the ones in need of 
guarantees. Why was the treaty with Kanesh different? This is not possible to answer 
from the text itself, but it may be an indication that the Assyrians were more involved 
with the local community in Kanesh than in the other kingdoms for which we have 
treaties, making it important to regulate relations between the community of 
Kanishites and Assyrian traders, and not just the relations between the local 
authorities and the Assyrians. 
 
                                                                                                                                           
of the text, however, the people involved are “the sons of Assur” and “the sons of Kanesh”, making it probable that the 
treaty concerns bilateral agreements. 
906 Kt. 00/k 6, 37-42 
907 Kt. 00/k 6, 71-79 
908 Kt. 00/k 6, 86-88 
909 Donbaz, “An Old Assyrian treaty from Kültepe,” 2005, 63 
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Eidem emphasises that although L87-442 + 447 + 1331 is from Kültepe level Ib, thus 
post-dating the most intense period of trade between Assur and Anatolia, “a 
significant trait is that the treaty was concluded not with the king [of Assyria], but 
with the city of Assur, a clear echo of the political structure in Assur in classical Old 
Assyrian times”.910 It should be kept in mind that the composition of “the city-
assembly” in “classical Old Assyrian times”, i.e. level II at the Kültepe site, is actually 
not that well attested. However, with the information available from these treaties, it 
can be argued that a collective organisation of authority appears to be a correct 
assessment of the structure of “the city-assembly” in Assur, as suggested above.  
 
These three treaties show that there were negotiations between the merchants of Assur 
and foreign kings. It is of interest that the treaties were made between “the sons of 
Assur” and the local authorities: to me, this suggests that the collective of merchants 
could act quite independently and formed an authority in their own right. The king 
may have participated in formulating the Assyrian side to the treaties, as a member of 
“the city-assembly”. However, the treaties are quite specific in using the plural for the 
Assyrian side to the treaty, indicating that several people were involved in making the 
treaties. It indicates that the Assyrian party to the treaties was understood as a 
collective. Any royalty among the Assyrians is anonymous, and this also applies to the 
party from Hahhum. This shows that in the period Kültepe Ib, “the city” as a 
collective decision-making body was important in Assur and that foreign relations 
were handled by the merchants as a group. There is no mention of waklum or šībūtum. 
In my opinion, this means that the treaties were made by the community of merchants 
and that “the city” included the merchant community or representatives of the 
merchant houses, not just “the elders”, the king, and the eponym. 
 
                                              
910 Eidem, “An Old Assyrian treaty from Tell Leilan,” 1991, 195; Veenhof & Eidem, The Old Assyrian period, 2008, 329 
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5.6 “The assembly”, “the elders”, and the community of 
merchants 
The Old Assyrian city-state was ruled by a king, who was a member of “the city-
assembly” and reached decisions there together with the eponym, “the elders”, and 
probably the wealthiest members of the merchant community. It appears that a 
cooperative environment existed between the merchant families of Assur. They all 
profited from the trade in silver, tin, and textiles. There are two features of the 
political culture of Assur in the Old Assyrian period that point to collective rule: the 
ālum, “city-assembly”, in Assur and the kārum seher rabi “the colony small and 
great” in the colonies. For the latter, texts from the kārum Kanesh indicate that there 
are good reasons for interpreting “the colony small and great” as a plenary assembly: 
this assembly is the only local authority mentioned in the colonies subordinate to the 
kārum Kanesh. It appears to have been under the authority of “the great” in the kārum 
Kanesh, but nevertheless played an important local role. The plenary assembly 
appears as the place of adjudication in the colonies outside Kanesh and as their main 
decision-making body. In the kārum Kanesh, on the other hand, it is evident from the 
statute texts that a complex system was in place for decision-making that emphasised 
“the great merchants” and the bīt kārim, the colony office.  
 
The kārum Kanesh was master of the other colonies in Anatolia, and therefore, it 
cannot be claimed that any plenary assembly was sovereign over the Assyrian 
communities in Anatolia. Rather, the wealthiest merchants, “the great”, were in 
charge. These “great merchants” in turn took their orders from the ālum. From the 
frequent references to tuppum ša ālim, “tablet of the city”, it is evident that “the city-
assembly” of Assur had great authority also in the colonies abroad. Whether “the city-
assembly” had plenary sessions is difficult to establish, because most sources do not 
mention explicitly who met in the ālum. The king took part, evident from the 
importance of the waklum for carrying out the decisions of the ālum. That the eponym 
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also sat in the ālum can be inferred from the importance of this office at Assur, giving 
the name of the year, as well as sealing verdicts of “the city-assembly” (cf. 5.3). 
 
The ālum met by “the sacred precinct” of Assur, the hamrum, and at the Stepgate. 
This can be interpreted as a restricted space inside a sanctuary or as a public place by 
the entrance to a sanctuary. Therefore, how many people participated at the sessions 
or whether the sessions were public is difficult to establish. As was seen from the 
level Ib period treaties between Assur and the authorities of other polities (5.5.6), the 
Assyrians formulated their treaties between “the sons of Assur” on the one hand and 
the foreign king or council on the other, making it probable that the entire merchant 
community was party to the treaty. Whether all the Assyrians also participated in 
establishing the Assyrian side of the treaty, in a plenary assembly at Assur can only be 
guessed at, but does not seem very probable. Rather, a more restricted group 
presumably conducted the Assyrian side of the negotiations.  
 
In my opinion, the evidence for Assur must be held separate from that of the colonies, 
since it seems clear that “the city-assembly” and “the elders” in Assur had far wider 
powers than any of the assemblies in the colonies. Thus, although the plenary 
assembly appears to be the main institution for adjudication in the subordinate 
colonies this does not mean that a plenary assembly was the highest authority in 
Assur. The independent role of “the elders” in Assur appears to me as a parallel to the 
relationship between “the great” and “the small” merchants in the kārum Kanesh. The 
structure of power places much authority in the hands of a restricted group of “great 
merchants” or “elders” that work closely with the most important officials in Assur, 
the king and the eponym. On the other hand, if “the elders” were an executive 
committee, it is a bit odd that they are mentioned so seldom in the texts, compared to 
the frequent references to the ālum. The problem of identifying “the elders” may be 
solved if they are interpreted as hiding behind the term ālum, in the sense that most 
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decisions made by “the city-assembly” were actually made by a sort of council 
consisting of the king, the eponym and “the elders”. This is difficult to prove, 
however, and there clearly are situations, such as the contribution from the colonies to 
the city-walls at Assur reported in TC 1, 1 (cf. 5.5.5), where “the elders” are 
mentioned separately from the ālum. It seems therefore warranted to suppose that the 
ālum was more inclusive than a council of “elders”. In my opinion, “the elders” were 
part of “the city-assembly”, but not the complete “city-assembly”.  
 
It is tempting to term the Old Assyrian political structure oligarchic, because of the 
apparent dominance of “the great” in the statutes of the kārum Kanesh and the 
important position of “the elders” of Assur. In this interpretation, the plenary 
assemblies reach no independent decisions, but are convened for the sake of 
announcements, rather than being arenas for debate. Assur and its colonies could thus 
be termed merchant oligarchies. This is an influential model for Old Assyrian society: 
Mogens Trolle Larsen compares the Assyrian settlements in Anatolia to Venetian and 
Genovese merchant houses that possessed a home office and established offices in 
enclaves abroad.911 Paul Garellli offers a different model that emphasises a balance of 
power between different groups in Old Assyrian society. In his analysis, the structure 
of the Old Assyrian city-state was a polity where the eponym, “the elders” and the 
popular assembly functioned as counters to the power of the priest king of Assur. In 
Garelli’s interpretation, “the great” of the kārum Kanesh equal “the elders” of Assur, 
and “the small and great” equal “the city”, as a popular assembly.912 Thus, whereas 
Larsen emphasises that power was concentrated in the hands of the wealthiest 
merchants, including the king and the highest officials in Assur, Garelli argues that 
there were checks and balances between the king and the people in the Old Assyrian 
political structure.  
                                              
911 Larsen, “The Old Assyrian city-state,” 2000, 81 
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The model of a merchant oligarchy is the more fruitful in my opinion, because the 
sources regarding political institutions and offices invariably also concern matters of 
trade. The king and all the eponyms were apparently merchants. As Dercksen 
demonstrates, the eponyms in the Kültepe list of eponyms (KEL) were all merchants 
and the office of eponym was a routine part of their career, not an office attained at a 
high age.913 This indicates that merchants were actively involved in city-state politics 
as part of their commercial career. The whole of Old Assyrian society appears to be 
geared towards trade. This view may be skewed by the fact that the archives found at 
the site of the kārum Kanesh concern trade and business. Part of the reason why the 
merchants and their “elders” appear to be the most influential and politically active 
group in the Old Assyrian city-state may be because the archives studied are from a 
community of merchants. However, there is not much evidence regarding the rest of 
Old Assyrian society. Trade does appear to be the most important activity in Assur in 
the Old Assyrian period. There is no comparable evidence for a formally constituted 
and active “people”. The closest would presumably be the group of “small 
merchants”. Garelli’s model cannot be maintained, as there is not sufficient evidence 
for the reconstruction of a system of checks and balances between the king, the 
people, and other groups in the polity. The king appears rather to be a part of the 
decision-making institutions of the merchant community. This indicates that power in 
the Old Assyrian city-state and its colonies was in the hands of an élite or a narrow 
corporation of wealthy merchants. As will be argued in the following, they were a 
narrow corporation rather than an exclusive élite. 
 
                                                                                                                                           
912 Garelli, “Pouvoirs locaux en Assyrie,” 1982, 77-78 
913 Dercksen, Old Assyrian institutions, 2004, 59 
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“The great merchants” can be seen to form a narrow ruling group that shares power 
between its members. They had the wealth and authority to demand a preeminent 
place, being successful merchants and payers of the dātum-contribution. Their social 
and political status is connected to their activities as traders. Thus, they are not an 
élite in an aristocratic sense. It is their success as merchants that make them “great”. 
“The small merchants” were not excluded from decision-making processes, as they 
presumably would have been if Old Assyrian society was an oligarchy. The plenary 
assembly of “small and great” was an important part of the structure of decision-
making in the Anatolian colonies. It was apparently here that information was made 
public. The importance of the plenary assembly of “small and great” in kārum Kanesh 
and the other Assyrian settlements in Anatolia indicates that the merchants formed 
corporations with a certain level of consideration of the opinions of all its members.  
 
It can be argued that the king, “the elders”, the heads of the wealthiest merchant 
houses, and the eponym worked together in the ālum as a closed élite, to the exclusion 
of the rest of the Assyrians. However, I would argue that they pursued a narrow 
corporate strategy for power: they appear as a limited group, but their decisions were 
made for the city and all the merchants together as a community. They were not a 
closed élite, as their sessions appear to have been open to non-participating listeners, 
being held at “the sacred precinct” of Assur. On the other hand, they were not a 
broadly constituted corporation of all the merchants, as there were evidently 
differences in status between “the elders” and the rest, or the king and the rest, as well 
as between “the small” and “the great”. The king may have been on par with “the 
elders” and the eponym, but that does not mean that he was under the authority of a 
large assembly of the people. 
 
In a similar fashion to Assur, “the great” in the kārum Kanesh do not appear as a 
closed élite, since their sessions were open under certain (albeit badly understood) 
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circumstances, to all the merchants, “small and great”. Therefore, “the great” pursued 
a narrow corporate strategy; they are a small group of decision-makers that operate in 
close contact with the rest of the community and sometimes make decisions together 
with them. In the other colonies, the plenary assembly seem to have greater power 
than in Assur or the kārum Kanesh. Thus, it can be argued that locally, the merchants 
could pursue a broad corporate strategy of power including all merchants, reaching 
decisions together in assemblies of “small and great” merchants. Thus, the local 
merchant communities had a degree of participation by all members of the community 
in reaching decisions. 
 
The Old Assyrian city-state and its colonies appear to be based on an organisation of 
power where a narrow corporation of wealthy merchants, including the king, were at 
the top of society. There appears to have been no autocratic ruler, a palace or temple 
élite, or a hereditary aristocracy. It can be argued that the common source of power 
for the king and the elders was the trade in metal and textiles in Anatolia, and that this 
resulted in a sharing of power among the richest and most successful merchants. The 
king had a special status, as the steward of the god Assur. This does not seem to have 
influenced his position in relation to the other merchants, however, as decisions were 
made together with them in “the city-assembly”. 
 
In the treaties between Assur and foreign kings (cf. 5.5.6), the merchants conduct the 
making of the treaty for the Assyrian side. This indicates that the merchants as a 
group could represent the polity and negotiate on par with foreign kings. It can thus 
be argued that the sharing of power between the king and the merchants was due to 
the commercial nature of the Old Assyrian city-state economy. The whole community 
was geared towards trade, encouraging a narrow corporate strategy of cooperation 
between the most powerful merchants that also occasionally included the broader, 
more inclusive group of all merchants. In the colonies outside Kanesh, the merchants 
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appear to have been organised in a more egalitarian fashion. The broad corporate 
strategy among the merchants can be due to their common interests as a group of 
foreigners living in enclaves among the Anatolians. Although the Anatolians had a 
sophisticated culture that was able to absorb large quantities of luxury textiles and 
metals, the Assyrians would be anxious to protect their interests and guard themselves 
against transgressions of the treaties with local kings. In particular, the Assyrians 
would have had an interest in evading taxes and duties and protect their privileges. 
This would presumably be best looked after in an atmosphere of cooperation, 
encouraging a broad corporate strategy of equal consideration of interests, where 
decisions were taken in an arena council, “the assembly of small and great” (cf. 
1.4.2).  
 
In the kārum Kanesh, the situation appears to have been different, and power lay with 
“the great”. This may have been due to the prominent place of this colony in the 
hierarchy of Old Assyrian settlements in Anatolia, making a more hierarchic structure 
of power expedient here for the transmission of instructions and swiftness of 
decision-making. However, in Assur and in the kārum Kanesh, the most prominent 
merchants were also part of the more inclusive sessions of the ālum and “the small 
and great” respectively. Old Assyrian society thus had a concept for the totality of 
merchants and in this sense, the most powerful in society had close connections to the 
rest of society and a community of interest with them: in Old Assyrian communities, 
“the great” as well as “the small” were part of the polity.  
 
Having investigated evidence for the organisation of the Old Assyrian city-state and 
its colonies, I have found that there was a complex structure of decision-making 
where several agents participated. Power appears to have been shared between several 
institutions and families, with an emphasis on wealth and experience as criteria for 
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authority. I turn now to Late Bronze Age Ugarit, to investigate relations of power 
between the different sectors in society and their institutions for decision-making. 
 
5.7 Ugarit, the palace, local communities, and the 
merchants 
Ugarit was a city-state and important trading centre placed between the great imperial 
powers of the Late Bronze Age.914 The city was ideally situated on the coast of north-
western Syria: it lay on a key location for the exchange of goods between Anatolia 
and Egypt, the Aegean and Mesopotamia. Ugarit was ruled by a king, who resided in 
a sumptuous palace. However, several of the inhabitants were farmers and lived in the 
countryside. What were the relations between central authorities and the local 
communities? How did the importance of trade influence the political structure of 
Ugarit?  
 
In the Late Bronze Age, the aggressive great powers of the Hittite empire, Mittanni 
and the Egyptians fought over influence and control in Syria and Palestine. Probably 
because of its importance for trade, Ugarit was able to negotiate treaties with these 
powers. As will be seen (5.11.2), some of these treaties were made directly between 
merchants of Ugarit and foreign rulers. In the best documented period of Ugarit, the 
years immediately preceding the destruction of the city and its palace around 1190 
BCE, the city-state was under Hittite sovereignty, and answered to the Hittite regent 
of Syria resident at Karkemish. Karkemish was an important city for Hittite interests 
in Syria: it provided a link between the Anatolian plateau and the Syrian plain. The 
Hittite ruler was the Great King of the empire, and beneath him, he had members of 
                                              
914 Ugarit/Ras Shamra is an ancient site, occupied from the Neolithic period (cf. Akkermans & Schwartz, The archaeology 
of Syria, 2003, 47). Only the Late Bronze Age period will be discussed here. 
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the royal family acting as regional rulers, who in their turn controlled local princes of 
cities and districts. Ugarit’s position was regulated by treaties and it had its own local 
ruler, not a foreign governor.915 
 
The history of Ugarit is well documented. Excavation at the site of Ugarit, modern 
Ras Shamra, started in 1929. The deciphering of texts found during the Ras Shamra 
excavations shows that Ugarit was a city-state of international importance. Tablets 
from Ras Shamra are written in Akkadian and Ugaritic, and there are also texts in 
Hurrian. Ugaritic is a Semitic language closely related to Phoenician and Hebrew. 
The Akkadian texts were written in cuneiform, whereas the Ugaritic texts were 
written in an alphabetical system of cuneiform signs peculiar to Ugarit.916  
 
Ugarit was a metropolitan commercial city. Several models have been proposed for its 
political structure. Some scholars have seen it as a pyramidal society where the king 
and his palace controlled everything.917 Others view Ugarit as a kind of mercantile 
oligarchy.918 The most influential model, however, has been the so-called two-sector 
model, where the palace is strictly separated from the local communities.919 These 
models will be discussed below (5.8). How did the socio-political structure of Ugarit 
accommodate the interests of the palace, the local communities, and the community of 
merchants?  
 
                                              
915 Cf. Kuhrt, The ancient  Near East, 1997 [1995],  305-314 
916 Cf. Kuhrt, The ancient  Near East, 1997 [1995], 301-303 
917 Schloen, House of the Father, 2001 
918 Bordreuil, “An efficiently administered kingdom,” 2000, 190 
919 Heltzer, Rural community, 1976; Heltzer, Internal organization, 1982; Liverani, “Communautés de village,” 1975 
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5.8 Palace and populace: two sectors 
From the palace archives excavated at the site of Ugarit come lists with a bewildering 
range of categories for people with different relations of dependence to the palace. 
Analyses of the vocabulary of lists and letters have been important in the 
reconstruction of the social structure of Ugarit. An influential model for Ugaritic 
society is a dualistic model proposed by Michael Heltzer.920 He emphasises the 
distinction between a palace sphere and a sphere of village- communities. In his 
analysis, the people listed as “the sons of the king” belonged to the palace. The people 
listed as “sons of GN” on the other hand belonged to the village sphere. The palace 
employed large numbers of people of several professions. These are listed on tablets 
from the royal archives as receivers of service-grants and distributions, and are called 
bnš mlk, “sons of the king”, in Ugaritic; the Akkadian term is ardē šarri, “the king’s 
servants”.921 Separate from these in Heltzer’s analysis was the “main mass of the 
freeborn population” of Ugarit that was called mārū mātugarit, “sons of Ugarit”.922 
More precisely, they were non-professionals that lived in village-communities, paid 
taxes and performed duties collectively, and are referred to collectively in texts as 
bnšm, “sons [of GN]” in Ugaritic; the Akkadian term is mārū, “sons [of GN]”, GN 
usually being a village name.923  
 
Heltzer’s dualistic scheme is based on two texts in particular: the Akkadian texts RS 
17.238 (PRU IV, 107-108) and RS 17.130 (PRU IV, 103-105). In these texts, the 
inhabitants of Ugarit appear to be divided into two distinct groups of people, viz. “the 
                                              
920 Heltzer, Rural community, 1976; Heltzer, Internal organization, 1982 
921 Heltzer, Internal organization, 1982, 11-12; ibid. 23-48 
922 Heltzer, Rural community, 1976, 5-6 
923 Heltzer, Rural community, 1976, 7-18; ibid. 63-74 
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servants of the king” and “the sons of Ugarit”.924 In the following, I will present these 
texts, before discussing Heltzer’s dualistic model in detail. How were the relations 
between palace and populace in the political structure of Ugarit? 
 
RS 17.238 is an instruction of the Great King of the Hittites to Ugarit concerning 
fugitives from Ugarit: any “servant of the king of Ugarit” (arad šar mātugarit), or “son 
of Ugarit” (mār mātugarit), or “servant of a servant of the king of Ugarit” (arad ardi 
šar mātugarit) who is going to join the hapiru,925 the Great King will return to the king 
of Ugarit (šar mātugarit).926  
 
RS 17.130 is an edict of the Hittite Great King to the king of Ugarit, regulating the 
relations between merchants of a Hittite port city called Ura and the people of Ugarit. 
The document is styled from one king to the other.927 The treaty is made by the Great 
King between “the sons of Ura, the merchants” (mārūM alura amil M tamkārū) and “the 
sons of Ugarit” (mārūM mātugarit).928 The merchants of Ura are not to reside in Ugarit 
during the winter, and they may not buy houses or land there.929 In the case of 
forfeited loans, a merchant of Ura may not take land or a house in Ugarit. Any 
forfeited property becomes the property of the king of Ugarit. The creditor may take 
the debtor and his family away as slaves.930  
                                              
924 Heltzer, “Service system,” 1988, 9-10 
925 Hapiru is an Akkadian term for landless peasants turned lawless marauders, cf. chapter 6 
926 Nougayrol, Archives internationales, 1956, 107-108: PRU IV 17.238, 3-10 
927 Nougayrol, Archives internationales, 1956, 103-105: PRU IV 17.130, 1-4 
928 Nougayrol, Archives internationales, 1956, 103-105: PRU IV 17.130 6-10, 35-38 
929 Nougayrol, Archives internationales, 1956, 103-105: PRU IV 17.130 11-19 
930 Nougayrol, Archives internationales, 1956, 103-105: PRU IV 17.130 20-34 
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On the basis of these texts, Michael Heltzer divides society at Ugarit into three main 
groups: free peasant, royal dependents, and slaves. The main population consisted of 
free village peasants. These are the people referred to as “the sons of Ugarit” (mārūM 
mātugarit) in the texts from Ras Shamra. The second group of people was “the 
servants of the king” or “the royal dependents” (ardē šarri). The Ugaritic equivalent 
of this term is bnš mlk, “a son of the king”.  A third group were “the servants of the 
servants of the king” and the slaves.931 In Heltzer’s model, craft specialisation was 
important in the royal economy and the workers were organised into gangs that were 
paid by the palace. The royal dependents, called “the sons” or “servants” of the king, 
received land plots in return for their services, on the condition that they were not 
idle.932 The land belonged to the king and to free village peasants, and could be 
alienated.933  
 
Heltzer’s model appears to make good sense of the texts from Ugarit and to explain 
the different terms used for social categories. The royal dependents included officials, 
priests, and warriors. However, as will be seen (5.9), there is evidence that the 
division of society was not as neat as Heltzer supposes and that there was no hard and 
fast division between “the royal dependents” and the rest of the population of Ugarit. 
Before discussing this evidence, however, the implications of Heltzer’s model will be 
considered in more detail.  
 
                                              
931 Heltzer, “Service system,” 1988, 10 
932 Heltzer, “Service system,” 1988, 12-13 
933 Heltzer, “Service system,” 1988, 10-11 
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In Heltzer’s model, land is owned either by the king or by peasants living in village-
communities. Land-ownership is the key to a person’s status. There is an important 
divide between the free villagers, “the sons of GN”, who owned land, and the 
dependents of the king, “the sons of the king”, who received land or means of 
livelihood from the palace. However, the royal dependents had a higher status than 
the free peasants: the royal dependents were part of the palace hierarchy and had 
access to the centre of power, whereas the peasants were cut off from any form of 
political influence. Heltzer’s dualistic model implies that the city and the countryside 
were opposed to each other. In the kingdom of Ugarit, two modes of production were 
pursued simultaneously: the palace economy based on the royal dependents, their land 
grants, and craft-production on the one hand and the domestic mode of production of 
the peasants on the other, from which they paid taxes to the palace.  
 
The two-sector model has been very influential in Ugaritic studies. The division 
between the palace and the village-communities is fundamental in most 
reconstructions of Ugaritic society. In the analysis of Juan-Pablo Vita, the society of 
Ugarit was centred on the king. He was the central figure in foreign relations, in the 
army and in religion.934 The king had a prefect, the sākinu, who complemented the 
king and was his deputy when needed.935 The administration of the city-state was 
large and complex.936 In contrast to life in the capital that was dominated by the 
palace, life in the villages was characterised by the village-community, consisting of 
groups of families. The legal representatives of the villagers were “the elders” 
(šībūtum, abbū). The palace representative in the village was the hazannu, or 
“mayor”.937 Thus, Vita’s reconstruction of Ugaritic society follows the dualistic 
                                              
934 Vita, “The society of Ugarit,” 1999, 468 
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936 Vita, “The society of Ugarit,” 1999, 473-474 
937 Vita, “The society of Ugarit,” 1999, 483-484 
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scheme of Heltzer. What about the temples, then, of which there were several in 
Ugarit? Were they also part of the palace sphere? Edward Lipínski argues that the 
king also controlled the priests, since they belonged to the dependents of the palace 
and were allotted fields and received food, wine and other means of subsistence from 
the king. Therefore, in Lipínski’s analysis, the temple economy was incorporated into 
that of the palace.938 Thus, according to Heltzer, Vita, and Lipínski, all parts of 
Ugaritic society fell either into the palace sphere or the village sphere. 
 
The two-sector model has the perhaps surprising implication that the people of 
highest status also had the least independence. As Ignacio Márquez Rowe points out, 
if freedom is defined by access to the means of production, the free population of 
Ugarit were numerous and poor, whereas the palace dependants were few and 
wealthy, but unfree.939 In this perspective, an alternative interpretation of the material 
from Ugarit suggests itself: “the sons of the king” can be interpreted as a wealthy élite 
of officials of the palace and “the sons of Ugarit” as the rest of the population. 
However, as will be seen (5.10.1), there appears to be no consistent correlation 
between wealth, urban residency and status as “son of the king”. 
 
Analysis of land ownership is fundamental to the attribution of statuses to the various 
groups of the population of Ugarit. It must be remembered that although Ugarit was a 
city with much trade, agriculture was the most important sector of the economy. From 
the archives of Ugarit, Heltzer has found clear evidence that the king owned much 
land and that production for the palace took place on farms or fortified manors called 
gt in Ugaritic, dimtu in Akkadian. He has also found evidence that villagers had to 
                                              
938 Lipínski, “The socio-economic condition of the clergy,” 1988, 136-137, 149 
939 Rowe, “The king’s men in Ugarit,” 2002, 2 
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work for the palace on occasion and performed a corvée known as pilku.940 Taxes 
were levied on land and flocks owned by families belonging to the village-
communities.941 Liverani argues that the palace in Ugarit systematically exploited the 
countryside by establishing a system of the farms called gt, where conscripted 
workers toiled to generate a surplus. The village communities, on the other hand, 
consumed almost their entire surplus locally.942 In his analysis, the palatial system was 
imposed on village communities with a heritage hailing back to the Neolithic. The 
palace and the village communities thus represent two distinct systems.943 In Heltzer 
and Liverani’s analyses, the village sector had some ties to the palace sphere in the 
two-sector model: the peasants paid taxes and performed corvée-duties, but owned 
their own land, in contrast to the land grants of the royal dependents that were held on 
the condition of service to the palace. 
 
In addition to agriculture, trade was an important part of the economy. Ugarit traded 
overland and overseas.944 Trade was conducted by the tamkārū, “merchants”. 
According to Heltzer, they were royal commercial agents, but sometimes managed 
their own commercial operations, too. They received land allotments from the king 
and therefore belonged to the group of royal dependents.945 In the analysis of 
Liverani, all trade in the Near Eastern Late Bronze Age was centred on the palaces, 
with large regional patterns of exchange.946 
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In Heltzer and Liverani’s interpretations, every part of Ugarit’s society and economy 
fit the two-sector model. The palace is involved with agriculture and trade with its 
own agricultural production-centres and its own commissioned merchants. However, 
as will be seen, the position of the merchants in Ugarit may not be as easily 
accommodated to the two-sector model as Heltzer and Liverani imply. As will be seen 
(5.11.2), there is evidence indicating that the merchants were not dependents of the 
king of Ugarit.  
 
The model of two sectors of society has been applied to all aspects of Ugarit society, 
from military to religion, agriculture and trade. Ugarit appears as a centralised and 
bureaucratic palace state, with a rural population that lived in semi-autonomous 
villages and paid taxes to the palace. The two-sector model is not without its 
problems, however. First of all, it can be argued that there is a methodological 
problem in the reconstruction of the entire Ugaritic society on the basis of three terms 
found in RS 17.238. Further, the two-sector model cannot account for all the evidence 
to the socio-political organisation of Ugarit.  As will be seen, there is evidence for 
“sons of the king” living in the village-communities (5.10.1). First, however, 
alternative models for the socio-political structure of Ugarit will be investigated. 
 
5.9 Palace and populace: a hierarchy 
The two-sector model of palace dependents and a village sector has been criticised in 
recent years. The model is attacked by P. Vargyas, who interprets the three categories 
of people in RS 17.238, i.e. “the servant of the king of Ugarit” (arad šar mātugarit), 
“son of Ugarit” (mār mātugarit), and “servant of a servant of the king of Ugarit” (arad 
ardi šar mātugarit), as belonging to a society divided into officials, free farmers, and 
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slaves.947 In his view, the main divide in the society of Ugarit was that between rich 
and poor, not between palace dependents and others.948 Therefore, he argues, the term 
“son of Ugarit” (mār mātugarit) does not mean a person belonging to the village-
community, but is simply a member of the free population, regardless of whether he 
was a royal dependent or a member of the village-communities.949 In the 
interpretation of Vargyas, Ugarit was a territorial state with an agricultural base, 
where the highest levels of society were occupied by people close to the king.950 Thus, 
in Vargyas’ interpretation, “the servants of the king” are officials, whereas “the sons 
of Ugarit” are everyone else who are free. Some of the free population were 
dependent on the palace for their subsistence, other were peasants. In Vargyas’ view, 
there was no separate village sphere separated from the palace.  
 
As will be seen (5.10.1; 5.10.2), against Vargyas’ interpretation, the villages of the 
kingdom of Ugarit did have a political structure that functioned independently of the 
palace and the royal “mayors”. Thus, Vargyas’ model of a hierarchic territorial state 
does not explain all the evidence. Against the view that Ugarit was a territorial state, 
it can be argued that the city Ugarit, where the palace was situated, was the political 
centre and identity of the state, and not the territory: in the address of the Hittite king 
in RS 17.130 (cf. 5.8), the Hittite king first greets the king of Ugarit and then “the 
sons of Ugarit”. The political identity of Ugarit can thus be argued to be the person of 
the king and “the sons of Ugarit”, in the sense of the central authorities and the 
citizens. In my view, this indicates a city-state, rather than a territorial state. 
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The two-sector model is also attacked by J. David Schloen.951 He argues that society 
at Ugarit should be understood in terms of a pyramidal patrimonial household with a 
father at the apex, what he calls “the Patrimonial Household Model”. In this model, 
everyone is subsumed into a household, and the head of a household is subject to the 
head of a greater household. Thus, the king of Ugarit is the head of his kingdom and 
owns all land, but in his own turn, he is part of the greater household of the Hittite 
Empire where the Great King is at the apex. 952 Schloen dismisses Heltzer’s model of 
a royal service system at Ugarit, calling it an anachronistic application of the Marxist 
Asiatic mode of production953 (cf. 2.3).  
 
A model similar to Schloen’s patrimonial household model is suggested by Ignacio 
Marquez Rowe. He argues that the palace dependents at Ugarit were not dependents 
holding royal grants, but were actually bound by an antichretic personal pledge. This 
is a pledge that involves labour as payment of interest on a loan. In Rowe’s 
interpretation, what has been interpreted as palace dependents were debtors who 
laboured temporarily for the king to pay off debt. Their status was between that of 
free and enslaved.954 Rowe suggests that these “king’s men” were bound by personal 
debt rather than a promise of service to the crown in return for a royal grant.955 
 
Schloen and Rowe both argue against Heltzer’s two-sector model by emphasising the 
power of the king and the élite in an integrated pyramidal hierarchy. They dismiss the 
idea of a separate village sector in the social structure and include all who do not 
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belong to the palace in a poor majority dominated by a wealthy élite. However, as will 
be argued in the following, the models of a two-sector economy or a pyramidal 
hierarchy do not explain the evidence for the organisation of power in the village 
sector or the relations between village communities and the central authorities. 
 
5. 10 The village-communities and their institutions 
In the two-sector model, the villagers in their village-communities are integrated in 
the palace economy as tax-payers, but they have no access to or influence on central 
decision-making bodies. Rather, the villages are collectively responsible for paying 
taxes and villagers are addressed as groups of people, not as individuals. In the 
following, evidence for decision-making bodies of the village-communities will be 
investigated. What were the relations between local decision-making bodies and the 
central authorities? 
 
5.10.1 “The elders” of Rakba 
There are a few texts from the archives of Ugarit that provide insight into local 
decision-making bodies of the villages. RS 20.239 refers to a decision taken by the 
šībūtum, “elders” in the town of Rakba and includes a list of “elders”. In the 
following, I will present the text and discuss what it can tell us about the political 
structure of the villages of Ugarit. Who were “the elders” and what was their 
authority? 
 
RS 20.239 is a complaint from a certain Mada’e sent to “the prefect” (sākinu) of 
Ugarit, concerning oxen of his that “the men of the town Rakba” (amīlūM āl rakbaia) 
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have stolen. Mada’e refers to previous letters concerning his cattle, and demands that 
if “the prefect” will not conclude the case, “the elders of the town Rakba” (amīl M 
šībūtuM ša alrakba), where the cattle was stolen, must go to the temple and swear an 
oath. “The elders” are named Babiyanu, son of Yadudana, Abdu and his son, Addunu 
his brother-in-law, and someone called the “Chief of a Thousand” (amīlakil lim).956  
 
RS 20.239 has attracted much scholarly attention and has been taken as evidence for 
the organisation of local self-government in the village-communities, independent of 
the palace. Mario Liverani takes RS 20.239 as evidence that the villages had councils 
of “elders” and that the decisions of “the elders” were the expression of the political 
will of each village. He points out that the list of “elders” in RS 20.239 includes only 
five names, some of whom were kin, and argues that “le collège des anciens n’est 
point un organe de “démocratie” main c’est justement l’expression des forces internes 
du village”.957 Liverani’s assessment is supported by Michael Heltzer who takes RS 
20.239 as evidence for councils of “elders” in the villages of Ugarit. In Heltzer’s 
opinion, the list of “elders” in RS 20.239 reveals that membership in the local 
councils were limited to a few wealthy families: he emphasises that “the elders” of RS 
20.239 “by no means comprised a democratic institution”. He argues that at least 
three of them are relatives and one is a high-ranking royal official. Heltzer therefore 
concludes that “the characteristic feature is that the eldership was distributed among 
members of one family”.958  
 
In the interpretations of Liverani and Heltzer, the village-communities were 
dominated by the most powerful families. From RS 20.239, Heltzer even sees power 
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limited to one family in a village. In Liverani and Heltzer’s interpretations, local 
power was in the hands of small councils of local powerful families and royal 
officials resident in the village or owning land there. I agree that the names on the list 
of “elders” indicate that they were all from the same family, including a father, his 
son, and a son-in-law. How was this council organised and how were the members 
recruited? There is not much to go on in this short text, but “the elders” appear to be 
community representatives who are expected to take an oath on behalf of the 
community concerning stolen cattle, whence the appeal by Mada’e to the sākinu, “the 
prefect”, that “the elders” come and answer for the theft of his cattle.  
 
It is odd that the person titled “Chief of a Thousand”, apparently a royal official and 
therefore one of the royal dependents, is a member of the council of “elders” of the 
village Rakba. There does not seem to be a rigorous division between the two sectors 
of palace and village: rather, the impression is that certain local families and royal 
officials formed a local élite. Liverani and Heltzer emphasise that the council of 
“elders” was not democratic, but reflect the local relations of power between families. 
G. Bunnens points out the intermediate role of “the elders” of Rakba, as spokesmen 
for the community in answering to the accusations of theft. However, in his 
interpretation, “the elders” are essentially a passive group, only answering to direct 
accusations and not taking any independent initiative.959 However, it can be seen that 
“the elders” provided a service for the rest of the community by going to the temple 
and swear an oath concerning the stolen cattle of Mada’e. Although they did not take 
any initiative in representing their community, they did undertake the journey to go 
and defend their fellows against the accusations of theft. As community 
representatives, the elders appear to be held responsible on behalf of the entire 
community. This is an important aspect of the council of “elders” in RS.20.239. Thus, 
the relations between the community and its leaders was in a sense hierarchic, in that 
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the council members probably were members of a wealthy family and sat in the 
council together with a royal official. However, their position does not appear to be 
very privileged, as they were expected to serve the community by swearing oaths on 
its behalf. Also, they were held responsible for the actions of their fellow villagers.  
 
Unfortunately, there is little evidence available for “the elders” of the village-
communities and therefore difficult to draw firm conclusions about local decision-
making bodies. There is more evidence for the populations of towns and villages, 
referred to collectively as “sons of GN” in texts from Ugarit, to which I now turn. 
 
5.10.2 “The sons of GN” 
Throughout the texts from Ugarit, villagers or townspeople are referred to collectively 
as mārū alGN, “sons of GN”. There are texts where “the sons of GN” act in a 
judiciary capacity and take part in lawsuits. In others, “the sons of GN” are held 
collectively responsible for misdeeds committed in their town. Some texts also 
contain verdicts of the Hittite overlords, viz. the king in Karkemish and the Great 
King of the Hittite empire. Who were “the sons of GN”? What was their authority? 
 
RS 17.299 contains a verdict made by a certain Baba. Baba, another person named 
Qadidu, and “the sons of the town Halpi-the-Great” (mārūM alhalpirapši [??]) reached 
a verdict. Qadidu said that his “brother” (ahu) was killed in Halpi-the-Great. “The 
sons of the town Halpi-the-Great” answered Qadidu […].960  
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RS 17.234 contains a verdict made by Initeshub king of Karkemish between “the sons 
of the town Shatega” (mārūM alšatega) and “the sons of the land of Ugarit” (mārūM 
mātugarit). The case concerns murder.961 
 
RS 17.229 contains a verdict by Hattushili III, the Hittite king. It concerns the 
merchant Talimmu, whose merchants have been killed in the town Apsuna (alapsuna). 
Talimmu therefore went with “the sons of Apsuna” (mārū alapsuna) for adjudication 
in Ugarit, and “the sons of Apsuna” paid a fine.962 
 
RS 17.288 contains a letter from the king of Ushnatu, a neighbouring kingdom to 
Ugarit, sent to the sākinu or “prefect” of Ugarit. It concerns theft. The king of 
Ushnatu complains that thieves in his kingdom go to the town of Aranyia in Ugarit, 
and that “the sons of Araniya” (mārū alaraniya) receive the stolen goods. He therefore 
wants them brought to justice.963 
 
In all these texts, “the sons” of the towns or villages are referred to as a collective. 
Their identity is not easy to establish. According to Heltzer, “the term “sons” refer to 
the main mass of the freeborn population, without special reference to social 
differences”.964 Indeed, in RS 17.234, “the sons of GN” are referred to as an 
undifferentiated group that is held collectively responsible. Therefore, they can be 
interpreted as “the citizens of GN” or “the people of GN”. However, in RS 17.229 
“the sons of GN” are referred to as a group that travelled to participate in 
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adjudication. It appears that under certain circumstances, “the sons of GN” were 
expected to travel to participate in adjudication, as well as to pay fines. This does not 
indicate that “the sons of GN” were “the people of GN”. Therefore, contrary to 
Heltzer’s model, “the sons of GN” cannot always refer to an undifferentiated 
collective of all the villagers, but must in some cases refer to a smaller group of 
people, perhaps a corporate body.  
 
Mario Liverani argues that the village-community had a kind of autonomy: although 
the palace placed a hazannu or “mayor” in the towns as the king’s agents, the village-
communities also had institutions such as the council of “elders” to represent them.965 As 
mentioned above (5.10.1), there are only a few direct references to “the elders”. The 
references to “the sons of GN” are far more numerous. I suggest that in at least some 
cases, “the elders” are hiding behind the more inclusive term “sons of GN”, in the 
sense of a limited group or corporation. 
 
In my opinion, RS 17.229 indicates that “sons of GN” could refer to local decision-
making collectives, and was not only used for collective references to the village-
community. It appears that the Hittite overlords addressed the town populations 
directly and that the villages were expected to act on the instructions of the king. 
There are some texts that indicate that “the sons of GN” were a limited group, such as 
RS 17.299 and RS 17.229. In these texts, “the sons of GN” are a party in legal 
processes concerning murder committed in their area. In my view, this makes it likely 
that they were a corporate body of limited size and not the entire village-community. 
Quite the contrary, it appears to me that “the sons of GN” represented their 
community and acted on its behalf: “the sons of GN” were addressed by foreign 
authorities as representatives of the whole community. I therefore suggest that the 
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term “the sons of GN” in some texts refers to a limited decision-making body that 
took oaths on behalf of the community and represented them in cases concerning 
transgressions committed in the town or by townspeople. Although little evidence is 
available for the size and composition of these decision-making groups, it is likely 
that they were similar to “the elders” of RS 20.239 (cf. 5.10.1), a small group of men 
from wealthy families that could travel and represent the community in legal 
processes. Since the Hittite king addressed “the sons of GN” directly and not through 
the palace of Ugarit, the villages may appear to be independent of the central 
authorities. However, why does the “prefect” of Ugarit act as middle-man in RS 
17.288 between the king of Ushnatu and “the sons of Aranyia”? 
 
In RS 17.288, the sākinu, “prefect” of Ugarit, dealt with the local community of 
Aranyia on behalf of a foreign king. Also, in RS 20.239, the sākinu turns to “the 
elders of Rakba” in order to conclude the case of stolen cattle (cf. 5.10.1). Therefore, 
“the sons of GN” and “elders” can be said to be integrated in the political structure of 
Ugarit. They are not treated as an anonymous collective, but appear to be 
representatives of the local communities that communicated with the central 
authorities. Thus, the texts discussed above provide evidence against the model of two 
separate sectors of Ugaritic society: there were local decision-making bodies in the 
village-communities, but they were integrated in the Ugaritic city-state.  
 
All the evidence discussed above (5.10.1-2) concerns towns and villages outside the 
city Ugarit. The countryside appears more politically integrated in the city-state than 
Heltzer and Liverani assume. I now turn to evidence concerning groups of people in 
Ugarit itself. Merchants played an important role in Ugarit’s economy. Were there 
independent merchant communities at Ugarit? In the following, evidence for 
decisions made by collective bodies of merchants and other groups in Ugarit will be 
 403 
investigated to determine who participated in making decisions in the city and how 
these bodies were integrated in the structure of power of the kingdom. 
 
5.11 Collective decision-making bodies in Ugarit 
Among the texts from Ugarit, there are several letters from the Hittite overlords that 
are addressed collectively to merchant groups. These letters contain instructions and 
verdicts. The identities of the groups addressed are difficult to establish, and scholars 
are not agreed on who they were or what their position in Ugaritic society was. Who 
were these groups of people and why did the Hittite overlords address them, and not 
the king of Ugarit? 
 
5.11.1 “The elders of Ugarit” 
The first group I will discuss are “the elders of Ugarit”. RS 17.424 C+397 B is 
addressed to the sākinu or “prefect” of Ugarit from a foreign king, of the 
neighbouring kingdom Amqi (?) and mentions the abbū al Ugarit, “elders of Ugarit”. 
The king of Amqi complains about a certain Ardu, who is titled amil akil kārim, 
“foreman of the quay authorities”, concerning taxes on merchandise. The king of 
Amqi demands of the sākinu that the abbū al ugarit, “the elders of Ugarit”, look into 
the matter concerning taxes levied on “merchants who walk on foot”.966 
 
RS 17.424 C+397 B is a difficult text for several reasons. It is not clear who wrote the 
letter. Nougayrol, the editor, suggests the king of Amqi, a powerful city-state 
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kingdom in Syria. This seems plausible, as the letter apparently concerns relations 
between neighbouring powers. A further problem with the text is the term abbī al 
ugarit “elders of Ugari” or perhaps better “fathers of Ugarit”. It is a well-attested 
honorific term and can be used of “elders”.967 However, in RS 20.239, the term 
šībūtum was used of “elders”, not abbū. This is probably of little consequence, 
however, and I assume that the abbī are a group of “elders”. 
 
It is not clear what the king of Amqi expects of “the elders of Ugarit”. This is a 
problem for interpreting RS 17.424 C+397 B. It is after all difficult to determine what 
kind of decision-making body these “elders” were, if it cannot be established what 
they decided on. What is of interest, however, is that the sākinu received a letter with 
instructions to make “the elders” look into business concerning international relations. 
Unfortunately, the letter is one of the very few instances where “elders” are 
mentioned for the city Ugarit itself, and firm conclusions cannot be drawn.  
 
The reference to merchants in RS 17.424 C+397 B is interesting: as will be discussed 
below (5.11.2-3) there are several more texts from Ugarit that refer to groups of 
merchants. The relation between “the elders of Ugarit” and the taxes on “merchants 
who walk on foot” is obscure, however. The exact meaning or reference of the term 
“merchants who walk on foot” is unclear. It is not improbable that these merchants 
were engaged in trade with Amqi, but the reading is not certain. I turn now to groups 
of merchants operating in what appears as a decision-making capacity. 
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5.11.2 “The sons of the city” and “the merchants of Ugarit” 
There are agreements found on tablets from Ugarit that regulate relations between 
merchants and “the sons of GN”. Who were these merchants? Why are the treaties 
formulated as agreements between groups of people and not between the rulers of 
city-states or principalities?  
 
RS 17.146 contains an agreement that Initeshub, king of “the country and city 
Karkemish” (māt alkargamis), made between “those of the country and city Karkemish” 
and “those of the country and city Ugarit” (māt alugarit).968 The treaty between the two 
cities concerns murder in Karkemish of “the king of Ugarit’s merchants” (amīl tamkārī 
ša mandatti ša šar māt alugarit). If “the sons of Karkemish” (mārūM māt alkargamis) 
catch the murderers, they are to pay compensation for goods lost and a price for each 
life taken. The goods will be compensated according to the declaration of “the 
brothers” (ahhūM) of the murdered merchants. “The sons of Ugarit” (mārūM māt 
alugarit) are to swear an oath concerning the declaration of the lost goods.969 If “the 
sons of Karkemish” are unable to find the killers, they are to go to Ugarit and declare 
this under oath (ina māmīti itammuni), and that they do not know the whereabouts of 
the missing merchants or their goods. Then, they only pay a price for each life taken 
and do not recompense any goods.970 The same rules apply for “merchants of the king 
of Karkemish” killed in Ugarit, only that if “the sons of Ugarit” are not able to find 
the murderers, they are to go to the town Nubana (alnubana) or the town Gurata 
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970 Nougayrol, Archives internationales, 1956, 154-157: PRU IV 17.146, 19-27 
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(algurata) and declare this under oath to “the brothers” of the merchants.971 The treaty 
ends with a curse against altering the agreement.972  
 
In this treaty, the regional overlord, the king of Karkemish, draws up a mutual treaty between 
“the sons” of either city, Karkemish and Ugarit. He appears as a kind of arbiter. Who were 
the parties to the treaty? It may seem that “the sons of the city” refer to the people of Ugarit 
and Karkemish. However, in my opinion the detailed instructions for adjudication and 
satisfaction of demands from the colleagues of the merchants rather suggest that a particular 
group of people is meant and not all the inhabitants of the cities. It appears more likely that 
“the sons of the city” are identical with the merchants in RS 17.146.  
 
RS 17.146 has been used as evidence to argue that Ugarit was a city with a high degree of 
citizen participation in politics: Hanoch Reviv emphasises that the king of Ugarit is not 
mentioned as party to the treaty in RS 17.146 and that the king of Karkemish is not a direct 
party, either. Instead, Reviv argues, “the sons of the city” were responsible, as a body of 
citizens, for carrying out the agreement. According to Reviv, “the emphasis is placed, 
therefore, on the collective responsibility of those directly involved – the citizenry of the 
cities, for the kings were not party even if they were the principal beneficiaries of the fruits 
of these agreements”.973  
 
Reviv’s interpretation is problematic: if “the sons of GN” are the citizenry, how was the 
entire citizenry held responsible? As seen in other situations of collective adjudication 
(5.10.1), part of the process for determining guilt was to go to a specified town or temple and 
swear an oath. This does not square well with the idea of a broad collective responsibility of 
                                              
971 Nougayrol, Archives internationales, 1956, 154-157: PRU IV 17.146, 28-44 
972 Nougayrol, Archives internationales, 1956, 154-157: PRU IV 17.146, 45-53 
973 Reviv, “Urban self-government in Syria-Palestine,” 1969, 292 
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all the citizens. To me, it appears more likely that the merchants were “the sons of the city” 
in RS 17.146 and they were the ones who had to go and swear an oath.  
 
Who were these merchants? Heltzer interprets the tamkārū ša mandatti as “trade agents of 
the king or those who pay him taxes”. 974 This might well have been the case, but it should 
be kept in mind that the king of Ugarit is not referred to in RS 17.146. It seems like the 
merchants were a group that was viewed as a separate party in treaties. Thus, it can be argued 
that there were corporate groups of merchants in the cities similar to “the elders” in the 
villages. This is indicated by the clause in the verdict demanding that “the sons of Ugarit” are 
to go to specified towns to swear an oath, suggesting that the mārūM māt alugarit was a group 
of people and not “the citizens” in general. Whether this group was identical with the 
merchants is difficult to determine, but seems plausible, since they are referred to as the 
aggrieved party and would be the ones interested in hearing the oaths. 
 
The relations between the king and the merchants are difficult to determine. It seems 
that some trade was under the control of the king in the sense that he commissioned 
merchants. However, it is not the king of Ugarit that the king of Karkemish holds 
responsible for murder of merchants or loss of goods. Rather, such cases appear as the 
responsibility of the merchants themselves and their organisation. Does this mean that 
the merchants were royal officials, held responsible as part of the palace organisation? 
In my opinion, the merchants appear to have a separate organisation from the palace, 
since they are mentioned as party to the treaty by the king of Karkemish, without any 
mention of the palace of Ugarit or the king. If “the sons of the city” are identical to 
“the merchants of Ugarit” in RS 17.146, they appear to have been party to treaties and 
to have had their counterparts in other cities. Thus, it can be argued that the merchants 
were organised in corporations that were recognised as parties to treaties by the rulers. 
Therefore, the merchants can be said to have had an autonomous status, at least to a 
                                              
974 Heltzer, “The economy of Ugarit,” 1999, 440 n.87 
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certain degree. This is probably the reason why they could communicate directly with 
the king of Karkemish. 
 
5.11.3 “The men of the gate” 
In the tablets from Ugarit, there are treaty-texts that mention other groups beside 
merchants that appear as parties separate from the palace. As will be seen in the 
following, one such group is “the men of the gate”. Who were they? 
 
RS 18.115 contains a treaty between Karkemish and Ugarit made by king Initeshub of 
Karkemish. It concerns the murder of merchants from either city. If “the sons of 
Karkemish” do not succeed in apprehending the murderers of a merchant of the king 
of Ugarit, “the sons of Ugarit together with their men of the gate” (mārūM māt alugarit 
qadu amīlīM ša bābišunu) are to go to Karkemish, where they are to swear to the loss 
of their brothers’ goods and be reimbursed by “the sons of Karkemish”.975 If they find 
dead people (?) but no murderer (?) has been caught, “the sons of Karkemish and their 
men of the gate” are to go to Ugarit instead, and swear that they do not know the 
murderers, and that these merchants, their silver, their donkeys and all their other 
belongings are gone.976 If merchants of the king of Karkemish are killed in Ugarit, 
and the killers are caught, then “the sons of Karkemish and their people of the gate” 
shall go to Ugarit to obtain reimbursement there.977 If “the sons of Ugarit” are unable 
to satisfy “the sons of Karkemish” with regards to presenting the killers, “the sons of 
                                              
975 Nougayrol, Archives internationales, 1956, 158-160: PRU IV 18.115, 3-10 
976 Nougayrol, Archives internationales, 1956, 158-160: PRU IV 18.115, 12-18 
977 Nougayrol, Archives internationales, 1956, 158-160: PRU IV 18.115, 20-26 
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Ugarit” are to go with “their men of the gate” to the town of Nubana or Gurata and 
swear to their ignorance, and then pay wergild.978 
 
RS 18.115 is quite similar to RS 17.146 discussed above (5.11.2) and contains some 
of the same difficulties. The groups involved in the treaty are difficult to recognise. 
What is meant by “their men of the gate”? It has puzzled scholars and no agreement 
has been reached. Hanoch Reviv points out that the term mārūM māt alGN qadu amīlīM 
ša bābišunu, “the sons of the country and city GN with their men of the gate”, is only 
found on this tablet. He suggests that it refers to a body connected to “the sons of the 
city” and a gate where oaths were sworn. In his interpretation, this body was “the 
elders”, “who, most likely represented the “sons of” the city at the oath ceremonies 
binding the agreements.”979  
 
A. Leo Oppenheim does not accept Reviv’s interpretation of RS 18.115. Oppenheim 
suggests instead that the term mārūM  māt ālGN qadu amīlīM ša bābišunu refers to 
strangers allowed to live inside the gates of Karkemish, as foreigners living in 
separate quarters or streets.980 Why foreigners who were not even allowed inside the 
city are mentioned in treaties between Ugarit and the king of Karkemish, however, is 
not clear to me: RS 18.115 states that “the men of the gate” of Ugarit are supposed to 
go to Karkemish together with “the sons of the city” to swear an oath in Nubana or 
Gurata. In my opinion, this speaks against Oppenheim’s interpretation of “their men 
of the gate” as some kind of resident foreigners. The fact that they are expected to 
travel somewhere else on the king’s instructions to swear an oath indicate that they 
were a corporate body belonging in Ugarit. Reviv’s suggestion that “men of the gate” 
                                              
978 Nougayrol, Archives internationales, 1956, 158-160: PRU IV 18.115, 27-34 
979 Reviv, “Urban self-government in Syria-Palestine,” 1969, 293 
980 Oppenheim, Ancient Mesopotamia, 1977 [1964], 78 
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in the treaty is evidence for a body of “elders” is a tempting solution to the problem of 
establishing their identity. However, in the text it is stated that “the sons of the city” 
and “the people of the gate” go together, not separately, to swear the oath. Therefore, 
it is difficult to see that “the people of the gate” was a group of “elders” representing 
some kind of citizen-assembly of “the sons of GN”. Also, “the people of the gate” are 
not mentioned in RS 17.146 (cf. 5.11.2), where it is stated that “the sons of the city” 
shall go and swear the oath. Why are “the elders” not involved in that case, if they are 
involved in the treaty in RS 18.115? 
 
The problem of the identity of “the men of the gate” cannot be solved without more 
texts that mention them in context. It should be added that Reviv’s suggestion is based 
in his conviction that “the sons of GN” are the citizens. As has been argues above 
(5.11.2), this interpretation is not acceptable, as “the sons of GN” in some cases 
clearly refers to a restricted group and not a large assembly. Therefore, I suggest that 
“the men of the gate” was a corporation involved in adjudication and taking oaths, as 
part of the groups of merchants involved in the treaty. In my opinion, they are not 
mentioned in all treaties precisely because they are subsumed under the terms “sons of 
the city”, in this context meaning the merchants. 
 
5.11.4 “The men of the city” and “the sons of the city” 
In the texts hitherto discussed, the difficulties in identifying the different parties to 
treaties from Ugarit are apparent. There are “men of the city” and “sons of the city” in 
the Ugaritic text, terms that in some circumstances appear to refer to a few persons, 
and in other cases to refer generally to the residents of a town or city. In the 
following, some more examples will be discussed, in order to shed light on the 
meaning of these difficult terms. 
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RS 17.230 contains an agreement made between king Initeshub of Karkemish 
(mātkargamis) and “the men of the land Ugarit” (amīlū mātugarit). If “a man of 
Karkemish” (amīlu ša mātkargamis) is killed in Ugarit, and the murderer is caught, 
they will pay a triple compensation for that “man” (amīlu) and the goods that 
disappeared with him. If the murderers cannot be found, they are to pay a triple 
compensation for his life, and for the goods, as much as disappeared with him. The 
compensation will be the same for “a man of Ugarit” killed in Karkemish.981  
 
The treaty in RS 17.230 is made between the Hittite overlord at Karkemish and the 
amīlū or “men” of Ugarit. “The men of Ugarit” are held responsible for loss of life 
and goods of “men of Karkemish”. Who are these “men of GN”?  Are they a different 
group of people from “the sons of GN”? As an explanation for the use of these two 
separate terms, Hanoch Reviv suggests that the term “the men of Ugarit” (amīlū 
mātugarit) means all the citizens of Ugarit, whereas the term “sons of Ugarit” (mārūM 
māt alugarit) means “the merchants of Ugarit”. He argues that since RS 17.230 does not 
mention “the men of Karkemish”, “it should be assumed that the king of this city 
would compensate Ugarit if so sued. Thus, it appears that a civic institution of the 
“sons of Ugarit” and its representatives could sue not only their foreign counterparts 
but also the ruler of a foreign country.”982 In his analysis, “the citizen-body appears 
not only as a body representing the city, but possibly also as the civil institution for 
the execution of such agreements throughout the kingdom”. 983  
 
Like his interpretation of “the sons of Ugarit” (cf. 5.11.2), Reviv’s interpretation of 
“the men of Ugarit” is problematic. First, it contradicts his suggestion that “the sons 
                                              
981 Nougayrol, Archives internationales, 1956, 153-154: PRU IV 17.230 
982 Reviv, “Urban self-government in Syria-Palestine,” 1969, 294 
983 Reviv, “Urban self-government in Syria-Palestine,” 1969, 291 
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of GN” was the citizenry.984 Second, the situation of loss of life and goods of “the 
men of Karkemish” is quite similar to the other treaties discussed above that 
concerned merchants of Ugarit and other cities. The treaty clearly does not concern all 
“citizens of Ugarit”, but lays down rules for compensation in cases where life or 
goods are lost. Why would the citizens of Ugarit become involved in the affairs of 
merchants of Karkemish? Reviv’s interpretation rules out merchants being involved, 
but it should be asked what other “citizens of Ugarit” would become involved with 
foreign powers concerning travelling merchants. I would rather suggest that similar to 
the texts RS 17.146 and RS 18.115 discussed above (5.11.2-3), RS 17.230 is about 
relations between merchants of Ugarit and merchants of other cities. They do not 
appear to be royal officials, however, since their conduct is negotiated directly with a 
foreign ruler, rather than coming from their own king. Reviv’s distinction between 
“men of Ugarit” and “sons of Ugarit”, is rather tenuous and there is no independent 
evidence that there was a formally constituted citizenry at Ugarit that made treaties 
with foreign kings. The difficulties of separating “the men” from “the sons” will be 
made clear in the following from the analysis of a few further texts from Ugarit. 
 
RS 17.158 contains a verdict from a case where king Initeshub of Karkemish (šar 
mātkargamis), “a merchant who serves the king of Tarhudashi” (amīltamkāru ardu ša 
šar māttarhudašši), and “the sons of Ugarit” (mārūM mātugarit) “have gone to court” 
(ana dīni išniqu).985 “The sons of Ugarit” stand accused of the murder of a merchant 
from Tarhudashi, and the king of Karkemish rendered the judgement that the accuser 
shall swear to the facts, and “the sons of Ugarit” are to pay a fine in compensation. 
The tablet is a receipt that must be presented if someone should wish to open the case 
for a retrial.986 The case is followed up in RS 17.42, where the same merchant as in 
                                              
984 Cf. Reviv, “Urban self-government in Syria-Palestine,” 1969, 292 
985 Nougayrol, Archives internationales, 1956, 169-171: PRU IV 17.158, 1-4 
986 Nougayrol, Archives internationales, 1956, 169-171: PRU IV 17.158, 5-25 
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RS 17.158 swears that he will not complain further in this case, and that “the sons of 
Ugarit” are to behave likewise.987  
 
RS 17.145 mentions a person called Aballa, who goes to court with king Initeshub 
and “the sons of Ugarit” (mārūM mātugarit). Aballa claims that the merchants 
dependent on him have been killed in Ugarit. The king judges that “the men of 
Ugarit” (amīlūM mātugarit) are to pay compensation for the slain merchants. The text 
includes an instruction that the tablet must be presented if anyone wishes to reopen 
the case.988  
 
RS 17.158 and RS 17.145 are quite parallel cases. Thus, it can be seen that there are 
no clear distinction in the texts from Ugarit between “sons of GN” and “men of GN”: 
in RS 17.145 “the men of Ugarit” (amīlūM mātugarit) are held responsible for the same 
crimes as “the sons of Ugarit” in RS 17.158. “The sons of Ugarit” in RS 17.145 
appears as a body that could be sued and meet litigants in court. A parallelism can 
also be observed between RS 17.230 above, where “the men of Ugarit” pay 
compensation, and RS 17.158, where “the sons of Ugarit” pay compensation. It is 
difficult to discern a difference between when “the sons” were held responsible and 
when “the men” were held responsible. In my opinion, a sensible solution to this 
problem is to assume that the two terms are used interchangeably for the same group 
of people in these letters, viz. the merchants. 
 
                                              
987 Nougayrol, Archives internationales, 1956, 171-172: PRU IV 17.42 
988 Nougayrol, Archives internationales, 1956, 172-173: PRU IV 17.145 
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5.12 The relations between palace, local communities, and 
merchants 
Treaties were drawn up by the Hittite regional overlord between the merchants of 
different cities without the direct intervention of their rulers: the amīlūM mātugarit, 
“the men of Ugarit” and the mārūM mātugarit, “the sons of Ugarit” appear as parties to 
treaties. These groups appear as bodies of merchants with an autonomous status 
within the kingdom of Ugarit. The treaties demonstrate that bodies of merchants 
could operate independently of their king and manage their own affairs. The Hittite 
regional overlord signs treaties with these collective bodies, rather than with the king 
of Ugarit.  
 
There are also other collective bodies that manage their own affairs in the texts from 
Ugarit: the village-communities appear as collectives, “the sons of GN”, from the 
texts of the royal archives. In certain cases, “the sons of GN” appears to be a council 
of “elders”. The difference between the townspeople and “the elders” can only be 
read from context.  
 
It is interesting that merchants and local village-communities had their own collective 
decision-making bodies. This indicates that the palace did not control everything and 
that a degree of local autonomy was existed within the kingdom. However, the 
recording of the activities of these institutions in the royal archives does suggest that 
there were close ties between these local councils and the palace administration. Also, 
officials appealed to these local bodies. In some cases, officials appear to have 
participated in them. Thus, it cannot be claimed that the village-communities were 
independent of the palace and belonged to an autonomous sector. This also applies to 
the bodies of merchants. Rather, the local decision-making bodies of the village-
communities and the merchant corporations were integrated in the city-state. This is 
indicated by the concern of the authorities to record cases that involved these bodies. 
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Several decisions in the kingdom of Ugarit appear to have been made in local 
councils and adjudication was clearly not the preserve of the palace. In the village-
communities, “elders” attended courts in order to defend their community against 
accusations of theft, as seen above (5.10.1). Although “the elders” formed a restricted 
group, their duties appear to be as representatives of the local community. Therefore, 
their strategy for power can be called a narrow corporate strategy.  
 
It is interesting to note that the merchants had a semi-independent position in the 
kingdom. This is probably due to the importance of trade at Ugarit. Although the 
merchants were sometimes commissioned by the king of Ugarit, the treaties discussed 
above (5.11.2-4) are made between the Hittite overlord and groups of merchants 
directly. The merchants formed a collective, but little is known about how this 
collective was organised. It can be assumed that adjudication was made through 
representatives of the merchants, similar to “the elders” that represented their local 
communities. Thus, the merchants pursued a narrow corporate strategy, where a 
restricted group represented the others in court cases. 
 
Ugarit had an extensive royal family and a wide range of palace officials. However, 
there appears to have been corporate groups within the city-state that were not directly 
subsumed in the palace hierarchy. The village-communities appear to have been less 
independent than Heltzer (1976; 1982) and Liverani (1982) claim, making local 
decisions, but being integrated in the structure of power of the city-state. On the other 
hand, the merchants appear as more independent than their two-sector model allows 
for. This also applies to the patrimonial household model of Schloen (2001). The 
merchants had their own collective identity and status as party to treaties with foreign 
rulers, meaning that they were not royal dependents controlled by the palace or 




The political cultures of the Old Assyrian city-state and its colonies and Late Bronze 
Age Ugarit have in common that corporate bodies played an important role in their 
daily affairs, legal decisions and perhaps also in politics: in Ugarit, corporations of 
merchants made agreements with the Hittite king and the Hittite viceroy in Karkemish 
(cf. 5.11.2). The same can be seen from the treaties between Old Assyrian merchants 
and the kingdoms of Anatolia and Syria (cf. 5.5.6).  
 
From the Old Assyrian material, it can be seen that the wealthiest merchants formed a 
powerful group in the city-state together with the king. In the Old Assyrian colonies, 
the wealthiest merchants seem to have dominated decisions. Thus, a collective of 
heads of wealthy merchant houses were in power, and not the king alone. Collective 
decision-making was important in the city-state of Assur as well as in the Anatolian 
colonies. However, there was no popular assembly in charge of the polity (cf. 5.6). In 
the material from Ugarit, the merchants do not seem to have taken part directly in 
running the state. They were organised in corporations that made their own 
agreements with foreign powers, but that does not mean that they were an 
independent political force (cf. 5.12).  
 
The polities discussed in this chapter were dependent on trade and this may explain 
the powerful position of the merchants. The kings were not despots. Rather, 
corporations played a semi-independent role in the polities and made their own 
agreements with foreign powers.  
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From Ugarit, there is evidence that power in the local communities was in the hands 
of corporations of “elders” or “the sons of GN”: royal officials communicate with 
“the elders” or “sons of GN” concerning adjudication in the local communities and 
between these communities and outsiders. The term “the sons of GN” does not always 
refer collectively to towns or villages, but is sometimes used in the sense of a 
corporation (cf. 5.10.1-2). The communication between central authorities and the 
local communities through these local corporations indicates that “the elders” and 
“sons of GN” pursued a narrow corporate strategy for power, in the sense that they 
answered to the community and represented them with the central authorities. Popular 
power existed only so far as the local communities could influence their “elders” or 
other representatives. The king seems to have interfered with the local communities 
through his officials, and it cannot be claimed that the local authorities influenced the 





6. Autonomy and popular power in city-states under 
foreign empire 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the political identity and capacities of the people of a few Near 
Eastern city-states will be investigated, with a view to local collective action and 
relations between the local ruler and the people. In particular, correspondence 
between city-states and their imperial overlords will be discussed, in cuneiform texts 
from Levantine city-states of the Amarna period of the Late Bronze Age and 
Babylonian city-states of the Iron Age.  
 
From archives of the imperial authorities of Amarna Age Egypt and several archives 
of Iron Age Assyria and Babylonia, there are letters that shed light on local political 
life. I will discuss local revolts reported in cuneiform texts of the Amarna 
correspondence from a perspective of the local communities, in order to analyse their 
strategies for power. I will also discuss relations between the Assyrian king and his 
Babylonian vassal cities in the Neo-Assyrian period, from letters sent to the 
authorities of local city communities. The privileges of the urban population will be 
paid special attention. 
 
6.2 The Amarna correspondence 
The Amarna correspondence consists of letters written in Akkadian cuneiform on clay 
tablets. It is named after Tell el-Amarna in Egypt where the tablets were excavated. 
Tell el-Amarna is a mound that covers the ruins of Akhetaten, capital of ancient Egypt 
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under Pharaoh Akhenaton, also known as Amenophis IV. Scholars refer to the period 
covered by the letters from Tell el-Amarna as the Amarna Age. It encompasses the 
14th century.989 The letters come from Akhenaton’s royal archives and concern 
relations between the great and lesser powers of the Late Bronze Age, including their 
diplomatic relations with Egypt. Almost all the tablets are written in Akkadian, the 
international language of the Late Bronze Age.  
 
The Amarna letters were collected, collated, organised, and published in 
transliteration with German translations by the Norwegian scholar J. A. Knudtzon in 
the early 20th century.990 Knudtzon’s edition is largely still current, although new 
fragments have been added to the corpus. His translations are now superseded by the 
complete and annotated translations with commentary by William L. Moran into 
French and English.991 Throughout this chapter, Moran’s English edition has been 
used extensively. It should be noted that the translations of certain Akkadian terms in 
the idiom of the Amarna correspondence are controversial and sometimes affect the 
interpretation of entire passages, and I will refer to diverging views where this is 
relevant. 
 
The contents of the Amarna letters fall into two categories, the international 
correspondence and the vassal correspondence. The international correspondence 
unearthed at Amarna contains communications between Egypt and other imperial 
powers of the Late Bronze Age, viz. Assyria, Kassite Babylonia, Mittanni, the Hittite 
empire, and several minor kingdoms and cities. Differences in rank are explicit in the 
letters and the rulers are referred to as either Great or Minor kings. The Great kings 
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were those who ruled internationally respected empires, whereas the Minor kings 
ruled less distinguished realms. The Great kings referred to each other as brothers and 
thus regarded each other as peers. Several Amarna letters concern exchange of 
precious gifts between Great kings. Mario Liverani has dubbed this phenomenon a 
“Great Power’s club”.992 I agree that this is a fitting description, as it catches the 
international, yet intimate character of the relations between rulers: Great kings of the 
Amarna correspondence wrote to each other as brothers and friends. The Minor kings, 
on the other hand, show humility in their letters to more powerful rulers, including the 
Pharaoh.  
 
Generally speaking, the Amarna period was a rather stable period politically speaking, 
in the sense that there was no single hegemonic power, but a balance between several 
powers. Mario Liverani points out that the Amarna letters bear witness to a general 
acknowledgment among kings of the existence of several centres of power, in contrast 
to the ideology of universal empire.993 The correspondence between the Great kings 
will not be discussed in the following, however. Rather, I will discuss cities of the 
Levant documented in the so-called vassal correspondence. These are letters that were 
sent between Pharaoh and his governors in city-states of the Levant and Syria. The 
letters sent to Pharaoh from local petty kings loyal to Egypt have much to say about 
local affairs in the Levantine city-states. As will be seen (6.4), the several letters sent 
by Rib-Hadda, the governor of Byblos to Pharaoh are particularly informative 
sources, as he wrote frequently and was deeply involved in local political upheavals.   
  
The letters from Rib-Hadda to Akhenaton belong in a context of imperial politics. The 
region of Syria and the Levant was a border area for several empires, notably Egypt 
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and the Hittites. Rivalling great powers generated war and intensified local conflicts. 
As will be seen below from the letters of Rib-Hadda (6.4.1-3), local rulers appealed to 
Pharaoh for help against their enemies. In these letters, there are frequent references 
to a threat posed by groups called the hapiru. The hapiru were apparently groups of 
landless and lawless people in the wilderness of Syria and Palestine. Under the 
leadership of a certain ‘Abdi-Aširta and his sons of the nascent state of Amurru, 
bands of hapiru were threatening to overthrow the city-based rulers that were loyal to 
Pharaoh.  
 
The local rulers of Syrian cities appear to have had difficulties controlling their 
subjects; from the reports of Rib-Hadda in his letters, the people seem disaffected and 
revolt to be imminent. The threat of revolt is a recurring subject in his 
correspondence, with appeals for military support from the Pharaoh and his Syrian 
garrisons. The position of local rulers apparently depended on support from their 
imperial overlords. The hapiru, on the other hand, had the advantage of a local 
powerbase in the wilderness and the fact that the rivalling Great powers in the region, 
Egypt and the Hittites, were distant and involved in local affairs only indirectly.  
 
Especially interesting for the present investigation is the apparently quite independent 
role of the people or groups of citizens in some cities in relations with the local rulers 
and with the Pharaoh. In the following, I will discuss the structure of power in the 
city-states of Syria and the Levant in light of the vassal correspondence, in particular 
the letters sent from Rib-Hadda of Byblos to Pharaoh. Emphasis will be on letters that 




6.3 Local rulers, city populations and rebels 
From the Amarna correspondence, it can be seen that local rulers sometimes had a 
difficult position as local governors serving foreign and for the most part distant 
kings. Local rulers were ruling as kings over cities that can be called city-states, while 
at the same time serving a foreign overlord. The city-states were not independent of 
imperial control, and therefore were not autonomous political units. As will be seen, 
they were rather in a position of semi-autonomy, where Pharaoh and his local 
garrisons intervened only rarely. 
 
Despite the generally amicable relations between the Great powers of the Amarna 
age, the region of Syria and the Levant was an international hot spot in the Amarna 
period. The Hittites controlled the northern parts of Syria and the Egyptians were in 
the south. In the east lay the kingdom of Mittanni that also interfered in the region. 
There were occasional clashes, trapping the local city-states between competing 
imperial armies. As will be seen from the letters of Rib-Hadda, discussed below 
(6.4.1-3), the empires installed local kings as governors, as well as regional officials 
from the imperial hierarchy to maintain control.  
 
Imperial government was not uniform. Ingolf Thuesen points out that there were 
different tactics of foreign control in Syria: the northern towns under Hittite control 
had rulers from local dynasties, whereas towns of the southern region of Syria were 
ruled by officials from Egypt. He suggests that in Syria “the situation can best be 
described as a city-state culture consisting exclusively of dependent city-states”.994 
However, the level of dependence on foreign powers does not appear to have been 
very great. Nadav Na‘aman points out that the local rulers were not regarded as 
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Egyptian “mayors” or “governors” in the full sense of the term, i.e. as Egyptian 
officials. They had to answer to the Egyptian court administration for all that 
happened in the cities in their charge. However, locally, “the mayors” regarded 
themselves not as officials of a foreign power, but as proper kings, with royal power 
over their local subjects and in relations with their neighbours.995 Na‘aman’s 
observations on the position of local rulers are supported by the vassal letters of Rib-
Hadda, in which he calls himself ruler of Byblos and refers to his fellows in other 
Levantine cities as rulers.996 In the Amarna letters, local rulers are referred to with a 
range of Akkadian terms, as either šarru, “king”, bēl, “lord”, or awīlum, “man”, as 
well as hazannu, “mayor”. I will refer to local rulers with the term “mayor”, as this is 
the established term in Moran’s translation of the Amarna letters (1992). The 
Egyptian officials in the southern region of Syria had regional responsibilities and did 
not rule individual city-states, like “the mayors” did. 
 
 
In the vassal correspondence that will be discussed in the following, the main threat to 
“the mayors” of the cities of southern Syria was not imperial armies, but local 
troubles. A rising dynasty that would eventually establish a new kingdom called 
Amurru was attacking several cities under Egyptian sovereignty, supported by lawless 
bands called hapiru. Their ranks seem to have been filled by landless peasants and 
other malcontents that had left their homes and gone to seek their fortune as 
marauding robbers.997 As cities fell to the forces of Amurru and the hapiru, city-
dwellers also joined the hapiru. Moran suggests that the establishment of Amurru 
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began with the conquests of a certain ‘Abdi-Aširta and his son Aziru.998 In the letters 
of Rib-Hadda, it is described how ‘Abdi-Aširta and his sons with their hapiru forces 
came out of the wilderness and laid siege to city after city. Mario Liverani points out 
the literary qualities of Rib-Hadda’s reports about ‘Abdi-Aširta and his son Aziru, as 
stereotyped “scoundrels” and doubts their historical connection to semi-sedentary 
rebels.999 This will be discussed further below (6.4). Regardless of its connections to 
the hapiru, Amurru was real enough. Alan James points out that Amurru eventually 
was established as a Syrian kingdom, at the expense of other city-states in the 
region.1000 Amurru became a kingdom after the fashion of other local polities in Syria. 
The structural similarities and differences between bands of hapiru, the kingdom of 
Amurru and the city-states of the Levant will be discussed further below (6.5). 
 
As will be seen in the following sections (6.4-6.4.4), the Amurru leaders and their 
hapiru forces are reported to have attacked cities, as well as inciting revolt among the 
citizens against their “mayors”. In several letters sent to Pharaoh, there are reports that 
the people have chased “the mayors” of their cities away: “the mayors” write to 
Pharaoh for military support and complain that they are left on their own against the 
hapiru and rebel leaders that take over cities and chase away or kill the citizens who 
refuse to join them.1001 In the following, the townspeople’s reactions to the hapiru 
threat will be investigated, from letters sent by Rib-Hadda of Byblos to Pharaoh. 
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6.4 The plight of Rib-Hadda of Byblos 
A Syrian “mayor” and his struggle with hapiru of the wilderness and unrest among 
the townspeople are well-documented by the letters from Rib-Hadda, the “mayor of 
Byblos”. He appears as one of the most ardent correspondents of the Pharaoh. His 
many letters reveal much of interest concerning the political situation in the city-states 
of the Levant in the Amarna period. They provide an inside view of a local ruler 
under pressure from both external forces and a disaffected local population. 
 
As “mayor” of Byblos, Rib-Hadda wrote several letters to Pharaoh with appeals for 
help against hapiru attacks led by ‘Abdi-Aširta and his son Aziru. From his letters, it 
appear that roving bands of hapiru operated in league with the ambitious leaders of 
Amurru, who wished to establish their rule over cities of the region and establish their 
new kingdom. ‘Abdi-Aširta and his son Aziru led the hapiru in several successful 
raids against cities in southern Syria, in order to establish the kingdom of Amurru and 
consolidate its power. The mayors that were loyal to Pharaoh appealed to Egypt for 
reinforcements or an Egyptian intervention. This was not to arrive, however. 
 
The Amarna letters are invaluable sources to the history of Syria in the Late Bronze 
Age. However, being personal letters, they must be interpreted and cannot count as 
disinterested accounts of historical events. As pointed out by Mario Liverani, the 
Amarna letters are not statements of fact, but persuasive messages made by their 
authors.1002 Liverani emphasises that ancient literary texts must be examined for what 
they can tell about themselves as texts and about the time when they were written, 
rather than being mined for historical kernels of truth hiding beneath and between the 
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words.1003 He argues that Rib-Hadda’s complaints to Pharaoh follows a literary idiom 
he identifies as “the righteous sufferer”: Rib-Hadda denounces ‘Abdi-Aširta and his 
son Aziru as hapiru leaders, not because they actually were leaders of desert brigands, 
but because this is a stereotype of “the enemy”.1004 Liverani does not accept that the 
cities in question are actually taken by hapiru in a concerted campaign, as Rib-Hadda 
repeatedly claims, but that the local revolts must be seen as part of an “alternating and 
unstable process that changes with the balance of power”.1005  
 
I find Liverani’s rally for an analysis of letters as literary texts rather than as 
repositories of ancient facts stimulating. Rib-Hadda should not be taken as a neutral 
witness to goings on in his native city and its environs: in his letters to Pharaoh he 
seeks an effect, not to report on historical fact. I agree with Liverani that the local 
revolts of Syrian cities must be regarded as more comprehensive than the 
opportunistic instigation to revolt by lawless foreigners. The uprisings should indeed 
be seen as part of the dynamics of local politics. However, the Amarna letters, and not 
only those of Rib-Hadda, do emphasise the role of the hapiru and their leaders, and 
this should not be ignored, regardless of literary parallels to “righteous sufferers”, 
Biblical or otherwise. Although the hapiru were probably not behind all the attacks on 
the local kings, it seems highly likely that turmoil and unrest created opportunities for 
political changes in the Syrian cities, including the slaying of “mayors”. 
 
In the Amarna letters, an important element in the tactics of the hapiru and their 
leaders appears to have been to bring over the local populations to their side and 
incite revolt against the cities’ “mayors”. The letters of Rib-Hadda are particularly 
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interesting for what they have to say about the role of the townspeople in the revolts 
incited by the hapiru and their leaders. In the following, evidence concerning several 
cities will be discussed, including Ammiya (6.4.1), Tyre (6.4.2), Rib-Hadda’s own 
city Byblos (6.4.3), as well as Tunip and Irqata (6.4.4). All the letters are sent from 
“the mayor” Rib-Hadda, except from the two latter cities, where “the citizens” or “the 
elders” of Tunip and Irqata write to Pharaoh. All the cities in question were affected 
by rebellion, popular uprisings, and struggles for power. In the following, I will 
present and discuss the evidence, before turning to the scholarly debate on the 
evidence for popular protest and popular power in the Amarna letters. 
 
6.4.1 The killing of “the mayor” of Ammiya and other cases of 
revolt 
In the letters from Rib-Hadda, there are several reports of cases of regicide and revolt 
in Syrian cities. Who were behind these killings? What does revolt say about popular 
power? 
 
In EA 74,1006 Rib-Hadda writes to Pharaoh complaining that hapiru are threatening 
the city Byblos. Rib-Hadda claims that only Byblos and two other towns are left to 
him, all other villages in the mountains and along the sea are lost to the hapiru.1007 
The hapiru are led by ‘Abdi-Aširta, who is instigating revolt by saying to “the men of 
the city of Ammiya” (amēlūt alammia) that they should kill “their leaders” ([E]N-
lakunu?) and become like the hapiru and live at peace.1008 ‘Abdi-Aširta is planning an 
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attack on Byblos, and thereafter a revolt against all “the mayors” (amēlūtuhazanutu) of 
the country.1009 
 
In EA 75,1010 Rib-Hadda writes to Pharaoh again about the threat the hapiru pose to 
Byblos. The fields cannot be tilled.1011 The hapiru have killed “the mayor” of Irqata, 
and “the men of Ammiya” (amēlūt alammim) have also killed “their lord” 
(bēla[š]u).1012 The situation is worsened by Hittites and the Mittanni fighting in Syria 
over vassal territories.1013 
 
EA 74 and EA 75 are evidence that the people of several of the Egyptian controlled 
city-states of Syria were in revolt. In the letter EA 74, there appears to be an 
opposition between “the men of the city of Ammiya” (LÚ.MEŠ/amēlūt alammia) and 
“their leaders” ([E]N-lakunu?). Who were “the men of the city of Ammiya”? There is 
no indication of the size of the group of “the men of the city”. It is not clear whether 
‘Abdi-Aširta actually spoke to a limited group of people called “the men of the city of 
Ammiya” or whether the city population in general is meant by this expression. The 
reference “the men of the city of Ammiya” can thus be to a limited group of important 
people or the townspeople in general.  
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In the CAD, the term amīlūtu GN/LÚ.MEŠ GN in the letter EA 74, 25 is interpreted 
as “the population of a city or a country”, more specifically “the people of GN”.1014  
Who were the people, however? If the decision to kill “the mayor” was taken by the 
entire city population, it is nevertheless not clear how this was done. This problem 
will be discussed further below (6.5).  
 
There are further problems in EA 74: the possible reading of ([E]N-lakunu?), “their 
leaders” in the plural is tantalising. Since the reading is not secure, very little can be 
concluded from it. Perhaps “the lords” are “the mayor”, Pharaoh, and an Egyptian 
governor in Syria? In my opinion, the inference of EA 74 is that the population of 
cities and towns were collectively protesting against their established leaders. 
However, the interpretation of the amīlūtu GN/LÚ.MEŠ GN as “people of the city” in 
the sense of citizens is controversial, and will be discussed in section 6.5.2. 
 
The events referred to in EA 75 demonstrate the seriousness of the threat the hapiru 
and their leaders and local revolts posed to “the mayors”. Why the local population 
revolted and joined the hapiru is not clear. In EA 74 and 75, the revolt appears as an 
outside as well as an inside threat. “The men of Ammiya” (amēlūt alammim) are 
referred to in EA 75 as the killers of “their lord”, but as in EA 74, we get no 
information who exactly these men were or how they were organised.  
 
In EA 74, it appears that ‘Abdi-Aširta addressed a restricted group of people in the 
cities in order to bring them to revolt: thus the reference to “the men of the city of 
Ammiya” (amēlūt alammia) is apparently to a small group of people and not to the 
entire city population. It would after all be easy for the mayor of Ammiya to forestall 
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a rebellion if a leader of the hapiru urged the people to revolt in a general assembly in 
the city. However, the rebellion in Ammiya does not look like a conspiracy planned 
by a small group of people. The event in EA 75 in the city of Ammiya is reported by 
Rib-Hadda as a revolt and killing of “the mayor” and it is noted together with the 
attack of the hapiru on Irqata and slaying of its “mayor”. This seems to me evidence 
that “the people of the city” refers to the entire population of the city and that it took 
part in a general uprising. There is no reference to supporters of “the mayor” in 
Ammiya, or evidence that there could be put up any effective resistance to the rebels. 
Therefore, large undifferentiated groups appear to be the forces behind the killing of 
“the mayors” in EA 75; the hapiru in Irqata and “the men of Ammiya” in Ammiya.  
 
From EA 74, the rebellion in Ammiya appears to have started with outside instigation, 
followed by mass action against “the mayor”, reported in EA 75. However, it cannot 
be ruled out that the role of outside forces is exaggerated by Rib-Hadda in his letters. 
In this interpretation, the local initiative was the more important factor. Indeed, for the 
revolt to succeed without intervention from people loyal to “the mayor”, the rebels 
must have been quite a large group. The reference to “the men of the city” therefore 
appears to be to all the men of the city, and not a small group or a conspiracy. It 
appears like the city population could be addressed by outside instigators of rebellion 
and that they could take collective action against their “mayor”. If this interpretation 
is correct, the amīlūtu GN/LÚ.MEŠ GN in EA 74 and EA 75 took power into their 
own hands: “the men of Ammiya” make the decision to kill their mayor collectively 
and they rebel against their mayor as an undifferentiated mass. It should be pointed 
out, however, that the reason they revolted was to change their allegiance to the 
hapiru and their leaders, not to establish a government by the people or other 
alternative to kingship. The political significance of townspeople killing the local 
“mayors” in Syrian city-states will be discussed further below (6.5.1). 
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6.4.2 Trouble in Tyre 
From the letters of Rib-Hadda, it appears that no city was spared the troubles of 
rebellion. Inner strife between contenders for power had an important role in this 
unrest. What can the rise to power of usurpers tell about the political situation in 
Syrian cities and the role of the people in establishing or toppling leaders? 
 
In EA 89,1015 Rib-Hadda writes to Pharaoh about trouble in Tyre: he complains that in 
“the city of Tyre” (alşuri), they have killed “their mayor” (hazannašunu), but Pharaoh 
makes no inquiry. Rid-Hadda claims that he knows the truth in the matter and that the 
killers are lying, feigning allegiance to Pharaoh. Rib-Hadda points out that he had 
married his sister to “the mayor” of Tyre and was formerly on good terms with the 
city, but now they have killed their “mayor”, as well as Rib-Hadda’s sister and her 
sons.1016  He writes that Pharaoh should inquire about “the mayor” and that the city is 
afraid and does not support “the mayor”, but that they are unable to do anything. He 
reminds Pharaoh that “the mayor” of Tyre is very rich and his residence renowned for 
its wealth. With the latest turn of events, ‘Abdi-Aširta is in control of parts of the 
coast.1017  
 
In EA 101,1018 Rib-Hadda writes to Pharaoh1019. He reports that ‘Abdi-Aširta is 
dead.1020 “The men of Tyre”, “the men of Sidon” and “the men of Beirut” (amēlūt 
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alGN) were now all friendly to Amurru.1021 Rib-Hadda asks whether these cities do 
not belong to Pharaoh, and recommends placing “a man” (amēlum) over each of them 
so that the ships of Amurru cannot enter these ports.1022  
 
In EA 89 the slaying of “the mayor” of Tyre is reported. Apparently, his successor 
was not loyal to Pharaoh. In EA 101, Tyre is on the side of the hapiru, so the new 
“mayor” in Tyre indeed appears to have sided with the rebels, if he was not killed too, 
sometime between the writing of EA 89 and EA 101. In EA 89, it appears that Rib-
Hadda is reporting that there is a new “mayor” in Tyre unknown to Pharaoh. This 
would explain Rib-Hadda’s insistence that Pharaoh inquire into the facts in the case. 
Rib-Hadda refers to the former “mayor” of Tyre as his “brother”, and they appear to 
have been on good terms. He warns against the new “mayor” of Tyre, however, that 
he is not loyal to Pharaoh and that he is not popular with “the people of Tyre”. Also, 
Rib-Hadda adds that the city of Tyre is afraid. It can thus be argued that there were 
three parts involved in the situation in Tyre as reported by Rib-Hadda, viz. the former 
“mayor” of Tyre, now dead, that was allied to Rib-Hadda, the new “mayor” who is 
responsible for the death of the former “mayor”, and the inhabitants of Tyre who do 
not want the new “mayor”. However, it is not clear from EA 89 how the new “mayor” 
attained his position, in particular whether Pharaoh formally instated him. It appears 
that Pharaoh was not involved at all, since he has made no inquiry into what has 
happened, but this may also be hyperbole on Rib-Hadda’s part.  
 
Rib-Hadda implies that he knows something that the Pharaoh knows not: the new 
“mayor” and his supporters are not loyal to Pharaoh and they are not popular with the 
rest of the city of Tyre. Of course, the accusations of disloyalty smacks of slander. 
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Rib-Hadda’s most pressing concerns were presumably that his sister had been killed 
and that the former “mayor” with whom he was on good terms had been killed and 
replaced by one of his enemies. Thus, the change of ruler in Tyre was against Rib-
Hadda’s personal as well as political interests, yet he describes it as an affront to 
Pharaoh. The impression from EA 89 is nevertheless of a city divided: in Tyre, the 
“mayor” was not killed collectively by “the men of the city”, but by somebody from 
Tyre who became “mayor” with the support of a few people of the city. In EA 101, 
“the men of the city” from Tyre are reported to be loyal to Amurru, but that does not 
necessarily mean that they were behind the slaying of “the mayor” of Tyre in EA 89. 
However, in EA 89, the new “mayor” appears to be loyal to ‘Abdi-Aširta, hence Rib-
Hadda’s warning to Pharaoh that ‘Abdi-Aširta was now in charge of the coast with 
the killing of the old “mayor” of Tyre. If Rib-Hadda is right that the new “mayor” of 
Tyre is a usurper, unawares of Pharaoh, it gives an impression that Pharaoh did not 
directly involve himself in the appointment of “mayors” in Syria. Rib-Hadda may 
seem to appeal to Pharaoh in order to make him react to his own advantage in a 
quarrel with the new ruler of Tyre. 
 
The impression from EA 89 is one of virtual autonomy in Tyre. Also, it appears from 
EA 101 that Egyptian authority in Syria had become weak. Rib-Hadda reports that the 
people of three port cities were friendly to Amurru and that they granted use of their 
ports to ships of Amurru. If EA 101 is compared to EA 89, the situation in Tyre 
appears to have changed, and “the men of the city” are not opposing their “mayor”, as 
Rib-Hadda claimed they were doing. They are, however, supporting Amurru. Perhaps 
Rib-Hadda is exaggerating the support for the old “mayor” of Tyre in order to move 
Pharaoh to intervene in local affairs? There are apparently no “mayors” loyal to 
Pharaoh in Tyre, Sidon, or Beirut, since Rib-Hadda is questioning Pharaoh whether 
these cities belong to Egypt and is pointing to the need to place “a man” (amēlum) in 
each of the cities. Does this mean that there were no rulers there at all, and that “the 
men of the city” were in control? Apparently the townspeople have seized power and 
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the cities are for the time being without “mayors”. However, from EA 101, it cannot 
be said with certainty who “the people” were, or how they were organised. 
 
6.4.3 The fall of Byblos 
Rib-Hadda’s own city Byblos eventually fell to his enemies. However, he appears to 
have had substantial support even after his fall from power. What does this tell us 
about the political situation in Byblos and the opportunities of the people for choosing 
their leaders? 
 
In EA 77,1023 Rib-Hadda requests a ship from Egypt to come and take away those in 
Byblos who still support him. The hapiru are rapidly taking over the country. Rib-
Hadda says he is afraid “the peasants” (amēlūt hu[pši]) will strike him down.1024 In 
EA 81,1025 Rib-Hadda writes to Pharaoh saying that ‘Abdi-Aširta has urged “the men 
of Byblos” (amēlūt [URU gubl]a) to kill their lord and join the hapiru like Ammiya 
has done.1026 He reports that people were trying to kill him.1027 
 
In EA 91,1028 Rib-Hadda is alone, all his cities except Byblos have been taken by the 
hapiru. He complains to Pharaoh that “my own men” (am[ēl]ūtia) are hostile to him, 
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and that his grain has been plundered.1029 In EA 92,1030 Rib-Hadda complains to 
Pharaoh that ‘Abdi-Aširta had been informed that no help would arrive, and so had 
been emboldened to attack.1031 He also reports that he had been promised help from 
“the mayors” of Beirut, Sidon and Tyre, but that it had not arrived.1032  
 
In EA 102,1033 Rib-Hadda writes to Pharaoh and complains that he is left all alone. 
Enemies are pressing on every side. He cannot go anywhere, and his house is an 
empty house.1034 He says that the city Ampi is at war with him, and that “the 
magnate” (amēlurabū) and “the lords of the city” (amēlūtubeli alimlim) are allied to the 
sons of ‘Abdi-Aširta, Rib-Hadda’s enemies.1035 
 
In EA 138,1036 Rib-Hadda writes to Pharaoh to tell how he has lost control over 
Byblos. “The men of the city of Byblos” (amēlūt algubli) wanted to join Aziru, a son 
of ‘Abdi-Aširta, when he had taken the city of Sumur, Rib-Hadda’s last stronghold 
apart from Byblos.1037 Rib-Hadda states that he tried unsuccessfully to suppress the 
rebellion. “The city” (āluki) had turned against him. Rib-Hadda’s brother tried to 
speak to “the city” (āluki) and there was a discussion where the outcome was that “the 
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lords of the city” (amēlūtubel āliki) joined the sons of ‘Abdi-Aširta.1038 Rib-Hadda then 
went to Beirut to get help, but when he returned from Beirut, Byblos was full of rebel 
troops. “The residents” (aššābu) favoured Rib-Hadda, protesting that as long as he 
was alive, he was still in control of them and could report their rebellion to Pharaoh 
with fatal consequences for the rebels. They chased away the troops of Aziru.1039 Rib-
Hadda reports that half the city supported Aziru, and half were on Pharaoh’s side. 
Eventually, Rib-Hadda lost. He received no help from Egypt and went into exile in 
Beirut.1040 The rest of the letter is full of complaints to the effect that without the help 
of Pharaoh, Byblos is lost to Rib-Hadda and his sons forever while the city is secure 
in the hands of the supporters of Aziru. The people of Byblos write to him in Beirut 
and ask where the troops of Pharaoh are, but Pharaoh appears to have abandoned 
him.1041 
 
From EA 77 and EA 81, Rib-Hadda appears increasingly desperate: the regicide 
citizens of Ammiya supported the hapiru, and they appealed to Rib-Hadda’s subjects 
to dispose of him in similar fashion to their own “mayor”. “The men of Byblos” 
(amēlūt [URU gubl]a) as well as “the peasants” (amēlūt hu[pši]) were turning 
against Rib-Hadda. Thus, these letters together give the impression that Rib-Hadda 
was surrounded by threats and that the rebellion was out of control. However, his 
reports should perhaps not be taken at face value. Liverani points out that Rib-
Hadda’s lone stance against the forces of chaos and evil is a quite consistent feature 
of his correspondence: “The process is not becoming increasingly serious, with more 
and more abandonment: it is always at the maximum level of seriousness”.1042 In 
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Liverani’s interpretation, Rib-Hadda suffers from “siege psychosis”.1043 This is a 
good observation, and it should be kept in mind that there are no sources available to 
actually corroborate Rib-Hadda’s repeated claims of being alone in a sea of treachery. 
Thus, although it can be argued from Rib-Hadda’s letters that there was unrest in 
several cities in Syria, his presentation of the sequence of events and his own role in 
them must be considered a biased report. 
 
The collective reference to Byblos as “the men of the city Byblos” (amēlūt [URU 
gubl]a) in EA 81 is of note. The term “the men of Byblos” is used parallel to the name 
of the other regicide city, Ammiya. It is not possible to determine from the term itself 
whether “the men of Byblos” was a large or small group, whether it was a corporate 
group or a spontaneous uprising. In the context of the letter EA 81, however, they 
appear as a large group of men, a body that was identified with the city, could be 
addressed directly, and could act as a collective against their ruler.  
 
In EA 91 and EA 92, the impression is that all the coastal cities had defected to the 
hapiru, either as a collective decision of “the men of the city” as was seen in EA 81, 
or by the establishment of a usurper: none of the local rulers in EA 92 were willing to 
help Byblos against the hapiru. The Egyptian officials were evidently not interested in 
supporting Rib-Hadda, and left it to his neighbours “the mayors” of Beirut, Sidon and 
Tyre to come to his aid, which they did not. The former “mayor” of Tyre had been 
killed, as mentioned in EA 89 discussed above (6.4.2), and Rib-Hadda was apparently 
no friend of the new “mayor” there. Pharaoh and the Egyptian officials’ negligence of 
Rib-Hadda is curious and reveals that the concerns of Rib-Hadda were not those of 
Egypt. Rib-Hadda’s reference to “my own men” (am[ēl]ūtia) as hostile to him in EA 
91 can either mean generally that the people were against him or that some specific 
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people were against him. This does not appear clearly in the text, but in the context, it 
seems safe to conclude that the people in general were against him. 
 
From EA 102, it appears that at the death of ‘Abdi-Aširta, his sons inherited the 
leadership and continued their campaigns against the cities of Syria. It seems like the 
rebels have made allies of the authorities in the city Ampi to make them defect from 
Egypt and help them against those cities that remained loyal to Pharaoh: Rib-Hadda 
states that in Ampi, “the magnate” (amēlurabū) and “the lords of the city” (amēlūtubeli 
alimlim) made an alliance with the sons of ‘Abdi-Aširta. The identities of “the 
magnate” or “the lords of the city” are not clear. That EA 102 refers to first one 
person and then a group of persons seems beyond doubt, but whether they are to be 
understood as a unit or as opposing agents is not clear. They appear as the authorities 
in Ampi. They do not appear to have started a revolt against any “mayor”, but rather 
to have gone over to the rebels. This would imply that “the magnate” was “the mayor” 
himself, who had joined the rebels in a campaign against Rib-Hadda and Byblos. It 
cannot be ruled out, however, that Rib-Hadda’s report is tendentious. The enmity 
between Ampi and Byblos could very well have started without the intervention of the 
sons of ‘Abdi-Aširta. Rib-Hadda’s accusations against Ampi is in line with his other 
letters to Pharaoh where the hapiru get the blame for everything. Local politics may 
well be at the root of the conflict, rather than marauding hapiru. 
  
EA 138 seems to indicate that “the men of the city” in Byblos acted on their own and 
with authority while their mayor Rib-Hadda was exiled in Beirut, perhaps even before 
Byblos was lost. After the defeat of Sumur, “the city” turns against him. There was 
apparently no unanimity and Rib-Hadda insists that there were parts of the city that 
supported him: “the city” had initially turned against him and “the lords of the city” 
wanted to defect to the rebels. Therefore, Rib-Hadda was forced to leave Byblos. 
However, Rib-Hadda attempted to return, and at that moment the city appears to have 
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been split: there are rebel troops present in the city, but “the residents” support Rib-
Hadda, apparently in fear of retribution for defecting to Aziru. They try to chase away 
the rebels, but the other half of the city are against Rib-Hadda, who is at any rate 
incapable of securing any troops from Pharaoh. Some of the people of Byblos are said 
to have written to him in Beirut and asked about troops from Egypt. This indicates 
that even with their “mayor” exiled, not all supported the new regime in Byblos that 
was loyal to Aziru. In EA 137, Rib-Hadda reports that his younger brother seized 
power in Byblos and turned the city against him in order to give it over to the sons of 
‘Abdi-Aširta.1044 This sets Rib-Hadda’s fall from power in a different light than 
would have been the case if foreign troops had instigated a revolt. Thus, outside 
forces are blamed by Rib-Hadda, whereas there were in fact the dynamics of local 
powers inside the Syrian cities that triggered the events he reports to Pharaoh. 
 
The situation of getting the city against him in EA 138 is paralleled by EA 91, where 
Rib-Hadda says his own men turned against him. The identification of the people with 
the city in EA 138 is paralleled by EA 81, where “the city” and “the men of the city” 
appear to be interchangeable terms. The identity of these people unfortunately does 
not appear clearly from the texts. In EA 138, however, it is clear that Byblos was a 
city where the people were divided over how to deal with the hapiru and whether they 
should support their “mayor” or not. 
 
The letters from Rib-Hadda to Pharaoh indicate that there were groups of citizens 
capable of making decisions on their own in Byblos and other city-states of Egyptian-
controlled Syria. The nature of these groups is difficult to determine from the texts; 
some appear as large gatherings, others as more restricted groups of people. The 
composition of these collectives, their standing in the political structure and the 
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strategies for power they may be said to pursue will be discussed further below (6.5.2; 
6.5.3). I turn now to letters from two other towns in Syria, viz. Tunip and Irqata. 
 
6.4.4 “The elders” and “the people” of Tunip and Irqata 
In addition to the letters of Rib-Hadda concerning the regicide city-states and his own 
endangered situation, there are two letters in the Amarna correspondence that are of 
particular interest for the study of local autonomy in Syrian cities, from the cities of 
Tunip and Irqata respectively. Here, collectives, and not “the mayor” write to 
Pharaoh. What does this tell us about the organisation of power in these cities? 
  
In EA 59,1045 “the sons of the city of Tunip” (mārē aldunipki) write to Pharaoh.1046 
They ask to have the son of their own local ruler returned from Egypt and installed as 
their new “mayor”.1047 They write that they fear Aziru will attack and defeat them, 
and appeal for Egyptian help.1048  
 
EA 59 is evidence that not only “the mayors” could write to Pharaoh. “The sons of the 
city of Tunip” appear as somehow representing the people of Tunip. It is not possible 
to decide whether all the people or a small group of them were writing, but the 
concern of the letter would be relevant to all the people of Tunip. It is interesting that 
“the sons of Tunip” take initiative to influence Pharaoh’s choice of “mayor”. The 
people behind the letter evidently wish for a “mayor” to rule them. They do not 
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appear to wish to establish any kind of alternative to kingship. The standing of “the 
sons of the city of Tunip” is ambiguous; they have the authority to address Pharaoh on 
behalf of their city, but they do so in order to have a “mayor” to rule the city. Tunip 
cannot be claimed to be ruled by a collective of people, but they do appear to have 
had a certain interim authority. 
 
In EA 100,1049 there is a message from “the city Irqata and its elders” (alirkata u 
amēlūt šib[ū]tiši) to Pharaoh.1050 They express their loyalty to Pharaoh and their 
intention to guard the city from the traitors to Pharaoh seeking to destroy it.1051 
 
The letter EA 100 is further evidence that not only “mayors” wrote to Pharaoh. The 
message of “the city Irqata and its elders” to Pharaoh is that they were loyal to him. 
Parts of the letter are very difficult to make sense of. According to William L. Moran, 
the people of Irqata refer to a “mayor” that was formerly placed over them by 
Pharaoh, but who was now dead and that part of the sense of the letter is that “Irqata 
and the elders” defend themselves against accusations of disloyalty to Egypt.1052 I 
agree that “the city Irqata and its elders” appear to await further instructions from 
Pharaoh, and thus the situation where no “mayor” is in charge seems temporary and 
extraordinary. The relation between “the city” and “the elders” is not clear, but the 
reference to both “elders” and “city” may be significant. This will be discussed 
further below (6.5.2). 
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6.5 “The mayor”, the people, and strategies for power 
In the following, I will discuss interpretations of the letters of Rib-Hadda and others 
to Pharaoh and what these letters can tell us about the political culture of city-states 
under foreign empire in Syria. Are these instances of regicide and revolt 
manifestations of popular power? The evidence from Tunip and Irqata (6.4.4) weighs 
against interpreting regicide as evidence for anti-monarchic sentiments in the city-
states of Egyptian-controlled Syria: there seems to me no reason to suppose that the 
townspeople wanted to rid their cities of kings as such. After all, they ask Pharaoh for 
a new “mayor”. What can be argued, though, is that regicide and revolt give 
indications that the townspeople, either collectively or in more restricted groups, were 
actively involved in decision-making processes behind the revolts. This did not 
necessarily happen because there were outside forces instigating revolt. Rather, 
initiative can be seen to have lain with the city-dwellers, who could make themselves 
felt as a force to be reckoned with. I will discuss this in more detail below (6.5.2). 
 
In the regicide cities, it is of interest that the townspeople appear divided over issues 
of policy and support different alternatives for who should rule the city they lived in: 
in EA 89, Rib-Hadda claims that the slaying of “the mayor” of Tyre was done in 
complicity with Amurru and the hapiru and that the new “mayor” and ‘Abdi-Aširta 
were in cahoots. In EA 138, Byblos is split between those who support the old 
“mayor” Rib-Hadda, and those who want to join Aziru and his hapiru. These two 
instances may indicate that enemies from the outside could provide the means for a 
change of rulers in the city. However, it seems evident from these two examples that 
the townspeople were not always agreed whether to revolt. It should be taken into 
consideration that Rib-Hadda is writing to Pharaoh in order to place the blame for 
Syrian unrest on Amurru. However, the troubles might just as well originate inside the 
cities. Given that Rib-Hadda is our only source to these events, this cannot be 
determined. However, the hapiru were probably not responsible for the inner conflicts 
of the regicide cities. 
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There were clearly diverging political initiatives taken by the people in Tyre and 
Byblos. This seems to me to imply means of communal decision-making. However, 
very little is mentioned concerning how decisions were made, we only hear of “the 
city” or “the lords of the city” or some similar group deciding to support one side or 
the other. How to interpret this evidence will be discussed in the following. 
 
6.5.1 The regicides as a symptom of class conflict 
The regicide cities in the Amarna letters have been interpreted as symptoms of social 
unrest by several scholars, interpreting the hapiru as role models for a political 
alternative to kingship.1053 Pinhas Artzi argues that the revolts in the Levantine cities 
were motivated by a Hittite expansion into Syria: because of the Hittite intervention, 
new possibilities, and new political ideas and practices were introduced that set 
several cities in turmoil.1054 In this situation, claims Artzi, there was a new possibility 
to actually change one’s overlord.1055 In Artzi’s interpretation, the landless hapiru 
represented new ideals of freedom. Because of the hapiru, the possibility of “a free-
will alliance between the ruler and the “people” and between themselves” was 
considered.1056  
 
The idea that the hapiru offered an alternative to the hierarchy of the city is also 
suggested by Mario Liverani, who argues that ‘Abdi-Aširta was a tribal leader and not 
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1054 Artzi, “Vox populi,” 1964, 159-160 
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a king, and therefore had no solidarity with “the mayors” of the city-states of Syria 
and Palestine.1057 The rebellion of ‘Abdi-Aširta in his opinion is to be understood as a 
social revolt of landless peasants and refugees against the city-dwellers, a “revolt of 
the commoners against the ruling class which holds the political and economic 
power”.1058 
 
The hapiru, then, are held to represented a different culture from that of the cities, one 
of free-will alliances between leaders and people. Can it be maintained that the hapiru 
introduced new concepts of power or new political structures that were not based on 
monarchy in the cities they are reported to have attacked? This seems doubtful: in EA 
89, it is evident that a new “mayor” was established in Tyre by supporters of ‘Abdi-
Aširta and the hapiru. Rib-Hadda even claims in this letter to Pharaoh that the people 
did not want the new “mayor”. If Rib-Hadda is to be believed, the letter EA 89 shows 
three things: first, the hapiru did not make it possible for the city to have a ruler of 
their own choice, in fact, in Tyre, the opposite was the case. Second, there was a 
concern among “the mayors” that the people should accept them as rulers, hence Rib-
Hadda’s warning to Pharaoh that the usurper at Tyre was unpopular. Third, at Tyre, 
there is a new “mayor” installed after the killing of the former “mayor”. Thus, Artzi’s 
argument of a new concept of free-will alliances between rulers and ruled cannot be 
said to find support in Rib-Hadda’s report on regicide in Tyre.  
 
Even if Rib-Hadda is wrong in supposing that the people of Tyre did not want their 
new “mayor”, there does not appear to have been any fundamental changes to the 
political structure of Tyre under the influence of the hapiru: the view that the hapiru 
represented ideals of freedom is not corroborated by the establishment of the kingdom 
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of Amurru in the region. There is no evidence that there was any more concern for the 
people’s wishes in this kingdom than in any other in the region. Rather, the 
establishment of Amurru was through conquest of neighbouring city-states.  
 
A free-will alliance between rulers and ruled as envisioned by Artzi could be argued 
to be typical of a tribal arrangement of semi-sedentary societies, hence being 
transferred from the semi-sedentary hapiru to the city-dwellers. However, tribal 
organisations cannot be claimed to have less strict bonds between rulers and ruled 
than city-states. The hierarchy of a tribe is expressed in terms of kinship; a lineage 
where relations are defined in genealogical terms.1059 In anthropological theory, the 
elementary family is held to be the basis of kinship systems.1060 Thus, in my opinion, 
it should be kept in mind that the authority held by a leader of a tribe, in the sense of 
an elder or a patriarch, is not less than that of a king in a city-state, albeit expressed 
not in terms of royalty, but in terms of kinship. One difference between urban and 
tribal social organisation is that a tribe tend to disintegrate into smaller groups when 
situations of serious dissent arise. This is a phenomenon observed by anthropologists 
among semi-sedentary tribes.1061 Clearly, a city does not have this degree of 
flexibility: the strategy of splitting up the tribe is facilitated by a semi-sedentary 
lifestyle. The authority of the individual group leader is still significant, however, and 
discussions take place between heads of households that are in their own right leaders 
in their own households. As M. Fortes and E. E. Evans Pritchard point out concerning 
lineage systems, “stability is maintained by an equilibrium at every line of cleavage 
and every point of divergent interests in the social structure. This balance is sustained 
by a distribution of the command of force corresponding to the distribution of like, 
                                              
1059 Evans-Pritchard, “The Nuer of the southern Sudan,” 1950 [1940], 284; Dumont, Introduction to two theories of social 
anthropology, 2006, 8 
1060 Dumont, Introduction to two theories of social anthropology, 2006, 20-21 
1061 Cf. Evans-Pritchard, “The Nuer of the southern Sudan,” 1950 [1940], 279 
 447 
but competitive, interests amongst the homologous segments of society”.1062 Thus, I 
would argue that the idea of tribes as basically democratic is a false lead. It cannot be 
claimed that power in a tribal group is shared by all members of the tribe: tribes have 
positions of authority that necessarily cannot be filled by everyone at once. Further, to 
choose their own leaders and follow them into the wilderness in search of new 
pastures would hardly be applicable to the city population of e.g. Tyre. The supposed 
freedom of tribal societies thus could not easily have been transferred to city-states, 
even if it did represent new ideals of free-will alliances. 
 
Liverani’s view of the hapiru appears to be based on a model of class conflict. 
However, it should be pointed out that the commoners of the Syrian city-states would 
be the first to suffer from the raids of landless refugees like the hapiru. Rib-Hadda 
states in EA 77 that his own peasants are against him. This may be taken as evidence 
that the peasants were joining the marauders. However, this cannot be taken as an 
indication of class conflict. What other alternatives did the peasants have when their 
farms and crops had been burned than to join the robbers, if possible? It can be seen 
that the ruling class was not done away with in any of the regicide cities; their old 
positions were merely occupied by new people. There was no general revolt against 
“mayors” as such, nor can it be claimed that the revolt of the hapiru brought about 
changes in sentiment towards royalty. An example is given by the city Irqata (EA 59), 
where the people write to Pharaoh for a new “mayor” and wish to have a son of their 
former “mayor” to rule over them.  
 
A Marxist approach of class struggle in analysing ancient societies works on the 
premise of a divide between rulers and ruled as the only relevant relation of power 
(cf. 2.3). This seems to invite the naïve interpretation that anyone fighting against 
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established leaders is fighting for freedom for the people. However, there is no 
evidence that “becoming like the hapiru” meant political freedom. Instead, city-
dwellers were invited to become robbers and join in the looting of the next city down 
the road. In the end, ‘Abdi-Aširta and his hapiru established the kingdom of Amurru. 
The view that ‘Abdi-Aširta and his hapiru were in opposition to the urban ruling class 
can only be maintained if one looks away from the fact that ‘Abdi-Aširta was also a 
ruler. There is no evidence that any of the hapiru or the regicide cities had more 
political freedom as a result of these revolts.  
 
The tone of Rib-Hadda’s letters to Pharaoh is that Pharaoh does not care to interfere 
against Amurru in support of his “mayors”, indeed, from the letter EA 89, it appears 
that Pharaoh was not informed about who was “mayor” in an important city such as 
Tyre. Mario Liverani argues that the reason for Pharaoh’s tardiness in reply is that 
Rib-Hadda was a “peripheral bureaucrat”, and that the Egyptian silence equals a “no” 
to his requests for troops.1063 However, Pharaoh appears exactly as negligent of the 
other cities in the region, including wealthy Tyre with its command of the coast. Does 
this imply that Pharaoh was not concerned to keep these cities? 
 
Perhaps Pharaoh’s reason for not sending troops was that it did not matter who ruled 
the cities, as long as the area as a whole was under the control of Egypt? With the rise 
of Amurru, it would be possible to make an arrangement directly with its ruler, rather 
than wasting resources on keeping the established “mayors” in power in their cities. 
This can explain why Rib-Hadda’s appeals to Pharaoh for help and reports about 
“mayors” being chased away met with so little response from Pharaoh. However, 
‘Abdi-Aširta was eventually killed, apparently on Pharaoh’s orders, so evidently no 
arrangement was entered between Pharaoh and Amurru, at least not initially. Thus, 
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Pharaoh’s lack of intervention does seem to indicate that he had no particular plan to 
dominate Syria through Amurru rather than “the mayors”. This is further evidence 
that the hapiru did not bring any fundamental political changes to the region. The 
cities were ruled as before and Egypt saw no reason to intervene. 
 
According to Nadav Na‘aman, “Pharaoh was slow to react, but once he made up his 
mind and decided to operate, he was able to carry out his decision with no real 
opposition. Following such a decision, ‘Abdi-Aširta was caught and killed”. Na‘aman 
emphasises that “the perspectives of the ruler of the empire were entirely different 
from those of his vassals”.1064 Na‘aman’s suggestion that the perspective of Rib-
Hadda was very different from that of Pharaoh can indeed explain the lack of reaction 
to Rib-Hadda’s letters. The revolts related in the letters to Pharaoh and the responses 
to them reveal that the cities of Syria were left mostly to their own devices. “The 
mayors” had much local responsibility and the cities were practically on their own. 
That a new “mayor” could usurp power by killing another and still be accepted 
without intervention by Pharaoh, as seen in EA 89, reveals the lack of concern in 
Egypt for the details of government in the cities of Syria and indicates that the cities 
had a certain degree of autonomy. Liverani argues that Pharaoh’s silence gives away 
Rib-Hadda’s role as an alarmist, trying to draw attention to his own endangered 
position as “mayor” by claiming that Syria was under attack and overrun by rebels.1065 
I agree that Rib-Hadda’s appears to relate all events to the machinations of his 
enemies. What may have been the case was most likely business as usual: competition 
for power in and between cities, driven by local factions in a cyclical process of 
domination and defeat. 
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It is interesting to note that Rib-Hadda in EA 89 emphasises the lack of support 
among Tyrians for the usurper in his appeal to Pharaoh to react. Apparently, it was of 
relevance to Rib-Hadda whether a “mayor” was supported by the people or not. This 
reveals that struggles for power were connected to popular sentiments. 
 
The political culture of the city-states of the Levant as it can be reconstructed from 
the Amarna letters appears to me not as insensitive to the concerns of the people as 
Liverani claims.1066 In EA 100, “the city of Irqata and its elders” appeal to Pharaoh to 
have a “mayor” of their choice installed. Thus, it cannot be claimed that the people 
and their “mayors” were in a permanent conflict. Quite the opposite appears to be the 
case, as the people and “the elders” expected that they could influence Pharaoh’s 
choice of “mayor”. In EA 89 the people of Tyre appear to have been divided over the 
new “mayor” who had established himself with the support of ‘Abdi-Aširta, showing 
that the people were concerned about who was “mayor” and that conflicts could arise 
in the city because of this. Likewise, in EA 138, there is conflict between groups of 
the people in Byblos whether to join the hapiru and abandon Rib-Hadda, showing that 
the people actually believed they had a choice. In my opinion, Rib-Hadda reports 
about his supporters to Pharaoh because he thought it important that the people 
supported him. From his letters, his position as “mayor” appears in fact to be more 
dependent on local public support than on his position as an Egyptian vassal. 
 
The hapiru and their leaders are described by Rib-Hadda as addressing the people of 
Syrian city-states in order to win them over and join the revolt against “the mayors”. 
However, it cannot be claimed that the hapiru introduced a free-will alliance between 
rulers and ruled. Neither did the hapiru introduce ways for the people to decide 
themselves who was to be in power. Rather, as will be discussed below (6.5.2), there 
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were already means for the townspeople to decide on such matters, before the hapiru 
arrived and instigated revolts. This is evident from the repeated appeals to “the men 
of the city”: the course of action decided upon by “the men of the city” can be seen as 
mass action within the political structure of the city, rather than a new strategy 
introduced by the peoples of the steppe. Thus, the people of the Syrian city-states 
reached decisions and opposed their rulers not because of the hapiru, but in a 
situation of crisis. This was perhaps precipitated by the hapiru presence, but may 
equally well have been driven by purely local conflicts.  
 
To what degree can regicide and revolt be claimed to represent popular power? As 
will be seen in the following, scholars have widely diverging views on the 
significance of decisions made by “the sons of the city” in the Amarna letters.  
 
6.5.2 Councils, assemblies and “the men of the city” 
A few scholars take the Amarna letters as evidence for formally organised popular 
power in Syrian city-states. Hanoch Reviv claims that the typical Syrian city-state was 
ruled by the council of elders, the people and the king. In his opinion, there were 
representative institutions and self-government in the cities of Syria and Palestine, 
“either along-side local rulers or entirely in the absence of any central authority”.1067 
Reviv argues that some Amarna letters reveal instances where authority was held by 
“the town” or “the men of the town”. However, he points out that it is difficult to 
determine whether this was the normal situation or merely reflects internal crisis and 
political upheaval.1068 Reviv points to the reference in EA 138 to exchange of letters 
between Rib-Hadda and “the men of Byblos” (amīlū algubla) where they declare that 
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they will no longer support him against the rebels.  In Reviv’s interpretation, this is 
evidence that the citizens had discussed the further policy of the city. He takes the 
episode as an indication that “in matters of decisive importance the citizen-body was 
constituted in its entire forum”.1069  
 
It is not clear what terms like “the men of Byblos” really imply in the Amarna letters. 
Was it the people in general or a restricted group? This problem has in fact been met 
in all the evidence investigated so far for ancient Near Eastern polities (cf. 4.3.2; 
4.7.3; 5.5.4; 5.5.6; 5.10.2; 5.11.2; 5.11.4). Therefore, it is dangerous to claim that the 
Amarna letters discussed here are evidence for a politically influential “people”. 
Reviv is right in being careful in his conclusions. It is evident that “the men of GN” 
had authority in some questions, but which “men”? As already noted above (6.4.1), 
the CAD translates the term amīlūtu GN/LÚ.MEŠ GN in the Amarna letters as “the 
people of GN”.1070  It is not obvious, however, that this implies all free male citizens. 
EA 138 does not say that the entire citizen-body was constituted to make decisions, as 
Reviv claims. It refers to “the men of Byblos”, but their identity is not clear. There is 
little indication of how they were constituted, organised, or reached their decisions. In 
my opinion, to conclude that Syrian city-states were ruled by citizen assemblies is 
therefore premature from the evidence in EA 138 alone. On the other hand, it is 
obvious that “the mayor” was not the only authority in Byblos, and that “the men of 
GN” in Syrian city-states had ways of reaching decisions against their “mayor” and 
effectuate them. How are we to assess action taken by the “men of GN” in the 
Amarna letters? 
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Benno Landsberger interprets the situation in Tunip in the letter EA 59, when “the 
sons of the city” write to Pharaoh to have a new “mayor” established, as evidence for 
a kind of “republican” organisation of the city.1071 Landsberger’s “republican” 
interpretation is supported by Hanoch Reviv, who further argues that Irqata in the 
letter EA 100 was organised as a republic: the people were in power, either with “the 
elders” being an integral part of “the town” or acting as representatives or executives 
of “the town” in the sense of “the people of the town”. In his interpretation, Irqata 
was ruled by “the people” and “the elders” in cooperation.1072 As will be seen in the 
following, however, this interpretation is controversial. 
 
Moran suggests that the king of Irqata in EA 100 died at the hands of ‘Abdi-Aširta 
and the hapiru.1073 He interprets this as a situation parallel to that in Tunip described 
in EA 59, and argues that both Tunip and Irqata wrote to Pharaoh and asked for new 
“mayors” to rule them. In his opinion, any “republican” traits the political 
organisation of Tunip had were of a temporary character.1074  
 
Gösta W. Ahlström is critical of any concept of popular rule in Syria. He concedes 
that “it is true that in some instances a city ruler was dethroned or killed and the city 
“elders” stepped in as caretakers, but there is no information to indicate how long 
such a situation lasted. It can in no way be labelled a democratic government; it may 
have been a temporary leadership under the city’s aristocrats”.1075 In Ahlström’s 
interpretation, the terms “lords of GN” and “men of GN” both refer to an aristocratic 
                                              
1071 Landsberger, “Assyrische Königsliste und ”Dunkles Zeitalter”, 1954, 61 n. 134 
1072 Reviv, “On urban representative government,” 1969, 287-288 
1073 Moran, The Amarna letters, 1992, 173 n.6 
1074 Moran, The Amarna letters, 1992, 131 n.1 
1075 Ahlström, “Administration of the state,” 1995, 589 
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body of leaders, a body that originated from an élite group that he identifies with an 
amīlu/awīlu class of citizens. In his interpretation, it is possible that “lords of GN” 
and “men of GN” were the elders of the community, the city council, or evidence of 
an oligarchy, but he emphasises that the terms are not clear.1076 The interpretation of 
Ahlström is supported by Hector Avalos, who argues that the terms “lords of GN” and 
“men of GN” refer to elders in the competence of judges.1077 
 
The republican interpretations of Landsberger and Reviv founder on the fact that in 
Irqata as well as in Tunip, the normal situation was that power was in the hands of a 
“mayor”. This implies that whatever means of popular power existed, whether 
“councils” or “assemblies” or both, they coexisted with the position of “mayor”. 
Reviv suggests that the powers of “the elders” and the masses were part of the city-
states structure side by side with “the mayor”. 1078 However, this does not answer who 
were included in “the men of GN” and Reviv’s claim of popular sovereignty in Syrian 
cities cannot be said to be substantiated by the evidence he adduces. Evidently, “the 
sons of the city” (mārē alGN) in Tunip were capable of doing without a “mayor”, at 
least for a while, yet they sent for a new “mayor” anyway. Local collective rule seems 
a possibility, as seen in EA 100, where “the city Irqata and its elders” (alirkata u 
amēlūt šib[ū]tiši) were able to fend for themselves, and wrote to Pharaoh to express 
their loyalty in order be on good relations with him. It appears that whatever the 
capacity of “the elders” and “the people” to wield power, they realised this potential 
within a structure of kingship, and not in opposition to it.  
 
                                              
1076 Ahlström, “Administration of the state,” 1995, 590 
1077 Avalos, “Legal and social institutions,” 1995, 622 
1078 Reviv, “On urban representative government,” 1969, 284 
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Against Ahlström and Avalos’ interpretations of “the elders” as aristocrats or judges, 
it should be pointed out that the Amarna letters do not discuss “the men of the city” or 
“the lords of the city” in their capacity of judges. There may have been councils of 
elders acting in this capacity in Syrian cities, but that is not what is discussed in the 
Amarna letters from Tunip or Irqata, or the letters of Rib-Hadda. I think Moran’s 
assessment of the situation in Tunip as temporary is correct: the people or their 
representatives took care of business only temporarily. Thus, the Amarna letters 
reveal that being ruled by a “mayor” was the normal situation for Syrian city-states in 
the Late Bronze Age. Nevertheless, the competence of “the sons of the city” or “the 
elders and the city” is interesting. They do not appear to be in opposition to “the 
mayor” as such. The people of the cities were evidently capable of governing 
themselves, at least temporarily, but they do not appear to want to do away with their 
“mayors” permanently.  
 
Ahlström interprets “the men of the city” and “the lords of the city” as one defined 
corporate group of aristocrats, despite how they appear in the Amarna letters: “the 
men of the city” are referred to as groups that were appealed to by outside forces and 
as mobs that killed their mayors, not as aristocratic groups. The identification of “the 
lords of the city” with “the men of the city” is not borne out by the texts: in EA 138, 
“the lords of the city” appear in opposition to “the residents”. After the decision to 
join the hapiru has been taken, “the men of Byblos” still write to Rib-Hadda to 
inquire about him and the troops of Pharaoh. In EA 102, “the magnate” and “the lords 
of the city” of Ampi appear together. They have joined the hapiru and are at war with 
Rib-Hadda and Byblos. This is not a situation parallel to the regicide cities, however, 
where “the men of the city” attack their “magnate” and chase him away. It should be 
kept in mind that a collective of citizens does not have to be formally organised in 
order to have authority and influence in a city. They may revolt or give their support 
to one or other contender for power without being a formal assembly in charge of the 
polity. The “men of GN” can pursue a broad corporate strategy for power without 
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actually ruling the city-state. Therefore, Ahlström’s arguments against popular power 
in Syrian city-states are not very convincing. 
 
Admittedly, the evidence for smaller or larger groups of people in the cities of the 
Amarna correspondence is difficult to interpret. It would be folly to suppose that all 
groups of people were formally constituted political institutions, like popular 
assemblies or councils with regular sessions. However, the variety of terms used for 
active agents in the Syrian city-states of the Amarna letters must have an explanation. 
For Tyre, Sidon, and Beirut, terms for ruler include “mayor” (hazannu) and “man” 
(amēlum), and he is confronted by people called “the men of the city” (amēlūt 
alGN).1079 In EA 102, concerning the city Ampi, other terms for people and groups in 
authority is used than for Sidon, Tyre, and Beirut. In Ampi, the terms “magnate” 
(amēlurabū) and “lords of the city” (amēlūtubeli alimlim) are used of the people making the 
decision to join the hapiru. Moran translates amēlūtubeli alimlim as “lords of the city” 
and interprets them as property owners.1080 If Moran is correct in this interpretation, 
this may indicate that the city Ampi had a restricted council of property owners that 
were influential with “the magnate” of the city. This would mean that “the lords of the 
city” are not identical to “the men of the city”, thus contrary to what Ahlström claims, 
but in accordance with the definition of “the men of the city” from the CAD, as “the 
people of GN”.1081 It can be argued that if Rib-Hadda saw no difference between “the 
lords of the city” and “the men of the city”, why did he refer to a group in Ampi as 
“the lords of the city”? Why not simply call them “the men of the city”? In view of 
these considerations, I suggest that “the men of the city” as attested in Byblos, as well 
as Tyre, Sidon, and Beirut are “the people” in the sense of a broadly constituted group 
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1080 Moran, The Amarna letters, 1992, 175-176 n.5 
1081 CAD A II, 1968, 60 
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of urban residents. However, there is no clear evidence that these or any other groups 
were formally constituted and recognisable as corporate bodies. 
 
The term “the lords of the city” (amēlūtubel aliki) is used not only for people in Ampi, 
but also for people in Byblos.1082 Moran points out that there is an apparent opposition 
in EA 138 between “the residents” (aššābu) and “the lords of the city” (amēlūtubel āliki). 
He suggests that this may indicate that “the residents” were of inferior status, in 
contrast to “the lords of the city”.1083 In the Amarna letters, there are in fact five 
different terms used to refer to the inhabitants of Byblos, “the city” (āluki),1084 “the 
men of the city Byblos” (amīlū algubla),1085 “the residents” (aššābu),1086 “the lords of 
the city” (amēlūtubel āliki),1087 as well as “peasants” (amēlūt hu[pši]).1088 The different 
terms must have been used for a reason. However, it cannot be claimed that Rib-
Hadda had specific corporate bodies or political institutions in mind. I suggest that the 
terms “the city” and “the men of the city” were used interchangeably in the sense of 
the townspeople in its entirety when there are instances of direct action taking place in 
public. This interpretation, however, is difficult to square with references in the 
Amarna letters to talks between the hapiru and “the men of Byblos”. Is this to be seen 
as a conspiracy between some powerful men of Byblos and the rebels, or as an 
assembly meeting where the rebels try to win over the city in its entirety? The texts 
are open to interpretation. Perhaps no specific institution is meant at all, but that the 
                                              
1082 EA 138 
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people of the city had agreed amongst themselves that they should defect from Rib-
Hadda.  
 
I suggest that since there are references to specific groups such as “the lords of the 
city”, “the residents” and “the elders”, in the Amarna letters, there was a difference 
between broadly and narrowly defined groups. The broader groups are then generally 
referred to as “the men of Byblos” or “the city”, and are the masses that rise up in 
revolt against “the mayors” and their retinue. “The men of the city” appear as 
susceptible to appeals from outside powers, and could mobilise in opposition to their 
own rulers.1089 I therefore interpret them as the free male population receiving 
information in the form of rumours and hearsay and acting as a mass uprising of 
collective disaffection with “the mayor”. 
 
The distinction between “the men of the city” and “the lords of the city” in Byblos is 
not clear. In EA 138, “the men of the city” want to defect and “the lords of the city” 
take the decision to join Aziru, whereas “the residents” at a later stage protests against 
the decision to defect. Later, the people of Byblos write to Rib-Hadda, apparently 
because they still supported him. The city is described by Rib-Hadda as split, and the 
continued unanimity is shown when “the men of Byblos” continued to write to Rib-
Hadda after he left Byblos for Beirut. Does this imply that “the men of Byblos” 
disagreed among themselves? To me, it certainly appears that way, and I take this as 
further evidence that “the men of the city” is the free, adult male population in 
general, and not an aristocratic council. It appears that there were groups with 
diverging interests in the city that could act as agents in changing their political 
situation. These are tantalising glimpses into a network of power strategies between 
different groups of the city, below the level of the local ruler or his distant imperial 
                                              
1089 EA 74, EA 81, EA 138 
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overlord. Unfortunately, little can be securely established about the composition or 
competence of these agents or groups of agents. 
 
To me, the Amarna letters suggest that there were levels of government beneath the 
position of “the mayor” in his palace. Local power was in the hands of the 
townspeople. How this was organised is difficult to say, but the evidence points to the 
existence of several authorities in these cities, and not just “the mayor”. This implies 
that “the mayor” was not all powerful. Rather, it can be argued that there was a 
political sphere beyond the palace and the upper strata of the socio-political hierarchy 
of the city-state. 
 
6.5.3 Revolt and strategies for power 
The regicide cities that had killed their own local leaders are said to have joined the 
hapiru. By this, they apparently accepted Amurru as their new master instead of 
Egypt. It seems that the new local leaders that came to power in the cities were loyal 
to Amurru. However, Rib-Hadda may be exaggerating the situation, emphasising the 
role of outsiders in instigating revolt, in order to downplay local disaffection. At any 
rate, it cannot be claimed that the regicide cities introduced any new political structure 
to the city-states of the region in the sense of increased popular power or popular rule. 
The involvement of the people or groups of the people in the upheavals does give 
insight into the socio-political fabric of these city-states, however, and strategies 
pursued for power and influence. 
 
From the Amarna letters, the political structure of the city-states of Syria appears to 
include the masses, more limited groups of influential people, as well as “the mayor”. 
This speaks against interpreting these city-states as strictly hierarchic monarchies. The 
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presence of multiple groups in struggles for power in the cities of Syria is noted by W. 
F. Albright and William L. Moran: they interpret the situation in Tyre as reported in 
EA 89 as an example of factional strife, where an opposition to “the mayor” were in 
league with ‘Abdi-Aširta and promoted a usurper as the new “mayor”. Albright and 
Moran argue that although the faction of the usurper claims to be popular with the 
people, Rib-Hadda reports to Pharaoh that the usurper and his faction were not 
popular and that the people were afraid. In the interpretation of Albright and Moran, 
the people of Tyre were afraid of their new “mayor”. Albright and Moran also point 
out that Rib-Hadda warns Pharaoh that the wealth of the palace at Tyre was a source 
of power that could fall in the hands of the hapiru.1090 
 
The suggestion that there was factional strife at Tyre is intriguing, but it should be 
pointed out that the parties to this strife are difficult to unravel. There were apparently 
two “mayors” involved and the new one is responsible for the death of the old one. 
Also, it seems clear that Rib-Hadda wants Pharaoh to believe that the new “mayor” is 
disloyal to Egypt and in league with ‘Abdi-Aširta. If the interpretation of Moran and 
Albright is correct, that the Tyrians were against their new “mayor”, but intimidated 
into keeping quiet, this would indicate some kind of popular resistance to the new 
ruler. This can explain Rib-Hadda’s claim in EA 89 that the city was afraid. Who were 
the killers of the former “mayor”? They are not identified, and it is confusing whether 
“they have killed the mayor” means the people of Tyre or a smaller group, whether 
some kind of conspiracy supported by ‘Abdi-Aširta or an open revolt against “the 
mayor”, or if it refers to the usurper and his immediate supporters. The usurper does 
not have the support of the people of Tyre, it appears. What, then, was the claim to 
power of the usurper? This is not clear. However, it cannot be ruled out that Rib-
Hadda’s accounts of a conspiracy with ‘Abdi-Aširta are false and that the new 
“mayor” is actually supported by a local faction. As already noted, it is of interest that 
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Rib-Hadda argues that it is of relevance whether the city accepted their “mayor” or 
not. The lines of conflict are not clear, however. The factions do not appear to be very 
sharply defined and their political aims, beyond that of installing a new “mayor” can 
only be guessed at. 
 
Ingolf Thuesen proposes a model for the development of social organisation in Syrian 
city-states as oscillating between different types or levels. Over the centuries, he 
perceives a pattern of change from village into city-state, and from city-state into 
territorial empire. When empires collapse, society reverts to the level of organisation 
of the village or town.1091 Thuesen interprets this as due in part to the geographical 
diversification of Syria: the land is split into pockets or natural enclaves that favour a 
city-state culture of self-governing urban centres.1092  
 
Thuesen’s explanation for the existence of self-governing city-states in Syria is 
reductionist and invites accusations of environmental determinism. It should be kept 
in mind that the region has been integrated into practically all empires of the ancient 
world. Thus, periods of self-government were more the result of historical processes 
and imperial ambitions of neighbouring powers than deep rivers and high mountains. 
Thuesen’s metaphor of oscillation between different levels of organisational 
complexity can be quite useful, however. The dynamics between rulers, subjects and 
rebels as reported in Rib-Hadda’s letters to Pharaoh can be interpreted in light of an 
oscillation in strength between different strategies of power. In a strong and stable 
kingdom, a narrow élite strategy for power can be said to be dominant: the king is 
acknowledged as a near divine being and rules without an opposition, together with 
his family and trusted officials. This is not seen in the Amarna letters, however. Here, 
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the king is already challenged by Pharaoh’s imperial might and reduced to a “mayor”. 
Also, in some cities, the people want him removed. The people follow a broad 
corporate strategy of revolt against their ruler in Byblos and Tyre. In Tunip and Irqata, 
on the other hand, the evidence suggests that a narrow corporation of elders were in 
charge. They do follow a corporate strategy, albeit narrow, in that they appear to have 
the community as a whole as their frame of reference and do not attempt to seize 
power for themselves. Rather, they send for Pharaoh to install a new “mayor”. 
 
Beyond the analysis of societies as levels of organisational complexity, with 
Thuesen’s model of a circular development from village into city-state, and from city-
state into territorial empire, and back into village, the cities can be analysed as places 
for the negotiation of interests between different socio-economic groups inside the 
city as well as with forces outside. In this way, popular power in the sense of broad 
corporate strategies for influence can be seen from the mass revolts against “the 
mayors”. Thus, in the city-states of the Amarna correspondence, the masses were part 
of the struggles for power and supported one or the other leader in their bid for 
influence. When power was in the hands of “the elders”, it can be said that a narrow 
corporate strategy for power was dominant. However, it appears that “the people” and 
“the elders” worked together in periods when no “mayor” was in place, and thus 
pursued a broad corporate strategy for at least a limited time. It should be noted that 
this does not mean that a popular assembly was in charge in the cities under 
discussion, only that “the people” pursued strategies for power as a group in order to 
change their own situation. Thus, “the people” was politically active, but it did not 
rule the polities. 
 
I suggest that the ideologies and strategies behind the revolt of “the people” against 
“the mayors” must be sought in the urban culture of these cities and not be blamed on 
outsiders, whether Amurru or the hapiru. Thus, Syrian city-state culture had a degree 
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of popular participation in politics. The people could protest against their rulers and 
install new ones. Also, the people or smaller groups thereof could hold the reins of 
government in their city in the absence of a ruler. 
 
From evidence from a much later period, the Iron Age of Babylonia, it will become 
evident that a civic culture of urban autonomy and popular participation existed in 
Mesopotamia. As will be seen in the following, this urban political culture could 
thrive also under formal imperial control. 
 
6.6 Babylonian cities and imperial authorities in the Iron 
Age 
In the Iron Age, Mesopotamia was dominated by empires that introduced a new level 
of interference in local affairs, with garrisons placed throughout conquered territories 
and regular impositions of tribute. The Neo-Assyrian Empire conquered 
Mesopotamia, including the ancient city-states of Babylonia, from the late 10th 
century onwards.1093 Babylon restored its power under king Nebuchadnezzar II (604-
562) and established the Neo-Babylonian Empire.1094 As will be seen in the 
following, the relations between Assyrian kings and Babylonian cities can be studied 
from letters sent between the city populations and their foreign rulers. From the Neo-
Babylonian period, there is evidence for the local organisation and administration of 
cities in the empire. Below, the status of the city Nippur in the early Neo-Babylonian 
period will be discussed (6.6.1), followed by an investigation of the political 
organisation of Babylonian city-states under the Neo-Assyrian Empire (6.6.2-3). I will 
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1094 Kuhrt, The ancient  Near East, 1997 [1995], 589-590 
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present and discuss sources to urban autonomy and the political organisation of 
Babylonian city-states in the Iron Age and investigate the role of citizens in the 
governing of the polities (6.7). What was the political situation in Iron Age 
Mesopotamia? 
 
The cities of Babylonia in the Iron Age were heirs to Mesopotamian urban traditions, 
with ancient temples forming the foci of civic identity. In the first millennium BCE, 
Aramaic and Chaldean tribal groups settled in southern Babylonia and established 
their own tribal lands. Scholars agree that they did not predominantly migrate to the 
ancient cities, but established independent communities and kingdoms. Mogens Trolle 
Larsen describes the situation in southern Babylonia as the existence of “cities as 
islands, so to speak, in a sea of tribal lands”.1095 According to Gojko Barjamovic, 
when the Assyrians started to consolidate their influence over Babylonia, they 
“encountered a monarchy that had fragmented into city-states, each headed by an 
individual holding one of the traditional ancient titles of city administrator, and whose 
functions the Assyrians found similar to those of their own governors”.1096 What was 
the status of these ancient Mesopotamian cities in the Neo-Assyrian Empire? How 
were the city-dwellers organised? 
 
The city-dwellers were organised differently from the tribesmen. J. A. Brinkman 
points out that the inhabitants of the ancient cities in the 1st millennium identified 
themselves by family descent and sometimes by city or town, whereas the Chaldean 
and Arameans retained their tribal affinities.1097 According to Brinkman, “in the late 
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eight and seventh centuries, when the Assyrian monarchs came to rule either directly 
or through intermediaries in southern Mesopotamia, they increased efforts to establish 
solidarity between themselves and Babylonian city-dwellers. They pursued a tactic of 
attempting to separate this urban population from the tribesmen; in times of unrest, 
they appealed directly to the men of Babylon for support against Chaldean and other 
rebels, such as Mukin-zeri and Shamash-shun-ukin”.1098 As will be seen (6.6.1; 6.7), 
the Chaldeans and Arameans appear to have had a tribal identity different from the 
city-based identity of the city-dwellers. Therefore, Brinkman’s assessment seems 
correct. The tribesmen cannot be said to have been integrated into the ancient cities, 
since the Assyrian kings made alliances with the ancient cities against Chaldeans and 
Arameans. Because of the presence of tribal groups with their own polities and the 
lack of an effective central power, southern Babylonia appears to have been 
fragmented. As will be seen further below (6.7), the threat of the tribes and the 
Assyrian reaction to their presence apparently led to a high degree of autonomy for 
the city-states of the region.  
 
In Mogens Trolle Larsen’s analysis, Babylon was no longer effectively a capital of a 
territorial kingdom in the Iron Age as it had been in the Old Babylonian and Kassite 
periods. Therefore a “resurgence of a city-state pattern of political organisation 
appears to have become possible”.1099 Gojko Barjamovic emphasises that foreign 
centres favoured local government in city-states under their dominance, because of 
the practical problems with direct control, distance being a crucial factor.1100 In 
Barjamovic’s interpretation, local communities were left to govern themselves for 
practical reasons. Thus, granting local autonomy was a means of maintaining 
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control.1101 In the following sections, several aspects of local autonomy in Babylonian 
cities in Iron Age empires will be discussed. What was the extent of the cities’ 
autonomy and what did it mean? This will be discussed in section 6.7. What does a 
privileged position of a city within an empire tell about the status of it citizens and 
their power in their polity? These questions will be discussed in sections 6.6.2, 6.6.3, 
and 6.7. Before turning to these questions, I will discuss evidence to the local 
autonomy of Nippur in the early Neo-Babylonian period, to investigate relations 
between local authorities and imperial authorities in Iron Age Mesopotamia. 
 
6.6.1 Local authorities in the early Neo-Babylonian Empire 
From the early Neo-Babylonian period in Nippur, there are texts that are taken to 
constitute an archive of the local “governors”, titled šandabakku, dated to between 
755 and 732.1102 Nippur was a city formally under the authority of the king in 
Babylon. The archive is a collection of 113 cuneiform texts that were found in a 
secondary context as lining in a burial. Their publisher, Steven W. Cole, interprets the 
tablets as constituting the šandabakku, or “governor” of Nippur’s archive, providing 
evidence that the local governor in Nippur ruled quite independently of the central 
government in Babylon.1103 This interpretation is accepted by several scholars.1104 The 
debate on Cole’s interpretation of the nature of this collection of tablets will be 
referred further below. As a point of departure, I will follow Cole’s interpretation that 
the tablets indeed belonged to the local governor and concerns political matters. Who 
was in power in Nippur in the early Neo-Babylonian period? What were the relations 
                                              
1101 Barjamovic, “Civic institutions and self-government in southern Mesopotamia in the first millennium BC,” 2004, 48 
1102 Cole, The early Neo-Babylonian governor’s archive from Nippur, 1996, 1-6 
1103 Cole, Nippur in Late Assyrian times c. 755-612, 1996, 5; CAD Š, 1989, 371-373 
1104 Larsen, “The city-states of the early Neo-Babylonian period,” 2000, 122; Jursa, Aspects of the economic history of 
Babylonia, 2010, 1. Objections to Cole 1996 in van Driel, “Eighth century Nippur,” 1998, 336-337 
 467 
between the central Babylonian authorities and the local governors of Babylonian 
cities? 
 
In Cole’s interpretation, there are three governors in the archive from Nippur. Most of 
the letters are to one called Kudurru. Further, there is a letter to one called Ēteru and 
one called Ērešu.1105 What can these letters tell us about relations between the 
Babylonian king and the individual cities of the kingdom? 
 
In letter no. 8, the king writes to Ēteru and complains that his men and cattle have 
been abducted by Ēteru and demands their return. The king declares that if the men 
and cattle are not returned, he will have Ēteru as his enemy. If the men and cattle are 
returned, however, they will be friends.1106  
 
Letter no. 8 indicates that the king of Babylon did not have great authority over 
Nippur: he seems forced to demanding his men and cattle back in writing, with a 
promise of future friendship. This does not indicate that Ēteru was a subject of the 
king. The situation preceding the letter is not known. Cole suggests that the cattle 
were in fact stolen by Chaldean tribesmen and that the king in Babylon asks Ēteru to 
intercede.1107 This is not clear from the text, however. 
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Letter no. 16 is from Adu(m)ā’ to his lord [the šandabakku of Nippur]. He says he has 
spoken to Mukīn-zēri concerning a dispute between the šandabakku and a certain 
Iqīša. Also, he has news about Bīt-Dakkūri: they have seized a river-crossing from 
Nippur and are joining forces with Mukīn-zēri.1108  
 
In no. 16, the recipient is warned against a gathering of troops by the tribal kingdom 
of Bīt-Dakkūri. This kingdom was in conflict with Nippur. There is also reference to 
a certain Mukīn-zēri. A man by this name is known as a usurper in Babylon and it is 
highly likely that the Mukīn-zēri of no. 16 is indeed the Chaldean king of Babylon. 
According to Cole, Mukīn-zēri in no. 16 is the chief of the Chaldean tribe Bīt-
Amūkāni, king of Babylon from 731 to 729.1109 In my opinion, no. 16 can be taken as 
evidence that Nippur had to deal with tribal groups on its own, indicating that the 
local leader, the šandabakku of Nippur, and the local community were autonomous. 
The king of Babylon appealed to them for intervention, probably because he was 
powerless to intervene himself. 
 
Letter no. 18 was sent from Kudurru [of Nippur] to Mukīn-zēri [of Babylon]. It 
concerns a patrol from Bīt-Yakīn that has stolen four men and five donkeys belonging 
to people in Nippur and sold it on to dealers in Uruk. Kudurru writes that “the people 
of Nippur” (LÚ.EN.LÍL.KI.MEŠ) have written to Mukīn-zēri on behalf of “the 
citizens” (DUMU.MEŠ) who have been plundered by Bīt-Yakīn. Kudurru bids 
Mukīn-zēri intercede with Uruk so that the men and donkeys can be returned.1110  
                                              
1108 Text in Cole, Nippur in Late Assyrian times c. 755-612, 1996, 89; Cole, The early Neo-Babylonian governor’s archive 
from Nippur, 1996, 67-69 
1109 Cole, The early Neo-Babylonian governor’s archive from Nippur, 1996, 68 
1110 Text in Cole, Nippur in Late Assyrian times c. 755-612, 1996, 90; Cole, The early Neo-Babylonian governor’s archive 
from Nippur, 1996, 72-73 
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In no. 18, Mukīn-zēri of Babylon appears to be entrusted to intercede with Bīt-Yakīn 
on behalf of “the citizens of Nippur”. Bīt-Yakīn was a Chaldean kingdom. The 
relations between the ancient cities and the tribal groups were complex. According to 
Cole, the leaders of Bīt-Amūkāni and Bīt-Yakīn were allies, but Nippur also formed 
an alliance with Bīt-Amūkāni.1111 Indeed, this would explain why Kudurru writes to 
Mukīn-zēri, since he was the leader of Bīt-Amūkāni as well as (temporarily) king in 
Babylon. Kudurru writes on behalf of “the people of Nippur”. Nippur appears to be 
on its own in dealing with the Chaldean kingdoms and their leaders, and to be in a 
position of negotiation with the king in Babylon, rather than being his subject. The 
political landscape of Babylonia seems fragmented and the tribal groups operate as 
they wish, unimpeded by any central authority among the ancient urban centres. In 
no.18, the situation is quite complex, with a Chaldean king in Babylon being appealed 
to for help in hostilities between tribal confederations and ancient cities. However, 
Nippur does not appear to be ruled by central authorities in Babylon or any other city 
in the region. It seems to have been independent in its decisions. Further, “the people 
of Nippur” appear as an independent group, writing to the king in Babylon, and thus 
can be said to constitute a separate authority from the šandabakku. 
 
In letter no.33, Kudurru [of Nippur] writes to a certain Gulūšu concerning the 
commission of repair work on the ziggurat in Dēr. Also, the salvage of a war-chariot 
that had been lost in the marshes is discussed.1112  
 
                                              
1111 Cole, The early Neo-Babylonian governor’s archive from Nippur, 1996, 73 
1112 Text in Cole, Nippur in Late Assyrian times c. 755-612, 1996, 93; Cole, The early Neo-Babylonian governor’s archive 
from Nippur, 1996, 97-99 
 470 
No. 33 indicates that Nippur had control over the city Dēr. Thus, Nippur’s power was 
quite extensive. Cole suggests that the letter was written before the Assyrian conquest 
of Dēr around 738.1113 This seems a reasonable suggestion, given that Nippur would 
hardly commission the repair of a ziggurat in Dēr if the city was under foreign 
control. The mention of a war-chariot is intriguing, but unfortunately, there is no 
indication in the text what battle said chariot was used in. 
 
The letters from Nippur are intriguing evidence for local affairs in an ancient urban 
centre in the early Neo-Babylonian period. What is the significance of these letters? 
As mentioned above, Steven W. Cole interprets the letters from Nippur as evidence 
that Kudurru, Ēteru, and Ērešu, the recipients of these letters, all had the title 
šandabakku and were “governors” of Nippur. He argues that “governors” of Nippur 
were powerful men in the mid-8th to mid-7th century period of Assyrian domination of 
Babylonia: the letters indicate that the Assyrians and their king in Babylon left the 
city-states of Babylonia to their own devices and that these cities were virtually 
autonomous.1114 In Cole’s interpretation, “the šandabakku of Nippur was an 
influential political figure in the mid-eight century and often governed independently 
of the crown. The governor joined in political alliances with the tribal chiefs around 
him and ruled a city whose economic ties reached to the middle Euphrates, Assyria, 
the Zagros highlands, and to Uruk and the Chaldeans near the Persian Gulf”.1115 He 
takes no. 8 and no.33 as evidence for the power and independent position of the 
šandabakku of Nippur: the governor of Nippur is expected to sort out the Babylonian 
king’s stolen cattle and he builds ziggurats in the city Dēr.1116  
                                              
1113 Cole, The early Neo-Babylonian governor’s archive from Nippur, 1996, 99 
1114 Cole, Nippur in Late Assyrian times c. 755-612, 1996, 45 
1115 Cole, Nippur in Late Assyrian times c. 755-612, 1996, 50 
1116 Cole, Nippur in Late Assyrian times c. 755-612, 1996, 50 
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Cole’s interpretation is accepted by Mogens Trolle Larsen, who argues that the 
archive is evidence that the Babylonian city-states were independent of central 
authorities in Babylon.1117 Larsen further argues that if Nippur was independent, “the 
other Babylonian cities further away from the traditional political centre must have 
been similarly free to pursue their own interests”.1118  The independence of 
Babylonian cities is also argued by M. Jursa, who points out that this situation could 
arise because of a combination of weak monarchy and “the arrival of population 
groups of non-Babylonian origin, in particular Chaldeans and Arameans, and to some 
extent also Arabs”. In this situation, “some of the old cities in the central alluvium 
seem to have enjoyed de facto independence or at least a high degree of autonomy, 
from the central government and its seat in Babylon”.1119 In my opinion, the evidence 
from Nippur is well explained by this scenario. As will be seen below (6.2-3), a 
privileged position for the ancient cities of Mesopotamia was a common feature of 
imperial policies in the Iron Age. 
 
As has been seen, the governor in Nippur is interpreted by several scholars as 
operating independently of the Assyrian vassal king in Babylon. The texts discussed 
above do indicate that the Babylonian king was little involved in the business of 
Nippur. The tribal kingdoms neighbouring Nippur appear to communicate directly 
with the governors of the cities, and not with any central authorities in Babylon. But 
do the letters constitute a governor’s archive? 
 
                                              
1117 Larsen, “The city-states of the early Neo-Babylonian period,” 2000, 122 
1118 Larsen, “The city-states of the early Neo-Babylonian period,” 2000, 122 
1119 Jursa, Aspects of the economic history of Babylonia, 2010, 1 
 472 
Cole’s interpretation of the letters from Nippur is criticised by G. van Driel, for 
exaggerating the political content of the letters. He argues that most of the 133 texts in 
the archive are letters concerning business and ransom of captives, rather than 
politics. In his interpretation, this indicates that the texts are a merchant’s archive, and 
not that of a šandabakku.1120 Van Driel points out that the šandabakku is not 
mentioned by title in the address of the letters. Therefore, he argues, the 
correspondence was not official, but private and belonging to a merchant.1121  
 
Against van Driel’s objections, it should be pointed out that the letters also contain 
references to negotiations with tribal chiefs and the king of Babylon. Although 
negotiations concern the return of prisoners or stolen cattle, they also refer to warfare 
and strategy. In my opinion, the letters discussed above are therefore clearly political, 
and beyond the scope of interest of a merchant. The letters can thus be used as 
evidence for the local government of Nippur in the mid-8th century. They are evidence 
of the weak control of the king of Babylon over the ancient cities of Babylonia. As 
seen from the letters discussed above, there was no authority in Nippur higher than 
the local governor in the mid-8th century. “The people of Nippur” also appear to have 
been an authority in their own right. The governor acts on par with other local leaders, 
including the kings of tribal confederations and does not appear to be the subject of a 
ruler of the vassal kingdom of Babylonia. Van Driel’s objections cannot be said to 
change the impression of decentralised authority in 8th century Babylonia. What was 
the nature of this autonomy? How was it expressed and who took part in it? These 
questions will be discussed in the following (6.6.2, 6.6.3, and 6.7).  
 
                                              
1120 Driel, “Eighth century Nippur,” 1998, 336-337 
1121 Driel, “Eighth century Nippur,” 1998, 334 
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6.6.2 Privileged cities in the Neo-Assyrian Empire 
The ancient cities of Babylonia gradually came under Assyrian control from the 
middle of the 8th century. Yet, as will be seen in the following, there is evidence that 
they enjoyed a number of privileges under Assyrian rule. Among other things, the 
Assyrian kings granted citizens of the ancient cities of Babylonia tax-exemptions and 
the right to a trial in their own city. These privileges were called kidinnu, pl. 
kidinnūtu, and means “privileged status”, used of a city or temple personnel.1122 It has 
been suggested that these privileges were set up in written form in prominent places 
in the cities.1123 The privileges of ancient Babylonian cities such as Sippar, Nippur, 
and Babylon are known from several sources. There were also privileged cities in 
Assyria. In the following, I will investigate a few cuneiform sources, viz. an 
inscription, a literary text, and a letter that mention these privileges, in order to 
establish the status of ancient cities and their citizens in the Neo-Assyrian empire. 
 
In an Assyrian inscription, the kidinnūtu of the people of Assur and Harran is 
mentioned: Sargon claims he rehabilitated several cities and re-established their 
freedom. He restored the kidinnūtu of the cities of Assur and Harran.1124  
 
From this inscription, it can be seen that Sargon prided himself in granting privileges 
to the cities Assur and Harran. However, the inscription gives no information about 
what these privileges were or who enjoyed them. Information about this can be found 
elsewhere, however: there is a 1st millennium literary text known as Advice to a 
Prince that among other things gives a detailed account of how a prince should treat 
                                              
1122 CAD K, 1971, 344-345 
1123 Van De Mieroop, The ancient Mesopotamian city, 1997, 135; Kuhrt, The ancient Near East, 1997 [1995], 615-616 
1124 Luckenbill, Ancient records of Assyria and Babylonia II, 1975 [1927], §78 
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cities under his rule. It contains warnings against royal abuse of the privileges of 
Babylonian cities and their citizens, including Sippar, Nippur, and Babylon.1125  
 
The Advice to a Prince warns against denying due legal process to a citizen of Sippar 
or of Nippur. It also warns against taking money from the citizens of Babylon as well 
as denying Babylonians due legal process. It is stated that “if (he) [the king] imposed 
a fine or imprisonment upon a son of Sippar, Nippur, or Babylon, the city where that 
fine was imposed will be razed to its foundations and a foreign foe will enter the 
place of imprisonment. If he called up the whole of Sippar, Nippur, and Babylon to 
impose forced labour on the people aforesaid, requiring of them service at the 
recruiter’s cry, Marduk, sage of the gods, deliberative prince, will turn his [the king’s] 
land over to his foe so that the troops of his land will do forced labour for his foe”.1126 
The advice mentions further privileges, including exemption from contributing fodder 
and conscripted soldiers. Also, the king is not to nullify contracts of “the sons of 
Nippur, Sippar, or Babylon”, nor alter their steles, or put labour obligations on them. 
Officers in charge of temples are not to impose forced labour upon these citizens.1127 
 
It is of note that the kidinnūtu that Sargon granted to Assur and Harran were granted 
to the cities, whereas the Advice to a Prince states that the privileges are granted to 
                                              
1125 Advice to a prince is an Akkadian text dated to the 1st millennium; it is known from tablets from 7th 
century Nineveh and Neo-Babylonian Nippur (Kuhrt, The ancient Near East, 1997 [1995], 612). Benjamin R. 
Foster suggests it was addressed to Merodach Baladan, an 8th century king of Babylonia (Foster, From distant 
days, 1995, 391). Whoever the advice was addressed to, it gives insight into the position of the cities of 
Babylonia in the Iron Age in relation to foreign rulers.  
1126 Advice to a prince, translation adapted from Foster, From distant days, 1995, 391-392 and Lambert, Babylonian 
wisdom literature, 1960, 110-115. A copy of the Akkadian text with transliteration and translation can be found in Cole, 
The early Neo-Babylonian governor’s archive from Nippur, 1996, 268-274. 
1127 Foster, From distant days, 1995, 391-392 and Lambert, Babylonian wisdom literature, 1960, 110-115 
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“the sons of GN”. Thus, privileges were granted cities as well as their citizens. The 
identity of “the sons of GN” in Advice to a Prince is difficult to determine. The fact 
that privileges were granted to cities as well as “the sons of GN” makes it difficult to 
establish whether these privileges applied to everyone in the city or the citizens as a 
specific group of people. As has been seen (4.3.1; 4.4), this problem is not easily 
solved. It will be discussed further below (6.6.3; 6.7). In the following, the 
significance of kidinnūtu will be discussed. What does it mean that a city is privileged 
in an empire? 
 
Scholars interpret the privileges of Nippur, Sippar, and Babylon as an expression of 
their relatively autonomous status in the Neo-Assyrian Empire. Their kidinnūtu 
formed an important part of the identity of ancient Babylonian cities and were 
apparently related to the high status of their temples. Brinkman points out that 
“citizens in major cult cities especially in the northwest alluvium held privileges of 
exemption from taxes, corvée, and army service”.1128 Dandamayev interprets Advice 
to a Prince as “a political pamphlet predicting misfortunes for the ruler who violates 
the privileges and rights of the sacred Babylonian cities”.1129 He emphasises that the 
ancient cities of Babylonia and Assyria had sacred privileges, including “local self-
government with exemption from taxation, forced labour, military service, as well as 
a guarantee against illegal imprisonment”.1130 Grant Frame emphasises that “the old 
cult centers […] were used to receiving special privileges with regard to such matters 
as taxation, corvée duty, and the administration of justice”.1131 He points out that the 
                                              
1128 Brinkman , Prelude to empire, 1984, 7 
1129 Dandamayev, “Babylonian popular assemblies in the first millennium B.C.,” 1995, 24 
1130 Dandamayev, “Babylonian popular assemblies in the first millennium B.C.,” 1995, 23 
1131 Frame, Babylonia 689-627 B.C. – A political history, 1992, 216 
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citizens of the ancient sacred cities were granted the special privilege of direct appeal 
to the Assyrian king.1132  
 
As seen in the excerpt from Advice to a Prince cited above, the privileges of citizens 
of Nippur, Sippar, and Babylon were exception from corvée, taxes, military service, 
and the right to trial in their own city. These three cities had ancient temples to the 
gods. As Brinkman, Dandamayev, and Frame point out, the status of these cities as 
cult centres can explain the privileged position of their citizens. Thus, there was a 
distinction between the people of these ancient cities and the other inhabitants of the 
Neo-Assyrian Empire.  
 
Amélie Kuhrt argues that the Advice to a Prince is evidence for a sense of citizenship 
in Babylonian cities, in the sense that the urban community are called “the sons of the 
city” and an individual citizen is referred to as “a son of the city”.1133 In her 
interpretation, the inhabitants of Sippar, Nippur, and Babylon were recognised as 
having certain rights and privileges in their relations to the king. If the king infringes 
on the rights of the citizens of these cities, he will reap disaster. In Kuhrt’s 
interpretation, “the sons of Sippar/Nippur/ Babylon […] in effect, dispute the king’s 
right to exercise absolute sovereignty, and even deny his authority in some aspects of 
jurisdiction: taxes of all kinds, labour service, army service and the right to exact fines 
are repeatedly singled out as demands that the king may not make without divine 
punishment descending on him”.1134 
 
                                              
1132 Frame, Babylonia 689-627 B.C. – A political history, 1992, 217 
1133 Kuhrt, The ancient Near East, 1997 [1995], 612 
1134 Kuhrt, The ancient Near East, 1997 [1995], 614 
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It could be argued that the Advice to a Prince is a literary exercise, with an idealistic 
or partisan view of city autonomy, and not a source to Neo-Assyrian politics in 
relation to the Babylonian cities. However, there are other sources to corroborate the 
historical importance of city privileges. CT 54 212 contains a 7th century letter 
addressed to the Assyrian king Esarhaddon. It is presented and discussed by Erica 
Rainer. In the letter, “the writer speaks of the exemptions that have been the 
prerogative of the privileged cities Sippar, Nippur, and Babylon, and insists that 
Nippur is as privileged as Babylon”. Apparently to illustrate his point, the writer 
quotes the last five lines of the Advice to a Prince.1135 The letter is fragmentary, but 
the tendency is quite clear. I agree with Rainer that the stress on urban privileges and 
the quotation from the Advice to a Prince shows that privileges were a live issue with 
the ancient cities of Babylon. 
 
Amélie Kuhrt takes the quote of the Advice to a Prince in CT 54 212 as evidence that 
“Babylonians definitely used the tract as a framework for conducting a dialogue with 
kings (including powerful conquerors like the Assyrian monarchs) and to exert 
pressure on them”.1136 I agree with Rainer and Kuhrt’s assessments of Advice to a 
Prince as a source to the historical existence of city privileges and their great 
importance. In my opinion, the interpretation of Dandamayev, Frame, and Kuhrt that 
“the citizens” of Babylonian cities were recognised and respected parties in dialogue 
with the Assyrian king makes sense of the Advice to a Prince and its warnings against 
disrespecting these privileges. As seen from Rainer’s example above, the Advice to a 
Prince was actually referred to in letters. The reference to city privileges of Nippur in 
CT 54 212 is evidence that the privileges of the ancient cities were a practical issue in 
the Iron Age, and not only a theme in literature. The combined evidence of the stele 
granting privileges to Harran and Assur, the Advice to a Prince, and CT 54 212 show 
                                              
1135 Rainer, “The Babylonian Fürstenspiegel in practice,” 1982, 320 
1136 Kuhrt, The ancient Near East, 1997 [1995], 614 
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that privileges were granted to cities and their “citizens” and were a part of the 
administrative practices of the Neo-Assyrian Empire. More examples of these 
privileges will be discussed below (6.6.3). 
 
The great antiquity of the Babylonian cities and the sanctity of their temples no doubt 
contributed to the respect paid to them by the Assyrian rulers. On the other hand, 
advice against transgressions and warnings against the terrible divine punishments 
that will follow indicate exactly that transgressions were taking place. Thus, the 
impression that rulers respected the cities and their population may prove 
exaggerated. The Advice to a Prince is nevertheless evidence that the cities and “the 
sons of GN” were treated together as parties in arrangements with the kings of 
Assyria. “The sons of GN” appear to have a status as a corporate body: “the sons of 
Nippur, Sippar, and Babylon” are referred to as identifiable groups with certain stated 
and guaranteed rights.  Who were they? Is the reference to the entire urban population 
or only a privileged few? This problem will be discussed below (6.6.3; 6.7).  
 
Why did the Assyrian king indulge the Babylonian cities with so many privileges? It 
was suggested above that the sanctity and antiquity of these cities, or more precisely, 
their temples, commanded great respect. However, it may also have had a more 
practical side. Van De Mieroop argues that the protected status of Babylonian cities 
was taken very seriously and that the Assyrian king used the cities as “outposts of 
their rule in an often hostile countryside”.1137 He suggests that “the Assyrian kings 
needed to maintain good urban contacts, especially with the cities of Babylonia, in 
order to secure their rule of the area”.1138 I agree that the Assyrian concern for the 
privileges of the Babylonian cities probably had a more pragmatic side than just the 
                                              
1137 Van De Mieroop, The ancient Mesopotamian city, 1997, 135-136 
1138 Van De Mieroop, The ancient Mesopotamian city, 1997, 136 
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respect for their temples. In view of the threat of tribal confederacies and usurpers 
discussed above (6.6.1), it seems to me a prudent policy for the Assyrian kings and 
their vassals in Babylon to keep on good terms with the ancient cities of Assyria and 
Babylonia. However, what were the options for Babylonian cities? Could they simply 
abandon their allegiance to Assur and seek other protectors? Could they opt for self-
government? 
 
In ABL 327, a letter addressed to Esarhaddon, an official of Nippur reports that people 
everywhere hate Nippur for its allegiance to Assyria. The official is ill and cannot 
appear in person before the king, but he sends his brother and ten mār banê, or 
“citizens” of Nippur. He urges the king to support Nippur and to provide the city with 
water by digging a canal. If the king does not provide water, the inhabitants of Nippur 
will desert the king.1139 
 
ABL 327 shows that the Babylonian cities could threaten to change their political 
allegiance if the Assyrians did not accommodate their demands. Whether this was an 
effective strategy cannot be answered from ABL 327, but it does indicate that the 
cities thought they could profit from threatening to transfer their allegiance. They 
appear de facto autonomous, since the free negotiation of allegiance would give them 
great leverage with the central authorities. Therefore, although they were formally 
under a foreign king, they could make decisions on their own. This does not indicate 
self-governance, but it is evidence that they could manage their own relations to 
external imperial powers. Amélie Kuhrt interprets ABL 327 as evidence that “cities 
could expect to obtain protection by threatening the Assyrians that they would side 
with the enemy if no action was taken to help them”. To Kuhrt, ABL 327 indicates 
that a dialogue took place between the king and the cities, “so protecting and 
                                              
1139 ABL 327 in Oppenheim, Letters from Mesopotamia, 1967, 175 
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privileging cities can be seen to be not just a one-way benefit extended by a king to a 
city, but a framework within which cities could exert pressure on the Assyrian king as 
well”.1140  
 
I agree with Kuhrt that ABL 327 gives the impression of a bargaining situation: the 
king appears to be under obligation to protect the Babylonian cities. Also, it indicates 
that a dialogue between the king and local officials and citizen representatives was 
taking place. It can be presumed that good and peaceful relations with the cities of 
Babylonia were important to the Assyrian king and not only a question of antiquarian 
or religious respect. ABL 327 is evidence that Esarhaddon did not rule over Nippur by 
force alone, but through contractual relations with the local city authorities. What 
were these local authorities? As will be seen in the following, details about the 
organisation or competence of the authorities of Babylonian cities under Assyrian rule 
in the first millennium have been much debated and are imperfectly known. This is in 
part due to difficulties in determining the exact meaning of a number of important 
terms, including words for “citizen” or “assembly”. These and similar difficulties will 
be discussed in the following.  
 
6.6.3 Mār banê and kidinnūtu: citizens and their privileges 
It is not easy to establish who were included in the privileges granted by Assyrian 
kings. How can this be determined? In ABL 878, a letter sent by the Babylonians to 
Ashurbanipal, the Babylonians appear to be complaining that a royal official has 
                                              
1140 Kuhrt, The ancient Near East, 1997 [1995], 538 
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killed a Babylonian. The Babylonians claim that not even a dog can be put to death 
when he has entered the city. All who enter the city are free.1141  
 
ABL 878 is not very well understood, and the cause for the complaint of the 
Babylonians is not altogether clear. The claim that not even a dog may be harmed may 
be dismissed as hyperbole.1142 However, Mogens Trolle Larsen suggests that ABL 878 
expresses civic pride in Babylon and that even persons of low status enjoyed full civic 
rights in Babylon.1143 This seems a reasonable interpretation: in my view, the use of 
hyperbole in ABL 878 indicates that the Babylonians considered their privileges to 
apply to everyone; to all Babylonians.1144  
 
What is the point of the Babylonian complaint to Ashurbanipal in ABL 878? It clearly 
has something to do with jurisdiction. Amélie Kuhrt suggests that “the point of the 
letter seems to be that the inhabitants of Babylon alone have the right of initial 
jurisdiction over anyone within the limits of the city. No one can be executed without 
a decision by the city authorities; even people claiming to act for the king have no 
right to infringe the city’s rules – such behaviour would be an offence affecting the 
                                              
1141  ABL 878 in Dandamayev, “Babylonian popular assemblies in the first millennium B.C.,” 1995, 24 
1142 Kuhrt, The ancient Near East, 1997 [1995], 615 
1143 Larsen, “The city-states of the early Neo-Babylonian period,” 2000, 125 
1144 It may be argued that there is evidence supportive of inclusive citizenship in Mesopotamian cities in the 
folktale The Poor Man of Nippur: in this story, a poor man, who is a citizen of Nippur, is wronged by a mayor 
and takes an elaborate revenge on him (text in Foster, From distant days, 1995, 357-362). Amélie Kuhrt points 
out that the poor man is termed “son of city X”, identifying him as a member of an urban community. The 
Akkadian text is on a 7th century tablet (Kuhrt, The ancient Near East, 1997 [1995], 612). However, it should 
be kept in mind that the text is a literary composition. The date of its composition and its direct relevance to the 
Neo-Assyrian letters discussed above may be questioned. The story can nevertheless be taken as evidence that 
being a citizen was not considered indicative of élite status. 
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whole urban community”.1145 In my opinion, this is a good explanation for the 
Babylonian complaint. It appears that the Babylonians could address the king directly 
and demand that he honoured their privileges. However, we are no closer to 
determining the nature of the “city authorities” or what is implied by “the whole urban 
community”. As will be seen in the following, there is evidence that there were status 
differences in Babylonian cities that speak against an interpretation of a general 
application of privileges to all inhabitants of the cities. 
 
In a 7th century inscription of Esarhaddon, the king’s restoration of Babylon and the 
return of deportees is discussed. The Babylonians are called sābē kidinnu, “entitled to 
release” by the gods Anu and Enlil. They are returned from slavery and their 
kidinnūtu are re-established. Their tax-exemption is reaffirmed.1146 
 
Thus, the people protected by the privileges entailed in the kidinnūtu are referred to as 
sābē kidinnu. They are “entitled to release”, i.e. they are not bound by the duties to the 
king that were otherwise imposed on the subjects of Assyria. However, with the term 
sābē kidinnu, we are still no closer to understanding the identity of these people. Who 
were exempt from duties? What was their social standing? 
 
The concept of kidinnūtu is used by scholars to argue that several Mesopotamian city-
states enjoyed a high degree of autonomy in the Iron Age. Hanoch Reviv explains the 
kidinnūtu as “established in the religious and political traditions of several 
Mesopotamian cities” and argues that their citizens were sābē kidinnu. This status 
was bound to the communal status of the city and was conferred on the city and its 
                                              
1145 Kuhrt, The ancient Near East, 1997 [1995], 615 
1146 Borger, Die Inschriften Esarhaddons, 1967 [1956], 1-6 (§2 Ass. A) 
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population.1147 However, were the privileges extended to everyone living in the city? 
This is not clear from the evidence and scholars are not agreed on this important 
question. Amélie Kuhrt suggests that in the Esarhaddon inscription, “kidinnūtu 
appears to represent a whole package of city-rights, a kind of “charter of autonomy”, 
which marks their renaissance as “Babylonians””. She finds support for this kind of 
formal privilege in ABL 878 mentioned above, where the Babylonians refer to their 
kidinnūtu and claim that anyone who enters the city are free and protected.1148 In 
Kuhrt’s interpretation, only a limited number of inhabitants in Babylonian cities, 
called mār banê, were part of the citizen body and protected by these privileges.1149 
Thus, kidinnūtu are held to be reserved for mār banê by some scholars. Who were the 
mār banê? 
 
In Mesopotamian legal and administrative documents of the Iron Age, several 
individuals are referred to as mār banî. The term is difficult to interpret and is 
disputed among scholars because it is used of a wide range of people, from high 
officials to manumitted slaves. According to the CAD, the Akkadian term mār banî is 
used of free persons or citizens. It is used as a term to distinguish a free person from a 
slave. Further, the CAD states that it is also used in texts from the 1st millennium in 
the sense of “nobleman”.1150 Scholars have interpreted the mār banê as a form of 
aristocracy,1151 as members of the upper class working within the greater organisation 
of temples,1152 as well as a citizen body including rich and poor urban property 
                                              
1147 Reviv, “Kidinnu  - Observations on privileges of Mesopotamian cities,” 286 
1148 Kuhrt, The ancient Near East, 1997 [1995], 615 
1149 Kuhrt, The ancient Near East, 1997 [1995], 617 
1150 CAD M, 1977, 256-257 
1151 Kuhrt, The ancient Near East, 1997 [1995], 618 
1152 Renger, “Goldsmiths, jewelers and carpenters of Neobabylonian Eanna,” 1971, 498-499 
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owners.1153 The translations “full citizen” or “citizen with full citizen rights” are also 
used.1154 Thus, the range of the term mār banî is disputed, as is the identity of the 
people called mār banê. It is important to define who belonged to this category in 
order to understand the organisation of Babylonian cities. If the mār banê formed an 
aristocracy, the urban autonomy of ancient urban centres in Babylonia would not 
concern very many city-dwellers. This discussion is related to the definition of awīlum 
in Old Babylonian (4.3.1 and 4.4). Who were the citizens of Mesopotamian cities?  
 
Amélie Kuhrt suggests that “the legally definable citizen-body” in Babylonian cities 
in the Iron Age was a wealthy élite called the mār banî that monopolised cultic 
duties.1155 According to Kuhrt, poorer people were excluded from cultic duties as well 
as from active participation in “the city-assembly”.1156 Thus, in Amélie Kuhrt’s 
interpretation, the mār banî was an élite that controlled civic and cultic functions in 
Babylonian cities. Similarly, Grant Frame suggests that participation in the assemblies 
of Babylonian cities was limited to “full citizens”, emphasising, however, that it is 
uncertain who was eligible to form part of the assembly and that the term mār banî is 
incompletely understood.1157 In fact, there appears to be no single recognisable élite 
called mār banê. Rather, the term is used for people of quite different socio-economic 
status. In the following, the connection between mār banê and the temples will be 
discussed. 
 
                                              
1153 Dandamayev, “The Neo-Babylonian citizens,” 1981, 47-48 
1154 Frame, Babylonia 689-627 B.C. – A political history, 1992, 231 
1155 Kuhrt, The ancient Near East, 1997 [1995], 618 
1156 Kuhrt, The ancient Near East, 1997 [1995], 619 
1157 Frame, Babylonia 689-627 B.C. – A political history, 1992, 231 
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M. Jursa argues that temple prebends, rights of income from the temples’ economic 
activities, provided a vital economic link between the temple and the city and its élite: 
the city élites were consecrated as priests and had income rights from the temples. 
However, he points out that the temple personnel had clear social distinctions: below 
the level of prestigious families were craftsmen and širku, temple slaves that lived in 
families, but were bound to the temple.1158 In my opinion, this distinction provides a 
good explanation of the temple communities and their role in the cities. Thus, the 
élites were connected to the temples by cultic duties and economic privileges, but this 
was not their only area of distinction. Conversely, not all who were connected to the 
temples can be said to belong to a socio-economic élite. What can this tell us about 
the status of mār banî?  
 
In manumission texts, Raymond Westbrook finds evidence that slaves could be 
manumitted by their masters to status of mār banî and at the same time have the status 
of širku, “temple slave”. In his interpretation, the two terms give better meaning as a 
pair than as opposites: the owner who pledged his manumitted slave as temple slave 
would be doing a pious act and the manumitted slave would enjoy the status of free 
citizen and not risk being sold into the service of a new owner. Rather, he would have 
a future in a temple household upon his master’s death.1159  
 
The combination of two statuses may seem a good solution to the apparent 
contradiction of one person being both mār banî and širku. However, Westbrook’s 
argument is not unproblematic. He does not really explain the distinction between a 
status of mār banî and that of širku. If the two statuses could be held by the same 
person simultaneously, it makes the interpretation of mār banî as “free citizen” rather 
                                              
1158 Jursa, “Cuneiform writing in Neo-Babylonian temple communities,” 2011, 186 
1159 Westbrook, “The quality of freedom in Neo-Babylonian manumissions,” 2004, 106-107 
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ambiguous. After all, being pledged to a temple does not mean you are free. If a 
person of the status of mār banî belonged to the upper class in Babylonian society, it 
appears strange that manumitted slaves could attain this status. Therefore, the status 
of mār banî appears to have cut across socio-economic differences. On the other 
hand, it is not necessarily the case that slaves were poor and destitute. To belong to 
the temple, even as a slave, was probably a source of high social status. However, an 
élite with members formally bound to a temple appears strange. As seen above, Jursa 
argues that the temple artisans and temple slaves did not belong to the same socio-
economic group as the families that held temple prebends.1160 I find this argument 
convincing. However, why are “temple slaves” and mār banê conflated in texts? 
What was the nature of the group called mār banê? 
 
The identity of the mār banê is difficult to ascertain and scholars have interpreted the 
available evidence quite differently. Johannes Renger argues that the artisans working 
in workshops of the Eanna temple in Uruk belonged to the mār banê, because their 
names appear in lists of people of this status.1161 He is convinced that the craftsmen 
“were usually members of the upper class, the mār banê, who worked within the 
greater organization of a temple”. Among the craftsmen there were also people who 
were širku, pledged to the temple as slave labour, and Renger suggests that “as far as 
their work was concerned their situation was not too much different from that of the 
craftsmen who were mār banê”.1162 Renger views the mār banê as a kind of nobility, 
and argues that several of the craftsmen mentioned in texts from Eanna “were among 
the members of a body of nobles (puhur mār banê) before whom investigations 
concerning the property and other matters of Eanna were undertaken by the 
                                              
1160 Jursa, “Cuneiform writing in Neo-Babylonian temple communities,” 2011, 186 
1161 Renger, “Goldsmiths, jewelers and carpenters of Neobabylonian Eanna,” 1971,494-496 
1162 Renger, “Goldsmiths, jewelers and carpenters of Neobabylonian Eanna,” 1971, 499 
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administration of the temple”. In his interpretation, craftsmen were mār banî but 
could become širku “under particular circumstances”.1163  
 
It is of interest that Renger maintains that the craftsmen belonged to the nobility, but 
at the same time worked side by side with people that were not free. It should be 
asked in what sense the status of mār banî was anything like an upper class status, if it 
included craftsmen working on equal footing with slaves. However, the status of not 
being free does not seem to have prevented a širku from becoming a mār banî, as 
argued by Westbrook above. In my opinion, the interpretation of mār banî as a 
nobility does not explain the evidence satisfactorily. Several scholars are sceptical of 
this interpretation, as will be seen in the following. 
 
The interpretation of the status of mār banî as a class of nobles is criticised by M.A. 
Dandamayev. He has found several references to the puhur mār banê, “assembly of 
the mār banê”, and argues that it is mentioned in connection with private matters as 
well as temple matters.1164 From documents of the 7th to 4th centuries from Babylon, 
Dilbat, Nippur, Sippar, Ur, Uruk, and other cities, Dandamayev has found the names 
of 264 mār banê and been able to determine the occupations of several of them, from 
city governors to shepherds in the service of temples. Of the 217 mār banê only 
mentioned by personal name and patronymics, Dandamayev has used 
prosopographical data from records were these people are mentioned, in order to 
“determine their social standing, occupational and financial positions”. He finds that 
there were “artisans, bakers, brewers, butchers, tenants of temple and privately-owned 
fields” among them.1165  Therefore, he suggests that the term mār banî covers free-
                                              
1163 Renger, “Goldsmiths, jewelers and carpenters of Neobabylonian Eanna,” 1971,498 
1164 Dandamayev, “The Neo-Babylonian citizens,” 1981, 45-46 
1165 Dandamayev, “The Neo-Babylonian citizens,” 1981, 47 
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born property owners in the cities, both poor and wealthy, and that the people of mār 
banî status were a privileged group of citizens, not nobles.1166  
 
M. Jursa is dubious of Dandamayev’s argument that mār banê formed a separate class 
of citizens with seats in the assembly or other collective decision-making bodies. He 
points out that the existence of a citizen class is difficult to argue, since it cannot be 
said to be a difference in privileges of the mār banê compared to other free men in 
Babylonia.1167 Instead of a citizen class, Jursa argues that the propertied urban élite, in 
particular the priests, were members of the city-councils and assemblies. These 
institutions, argues Jursa, consisted of elders, notables, temple officials, as well as 
secular members of society that together formed an oligarchy.1168 
 
The interpretation of Dandamayev has the advantage that it takes into consideration 
the wide range of occupations of the people called mār banî in legal, economic and 
other documents. Thus, he is able to prove that they did not form a class or a cohesive 
social group, but shared the title of mār banî, which meant that they were “free 
citizens”. However, I agree with Jursa that a class of “free citizens” cannot be said to 
be well attested. The title of mār banî is difficult to equal with one particular socio-
economic status or civic or cultic institution. Some mār banê held temple shares, or 
prebends, but that does not mean that they belonged to the temple organisations. 
These prebends could be obtained by people outside the temple. Against 
Dandamayev, it could be argued that the professional groups counted among the mār 
                                              
1166 Dandamayev, “The Neo-Babylonian citizens,” 1981, 48. Dandamayev points out that mār banî in the sense of 
nobleman is attested from the Persian period, but only from the Behistun inscription of Dareios I and other Persian 
inscriptions as an Akkadian translation of an Old Persian term (Dandamayev, “Babylonian popular assemblies in the first 
millennium B.C.,” 1995, 26). He rejects the meaning “nobleman” as based on a false interpretation of the Old Persian term 
amâta, a hapax legomenon translated with Akkadian mār banî (ibid. 27). 
1167 Jursa, Aspects of the economic history of Babylonia, 2011, 57-58 
1168 Jursa, Aspects of the economic history of Babylonia, 2011, 58 
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banê were those of temple functionaries, and not free artisans. However, the span in 
occupations from military to artisanal to academic among the mār banê suggests that 
they actually were occupied outside the temples and did not all belong to the temple 
organisation.  
 
As discussed above, in Kuhrt’s analysis, the term mār banî refers to a broad élite 
within the urban population, a form of aristocracy, rather than an inclusive collective 
of citizens. Thus, reference to Babylonians in the Assyrian inscription of Esarhaddon 
is not to “the people”, but a limited group of high status. However, this interpretation 
may be too narrow. In my opinion, the Advice to a Prince refers to “sons of GN” in 
what appears as a general sense, as the inhabitants of Babylonian cities (cf. 6.6.2). 
Also, the letter of complaint to Ashurbanipal, ABL 878 discussed above, insists that 
everyone is protected by the city’s privileges. Therefore, I am inclined to support the 
interpretation of mār banî as a general term for “free property owner”. If this is 
correct, the evidence indicates that the privileges of the cities imply a more inclusive 
reference to Babylonians in the sense of the inhabitants or urban residents of Babylon. 
However, it cannot be claimed that there was a recognisable “citizen class”. The 
conflation of specific and general use of these terms is a serious difficulty for our 
understanding of the nature of Neo-Babylonian urban government. It appears that the 
group of people taking part in assemblies and councils were urban property owners 
that belonged to a socio-economic élite connected to the temples, but not exclusively. 
 
In my opinion, the evidence for mār banê of humble occupations and low economic 
status presented by Dandamayev (1981) is a weighty argument against Renger’s 
interpretation (1971) of the status of the Eanna craftsmen as members of a class of 
nobles. Dandamayev’s interpretation of the mār banê as property owners explains the 
mār banê craftsmen better than Renger’s interpretation of the craftsmen as somehow 
belonging to the nobles or upper strata in society. However, Jursa (2011) is right in 
 490 
criticising Dandamayev’s thesis: there is no recognisable “citizen class” with special 
rights in the cities that distinguish them from others that were free, but not mār banê. 
Further, free-born property owners can be said to be an élite in their own right. At any 
rate, the definition of the mār banê as property owners and not as nobility fits well 
with a more general meaning of the term “sons of GN”, as a collective with influence 
and power in the cities. This will be discussed further in the following. Who were 
“the people” in Babylonian cities in the Iron Age?  
 
6.7 “The sons of the city” and urban autonomy 
The debate over the identity of those enjoying kidinnūtu, the “privileges” of 
Mesopotamian cities, is not resolved, as seen above (6.6.2; 6.6.3). In part, the debate 
is one of definitions: was there a class of citizens in power in Mesopotamian cities, 
was there a class of nobles, or was there an oligarchy of influential city-dwellers 
drawing authority from ownership of property, temple affiliation, or palace positions? 
As seen above (6.6.3), kidinnūtu can be taken as indicative of freedom and popular 
power, in the sense that the urban population as a whole was a privileged group of 
people in relation to foreign rulers. However, popular power is a difficult concept to 
apply to Mesopotamian cities, because the people in power are hard to identify. If the 
urban dwellers that took part in councils and assemblies were a narrow élite of temple 
affiliates, wealthy property owners, or palace officials, there cannot be said to have 
been much popular power or freedom in Mesopotamian cities. On the other hand, if 
the people who took part in councils and assemblies were representatives of the urban 
population in general, the picture is quite different. The problem is that recent 
research appears to straddle these two reconstructions, proposing that the urban 
population was free and autonomous in a social structure where power was in the 
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hands of a propertied oligarchy.1169 In the following, I will investigate more evidence 
for relations between foreign kings and the city-populations of Babylonia in the Iron 
Age, in order to establish the identity of these city-populations involved in 
negotiations, how they were organised, and how they communicated with foreign 
powers. Were “the sons of the city” a limited élite or a general free city-population? 
How were they organised as collective decision-making bodies? 
 
In ND 2632, a letter sent by two Assyrian officials to Tiglath-Pileser III, they relate 
that they stood outside the Marduk Gate of Babylon to talk to “the man of Babylon” 
and a Chaldean. “The sons of the city of Babylon” stood together with “the man of 
Babylon” and the Chaldean before the gate. The two Assyrian officials tried to bring 
“the “sons of the city of Babylon” over to their side and make them abandon the 
Chaldean. They argued that the Babylonian kidinnūtu were firmly established. 
However, “the sons of the city of Babylon” would not discuss the matter with them. 
“The Five” and “the Ten” were present, but would not come out.1170 
 
ND 2632 is evidence for communication between Assyrian officials and “the 
Babylonians” during the reign of Tiglath-Pileser III (744-727). The Assyrian officials 
appear to be addressing a governor of Babylon or other local official together with 
“the Babylonians” and a Chaldean. Thus, the Assyrians communicate directly with 
“the Babylonians”. “The Babylonians” are said to ignore the Assyrian attempts at 
engaging in a discussion over the Chaldean present in the city. The Assyrians appear 
to expect “the Babylonians” to reach decisions concerning their political allegiance, 
i.e. whether to support Assur or the Chaldean. Who were “the Babylonians”?  
                                              
1169 Barjamovic, “Civic institutions and self-government,” 2004, 58; Jursa, Aspects of the economic history of Babylonia,  
2010, 58; von Dassow, “Freedom in ancient Near Eastern societies,” 2011, 217-218  
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Mogens Trolle Larsen interprets the situation in ND 2632 as one where members of 
the council of elders in Babylon come out of the gate to parlay with the Assyrians, in 
the presence of representatives of a Chaldean king. In his interpretation, “this was a 
normal procedure used by the Assyrians in their diplomatic contacts with rebels: 
much easier to persuade them than to have to call in the army”. He argues that the 
situation “surely indicates that the citizens of a city such as Babylon had civic 
institutions by way of which they could undertake negotiations and in other manners 
represent the interests of the community i.e. an assembly which could even function 
to some extent independently of the local king”. This institution, Larsen argues, was 
the puhrum, or “assembly”, attested from several Mesopotamian cities. He assumes 
that the puhrum consisted of the elders of the community. Although there may have 
been a popular assembly, as well, he maintains that “we have no real knowledge of 
how such an institution might have functioned”.1171 I agree that a popular assembly is 
difficult to argue from the mention of “the Babylonians” making decisions. Probably 
some limited body was involved in the decision-making processes or negotiations 
with the Assyrians. What were the relations between this limited body and the rest of 
the urban population? 
 
“The elders” are well-attested in Mesopotamian cities, also for the Neo-Babylonian 
period. M. A. Dandamayev points out that the šībūtum of 1st millennium documents 
make decisions “together with the principal temple officials and governors of the 
cities”. He argues that “elders” acted as “representatives of their own cities” before 
the king. In his interpretation, “the elders” were an important part of “the popular 
assembly”, the puhrum. As the most influential of the citizens, they “acted as 
                                                                                                                                           
1170 Text in Larsen, “The city-states of the early Neo-Babylonian period,” 2000, 125; Cf. Van De Mieroop, The ancient 
Mesopotamian city, 1997, 137 
1171 Larsen, “The city-states of the early Neo-Babylonian period,” 2000, 125 
 493 
representatives of the assembly, and made decisions, instead of gathering all the 
members, that is the mār banī”.1172 Dandamayev’s interpretation of the mār banê as a 
group of “citizens” was discussed above (6.6.3): as argued above, it is not evident that 
there was a distinct group of people with citizen status and privileges, as opposed to 
other city inhabitants.1173 The nature of the puhrum as a “popular assembly” is 
doubtful, since it cannot be determined whether all citizens participated there. 
However, “the elders” may well have formed a local authority for the city-
communities and joined in sessions that included other decision-making bodies in the 
cities. The interpretation of “the elders” as community representatives seems a 
reasonable suggestion, although the nature of this representation, i.e. how they were 
appointed, is difficult to ascertain. 
 
Barjamovic points out that there is an emphasis in ND 2682 on the importance for the 
Assyrians of convincing the Babylonians, admitting that the identity of the people the 
Assyrians try to convince is not clear.1174 In his interpretation, the term Babylonians, 
“sons of the city of Babylon”, when used in technical contexts such as negotiating 
peace or apprehending criminals, refers to “an institution [original emphasis] that 
holds authority on behalf of the community and bears its name”. This is because he 
finds it improbable that “a community of thousands” could “issue a common 
declaration”.1175 
 
Barjamovic suggests that the Babylonians in ND 2682 were a small group, a 
representative institution that took part in negotiations on behalf of the Babylonians. 
                                              
1172 Dandamayev, “Neo-Babylonian elders”, 1982, 40 
1173 Cf. Jursa, Aspects of the economic history of Babylonia, 2011, 57-58 
1174 Barjamovic, “Civic institutions and self-government,” 2004, 60 
1175 Barjamovic, “Civic institutions and self-government,” 2004, 56 
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Was this group “the elders”, as suggested by Dandamayev and Larsen above? In my 
opinion, it is indeed difficult to imagine a situation where thousands of Babylonians 
conducted negotiations with two Assyrian officials. However, does this mean that 
“the Babylonians” and “the elders” were identical? Barjamovic argues from 
probability: it is more probable that a small group met with the Assyrians than the 
entire Babylonian population. However, there is nothing in the text to directly suggest 
that this small group was “the elders”. Further, if indeed representatives they were, 
how was this representation organised? Dandamayev’s suggestion that “the elders” 
were the representatives of a popular assembly founders on the lack of firm evidence 
for a popular assembly. In my opinion, “the elders” were probably a group of people 
of standing in the local community, giving them authority to undertake negotiations 
with the Assyrian officials. How they obtained this mandate is not clear. Perhaps they 
were the ones conducting negotiations in ND 2682, but this is not certain. 
 
In several letters from the Assyrian royal archives, there are references to “the sons of 
the city” that make decisions and appear as envoys or officials of their cities. Also, 
“the elders” are attested in this capacity.1176 In Barjamovic’s interpretation, the term 
“the sons of the city” refers to an institution with limited access to participation. He 
suggests that the Babylonian city-states were organised with a “distinction between a 
(relatively small?) number of old families, allowed by tradition and accumulated 
wealth (and a surplus of time) to hold the main secular and religious positions in the 
city, and a larger segment of the population who had less extensive rights and 
obligations toward the community, but who also had some political influence”. He 
argues that it is likely that “the city” (ālum) and “the assembly” (puhrum) were 
                                              
1176 Cf. Barjamovic, “Civic institutions and self-government,” 2004 
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“interchangeable terms”. In his interpretation, there was a “lack of distinction 
between the community and its ruling institution (“the citizens”)”.1177  
 
Barjamovic seems to imply that there were two groups of citizens in Babylonia, one 
small group that consisted of the rich and constituted “the citizens”, “city” or 
“assembly” in formal contexts, and a larger group of citizens that was not part of the 
civic institution that reached decisions. Thus, in the analysis of Barjamovic, 
Babylonian cities had an élite that held positions in the civic and temple institutions, 
whereas the less wealthy had limited access to any of the institutions of power in the 
cities, but still had some political influence. However, this influence is not well 
defined in Barjamovic’s reconstruction. In the following, some more texts will be 
discussed that may shed light on the structure of power in 1st millennium Babylonian 
cities. 
 
In ABL 301, Ashurbanipal sends a letter to the inhabitants of Babylon. He urges them 
to abandon the usurper that they are currently supporting. Also, he reminds them of 
the privileges that he has confirmed for them.1178 
 
The letter is addressed to “the Babylonians”. However, which Babylonians received 
the letter? In Larsen’s interpretation, “under normal circumstances it would certainly 
have been delivered to the elders of the city”. Larsen weighs the equally unattractive 
alternatives of the letter being read out in front of the elders (without any interference 
                                              
1177 Barjamovic, “Civic institutions and self-government,” 2004,58 
1178 Text in Larsen, “The city-states of the early Neo-Babylonian period,” 2000, 124; Oppenheim, Letters from 
Mesopotamia, 1967, 169-170 
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of the usurper) and the letter being a purely literary effort. He concludes that it was 
“put across to the Babylonians, but we are not in a position to say how”.1179  
 
It is indeed difficult to determine how “the Babylonians” could receive a letter that 
urged them to change their political allegiance. It is evident that a group of people 
was involved and that this group was addressed by the king. However, is it necessary 
to suppose that the usurper and the Babylonians were together at the time of reading 
the letter? The situation in Larsen’s interpretation is that the elders and the usurper 
king were together at the time of the opening of the letter, but could not the 
Babylonians have gathered independently of the usurper? The reference to “the 
Babylonians” again suggests a limited body of people, but their relation to the rest of 
the community is not clear. Were Babylonian cities ruled by an oligarchic élite or 
were commoners involved in making decisions? 
 
Several scholars argue that in the Neo-Assyrian Empire, local candidates for 
leadership in Babylonian cities came from local élites and were appointed by the 
Assyrian authorities. In Larsen’s view, the local élites “suggested to the Assyrians 
who would be acceptable to them, and they were directly involved in determining 
such matters as political allegiance”.1180 Grant Frame argues that “certain families in a 
city or province, presumably the leading families constituted a “ruling class” which 
tended to provide the chief officials”.1181 However, Frame points out that the city-
governor “was appointed and dismissed by the king and was responsible only to 
him”.1182 Frame observes that the governors often went to see the king and argues that 
                                              
1179 Larsen, “The city-states of the early Neo-Babylonian period,” 2000, 124 
1180 Larsen, “The city-states of the early Neo-Babylonian period,” 2000, 123 
1181 Frame, Babylonia 689-627 B.C. – A political history, 1992, 228 
1182 Frame, Babylonia 689-627 B.C. – A political history, 1992, 228 
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“personal contacts with the king and his advisors were important for an individual 
who wished to obtain an official position, to maintain it, and, eventually, to secure 
favours and positions for his friends and relatives. The king was unlikely to bestow 
offices on, or show favour to, someone he had not already met or someone who had 
not been vouched for by an individual he trusted. Thus officials tended to come from 
the same families since they automatically had access to court”.1183  
 
Against the view that officials were primarily dependent on royal favour, Barjamovic 
argues that local temple administrators and governors alike came from certain rich 
and powerful families, but were primi inter pares and cooperated with a “larger civic 
organisation termed “the citizens of the city”, “the city elders” and/or “the city 
assembly””. He suggests that these “civic organisations” were dominated by “the 
prominent families in the city”.1184 However, as will be discussed further below, there 
is evidence that the civic organisations operated in public, opening for a more general 
participation in the making of decisions. 
 
Barjamovic argues that in the Neo-Assyrian Empire, “the empire often chose to 
cultivate close bilateral relationships with existing political institutions in the city-
states, and used the promise of relative political autonomy and economic privilege as 
bargaining chips in an attempt to bind them to the central power and nurture their 
mutual competition to distance them from one another and their neighbouring tribal 
communities”.1185 Thus, in his interpretation, the Assyrians pursued a strategy of 
divide and conquer. However, it could also be maintained that it was not the fear of a 
unified revolt that promoted the extension of privileges to Babylonian cities, as much 
                                              
1183 Frame, Babylonia 689-627 B.C. – A political history, 1992, 230 
1184 Barjamovic, “Civic institutions and self-government,” 2004, 55 
1185 Barjamovic, “Civic institutions and self-government,” 2004, 52 
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as the practical side of maintaining peaceful relations with established urban 
communities in ancient cities. These urban communities do appear to have been 
dominated by a limited number of wealthy families, as Frame (1992) and Larsen 
(2000) suggest. It is nevertheless interesting that civic bodies were influential in 
Mesopotamian cities, regardless of how broad or narrow their composition were. It 
should be asked why local autonomy was so coveted by the Babylonian cities that this 
was considered decent bait by the Assyrians. The privileges cannot be fully 
understood by only looking at one side of the contract. For the promised autonomy to 
be attractive there must have been a strong local political identity in the Babylonian 
cities as well as institutions in place that could run the polities in question. It seems 
likely that the Assyrian appeals to Babylonian city autonomy could only be effective 
if self-government was an integral part of Neo-Babylonian urban culture. It is not the 
autonomy of the local governor that stands out in the letters, as much as the 
independent positions of “the sons of the city”. How did the Assyrian kings comply 
with the will of the people in Babylonian cities? 
 
In ABL 340, there is a report to king Esarhaddon from a certain Mar-Issa, who 
amongst other news forewarns the king that he may receive false reports from the 
šākin tēmi, “the commandant”, of Babylon the “the sons of Babylon” (DUMU.MEŠ 
KÁ.DINGIR.RA.KI) have thrown lumps of clay at him. The Babylonians had 
protested against taxes laid on them, because they were destitute, and “the 
commandant” has falsely accused some of them of throwing lumps of clay at his 
messengers, thereafter imprisoning some Babylonians. A judge in Babylon is detained 
in house-arrest, and it is rumoured that he had incited the protests against the 
taxes.1186 
 
                                              
1186 ABL 340=SAA 10, 348 in Parpola, Letters from Assyrian and Babylonian scholars, 1993, 283-284 
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This text indicates that some officials were concerned that the Assyrian king received 
truthful reports about the actions undertaken by “the sons of the city” and how they 
felt about the policies of the king. It appears that the raising of taxes is considered 
unlawful in the present situation and that the commandant has transgressed against the 
Babylonians. It is of interest that “the sons of Babylonians” are reported to have 
pelted the messengers of the commandant with lumps of clay. Barjamovic suggests 
that the text indicates some sort of public announcement of the planned gathering of 
taxes and a corresponding negative public reaction.1187 Kuhrt takes the episode as 
indicative of popular resentment of Assyrian rule.1188 I agree with these assessments. 
In my opinion, the report indicates that information and decrees were made known to 
crowds, who could react violently and protest against unwanted policies. Further, a 
judge is accused of inciting revolt, indicating that “the commandant” thought it 
plausible that local figures of authority could incite the people to protest against the 
king’s decrees. The concerned official writing to the king apparently hopes that the 
king will not punish the Babylonians, because they are innocent of the throwing of 
lumps of clay. They are reported to have protested against the taxes, however, and this 
seems to be considered a legitimate reaction by the writer of the letter. 
 
The strategies for power that were pursued by the Babylonians can only be tentatively 
analysed: “the sons of the city” are not adequately identified; making any 
reconstruction based on their position vis-à-vis the Assyrian king insecure. If “the 
sons of the city” formed an élite council consisting of members of the most prominent 
families, their strategy for power would presumably be that of a broad élite, with 
closed meetings and covert negotiations with the Assyrian king and his 
representatives. However, this does not seem to be the case. In ND 2632, it appears 
that negotiations between “the sons of the city” and the Assyrians took place openly, 
                                              
1187 Barjamovic, “Civic institutions and self-government,” 2004, 66 
1188 Kuhrt, The ancient Near East, 1997 [1995], 586-587 
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by the city-gates. This indicates that the Babylonians as a collective were onlookers to 
the negotiations led by “the sons of the city”. In ABL 340, “the sons of Babylon” are 
accused of throwing lumps of clay at the messengers of “the commandant” of 
Babylon and “the commandant” himself, indicating that decrees were made  known to 
crowds and  that the people could protest in public. Thus, “the sons of the city” were 
more probably following a narrow corporate strategy, as representatives of the 
community: they were observed by the community and negotiated on their behalf. The 
emphasis on persuasion from the Assyrian side, as seen in ABL 301, is further 
indication of a corporate strategy: there was no ruling élite with which the Assyrians 
could come to an understanding; rather, the entire Babylonian population needed to be 
convinced that their interests were best served by supporting the Assyrians and their 
policies. This is actually indicative of a broad corporate strategy, where decisions are 
made in arena councils and the community is in charge of its own affairs collectively. 
In this interpretation, the legitimacy needed for the Assyrians and “the sons of the 
city” was provided by the openness of the negotiations, taking place at the gates 
before the assembled Babylonians. The entire community of the Babylonians needed 




Under foreign empire, local kings of Near Eastern cities became governors or the 
foreign authorities installed a governor of their own. Most of the evidence discussed 
in this chapter consists of letters sent between local rulers and the imperial overlord, 
from the correspondence from the archives of Pharaoh found at Amarna, as well as 
the archives of Neo-Assyrian kings, local rulers, and other local authorities. However, 
as seen in several of these letters, the king or governor was not the only local 
authority (cf. 6.4.3-4; 6.7). There were local groups that held considerable 
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economical, ideological, and political power. The local urban populations appear in 
some letters to have been quite influential. There is evidence of groups of people with 
authority from the urban population. They are referred to as “the elders” or “the sons 
of/men of GN”, and these terms are often translated as “citizens” by modern scholars. 
The evidence is difficult to assess and scholars do not agree on the identity or powers 
of these bodies, or indeed if they were corporate groups at all (cf. 6.5.2; 6.7). How the 
identity and capacities of “the citizens” are interpreted will to a high degree determine 
how popular power in city-states under foreign empire is assessed.   
 
The information on local polities and their inhabitants available in the sources is 
determined by what was of interest to central authorities. The everyday concerns of 
the local city communities are not likely to be recorded.  Extraordinary occurrences 
are likely to be reported to the imperial authorities, however. Also, when the need 
arose for the local authorities to take specific action, the imperial authorities wrote to 
them. Otherwise, much of the local business of the city-states under foreign empire is 
likely to have been beyond the scope of the royal archives. There are some texts that 
shed light on local affairs, however: I have chosen to discuss texts from the Amarna 
correspondence and Iron Age Babylonia together in this chapter, because these texts 
provide insight into local autonomy and instances of the local city population making 
decisions independent of or in response to the foreign imperial authorities, even 
independent of their local ruler. Instances of revolt or unrest are situations that were 
reported to central institutions (6.4.1-2; 6.7). Through reports on these events, a 
glimpse of local political practices is provided.  Strategies for power can be observed 
that are not from the top of the hierarchy, but from below, from the city-dwellers. In 
these reports of local events, city-state politics can be observed in cities that were 
formally under the authority of an imperial overlord. 
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In the Syrian city-states discussed in the Amarna correspondence, local rulers are 
kings locally, but also “mayors” under Egyptian authority. It seems that the split 
identity between being a local king and the vassal of a foreign power caused 
difficulties for the local rulers: since they were not proper Egyptian officials, they do 
not seem to have been able to draw effectively on official Egyptian resources. They 
appear as outsiders in their relations with Pharaoh. Simultaneously, they had 
obligations to maintain control in their cities, predominantly from their own 
resources. In the Amarna correspondence, as seen above (6.4), it is usually the local 
kings who write to Pharaoh. However, it is also clear that Pharaoh was acknowledged 
and well established as the main authority in southern Syria: there are a few instances 
where “the people” or “the people and the elders” write directly to Pharaoh (6.4.4). 
Thus, the main power appears in the last instance to have been Pharaoh, whereas the 
local rulers came to occupy a relatively weak middle position between being officials 
of a foreign power and being local kings under the authority of a foreign ruler. This 
situation was dangerous for the political stability of the region, not primarily because 
of the intervention of foreign powers, but from social unrest and the establishment of 
new local dynasties that challenged “the mayors”. 
 
In the material from the Amarna correspondence and the letters of Neo-Assyrian 
kings, there are several instances of direct communication between foreign rulers and 
the inhabitants of towns and cities. In the letters of the Amarna correspondence that 
were sent from Rib-Hadda of Byblos to Pharaoh, contact between the people of 
Byblos and the foreign ruler ‘Abdi-Aširta is referred to indirectly: Rib-Hadda reports 
that ‘Abdi-Aširta and his hapiru are trying to win over the townspeople of the region, 
including his own subjects, to the side of the rebels (6.4.3). In correspondence sent 
between the Neo-Assyrian king and his subjects in the Babylonian cities, the king 
addresses “the people” directly, and “the people” also send letters to the king (6.6.1-
2). It is thus evident that some form of civic body could be addressed by a foreign 
ruler and that this civic body could be expected to make decisions for the town or city. 
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It is also evident that there was communication between foreign rulers and this civic 
body. This indicates that there was recognition of a civic body as a competent and 
authoritative party in discussions. The foreign rulers did not go through officials in 
the situations reported in the Neo-Assyrian letters, but rather appealed to the civic 
body directly. However, it is difficult to determine who belonged to this civic body; 
whether it was a body of “elders”, a general assembly, or other kind of gathering. 
 
In neither of the groups of evidence discussed in this chapter it is possible to 
determine who were included in these civic bodies. Three different scenarios can be 
argued: 1. A foreign authority addresses the people in the sense of all “the citizens”, 
in a popular assembly. 2. A foreign authority addresses the people in the sense of “the 
elders”, as an élite group of the rich and influential city-dwellers. 3. A foreign 
authority addresses “the elders” as representatives of “the people” and sometimes 
appeals to “the people” in assembly as well. 
 
The first alternative implies that the people of towns and cities were large corporate 
groups and that they were organised in an assembly that could reach decisions 
independent of governors or local officials. The second alternative implies either that 
the town or city was represented by a council of “elders” or that a clique of influential 
and wealthy heads of families reached decisions for the inhabitants. Both alternatives 
have to take into consideration the fact that the evidence operates with what appears 
as inclusive as well as exclusive terms for the civic body, within the same polity. 
Thus, in some of the texts that have been discussed, there is an address to “the sons of 
the city”, apparently in the sense of everyone, and in others in a narrow sense as “the 
lords of the city” or “the elders” (cf. 6.5.2; 6.7). Neither of the alternatives can be 
entirely correct: the choice cannot stand between the ruler addressing either a broad 
corporate group in power or an élite group in power.  
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This leaves the third alternative, where the people are somehow represented by “the 
elders” or “the sons of the city” in a limited sense. In this interpretation, the evidence 
for sessions of elders and other élite groups is taken into consideration, as well as the 
evidence for inclusive and less formal gatherings of the inhabitants of towns and 
cities. The picture that emerges of city-state organisation under foreign empire in the 
Near East is that the inhabitants had their own separate decision-making bodies that 
could act independently of their governors and officials and have direct contact with 
foreign rulers. These decision-making bodies do not appear to have been formally 
constituted. Little is known about how they were organised. It seems that the people 
took part in or at least were witnesses to decisions, but that the authority in the town 
or city was with a more limited body of heads of households or representatives of élite 
families. Thus, there were popular politics in the city-states under foreign empire: 
there is evidence for semi-autonomous cities in the Levant in the Late Bronze Age 
and in Mesopotamia in the Iron Age, where the people could reach decisions 
independent of officials and rulers. However, the relationship between the people and 
the more limited decision-making body is difficult to unravel and the two often cannot 









7. Comparative analyses of ancient Near Eastern 
polities and archaic Greek poleis 
7.1 Introduction 
Popular power in ancient Near Eastern and archaic Greek polities has proved hard to 
find. In the preceding chapters, it has been established that there were active agents 
involved in the structuration of society coming from outside the hierarchy of palace 
and temples of Near Eastern polities and outside the circle of aristocrats in Greek 
poleis. These agents included elders, groups of merchants, and citizens gathered in 
assemblies. However, it has been a recurring problem to identify the socio-economic 
status of these agents. More specifically, a broad citizen group in power is rarely 
attested. In most Near Eastern polities, decisions were made by limited groups of 
people belonging to élites, usually with ties to the palace or temples, if not actual 
officials. It cannot be argued that all evidence from Near Eastern polities to political 
initiative taken by agents outside the temples or palace means evidence for popular 
power or agency from below, outside the élite. This must be determined in each 
specific case. Similarly, in archaic Greek poleis, politics were dominated by the élite, 
in aristocratic factions or in the form of individual bids for tyrannical power. 
However, some Greek poleis show clear tendencies for an active role played by the 
people and their constitutions provided for a formal place of the demos in the political 
structure. What are the differences and similarities between Greek and Near Eastern 
polities regarding popular power? 
 
The following comparative analyses will focus on evidence for challenges to despotic 
rule and aristocratic dominance. These challenges took the form either of élite 
heterarchy or agency from below. I will investigate evidence for strategies for power 
that cross the established hierarchies of city-states, network states, and empires. From 
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the Near Eastern evidence, the agency of agents outside the palace and temples in 
relation to the structures of the polities where they live will be emphasised. 
Particularly important for the comparative analyses of popular power will be the 
structuration by the people of their own socio-political environment through agency in 
broad or narrow corporate strategies for power. Before turning to a comparative 
discussion of evidence for popular power, however, I will discuss aspects of 
comparing Iron Age societies to Bronze Age societies. As will be seen, for Greece, 
the transition from Bronze Age to Iron Age is held to entail fundamental changes in 
socio-economic organisation. In the Near East, on the other hand, there is a great 
degree of continuity from the Bronze Age into the Iron Age. This may be used to 
argue against a comparison between Greek polities in the Iron Age and Near Eastern 
polities in the Bronze Age and Iron Age. Therefore, I will discuss this transition from 
bronze to iron in the following and investigate what consequences this change had for 
the political history of Greece and the Near East. 
 
7.2 From bronze to iron: breaks and continuity in Greece 
From around 1200 BCE, bronze was superseded by iron as the most important metal 
in the ancient world. This was related to a collapse of trade connections and the 
demise of several centres of kingdoms and empires (cf. 7.2.2 below). The 
international contacts necessary for the making of bronze were interrupted. This did 
not mean that long-distance contacts ceased: the Iron Age was an age of vast empires 
in the Near East. However, in Greece, the end of the Bronze Age meant a 
considerable slump in international contacts compared to the Mycenaean period. The 
change from bronze to iron in Greece has been set in relation with the development of 
local communities where power was shared by a collective of males.1189 It is supposed 
                                              
1189 Morris, Archaeology as cultural history, 2000, 155-191 
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that a series of economic and ideological changes set in in Greece, resulting in 
egalitarian poleis taking over from the hierarchic and internationally oriented 
Mycenaean palaces of the Late Bronze Age. This thesis has its opponents, protesting 
that sharing of power did not reach beyond a circle of élite men in archaic Greece (cf. 
1.5.2). However, it seems evident that the organisation of the polis is a far cry from 
the centralised bureaucracy of the Mycenaean palaces and their powerful rulers. 
Admittedly, there is a tradition in Greek authors that there were kings in Greece in the 
Dark Age. This is controversial, however. Several scholars maintain that the kings in 
Iron Age Greece belong in the world of myth, embellishing the earliest generations of 
archaic and classical aristocratic lineages.1190 The survival of Late Bronze Age 
kingship into the archaic period is doubted by several scholars: the specific role the 
Mycenaean rulers played in the palace societies was discontinued with the fall of the 
palaces.1191 I agree with these assessments and do not believe that hereditary kingship 
was a regular feature in early poleis. Rather, power in archaic poleis was held by 
aristocratic élites that ruled collectively. 
 
The collapse of the Mycenaean palaces was part of great changes in Greece. The 
difference between the Mycenaean world and the archaic poleis is striking. What lies 
behind this change? The independent, relatively small communities typical of the 
Greek poleis have been explained in light of a new local focus and local 
empowerment after the spread of iron technology in the wake of the breakdown of 
international trade at the end of the Late Bronze Age and the demise of the palace 
élites. William H. McNeill claims that “a more democratic era dawned as iron-
wielding invaders overthrew ruling elites that had based their power on a monopoly of 
                                              
1190 Drews, Basileus, 1983, 116-131; Osborne, Greece in the making, 1996, 37; Hall, A history of the archaic Greek world, 
2007, 120-127 
1191 Wright, “From chief to king,”, 1995, 75; Palaima, “The nature of the Mycenaean wanax,” 1995, 131-132; Palaima, 
“Wanaks and related power terms,” 2006, 69 
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chariotry”.1192 Few archaeologists would concur to this view. Antony M. Snodgrass 
argues that the sociological importance attributed to iron “seems today quite 
unjustified” because “its introduction was far too complicated a process to have a 
direct influence on the known events of history”.1193 I agree that metallurgy alone 
cannot explain the structure of the archaic poleis. However, the transition to iron may 
be argued to be indicative of a turn towards local, rather than regional or international 
power bases for political organisation in the Greek world. It must be emphasised that 
the qualitative division between Bronze Age and Iron Age politics is not absolute. As 
will be argued below (7.2.1), there may have been similarities between archaic poleis 
and local communities controlled by the Mycenaean palaces. 
 
The diminished importance of bronze meant that trade in tin, formerly organised by 
the palaces, lost its position as a main source of power and prestige. The locally 
oriented nature of Greek Iron Age polities is reflected in their use of local iron that 
could be procured without regular contacts with a trans-regional trade network. 
However, as will be discussed below (7.2.1), the change from bronze to iron in 
Greece did not necessarily mean that local communities outside the palace centres 
were organised very differently in the Mycenaean period compared to the archaic 
period: the palaces were gone and their officials were no longer part of local politics 
in the archaic period, but the local communities in Greece probably continued their 
existence from the Late Bronze Age into the Iron Age. What changed politically in 
Greek communities in the transition from palaces to poleis? Did Greek politics 
change into something incomparable to Near Eastern political culture? 
 
                                              
1192 McNeill, The pursuit of power, 1982, 12-13 
1193 Snodgrass, “Iron and the early metallurgy in the Mediterranean,” 1980, 368-369 
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7.2.1 From palaces to poleis 
Greek society in the Iron Age cannot be studied in isolation from its Late Bronze Age 
background. The first complex societies in Greece are the so-called palatial societies 
of Crete and the Greek mainland, the Minoan and Mycenaean civilizations. The 
Mycenaean palaces of the mid-second millennium BCE were all destroyed around 
1200 BCE, the end of the Late Bronze Age, called the Late Helladic III period. This 
was followed by a Submycenaean period of continued settlement at several sites, 
ending around 1050. The first monumental building in Greece in the Iron Age was 
erected around 900, at Lefkandi.1194 Thus, the LHIII period is followed by a 
Submycenaean period with a certain degree of cultural continuity from the world of 
the palaces. This period is followed by the Geometric period from around 1050. At 
the end of the Geometric period, scholars usually place the Homeric world, around 
700 (cf. 3.3). The gap between the palaces and the poleis may seem to be quite small. 
However, there is a world of difference between the oikos of Odysseus and the palace 
at Mycenae, Pylos or Tiryns. 
 
Despite a certain continuity of culture and a narrowing window of ignorance about 
the period between the fall of the palaces and the epics of Homer, it can be 
maintained that a Dark Age followed the collapse of the palaces, with an overall 
decline in social complexity in Greece. There was a continuation in language and 
religion. The degree of social continuity is disputed, however. Ian Morris argues that 
the “second-generation” of Greeks after the collapse of the “first-generation” society 
“had only distorted memories of the first, but these notions of a lost heroic age were 
central to second-generation culture”.1195 Thus, if Morris’ suggestion is correct, the 
people of archaic Greece remembered the Mycenaean period as a heroic age, but more 
                                              
1194 Cf. Whitley, The archaeology of ancient Greece, 2001, 77-90 
1195 Morris, “The collapse and regeneration of complex society in Greece, 1500-500 BC (version 1.0),” 2005, 2 
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as distorted notions of a glorious past than true memories of the socio-economic 
organisation of Late Bronze Age palace culture in Greece. Other scholars see a 
greater degree of continuity (cf. 3.3). Kurt A. Raaflaub argues that epic society must 
have existed at some point, beyond the epic poet’s deliberate epic distance.1196 As is 
evident from the Homeric epics, Mycenaean centres such as Mycenae or Pylos, were 
indeed remembered as important places. However, equally evident from the Homeric 
epics is that all memory of the palace society with its Linear B script and centralised 
redistributive economy was lost in the Iron Age. It is difficult to accept that a society 
resembling that of epic must have existed, as Raaflaub claims. It is even more 
difficult to accept that this society was a continuity of the Mycenaean palaces. How 
can scholars hope to sift what are fantastical elements from true memory? It should be 
accepted that there is a gap between Late Bronze Age and Iron Age Greek culture, 
material as well as socio-political. Does this mean that the Greek polis is 
incomparable with Bronze Age societies? 
 
The political economy of the Mycenaean Late Bronze Age palace society was 
characterised by the mass of the population being agricultural producers whose 
surplus was redistributed by a restricted élite and a palace-centred bureaucracy. This 
may be said to correspond to the palace economy of Near Eastern polities, often 
termed a two-sector economy (cf. 2.3; 5.8). Although the palaces did not control 
everything, important resources were controlled by the palaces and redistributed by 
them in a centrally organised bureaucracy of sorts. In contrast, the polis society of the 
archaic period was characterised by independent land-owners who were citizens and 
warriors of their communities and ruled their own polities in collective institutions of 
decision-making, in what may be termed citizen-state. Thus, in the palatial societies, 
all power was in the hands of the palace, whereas in the citizen-states, power was 
with the community. However, these terms are too general to adequately describe the 
                                              
1196 Raaflaub, “Auf dem Streitwagen des Sängers,” 2011, 351 
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degree of popular power in a polity, as local decisions can be made by the people in a 
predominantly palatial society and redistribution can take place in a citizen-state. I 
can therefore see no fundamental structural incommensurability between palatial 
societies and citizen-states.  
 
The most important sources to Mycenaean society are the Linear B tablets. These are 
for the most part lists of rations and supplies left behind by scribes, and provide 
glimpses into a brief period in LH IIIB when these clay documents where accidentally 
preserved in fires of destruction. From these tablets, Mycenaean society has been 
reconstructed. How were the Mycenaean palace-societies organised? 
 
The wa-na-ka or wanax was the highest authority in the Mycenaean states and is 
usually referred to as a ruler. There were also local leaders known as lawagetai and 
basileis. The palaces were the centres of the Mycenaean polities.1197 Carol G. Thomas 
argues that central authority was not absolute, because local leaders possessed 
impressive holdings.1198 Indeed, local authorities appear to have had much influence. 
The qa-si-re-u or basileus was responsible for the distribution of bronze to local 
smiths, meaning that he controlled important resources.1199 However, against 
Thomas’ argument that the central authority was not absolute, it can be argued that 
the basileus as local leader was exactly an agent of the central authorities, responsible 
for the distribution of bronze from the palace.  
                                              
1197 Recently, Jorrit Kelder has argued that the Mycenaean palaces were all integrated in a single regional kingdom (Kelder, 
“A great king at Mycenae – an argument for the wanax as Great King and the lawagetas as vassal ruler,” 2008, 1-26; 
Kelder, The kingdom of Mycenae, 2009). This is an intriguing suggestion, and if it can be proved, would definitely change 
the image of continuity from palaces to poleis. The debate on a possible Mycenaean kingdom will not be pursued here, 
however. 
1198 Thomas, “The components of political identity in Mycenaean Greece,” 1995, 351-352 




The identity of the basileis is not easy to establish. Pierre Carlier suggests they may 
have been leaders of a local gerousia, or council of elders.1200 This is an intriguing 
suggestion, and indeed, there may have been local councils led by the basileis. There 
is not much evidence for this, however, because the Linear B texts concern economic 
transactions, not political decision-making processes. The political relations between 
a local basileus, gerousia, and the central authority cannot be reconstructed from the 
Linear B tablets. 
 
Life in the village communities is largely left out in the Linear B sources. Alexander 
Uchitel points out the existence of two terms, da-mo and do-e-ro, in the Linear B 
tablets from Pylos and suggests that “the category of population called da-mo largely 
remains outside the control of the central authority of Pylos”.1201 Thus, the impression 
of centralised control in the Linear B tablets may be a result of the nature of the 
sources, being administrative texts from the palace. Mycenaean societies in the 
interpretation of Uchitel appear as polarised into a central palace and an independent 
rural population. How different were the local communities of the Mycenaean period 
from the archaic poleis?  
 
The exact meaning of Mycenaean political terms is difficult to assess. It is beyond 
doubt that some of these terms survived into the language of the poleis. In the 
Homeric epics, and later Greek language, basileus is the most common word for king 
or chief.1202 Anax is used in the sense of lord or master.1203 The da-mo or damos is 
                                              
1200 Carlier, “Qa-si-re-u et qa-si-re-wi-ja,” 1995, 362-363 
1201 Uchitel, “The archives of Mycenaean Greece and the ancient Near East,” 1985, 28 
1202 LSJ: basileus 
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recognisable in demos, the common people in the countryside or the sovereign people, 
the free citizens.1204 A continuity of some decentralised, local Mycenaean social 
institutions into the Dark Age is likely. However, it is not permissible to reconstruct 
Mycenaean society from later Greek usage of terms found in Linear B. Local 
continuity of settlement and certain aspects of culture are likely, but the disappearance 
of regional authority must have had a profound effect on political culture in particular. 
The hiatus in the use of written language is quite telling. It must be assumed that the 
changes from bronze to iron meant a decentralisation of power, obviating the use of 
archives, without assuming that this necessarily equals local collective rule by the 
people. 
 
Cynthia Shelmerdine emphasises that in Mycenae “the real power of the king and his 
administrators was to harness the diverse resources of a Mycenaean state, both human 
and material, to the distinct advantage of themselves”.1205 In this perspective, the rise 
of palaces on the Greek mainland can be viewed as a result of a process where an élite 
managed to allocate important resources to itself, building up a basis of power 
through redistribution. This led to a centralisation and concentration of power. This is 
not the only aspect of Mycenaean society, however. Ian Morris points out that the 
palace did not control the whole society: there are references in Linear B to property 
outside palatial control.1206 Nevertheless, a striking feature of the Linear B tablets is 
the emphasis on hierarchy and centralisation: valuable materials were distributed from 
the palace centre, e.g. bronze to the bronze-smiths, as seen from Liner B lists of 
bronze allocations, where a basileus is responsible for the distribution of bronze to a 
                                                                                                                                           
1203 LSJ: anax 
1204 LSJ: dēmos II and II 
1205 Shelmerdine, “Mycenaean palatial administration,” 2006, 84 
1206 Morris, “The collapse and regeneration of complex society in Greece, 1500-500 BC (version 1.0),”  2005, 4 
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gerousia of bronze workers.1207 The produce of the local farmers was collected by the 
palace for storage and recorded on Linear B tablets. It can be argued that there may 
have been local communities outside the palace where farmers owned their own land. 
However, as already mentioned, there is little evidence to how these local 
communities were organised. The Linear B sources tell us about an acquisitive centre 
eager to secure resources for itself, but little about local conditions. In a few texts, 
there are hints at the existence of local basileis and gerousia.1208 However, this 
evidence is difficult to interpret, as there is little more to go on than the terms 
themselves, with no context that could have told us what they implied in Mycenaean 
society. Thus, it must be maintained that palace societies were more centralistic than 
the later poleis. The ruler in his palace was a different type of authority than the 
councils or assemblies of citizens in archaic poleis. Therefore, it can be argued that 
the change form bronze to iron accompanied great socio-political changes in Greece. 
   
Scholars argue that the citizens of Greek communities of the Iron Age held the 
citizen-assembly as their highest authority.1209 Indeed, the assembly was important in 
polities of the archaic period, as seen in the Homeric epics, Hesiod, and the archaic 
poets. It can therefore be argued that collective decisions were authoritative in several 
poleis (cf. 3.3-4). However, access to the assembly cannot be claimed to have been 
universal in all poleis, even among citizens. It cannot be claimed that the polis 
emerged as an inclusive political community by nature. The citizen collective was 
                                              
1207The evidence for the distribution of bronze by a basileus and the existence of a gerousia on a local level is PY An 261 
(= tablet 40 in Ventris & Chadwick, Documents in Mycenaean Greek, 1956). This tablet has been interpreted as evidence 
for the central organisation of metallurgy. However, there are suggestions that the bronze workers were a local community 
and not palace dependents: Sigrid Deger-Jalkotzy argues that PY An 261 is a list of leaders and members of a kinship 
group, or sib, from regions outside the palatial centre, that were summoned to the palace to perform work as smiths (Deger-
Jalkotzy, “Working for the palace: PY An 261,” 1998-1999, 68-76). This is an interesting argument, but I will not pursue 
this debate further. I accept the interpretation that the people in PY An 261 were bronze workers that received their raw 
materials from the palace. 
1208 Cf. Deger-Jalkotzy, “Working for the palace: PY An 261,” 1998-1999 
1209 Morris, “An archaeology of equalities? The Greek city-states,” 1997, 100-102 
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narrow and in several poleis, only a circle of élite peers were in power. Poleis were 
not characterised by popular power; popular power was one possible outcome of the 
power-struggles in Greek communities. 
 
7.2.2 From palaces to palaces: the Near Eastern world 
The transition from the Bronze Age to the Iron Age in the Near East was less 
dramatic than in Greece, although important changes took place. Around 1200, a 
process of widespread collapse set in where some cities were destroyed, notably 
Ugarit. Other cities were abandoned, such as Hattusha, capital of the Hittite empire. 
The Hittite empire itself disappeared from the political map of the Near East.1210 The 
Iron Age was different from the Bronze Age in the Near East in important respects. 
Amélie Kuhrt points out that Babylonia suffered crises from in the 11th century and 
were invaded by Elamites and Arameans.1211 Scholars agree that fundamental social 
and technological changes took place after 1200 in the Near East. Liverani argues that 
the collapse of the palaces entailed the breakdown of centralistic dominance in trade, 
opening up for independent agents. Also, technological changes meant that local ore 
became more important than imported metals.1212 In my opinion, this is a reasonable 
assessment of the structural changes that followed the collapse of the palaces and 
their exchange systems. However, it should be pointed out that several of the ancient 
centres soon re-established themselves as hubs in the trading systems of the Iron Age 
after the collapse around 1200, most prominently the Phoenician cities of the 
Levant.1213 This does not mean that there were no significant changes in the Near East 
in the Iron Age. Jursa emphasises that new Aramean tribes claimed a place on the 
                                              
1210 Kuhrt, The ancient Near East, 1997 [1995], 385-386 
1211 Cf. Kuhrt, The ancient Near East, 1997 [1995], 374-381 
1212 Liverani, “The collapse of the Near Eastern regional system,” 1987, 70-71 
1213 Kuhrt, The ancient Near East, 1997 [1995], 401-410 
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political map of the Near East in the Iron Age.1214 In the Iron Age, the camel became 
an important animal for draught and personal transport. Also, alphabetical scripts 
became widespread within the cuneiform cultures of Syria and Mesopotamia.1215 I 
agree that these are important changes in Mesopotamian culture. However, continuity 
of settlement, cult and intellectual heritage is conspicuous in Mesopotamia. There is 
no hiatus in the Near East to the same degree as the transition from the Mycenaean to 
the archaic period in Greece, with its temporary suspension of written records and the 
total abandonment of the Linear B script.  
 
It can be argued that the greatest difference between Near Eastern societies and those 
of Iron Age Greece is the lack in Greece of central authorities on a regional level 
among archaic poleis and the absence of stable leadership based in strong institutions. 
The palaces were never re-established in Greece, whereas they survived in the Near 
East and continued to thrive. Centralised leadership in Greece could have emerged in 
the form of a unified élite or a single ruler, but few, if any hereditary kingships were 
established in Greek poleis in the archaic period. Sparta is the obvious exception, but 
even there, the kings were circumscribed by the power of officials (cf. 3.4.1). The 
absence of stable central authorities in Greece is characteristic of archaic poleis. This 
resulted in heterarchy and fierce competition within the élite, stasis. Apparently, only 
with the establishment of tyranny in Greece, it became possible for the people to 
constitute themselves as a defined people, rather than being tied to the authority of 
local aristocrats. This tendency to élite heterarchy is not seen in Near Eastern polities. 
There, rulers sought to give the impression of absolute authority. As has been seen 
throughout the preceding chapters, however, the population of several cities and 
pastoralist communities were recognised as parties in discussions and treaties (4.3.3; 
4.7.2; 5.4; 5.5.6; 5.10.2; 5.11.2; 5.11.4; 6.4.3; 6.4.4; 6.6.2; 6.7). In spite of the 
                                              
1214 Jursa, Aspects of the economic history of Babylonia, 2010, 1 
1215 Jursa, Aspects of the economic history of Babylonia, 2010, 48 
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differences in Greek and Near Eastern political traditions, with small city-states 
characterized by rivaling élites on the one hand and ancient urban centres with 
temples and palaces on the other, the politics of local communities, towns, and cities 
can be compared. The local communities of cities in the Near East can be compared 
to the citizen-communities of the archaic poleis. What were the strategies for power 
available to these local communities? How did people take part in decision-making in 
the polities where they lived? 
 
7.3 Revolt, civil strife, and popular power 
Throughout the present investigation, instances of revolt have been discussed (3.4.3; 
6.1-3). These revolts can be seen as expressions of popular power: revolt does not 
only reveal a weakness with the central authorities, but is a manifestation of an 
intention by the people to act as agents in structuring their own socio-political 
environment. Revolt may not lead to lasting changes and it may not grant the people 
power unconditionally and indefinitely, but popular revolt momentarily sets the 
hierarchy of society out of play and makes it possible for the people to set the agenda. 
Popular revolt can take several forms, from destructive riots to more contained 
protests. When the people are acting as a collective and are taking power into their 
own hands, they may be said to pursue a broad corporate strategy for power. 
However, the group revolting does not necessarily speak for the entire citizen 
community. A problem that has been met repeatedly in the Near Eastern sources to 
revolt is that of identifying the groups involved in the revolt (cf. 6.5). I will return to 
this further below in this section. 
 
From Greek sources, one particular instance of revolt is the protest of the Athenian 
demos against the attempt of Isagoras and the Spartans to dissolve the council in 
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508/7 BCE (cf. 3.4.3). It can be argued that with this act, the Athenians as a people 
intervened to secure their access to decision-making bodies as well as to put an end to 
destructive stasis between aristocratic leaders. This stasis had prevailed in the period 
before Peisistratos’ rise to power as tyrant and threatened to flare up again. In my 
analysis, the Athenian demos was pursuing a broad corporate strategy for power: as a 
collective the Athenians take direct action and chase away the usurper Isagoras and 
his foreign troops. In the following decades, the Athenians established a democracy 
where even the poorest citizens were guaranteed a degree of participation in politics.  
A similarly empowered people cannot be found in Near Eastern polities. However, 
there are several episodes of revolt in Near Eastern sources, particular the Amarna 
letters. These will be discussed in the following. 
 
From the Late Bronze Age Syrian cities of Ammyia, Tyre, and Byblos, the Amarna 
letters contain reports that there were instances of revolt (cf. 6.4.1-3). In these cities, 
“the mayors” installed by the Egyptian Pharaoh were chased away or killed. “The 
citizens” or groups of them were responsible, and the episodes appear to be protests 
against “the mayors”, in support of the rising kingdom of Amurru. It should be 
pointed out that new rulers were installed in all these cities after the revolts. Thus, 
there is no evidence that the people took control of the decision-making bodies or that 
the people became sovereign in the constitution. The identity of the groups revolting 
is difficult to establish. As I have argued in chapter 6, however, “the men of GN” is 
used in the Amarna letters to refer to the collective of townspeople (cf. 6.5.2). The 
revolts show that the people could mobilise as a group and become agents with their 
own corporate strategies for power.  
 
The term for people, “the men of GN” or “the sons of GN”, apparently has a range of 
referents in the Amarna letters, from a restricted group of elders to the townspeople or 
citizens in general. It is not always clear who are hiding behind this term, and the 
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interpretation of the sources will vary widely after how the term “the men of GN” is 
interpreted. Thus, an interpretation where “the men of GN” are interpreted as a 
council of “elders” can be used to argue for a reconstruction where a local élite of 
powerful men pursue a broad élite strategy for power. On the other hand, the council 
of “elders” can be interpreted as a collective of heads of households pursuing a 
narrow corporate strategy for power, sharing power among themselves as community 
representatives. Also, if “the men of GN” are interpreted as a collective of citizens, in 
the sense of “the people”, a reconstruction where “the people” pursue a broad 
corporate strategy can be argued. In certain instances in the Amarna letters, it seems 
to me quite clear that it is the townspeople as a collective who act in the uprising (cf. 
6.5.2). In the regicide cities of the Amarna age, the city-population act in revolt 
against their rulers. It should be pointed out that there is also evidence that there were 
competing groups within the regicide cities, so that there is no reason to suppose that 
there was a united popular uprising behind every instance of revolt. Quite the opposite 
appears to have been the case, in fact: e.g. the population of Byblos was not united in 
their opinion of their ruler Rib-Hadda, according to Rib-Hadda’s own reports to 
Pharaoh (cf. 6.4.3).  
 
To me, it appears evident that the people of Athens and the people of Ammiya, Tyre, 
and Byblos were knowledgeable agents pursuing their own strategies for power. The 
Athenian demos and “the men of GN” acted in the capacity of agents challenging the 
prevailing structure of power in their polities. The Athenians challenged the 
establishment of a Spartan-supported oligarchy and reacted in the face of danger of 
continued civil strife (3.4.3). “The men of GN” in Byblos, Ammiya, or Tyre did not 
want “a mayor” controlled by Pharaoh, but opted for rulers loyal to Amurru (6.4.1-3). 
Thus, the people of these cities dictate the foreign policies of their cities and attempt 
to install the leaders of their choosing. There is an important difference in that the 
Athenian demos seized power, taking the reins of the city-state into their own hands, 
whereas the people of the Syrian cities installed new rulers or asked Pharaoh to 
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provide new rulers for them. However, the people in Syrian cities through their 
revolts nevertheless demonstrate that they were capable of throwing sitting rulers and 
to rule themselves in the interstice before a new king was installed (cf. 6.4.3-4). Of 
note in the Greek and Syrian examples is the existence of several groups in the 
struggles for power (cf. 3.4.2 and 6.5.2). In the following, these competing groups 
will be discussed from a perspective of civil war. 
 
As mentioned above (7.2.2), the Greek polis in the archaic period was plagued by 
stasis, civil strife between factions, groups consisting of aristocrats and their 
supporters. From the archaic poets (cf. 3.4.2; 3.4.4-5) it is evident that aristocratic or 
élite leaders defined the goals for civil strife. The goal was more often than not 
personal power for the leader of the faction, resulting in the loss of influence and 
power for the other aristocrats. This can be observed in the poems of Alkaios (3.4.4), 
where Pittakos is accused of making himself leader of the people in order to achieve 
power in Mytilene. It is implicit in this criticism that Alkaios would rather have his 
own aristocratic faction in power. For Alkaios, a crucial difference between the 
preferred aristocratic rule and unacceptable tyranny seems to be that Pittakos is 
seeking power for himself, whereas Alkaios’ own perspective appears to be that the 
élite should rule collectively. The lines of conflict do not appear to have been between 
clearly formulated ideologies or constitutions, but struggles between groups of 
aristocrats and élite leaders that catered to the masses. From Theognis (3.4.5), it can 
be observed that the élite could be divided in stasis, and that the different groups in 
the conflict could be more or less friendly to the people. There are no obvious 
democratic parties visible in the sources to these conflicts however, in the sense of a 
party of the people acting for the people, in the sense of commoners or the masses. 
Members of the élite sought power with the complicity of the people, but they did not 
intend to give power into the hands of the people. This means that the people could be 
powerful in their role as supporters of an élite leader, but not that they achieved 
lasting power. As mentioned above, the obvious exception to this is the Athenian 
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demos in 508/7 that acted on their own alternative with no leader present in the city 
(3.4.3). Kleisthenes would have been a clear candidate for such a leading role, but he 
appears to have been in exile at the time. Therefore, the people came to the fore as 
their own liberators from Sparta and the oligarchs. 
 
Civil strife can be observed in the regicide Syrian cities in the Amarna 
correspondence (cf. 6.4.2-3). In EA 89, there is a report from Tyre that some people 
have killed “the mayor” and set up a new one that the people do not want (6.4.2). In 
this situation, a group of citizens act in order to replace the current ruler with a new 
one. The citizens in general apparently did not want the new ruler. This can be 
interpreted as a parallel to archaic stasis, where groups of citizens were mobilised by 
members of the élite in order for them to gain personal power. The opposition to the 
new “mayor” at Tyre reveals that there were diverging opinions on who should rule. 
The people are reported to regard the new “mayor” as a usurper, but were too afraid to 
say anything once he was in power.  
 
There are further examples of civil strife from the Amarna letters: in EA 138, there is 
a report from the deposed “mayor” Rib-Hadda of Byblos that half the city had 
supported him and the other half had supported the rebels (6.4.3). Rib-Hadda left 
Byblos after “the lords of the city” declared that they supported the rebels. Not long 
after, Rib-Hadda tried to return and was supported by “the residents”. In the ensuing 
struggle between loyalists and rebels, “the mayor” lost and went into exile. This can 
also be seen as a parallel to archaic stasis, with groups in support of different political 
goals competing for power in the city. However, different from the examples of civil 
strife in Alkaios or Theognis (3.4.4-3.4.5), there is no direct evidence in EA 138 for 
élite leaders seeking power in complicity with the demos. Rather, “the lords of the 
city” and “the residents” appear as groups with goals and objectives in their own 
right. “The men of Byblos” are also mentioned, writing to Rib-Hadda in exile. It is 
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not possible to distinguish these as a separate group comparable to the demos of 
Mytilene, however, that supported Pittakos to the chagrin of the aristocrats. “The 
lords of the city” and “the residents” may be interpreted as élite groups vying for 
power. Their identity is difficult to establish, however. “The residents” may have been 
a popular faction (cf. 6.5.2), meaning that the struggles in Byblos were between the 
élite and the masses. This is not certain, however, and cannot be determined as long 
as “the residents” cannot be defined more accurately. 
 
From the examples in EA 89 and EA 138, it can be seen that the cities Tyre and 
Byblos, though formally city-states ruled by “mayors” who answered to the Pharaoh, 
did not work as hierarchic pyramids with the ruler at the top. There are instead 
crossing lines of interest between higher and lower levels in the hierarchy of the 
polity. Groups of citizens pursue strategies for power in support of or in opposition to 
the ruler, but they also rely on their own collective strength. It is difficult to identify 
the different groups discussed in the letters. They were probably not corporate groups 
with regular meetings. However, decision-making assemblies are frequently 
encountered in Near Eastern sources. It is to this evidence that I now turn, in order to 
compare further aspects of Greek and Near Eastern political culture. 
 
7.4 Assemblies 
As has been seen repeatedly in the preceding chapters there are great difficulties in 
defining important aspects of Near Eastern assemblies. Who participated in them? 
How often did they meet? What authority did they have? These questions can only be 
answered tentatively (cf. 4.3.1-5; 4.7.1-4; 5.5.1-6; 5.6; 5.10.1-2; 5.11.1-4; 6.5.2; 6.7). 
This is in contrast to the Greek evidence: as was seen in chapter 3, assemblies and 
councils are quite well attested for archaic poleis and played an important role in their 
 523 
political structure. A direct comparison of Greek and Near Eastern political 
institutions is difficult. In the following, I will compare the Old Assyrian and Old 
Babylonian assemblies to assemblies of archaic Greek poleis. I will also discuss how 
the citizens of Neo-Babylonian cities were organized in decision-making bodies. 
These Near Eastern assemblies are rather well attested, albeit inadequately 
documented concerning their composition and competence. As will be seen, however, 
they may provide parallels to archaic Greek political practices. 
 
In several Near Eastern texts, the Akkadian word ālum is used for “city” and “city-
assembly”, creating a difficult double meaning. Was the whole city gathered in 
assembly or did the assembly represent the whole city? I have argued that the latter 
was the case for some cities, including Old Babylonian cities (4.3.3) and Old Assyrian 
Assur (5.5.4). However, there is the third possibility that “the city” was a restricted 
council and not a representative body at all. Again, this is difficult to determine due to 
our incomplete understanding of Akkadian political concepts and terms (cf. 1.5.4). 
Throughout the sources discussed in this investigation, the Akkadian word for 
assembly, puhrum, is used of small gatherings as well as large congregations. Thus, 
the terminology creates problems for a comparative analysis of institutions. However, 
this does not mean that there were no political practices identifiable from ancient 
Near Eastern sources comparable to those of archaic Greek poleis. In the following, 
evidence for assemblies from Mesopotamian cities will be compared to collective 
decision-making in Greek poleis. 
 
The Old Assyrian “city-assembly” is an interesting case of collective decision-making 
in Mesopotamia. What does it imply when “the city” and “the city-assembly” are 
called the same, i.e. ālum? It would be rash to suppose from homonymy that the ālum 
was an assembly of all Assyrians or all citizens of the Old Assyrian city-state. The 
ālum reached decisions concerning the important trade in metals and textiles with 
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Anatolia and made treaties with foreign powers (cf. 5.5.4; 5.5.6). It is also attested 
that the ālum made decisions about rebuilding the city-walls of Assur (cf. 5.5.5). It 
appears the wealthiest merchants had leading roles in the ālum and there are no 
indications of large citizen-assemblies being convened regularly at Assur. Although 
“the city-assembly” was an important, perhaps the most important institution for 
decision-making in the Old Assyrian city-state, the people cannot be said to be 
sovereign in the polity of Assur. It is nevertheless of note that the ālum, as an 
assembly that included the king, the eponym, and the wealthiest merchants, was a 
collective authority and not a royal council: decisions were made by the ālum, not the 
king alone. The Old Assyrian city-state had complex institutions for making decisions 
that were binding on the whole community and that included representatives of the 
community. 
 
“The city”, ālum, as a term for assembly is also well-attested in Old Babylonian legal 
documents, along with the term puhrum, “assembly”. There are no indications in 
these documents, however, that the ālum was a citizen-assembly in the sense of a 
gathering of all citizens for political decision-making. It rather appears that the ālum 
was a limited body of people making decisions in legal matters. The participants at 
the sessions of the ālum may have included a large number of citizens as onlookers, 
but the lists of witnesses suggest that the active participants were few and of high 
rank, including “the mayor” (cf. 4.3.1).The assemblies appear to have held meetings 
in public, and officials could be subjected to scrutiny there (cf. 4.3.2): in the Codex 
Hammurapi a judge who is accused of misconduct in office must answer in “the 
assembly”, puhrum. If he is found guilty, he must pay a fine in relation to the amount 
involved in the case, and he is expelled from his office as judge in “the assembly.”1216  
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In Old Babylonian legal documents, “the city-assembly”, ālum, and “the assembly”, 
puhrum, appear from city to city as parallel or, more probably, identical institutions. 
Both terms seem to refer to collective legal bodies that made decisions for the 
community. In Old Babylonian legal documents, officials of the king sometimes 
preside over the meetings (cf. 4.3.1-3). Thus, these assemblies were at least in certain 
cases dependent on officials of temples or the palace. This ties them to the central 
institutions of the Old Babylonian state. However, the assemblies appear as mainly 
local decision-making bodies that co-existed with central authorities and occasionally 
cooperated with them, rather than being state institutions. The mayor’s authority was 
rooted in the local communities of the cities (cf. 4.3.1). Thus, the power to make 
decisions was not centralised at the court of the Old Babylonian kings, but resided 
partly in local assemblies. This is important, because it shows that citizens of Old 
Babylonians cities were judged by their own community.  
 
It does not seem a fruitful approach to treat all terms for decision-making gatherings 
as evidence for formally constituted institutions. In my opinion, what the several 
assemblies mentioned in Old Babylonian texts show is that there were local levels of 
decision-making where community representatives were in charge. These local 
community representatives were expected to be well informed about their local 
community (cf. 4.3.4). Apparently, arbitration was an important part of the legal 
system of Old Babylonian cities and this was done by local collective decision-
making bodies, sometimes together with officials. This shows that the local and 
central authorities overlapped at certain stages. The local perspective of the collective 
decision-making bodies, however, ensured that they looked to the interests of their 
fellows. Thus, there was a local political level that cooperated with representatives of 
                                                                                                                                           
1216 Cod. Ham. §5: Meek in Pritchard (ed.), ANET, 1971 [1969], 166; Viel, Complete code of Hammurapi vol. II, 2005, 
397-399 
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the central authorities. This is indicative of popular power, in the sense that there was 
power outside the direct control of the palace or temples.  
 
The difference is great between an archaic Greek polis and an Old Babylonian city. In 
the polis, there was nothing comparable to the central institutions of palace and 
temples. Greek temples did not play the same economic role as those of 
Mesopotamian cities. Also, there was a huge difference in scale between archaic 
poleis and Mesopotamian cities. However, as mentioned above, on a local level, 
comparisons can be made: Old Babylonian cities had assemblies and councils for 
adjudication where commoners had access, at least as onlookers (cf. 4.3.2; 4.3.5; 4.4). 
Thus, power did not rest with the king, his officials, and the temple officials alone. 
There were also local levels of decision-making, and these local levels were 
integrated with the central authorities through officials that cooperated with them, 
without dictating their operations. Some of the local communities of Old Babylonian 
cities, called bābtum, were neighbourhoods with their own institutions for 
adjudication (cf. 4.3.4). This is quite similar to institutions of a polis community 
where citizens were judged by their equals, in local assemblies. The local nature of 
the bābtum is evident from the nature of the cases it was responsible for; cases that 
demanded intimate knowledge of the inhabitants of the neighbourhood. The bābtum is 
then rather similar to the Athenian demes, the smallest local units out of which the 
late 6th century polis was constructed (cf. 3.4.3). The demes had their local institutions 
for adjudication. This is quite similar to the role played by the bābtum or quarters 
within Old Babylonian cities, as the smallest local authority, concerned with family 
matters and conducting its meetings locally. 
 
As has been seen throughout chapter 4, 5, and 6, Mesopotamian cities appear to have 
had a collective identity and collective organs of decision-making. Different from the 
Old Assyrian material (5.1-6), where it is evident that the king of the city-state Assur 
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participated in the ālum, the Old Babylonian kings apparently did not frequently 
participate in assemblies (4.3-4.3.5). This is most likely an effect of the establishment 
of network states in the Old Babylonian period, where the ruler was not the king of a 
city-state, but ruled over several cities distributed over a vast territory. It appears that 
the assemblies retained their local importance in the cities under Babylonian rule. The 
king was not bound by their decisions, however, and the assemblies do not appear to 
have had political power. The decisions reached by the ālum or puhrum in the Old 
Babylonian legal documents concern legal matters, in particular disputes between 
citizens regarding real estate, and not politics (4.4). This is different from the role of 
“the city-assembly” in the Old Assyrian city-state that made decisions of a political 
nature (5.6). In the Neo-Assyrian period, it is evident that the local communities of 
the Babylonian cities were conducting their own affairs and made decisions 
concerning political allegiance (6.7). Unfortunately, it is difficult to establish how the 
local communities were organized. It seems like “the sons of the city” formed a group 
of representatives for the local city community. Evidence for “elders”, “sons of the 
city” and “the assembly” are difficult to disentangle and it does not appear that 
Babylonian cities had powerful popular assemblies formally distinguished from other 
gatherings of decision-makers. However, the Assyrian kings had to address and 
convince collective bodies of citizens in open meetings, indicating that the people 
were well informed of political goings on and probably could influence decisions by 
clamouring or shouting. 
 
In Greek poleis, popular power and assemblies were closely connected. The legal 
system of Athens with its jury courts was dominated by the masses from the 6th 
century. It is not evident that the Old Babylonian ālum or puhrum were similar to the 
judiciary assemblies of Athens, however. At Athens, after the reforms of Kleisthenes 
all citizens could participate in assembly-sessions and systems were devised to ensure 
that the entire citizenry took part at one point or another in decision-making processes 
(3.4.3). This is not documented for Near Eastern polities. It may be that the entire 
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citizen population was present at decision-making gatherings in Neo-Babylonian 
cities, but that does not mean that they participated directly in making decisions.  
 
Who participated in the Old Assyrian, Old Babylonian, and Iron Age Babylonian 
assemblies? From the Old Babylonian evidence, it appears that the assembly met in 
public, but the decisions seem to have been taken by a restricted group of people. This 
indicates a narrow corporate strategy for power, where community representatives 
reach decisions for members of their own community, the citizens. The Old 
Babylonian public jury courts are similar to the Athenian jury courts established by 
Solon, in the sense that the citizens were judged by their fellows. However, there is no 
certainty concerning how jurors were selected in the Old Babylonian cities, so the 
parallel cannot be taken far. It may be that commoners were members of the juries, 
but the evidence adduced for this, in particular the Nippur Trial for Homicide, cannot 
be regarded as conclusive (cf. 4.3.5). From the Neo-Assyrian evidence, it can be 
argued that a large number of people were present at the meetings of the assemblies, 
but this is not certain (cf. 6.7). One of the ancient Near Eastern assemblies whose 
workings are documented in any detail is the assembly of the Old Assyrian kārum 
Kanesh. This will be discussed in the following. 
 
As mentioned already, the evidence from the Old Assyrian city-state indicates that 
decisions were in the hands of a restricted number of people. However, there is 
evidence for more inclusive assemblies in other communities of the Old Assyrian 
period: the Old Assyrian city-state had a number of trading-settlements in Anatolia. 
There, Assyrian merchants lived in a commercial quarter called the kārum, “quay”, 
and they lived by their own rules inside Anatolian city-states. The best documented of 
these settlements is the kārum Kanesh. From the so-called statute texts of the colony, 
it appears that its highest authority was the assembly of “the great” (5.5.1). “The 
great” were presumably the wealthiest and most influential merchants. If the assembly 
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of “the great” decided to do so, an assembly of “the small and great” could be 
gathered. However, “the small” merchants were not allowed to convene an assembly. 
As the wealthiest in the colony, “the great” merchants were in charge of the bīt kārim, 
the office of the colony. The merchants were in regular contact with the authorities at 
home in Assur. Also, the merchants in Anatolia were members of family firms that 
had their bases in Assur. Some of their business had to be taken to Assur for 
adjudication by “the city”. Quite regularly, the authorities in Assur, “the city”, wrote 
to the colonies and gave them instructions. These instructions were passed on from 
the kārum Kanesh to the other colonies in Anatolia.  
 
It appears that the kārum Kanesh convened a general assembly only in exceptional 
cases and only at the orders of “the great”. Therefore, it can be argued that power was 
in the hands of the heads of the wealthiest merchant houses. In the colonies 
subordinate to the kārum Kanesh, “the small and great” appear as the main authority 
and no separate role for “the great” is mentioned (5.5.2). These colonies answered to 
the kārum Kanesh, who in turn answered to “the city”. Thus, there was no powerful 
citizen-assembly comparable to those of Greek poleis in the Old Assyrian city-state or 
its colonies. 
 
It could be argued that the Old Assyrian city-state was a heterarchy, because there 
were several groups of wealthy merchants in power. Thus, Old Assyrian society was 
not ruled by a cohesive ruling group, but by the representatives of several merchant 
houses, among them the king. However, it cannot be said that the individual 
merchants were in a position to act independently of “the city” and pursue their own 
political agenda. They co-operate in common decision-making bodies and are subject 
to the authority of these bodies. Rather, the structure of the Old Assyrian city-state 
can be termed oligarchic, in the sense that the heads of several families were sharing 
power, to the exclusion of the less successful merchants: oligarchic polities emphasise 
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distinctions between the ruling minority and the rest of the inhabitants by establishing 
criteria for participation that cannot be met by the majority of the population. Thus, 
the rest of the population is actively excluded (cf. 1.4.2). This appears to have been 
the case in Assur and the kārum Kanesh, where “the small” were only consulted at the 
discretion of “the great”. Thus, only the heads of a limited number of wealthy 
merchant houses had power in the polity.  
 
The relations between the wealthiest families and the rest of the population of Assur 
are not well documented. Indirectly, from the sources for the kārum Kanesh, there are 
indications that the concept of a general assembly, “the great and small” was 
established in Old Assyrian politics, but this cannot be proved beyond doubt (cf. 5.6). 
At any rate, this body was not sovereign in the polity. Rather, “the city” was, as an 
assembly that included the king and the eponym. The wealthiest merchants appear to 
have taken turns in making decisions and serving in the most important offices. The 
king was not a despotic leader, but one of several leaders in the community, who all 
met in “the city”. What are the similarities and differences between the Old Assyrian 
city-state and the archaic Greek oligarchies? What strategies for power were pursued 
in the Old Assyrian city-state and its colonies? 
 
The dominance of “the great” and their sharing of power with the king in “the city” 
indicate that the polity was characterised by a narrow corporate strategy for power. 
“The small” could only act when “the great” wanted them to. Therefore, popular 
power in the sense of agency from below is not to be expected. This is comparable to 
the situation in archaic Sparta, where the polity was dominated by a gerousia that 
included the kings: the popular assembly, apella, could not propose any separate 
measures (cf. 3.4.1.) On the other hand, evidence for a general assembly in the Old 
Assyrian city-state is not conclusive and it does not appear that such an assembly was 
regularly convened. The parallel lies in the strategy for power, where a narrow 
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corporation of formally equal powerful people rules the polity in compliance with the 
broader segments of the citizenry. Thus, commoners are not excluded from 
participating completely, but their participation is circumscribed. Commoners are 
excluded from taking political initiative on formal criteria, i.e. lack of belonging to 
“the elders”, as in Sparta, or “the great”, as in Assyria. It is important, however, that 
citizens could attain to this group given that they came in possession of enough 
wealth and attained the social status necessary for joining the group with direct access 
to power. Thus, the ruling group was not a closed élite: it was formally a 
distinguished part of the collective of citizens and its qualities of distinction were not 
in principle beyond the reach of commoners.  
 
The evidence for assemblies in the Old Assyrian city-state and the Old Babylonian 
cities indicates that the wealthiest members of the community were regularly involved 
in running the polities, by making legal and political decisions. They did so in 
complicity with the king and his officials. In the Old Assyrian city-state the king took 
part in the meetings of “the city-assembly”. In the cities of the Old Babylonian 
network state, on the other hand, the city-assemblies normally operated without the 
king. The relation between the citizens who participated in the city-assemblies and the 
rest of the citizens cannot be securely established. It is likely that the rest of the 
citizens were onlookers in legal processes, but this must remain conjecture. General 
assemblies do not appear to have been in charge of the polities of the Old Assyrian 
city-state or the cities of the Old Babylonian network state. This is in contrast to the 
Babylonian cities of the Iron Age, where it is evident that “the sons of the city” were 
in charge of the polity and answered to the Assyrian king and his envoys (cf. 6.7). 
Although it cannot be determined whether “the sons of the city” were a large group of 
citizens or a more restricted group of community representatives, it seems evident that 
the collective of citizens were in charge, and not a council controlled by the 
Assyrians. The Assyrian kings frequently granted privileges to the Babylonian cities 
and these were considered to apply to all the people in the city (cf. 6.6.2). Thus, the 
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cities of Neo-Assyrian Babylonia appear to have had a great degree of autonomy. The 
polity was in the hands of the collective of citizens, through their representatives who 
undertook negotiations with Assyrian kings and other rulers. 
 
It cannot be claimed that Mesopotamian assemblies played the same role as they did 
in archaic Greek poleis. They were not the place for the expression of the will of the 
masses. However, the Mesopotamian assemblies do represent a collective identity for 
the city. They facilitated decision-making processes made by the community for the 
community, albeit through heads of households, wealthy merchants, and other 
distinguished members of the community. I turn now to evidence for smaller 
decision-making bodies in Near Eastern polities, often referred to as “the elders”. 
These groups may have been decision-making élites. Does their influence and 
importance mean that power was in the hands of a narrow élite in Near Eastern 
polities? 
 
7.5 “Elders” and eponyms 
Throughout the evidence discussed for political traditions of Greek and Near Eastern 
polities, “elders” frequently appear in a decision-making capacity. Who were they? 
What was their position in the community? In the following, “the elders” of Old 
Babylonian Mari and Assur will be discussed. In earlier research on popular decision-
making in ancient Near Eastern societies, much emphasis has been placed on a 
“primitive democracy” from tribal institutions (cf. 1.3-4). In this line of reasoning, 
cities are viewed as part of the development of an increasingly hierarchic form of 
society. Thus, pastoralists are egalitarian and democratically minded, and city-states 
ruled by kings still have remnants of the original egalitarian institutions. When the 
king of a city-state establishes an empire, despotism emerges and most traces of the 
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original egalitarian order disappears.1217 From this paradigm, scholars have argued 
that whenever there is evidence of communal-decision making in Near Eastern 
polities, i.e. decisions made by “elders”, this is a remnant from pastoralist traditions. 
In the Old Babylonian period, the Amorites have provided the pastoralist alibi for 
explaining the presence of communal organs of decision-making in cities.1218 It 
should be pointed out, however, that the Mari evidence shows that there were close 
ties between sedentary and pastoralist populations: they often belonged to the same 
tribal confederations (4.6). The argument that collective organs of decision-making 
were somehow being transferred to an urban environment by pastoralists does not 
explain this evidence very well. Collective decision-making by elders belongs equally 
in urban and pastoralist contexts and thus it cannot be claimed that the cities had less 
room than pastoralist societies for collective decision-making in their political 
structure. “The elders” should not be seen as survivors from a pastoralist political 
tradition, but be analysed in the context they appear in the sources. As will be 
discussed in the following, their position is comparable to that of Greek “elders”, in 
particular the Hesiodic basileis or the Spartan gerousia. 
 
In the Mari evidence, local leaders of both sedentary and semi-nomadic communities, 
the sugāgū, convened for assemblies. The sugāgum was a local leader that was 
selected by “the elders” of his community and who had authority as judge and leader. 
In this sense, he is reminiscent of the basileis in Hesiod, who were responsible for 
arbitration and sometimes convened in assemblies, as well (cf. 3.3.2). Different from 
the Homeric basileis, who formed an élite with a position unattainable by the 
commoners, the basileis of Hesiod appear as local notables that were not above 
criticism from the local community. However, it is likely that Hesiod himself 
                                              
1217 Cf. Jacobsen, “Primitive democracy in ancient Mesopotamia,” 1970 [1943] 
1218 McKenzie, “The elders in the Old Testament,” 1959, 404; Klengel, “Zu den šībūtum in altbabylonischer Zeit,” 1960, 
365 
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belonged to the social stratum of the basileis: his peasant persona appears as a literary 
device and not evidence of his social background or perspective. The basileis of the 
Works and Days appear as more of an aristocratic élite than the sūgāgū in Mari, who 
were actually selected by their community “elders”. 
 
The sugāgum and “the elders” of Mari communities were local powers that took care 
of the interests of their fellow townspeople. In particular “the elders” appear as 
important for the functioning of local politics, and they could step in in case a local 
leader died (cf. 4.7.4). “The elders” were probably heads of households. The local 
selection of the sugāgum by “the elders” suggests that they were members of the local 
communities where they had authority, and not appointed royal officials. The semi-
autonomous status of local communities of towns and camps throughout the Mari 
kingdom does not signify a despotic king at the top of a strict hierarchy, but rather 
that communities were left to decide on local matters themselves. What does this tell 
us about popular power in local communities of network states like Mari?  
 
“The elders” can be fit into several reconstructions of local politics. They can be 
viewed as an oligarchic group of powerful individuals, heads of prominent families or 
households that dominated their local communities. This was seen in Sparta (3.4.1), 
where the gerousia included the kings. Sparta can be said to fit a hierarchic model, 
where a limited council monopolises local decision-making and actively excludes the 
rest of the villagers or townspeople. Was this also the case in Mari communities? The 
Mari “elders” appear as community representatives more than a ruling group. “The 
elders” can be viewed as representatives of the interests of the different households in 
the town or village. This fits with a consensual model, where the relations of power 
are characterised by negotiations in order to accommodate the interests of the entire 
community (cf. 2.9). Admittedly, the sources rarely provide evidence that enables us 
to determine the relations between “the elders” and the rest of the local community. 
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However, the position of “the elders” as local authorities is evident from their 
important role in the selection of candidates for local leadership. There is no evidence 
for a conflict of interests between “the elders” and the rest of the local community. 
Therefore, it seems likely that “the elders” in the Mari sources represent the interests 
of the community. 
 
The strategy for power that “the elders” pursue in the local communities of the Mari 
kingdom is that of a narrow corporation: they form an elect group, but reach decisions 
for the community, including the negotiation of peace. They represent their 
community and meet with kings or their representatives, either by going to the palace 
or by receiving envoys in their home community in open meetings (cf. 4.7.4). 
Although they were a limited group, they represented the entire community and 
worked openly. The recruitment of “elders” was probably from among the most 
influential families of the local community. Therefore, they cannot be claimed to be a 
broad corporation that included all citizens. However, their decisions were for the 
local community, made from a local perspective and not from the court of the king in 
Mari. Therefore, they cannot be said to pursue élite strategies of power, whether 
broad or narrow: if they were a local aristocracy distancing themselves from the rest 
of the community by blood or rank, they would be following a broad élite strategy, 
but that does not seem to be the case. This is a marked contrast to the Homeric heroes: 
they form a council that is explicitly the reserve of the basileis, with their 
extraordinary powers of deliberation and cunning (cf. 3.3.1). It is quite similar to the 
role of elders in Sparta, however, where the elders are distinguished representatives of 
the community, as discussed above concerning Sparta and the Old Assyrian 
assemblies (7.4). The Spartan gerousia was opposed to the masses and the apella, 
however (cf. 3.4.1). What was the position of “the elders” in Near Eastern polities? I 
now turn to the Old Assyrian evidence for “the elders”. 
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In the Old Assyrian city-state, it appears that “the elders” of Assur executed decisions 
of “the city-assembly”: they were responsible for collecting silver from the Old 
Assyrian colonies in Anatolia to pay for fortifications back in Assur. The relations 
between “the city” and “the elders” are not well attested. However, it seems that they 
were quite different from the community elders of the local villages and towns of the 
Mari kingdom. Rather than being a group responsible for the community in relations 
to the king and for selecting local leaders, “the elders” at Assur appear as a form of 
executive committee of “the city-assembly” that included the king (5.5.5). 
 
From the Old Assyrian city-state, there is also evidence that there was a council of 
“elders” at the kārum Kanesh (5.5.3). This group may have been the same as “the 
great”, the wealthiest merchants of the colony. In the kārum Kanesh, the assembly of 
“the great” was in charge of the polity. The assembly of “the small and great” was the 
more inclusive assembly, but it was only convened at the discretion of “the great”. 
Therefore, it appears that in the Old Assyrian city-state as well as in its colonies, the 
wealthy merchants were the most influential, and that those outside this group had 
little influence on what was discussed. Because there was an assembly of “the small 
and great” at the kārum Kanesh, it is tempting to argue that there was a balance of 
power between “the elders” on the one hand and the people in the plenary assembly of 
the kārum Kanesh on the other, but as far as the statute texts of the kārum go, it does 
not appear that the plenary assembly had any decisive power. The Old Assyrian city-
state or its colonies do not seem to have a defined division of power between “elders” 
and a popular assembly, as was the case in Sparta (cf. 3.4.1). 
 
“Elders” act as decision-making collectives in most ancient societies. Their relation to 
central authorities in complex societies can be seen to vary greatly, from local 
intermediary authorities in network states to councils integrated in the decision-
making authorities in city-states. “Elders” are attested from Greek poleis, but more 
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common are different forms of councils where the citizens participated according to 
specific criteria of membership, either age, wealth, or both. In Near Eastern city-
states, “elders” had considerable power. This is probably related to the dominance of 
the heads of households in local communities of the Near East, in city-states and 
network states alike. Further, the dominance of the heads of households can be set in 
relation to the importance of clans, large groups of families united by fictitious 
ancestors, in Near Eastern societies. The councils of Greek poleis were different, as 
they often cooperated closely with popular assemblies, by preparing cases for the 
assembly (cf. 3.4.3). However, Greek councils could also be exclusive gatherings 
specifically geared towards making decisions without the participation of the masses, 
as seen with the Homeric boule (cf. 3.3.1). 
 
Further evidence for the political dominance of important families in Near Eastern 
city-states is the position of the Old Assyrian limmu, known as the year-eponym. He 
was responsible for taxes and duties, and the year in which he served was named after 
him and inscribed on a list (cf. 5.3). The translation of limmu by the Greek term 
eponym implies a similarity between the limmu and Greek offices. Indeed, there are 
parallels, but also differences. The position of limmu was apparently an office that 
was shared between the merchants, not as the pinnacle of their career, but no doubt a 
prestigious position. After all, the person in office gave his name to the administrative 
year. This has a parallel at Athens, with the office of archon that was monopolised by 
rich, noble families before the time of Solon.1219 In Athens, the archon was an 
eponymous office; the name of the holder of this office was given to the year in which 
he served and preserved in a list. The similarity between the Assyrian and Greek 
eponymous offices, that the year is named after the person in office, was pointed out 
long ago.1220  However, there are also important differences: the archonship in Athens 
                                              
1219 Cf. Ath. Pol. III.1-3 
1220 Hanell, Das altrömische eponyme Amt, 1946, 90-92 
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was the most important office in the polity, whereas the limmu of Assur was not: in 
Assur, the king held the most important office, whereas Athens had no king. It is 
nevertheless interesting that the Assyrian élite took turns in office and that the office 
was eponymous. It shows that the important families of the Old Assyrian city-state 
were integrated into the structure of power and shared power with the king. It is not 
evidence for popular power, but it shows that power was shared among several 
families in the polity. In the Old Assyrian city-state, through institutions like “elders” 
and offices like the eponym, power can be said to lie with the heads of households 
and not with only one individual household, that of the king. In Athens, the eponym 
lost political influence with the establishment of democracy after 508/7. The parallel 
is nevertheless important, because it shows that non-hereditary offices were important 
in both Assur and Athens. 
  
7.6 The palace, professionals, and local communities 
The Near Eastern polities discussed throughout this investigation were all centred on 
palaces, albeit with local variations of degree. The local communities had their own 
institutions of power, but these local powers were more or less connected to the 
central authorities in the palaces. The palace played a political role at e.g. Ugarit that 
is not paralleled by anything in any Greek polis. The palace was the political and 
economic centre of the polity. However, there were also groups within Ugaritic 
society that communicated with outside powers, without the intervention of the king 
(cf. 5.12). Thus, the Ugaritic kingdom can be described as a city-state rather than a 
palace society, with semi-independent groups that could operate with their own 
agenda: there is evidence that the merchants of Ugarit was in a rather autonomous 
position and made agreements with foreign rulers without the intervention of their 
own king (cf. 5.11.2). There is also evidence that the local communities of towns 
throughout the kingdom were autonomous and reached decisions collectively (cf. 
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5.10.1). The palaces of Late Bronze Age societies did not centralise all decisions. The 
merchants of Ugarit appear to have been organised in corporations that were 
acknowledged by outside forces. The local communities were semi-autonomous, 
although royal officials are in evidence as taking part in their local decision-making 
bodies. 
 
As mentioned above (7.2.1), the archaic Greek poleis had no parallel institution to the 
Mycenaean or Ugaritic palaces. At Ugarit, the merchants appear as semi-independent 
corporations, but they belong to the palace sphere, since their business was recorded 
in the royal archives. It is therefore difficult to establish a separate strategy for power 
for this group separate from that of the palace or to find any parallel between the 
position of the merchants and that of any social or professional group in archaic 
poleis. Greek poleis tended to emphasise the relation between landownership and 
citizenship and leave trade in the hands of outsiders. However, the position of the 
merchants in Ugarit shows that Ugaritic society was not strictly hierarchic or 
controlled by the palace.  
 
The local communities of Ugarit offer more in terms of institutions parallel to those of 
archaic poleis (cf. 5.10.1-2). The corporate identity of the village community as a 
whole and the powerful council of “elders” indicate a structure of power similar to a 
polity of the polis-type, where the citizens equal the polity. “The elders” of Ugaritic 
local communities pursued a narrow corporate strategy of power, as representatives of 
their local community. They received instructions from palace officials and were thus 
integrated to a certain degree in the structure of the state. However, the local 




7.7 Differences and similarities East and West 
There were important differences between archaic Greek and ancient Near Eastern 
polities. The rarity of kingship in Greece is an important contrast to the ancient Near 
East. On the other hand, there are plentiful examples of local decision-making taking 
place beyond the direct control of the palaces of Near Eastern polities. Nevertheless, 
the citizen-assemblies had a position in Greek poleis that is not comparable to any of 
the corporate bodies mentioned in the Near Eastern documents discussed throughout 
this dissertation.  
 
It could be argued that the Babylonian cities in the Iron Age were ruled by a 
community of citizens (6.7). As has been seen, however, the identity of these citizens 
is disputed and it does not seem likely that a broad citizen collective was in charge of 
the polity. The frequent references to discussions between “the sons of GN” and royal 
officials indicate rather that a limited group of citizens represented the city than a 
broad collective institution. On the other hand, the Greek institutions for collective 
decision-making should not be taken as evidence for popular power without further 
qualifications. As was seen from the sources to archaic Greek poleis, it is conspicuous 
that the élite fought for power by gaining control of the councils. Theognis complains 
that all sorts have been admitted to the council and assembly in Megara (3.4.5). In 
Athens, Solon is credited to have admitted more commoners to the council and 
assembly, breaking the monopoly of the élite (3.4.2). In Mytilene, Pittakos attained 
power through the assembly, and this curtailed the power of his aristocratic former 
allies (3.4.4). Thus, it can be seen that the archaic poleis was not characterised by 
powerful citizen-assemblies, but by struggle between élite factions, aristocrats, and 
wealthy landowners over the control of collective decision-making bodies.  
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It is not the absence or presence of a single feature that determines whether 
“fundamentally different” is a tenable description of the relations between Eastern 
and Western political culture. As has been seen, there are several common features as 
well as several distinguishing characteristics. In spite of all the sources available to us 
for the study of Near Eastern societies, there are significant areas of social and 
political reality for which there is very little information. Marc Van De Mieroop 
argues that there has been little research on the city in Mesopotamia because scholars 
have been convinced that the king’s power was absolute, “leaving little room for 
urban government independent of the king”.1221 However, can it be claimed that there 
was independent government in Mesopotamian cities when all officials were ratified 
by the king? The evidence examined in the preceding chapters suggests that there 
were several points of contact between local decision-making bodies and the king’s 
officials. It seems that in e.g. Old Babylonian cities, either the officials presided over 
meetings or delegated cases to them (4.3.1). It could be argued that local decision-
making is left out of the cuneiform documents available to modern scholars, because 
it was outside the sphere of official interests. From the evidence discussed in the 
preceding chapters, I have no doubt that there were groups in ancient Near Eastern 
polities that were not part of the palace-organisation. However, it is difficult to say 
anything with certainty about their composition or competence. Also, it seems clear 
that the palace interfered with the local decision-making bodies. The king and his 
officials were involved in adjudication from time to time and did not leave this to an 
autonomous collective of citizens. This was not the case in Greek poleis, where 
central authorities appear to have been collective in their organisation. 
 
The Near Eastern evidence for a wholly independent citizen community that reached 
decisions in a popular assembly simply is not there. Van De Mieroop argues that “the 
proceedings were not written down because they were of no importance. It was only 
                                              
1221 Van De Mieroop, “The government of an ancient Mesopotamian city,” 1999, 140 
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the trial verdict that was considered significant enough to be recorded”.1222 This is a 
good point, but cannot count as evidence for a popular assembly with defined and 
recognised powers. The lack of documentation cannot be used as evidence that the 
people were in charge. As long as the composition, competence, or modus operandi 
of the assembly is not documented, it is not possible to decide whether the assembly 
was a kind of élite council or arena council. Further, the majority of sources from 
local communities indicate that there was involvement of officials at some point in 
collective decision-making processes, in the sense that the local decision-making 
bodies were integrated with the officials of the state. To hypothesise that there were 
several decisions taken that were not documented cannot be taken as a compelling 
argument for local popular power.  It can be demonstrated that political life in Near 
Eastern towns and cities existed, but not that a formally constituted popular assembly 
was in charge of any polity. Why did not the people seize power in ancient Near 
Eastern polities? 
 
An explanation for the lack of formal popular power in Near Eastern polities can be 
attempted from the traditional strong position of the king in Near Eastern societies 
that would discourage the development of institutionalised popular power. As has 
been seen, however, several Near Eastern polities, including Old Assyrian Assur and 
Old Babylonian Mari, do not fit the model of a despotic kingdom. Therefore, the 
explanation for the apparent lack of popular power in Near Eastern societies cannot 
lie with the institution of kingship alone. 
 
In can be argued that the palace dominated foreign politics through warfare and trade 
and that everyone from royal officials to local leaders were bound to the king through 
oaths and forms of ratification of candidates for local leadership. This made the king 
                                              
1222 Van De Mieroop, “The government of an ancient Mesopotamian city,” 1999, 150 
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the focus of political identity rather than the community of citizens. However, as has 
been seen, the king did not control local decision-making and the representatives of 
the people participated in assemblies for adjudication. Also, there are sources 
indicating that the citizens of certain cities were respected as a party in negotiations, 
as a group of citizens (cf. 6.6.2; 6.7).  
 
Perhaps the question whether there was popular power in Near Eastern polities is 
wrongly put? A definition of popular power as the dominance of a popular assembly 
in the polity at any rate makes the answer easy: no. However, as has been seen, the 
people were not passive subjects, either. As can be seen from a wide range of sources, 
the population of towns and cities were addressed as collectives capable of making 
their own decisions (cf. 4.3.3; 4.7.2; 5.4; 5.5.6; 5.10.2; 5.11.2; 5.11.4; 6.4.3; 6.4.4; 
6.6.2; 6.7). It does not seem that they made these decisions in popular assemblies, 
however. There are many aspects of decision-making that are not understood, but 
none of the evidence discussed in the preceding chapters can be taken to indicate that 
a plenary assembly was the highest authority in any Near Eastern polity. Attempts to 
define the people as a corporation that somehow reached decisions in ways 
unknowable by scholars lacks conviction: it cannot be assumed that where there are 
no sources to how decisions were made, all the citizens had a say. The notion of an 
anonymous collectivity in decision-making rather obscures than explains the political 
structure of local communities.  
 
The lack of formal popular power in ancient Near Eastern polities can be explained by 
the powerful position of the king and his officials in Near Eastern polities: as long as 
royally appointed officials formed the top of the political hierarchy, the local 
collective decision-making bodies could not become sovereign in the polity. The royal 
officials were involved with the local decision-making bodies and the local 
communities were not autonomous. Most important, they were not in a position to 
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elect the most important officials in the polity from amongst themselves, only 
intermediary leaders. The king was usually not elected, since his position was 
hereditary.1223 The most important decisions were taken by the palace. Although local 
leaders were selected by “the elders”, these leaders did not influence the central 
authorities on behalf of their local communities. Although local communities selected 
their own local leaders and had collective decision-making bodies that wielded power 
in the polity, the palace and the temples continued to be the dominant organisations in 
the states, whether network states or city-states. Placing Near Eastern polities on a 
sliding scale from despotism to democracy, it can be concluded that they were all 
further towards despotism than democracy. The people and their representatives were 
not insignificant, however. There were popular politics within political structures 
dominated by the temples and palaces, the king and the élite. 
 
7.8 Conclusions 
In view of the discussions undertaken and conclusions drawn throughout the present 
investigation, the picture that Eastern and Western political traditions are 
fundamentally different because all Greek polities were ruled by citizen-assemblies 
and all Near Eastern polities were ruled by kings cannot be maintained. As was seen 
from the evidence to politics in archaic Greek poleis, their politics were often 
dominated by the élite (cf. 3.4.1-5). The élites were divided into factions that were 
centred on powerful landowners and they fought each other for dominance in their 
home communities. The people are mentioned as supporters of tyrants and only in 
connection with tyrants do they appear as active in politics. A notable exception is 
Athens in 508/7 when the demos rose against Isagoras and the Spartans (cf. 3.4.3). 
                                              
1223 There is a text discussing a conspiracy against the Old Akkadian king Naram Sin, where a certain Iphur-Kishi is raised 
to kingship by the assembly of the city Kish (Jacobsen, “Iphur-Kīshi and his times,” 1978-9, 6). However, to my 
knowledge, this example of royal election is quite unique and none of the kings discussed throughout this dissertation are 
known to have been elected by an assembly. 
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The bulk of archaic poetry that handles political themes, however, refers to inner 
political strife between factions of the élite. This indicates that the people of archaic 
Greek poleis only became unified and politically active corporations that pursued a 
broad corporate strategy for power after their cities had suffered tyranny. Sparta is an 
example of a polis where no tyrant attained power. In this polis, the constitution did 
not allow any political initiative to the people and power was in the hands of the 
gerousia and the kings (cf. 3.4.1). However, if tyranny was such an important factor 
in promoting a broad corporate strategy among the people and making them convert 
their mode of action from subordination to agency, why did not the same take place in 
the Near Eastern polities ruled by kings? 
 
The kings of several Near Eastern polities, as has been seen, actually did allow a 
degree of local autonomy and recognized local communities as parties to negotiations 
(cf. 4.3.3; 4.7.2; 5.4; 5.5.6; 5.10.2; 5.11.2; 5.11.4; 6.4.3; 6.4.4; 6.6.2; 6.7). The local 
communities did reach decisions regarding their own rulers. They determined the 
direction of foreign politics and could make truces and alliances with foreign rulers. 
However, power seems to be concentrated in the hands of a few heads of households 
and not to have been shared by all citizens. Why did not the entire free male 
population demand a say in politics? As has been argued, there are good reasons for 
assuming that the local free male population did take part in decisions, or at least were 
present when decisions were reached (cf. 4.3.1-5; 4.7.1-4; 5.5.1-6; 5.6; 5.10.1-2; 
5.11.1-4; 6.5.2; 6.7). Thus, they could follow a narrow corporate strategy for power 
where “the elders” acted as their representatives and in this way rule themselves. In 
Greece, the broad élite strategy of the aristocrats often led to factional strife between 
groups within the élite. This is largely absent from Near Eastern polities and can be 
explained by the dominance of the king and the priests as the legitimising factors for 
all local positions of power. The result was that local positions of power were 
controlled by the institutions of palace and temples, more specifically, by the king. 
There were no local aristocratic factions to the same degree as in Greece and 
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apparently no aristocratic leaders that relied on the people to attain the upper hand in 
their fight against other aristocrats. This may have prevented the people of ancient 
Near Eastern polities from pursuing broad corporate strategies for power.  
 
The choices of strategies for power are informed by structure (cf. 2.5-6). The stability 
of the palace and temple structure in Near Eastern polities meant that charismatic 
leaders did not strive to attain power through the people to the same degree that they 
did in archaic Greek poleis. In Greek poleis, on the other hand, the chaos that ensued 
from the breaking down of broad élite strategies of a united aristocracy led to a 
polarised relationship between the demos and the tyrant, resulting in an empowered, 
self-conscious people.  
 
There were corporate strategies for power in Greek and Near Eastern polities, but the 
stability of the institutions of palace and temples meant that Near Eastern citizens 
were not politicised in the same way as they were in Greece. In archaic Greek poleis, 
the instability of élite rule led to the breakdown of élite strategies, whether broad or 
narrow, and made corporate strategies the most attractive choice for the citizens. 
Their agency changed the structure of Greek poleis into communities ruled by citizen-
assemblies. This did not happen in the Near East. Although the citizens occasionally 
revolted against their king, they replaced him by a new king (cf. 6.4.2). Also, although 
e.g. the Babylonians, “the sons of Babylon”, made treaties with foreign rulers, 
Babylon was not ruled by a citizen-assembly (cf. 6.7). Thus, the difference in popular 
power in the Near East and Greece is that in the Near East, people could influence 
their own situation through a narrow corporate strategy where local heads of 
households acted as their representatives in councils such as “the city” or “the elders”, 
whereas in Greece, the masses with citizen status pursued broad corporate strategies 
and sometimes succeeded in establishing direct popular rule in citizen assemblies. 
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